t0ucn

[t0ucn]

Ok, so this is going to be a long read (7 google doc pages, to be exact). This is an essay I wrote for an Ethical Theory course I took in college, and it's one I'm very proud of. It's a critique of two chapters of Peter Singer's book, Practical Ethics, and revolves around the application of preference utilitarianism to animals in order to make the case for animal welfare. For a little additional context, this essay was actually meant to be a final project of sorts for the class, and was one of those essays where the professor or teacher tells the student to choose the topic they write about. I decided to write about this after an... incident that happened in class one day. To make a long story short, a complaint about how Singer proves his argument that I made in class was compared to the words of a racist. Not that the professor meant any bad by the comment, it's kind of a consequence of how Singer proves his views, something I realised as I was discussing this with my professor after class.

A few things before we begin: 1) I have provided a google drive link below, which contains all of the original footnotes I wrote with the essay, with the corresponding footnote number in the essay itself being denoted in parentheses (for example, the first footnote would be denoted as (^1) in the text):

(https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1kIRbjfEGhOTveA8AB90-PX6RG93jmROz5nn5qE6T7Pw/edit?usp=sharing)

2) for those who care, this is a slightly edited version to clean up the flow a little bit and get rid of any questionable wording

3) I highly recommend that you find a copy of Practical Ethics in order to find the quotes I have cited and so you can see the greater context for yourself. I give it in the paper, but there's always a chance that I misunderstand what Singer was going for

4) Take my words (especially a little later) with a grain of salt. I was a little tilted when I wrote it :)

Without further ado, please enjoy this funny little paper.

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Within Practical Ethics by Peter Singer are his views of animal welfare and how it relates to preference utilitarianism. This paper will focus on the arguments presented in chapters 2 and 3, wherein he first argues for the principle of equal consideration of interests over the principle of equality and then argues that the ideas of the principle of equal consideration of interests must be extended to animals if practitioners are to be consistent. While Singer’s conclusion of animal welfare are agreeable, the methods and arguments he uses to get there are not only weak, but actively problematic in what Singer unintentionally advocates.

Chapter 2 of Practical Ethics serves as the groundwork for which Signer advocates for animal welfare by justifying why the principle of equal consideration of interests (and, by extension, preference utilitarianism) should be adhered to over the principle of equality. This justification begins with an investigation into what one means when they say that all people are equal. Singer rightly points out this cannot be literal, otherwise we would not observe some being smarter than others, or some being more skilled in certain fields. This leads into considering equality based on some factual characteristic all humans possess. This starts with John Rawls’ equality based on a “moral personality”, which is a quality all humans have that allows them to make and head moral appeals. This, Singer claims, is derived from the fact that Rawls is a Social Contract Theorist; as being based on mutually beneficial agreement, this would imply that the importance of the moral personality is that “... only those capable of appreciating that they are not being hit, and of restraining their own hitting accordingly, are within the sphere of ethics,” (Singer, 18)(^1). 

Singer counters this in a couple of ways. The first is to say that moral personality does not hold for everyone on the same level of sensitivity, and some feel it more strongly than others. Despite, even in his summary of Rawls, the idea that it is a way of separating humans and animals by identifying what humans have and what animals don’t have, Singer claims that there isn’t an intuitive reason as to why we shouldn’t then make grades of moral status. The easy moral intuitionist counter, however, is that there clearly is; issues with intuitionism aside, to claim that we should treat others as lessers for any reason is (modernly) detestable. A different counter is to say that Singer misses the point, and that it is very obvious that humans are the only animal to engage in rational moral reasoning. It is this moral reasoning that defines moral personality, and having it to any degree is what makes humans morally relevant. This point may seem circular, and it is; it isn’t enough to say what Rawls posits is incorrect just because it isn’t intuitive without countering any arguments as to why Rawls thinks this. 

The second way Singer counters this is to say that not all humans possess the quality of moral personality. He points to infants and young children as lacking this quality(^2). Should we adopt the moral personality, it would lead to disregarding “... the interests of the very young… in ways that would be wrong if they were older or more intelligent,” (Singer, 19). Unfortunately for Singer, Rawls is a Social Contract Theorist, and this argument especially doesn’t work for his ideas regarding the social contract. As a recap, the point of Rawls’ theory is to help envision and justify a more egalitarian society. By utilising the veil of ignorance, the agent is encouraged to ignore their present circumstances and ask themselves if they would want to be born into the society in question should they not know who they would be born as. As they would have to start as infants and small children(^3), it would be in their best interests to have those group’s interests protected. As a result, Singer’s counter only works if you remove the idea of a “moral personality” from the context of Rawls’ social contract, and why the idea of a “potential moral person” is justifiable. While this doesn’t directly weaken Singer’s arguments, it will show a trend of misrepresentation and logical fallacy that pervades Singer’s work.

After reviewing John Rawls, Singer explores the idea of there being a factual basis for the principle of equality that excludes racism and sexism. Exploring this takes the rest of the second chapter, and is initiated by reviewing the following:

We can admit that humans differ as individuals, and yet insist that there are no morally significant differences between the races and the sexes. Knowing that someone is of African or European descent, female or male, does not enable us to draw conclusions about his or her intelligence, sense of justice, depth of feelings, or anything else that would entitle us to treat him or her as less than equal. (Singer, 19-20)

Singer counters this claim with a hypothetical opponent of equality, one who supposes that a caste system should be created based on an intelligence test. In essence, those below a certain score become slaves to those with a higher one. Singer claims that there would not be any grounds for opposing this should we base our equality on the claim that there are factual differences between individuals (Singer, 20). What Singer discusses up to this point is defining equality, which is set up as a way to determine the scope of moral concern. Despite not being explicitly stated, Singer discusses equality in a way that would imply those who are not equal are not considered in moral calculus(^4). I choose to remind the reader of this because to take Singer’s position is to completely ignore every ethical theory ever developed. Since the argument around considering who is morally relevant is purely based on the possession of a certain factual quality, regardless of the extent to which you possess it, the concern around caste-like systems seems like a red herring; the refutation of the hypothetical intelligence caste system lies in the moral theories that have been developed over the history of philosophy and thus lie outside the way we determine moral relevance.

To go even further, consider the underlying structure of the view Singer is attempting to encompass and counter; one I will refer to as the fascist argument. The structure is thus:

  1) Group A has property X

2) Group B lacks property X

3) All beings with property X are superior to those without X

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4) Group A is superior to Group B(^5)

Fascist, here, is used as a way to generalise every form of group hatred: racism, sexism, anit-semetism, etc. I do this not only for convenience, but because fascism, historically speaking, has been based in all of these. Authoritarianism and fascists have routinely united their populations around a single enemy based on every -ism there is in order to stay in power. Thus, I feel fascist is an appropriate way to describe this argument that Singer refers back to repeatedly. The point of exploring the intelligence hierarchy is to contest the factual basis for equality. What Singer does is apply the fascist argument to the factual basis for equality to create the hypothetical; Singer claims this would be an issue for the factual basis because there would be no logically compelling reason to contest the fascist argument and, by extension, the hierarchy. This ignores the root of the problem with the fascist argument, which is its soundness(^6). To articulate this, lets revisit the shovel and the pickaxe.

Both of these tools are used for digging, for that is their ultimate purpose according to those who make them and their design. Well, the shovel can dig dirt and the pickaxe can’t(^7). Because the shovel is better at digging dirt, it must be the superior tool. Notice how the premises of this argument are true. However, to say that the shovel is the superior tool is to ignore the fact that the two tools are used for digging different things. Thus, one cannot be said to be supremely superior because the shovel is better in a single respect; the argument is not sound. Rather, you must conclude that the shovel is superior at digging dirt. The same can be applied to the fascist argument, and can explain why a factual approach to equality is not the same as claiming superiority over other groups. It also neatly defeats Singer’s hypothetical in which the fascist argument is valid, since it being valid does not allow one to claim absolute superiority and create castes based on who has more intelligence. 

To go further with the analogy, it’s based on the fact that their ability to dig is what classifies them as digging tools. It doesn’t matter if it’s a trowel, shovel, pickaxe, etc. You could classify them by some arbitrary metric like what they can dig or how much they can dig, but it would be as useless as categorising people by skin colour because the tool would be used for digging regardless. Now, let's replace the digging tools with all living things. Using intelligence as the replacement for digging, we can see that this characteristic can be extended to animals as well. It is no secret that animals like dolphins or corvids are highly intelligent, and would thus be morally relevant anyway. And even further, I would consider intelligence as being necessary to determine dangers or food in the environment, causing most, if not all, of the animal kingdom to be classified as “intelligent”. Connecting this to the hierarchy hypothetical, to claim one being with intelligence is superior to another because of how much intelligence they have would be like superiorising the digging tools based on how much they can dig. The superiorisation would be arbitrary because where we draw the line between stages in superiority would be unsupportable, logically speaking. All that matters for moral relevancy is that the being in question possesses intelligence. The rest of chapter 2 is based on how the conventional view of equality is insufficient based on the hypothetical scenario of there being a factual difference between races and sexes(^8). I include this here for transparency, as the counter to this is identical to the counter given above for the intelligence hierarchy.

Chapter 3 is based around the idea that the principle of equal consideration of interests extends to non-human animals. This is predicated on the idea that should a being be capable of suffering and pleasure, they have interests. According to Singer (referencing Jeremy Bentham), “The capacity for suffering… is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language… it is a prerequisite for having interests at all,” (Singer, 57). This is then used to argue against animals as food, animal use for experimentation, and animal use for entertainment (zoos, circuses, etc.). To be specific, the argument encompasses all of these things and is simply this:

1) Suffering begets an interest to reduce suffering

2) All like interests are to be considered equally

3) Animals experience suffering

4) Thus, animals have an interest to reduce suffering

5) Since all like interests are to be considered equally, the animals’ interest to reduce suffering is considered at the same level as humans’ interest to reduce suffering

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6) We have a moral obligation to reduce the suffering of animals

Premise 4 follows from 1 and 3, and premise 5 follows from 2 and 4. The conclusion is sound and I have no issues with conceding to Singer most of the points he brings up in this chapter. However, Singer concedes something on page 58, where he brings up a hypothetical opponent who says the following:

Surely pain felt by a mouse just is not as bad as pain felt by a human. Humans have much greater awareness of what is happening to them, and this makes their suffering worse. You can’t equate the suffering of, say, a person slowly dying from cancer, and a laboratory mouse undergoing the same fate. (Singer, 58)

In discussing this, Singer uses the principle of equal consideration of interests to conclude that, regardless of species, the aim is to relieve the greater suffering. In this case, he fully supports the human receiving treatment because the human experiences the greater suffering. What this means, though, is that the principle of equal consideration of interests gives a preference to those who can experience more suffering, even amongst humans. This, if you’ll remember from chapter 2, is an exact reason why Singer was against the idea of basing equality on some factual basis; his argument was that if we use a factual basis, there would be no grounds for opposing a caste society based on how much of that quality an individual possesses (Singer, 20). Despite this, Singer contends that there are certain situations in which an animal can suffer more, but in order to avoid the problem with the factual basis he has to mold situations in which a different thing happens to a human and an animal to make their pain equivalent; he uses slapping a human baby and hitting a horse with a stick as an equivalent amount of pain (Singer, 59). But this is to ignore the fact that, given the same situation, the principle of equal consideration of interests will prefer humans in most situations. I’m not trying to say that this is some silver bullet, but I do find it a weird oversight considering how against the factual basis for equality he was; applying preference utilitarianism would lead to many of the same conclusions as applying the factual basis for equality, even among animals.

Going back to how Singer chooses to address the factoring of self-consciousness, he brings up a different interpretation of the argument wherein self-consciousness is made inherently more valuable. The counter for this is fairly obvious, as there really isn’t a reason why the self-conscious being is more valuable than the merely sentient being(^9), and championing self-consciousness is no better than any other arbitrary factual characteristic. But this is where I can no longer ignore Singer’s ableist tendencies when arguing for his views. Because in this defense, he claims that there “... are intellectually disabled humans who have less claim to be regarded as self-conscious or autonomous than many non-human animals,” (Singer, 74). While one could claim that Singer does not actually believe this, the followup to this quote is not that this view is incorrect, but that “... most of us find horrifying the idea of using intellectually disabled humans in painful experiments, or fattening them for gourmet dinners,” (Singer, 75). He uses the intellectually disabled in this way at several points in his paper. The pages where this occur that stood out when constructing this paper were pages 19, 60, 67, 74, 75, 76, 78, and 80(^10). If he meant to say “brain dead humans”, referring to those who have lost brain function and become bed-ridden, then he should have said so; claiming all intellectually disabled people lack self-consciousness and autonomy is not only tasteless and offensive, but factually inaccurate. In claiming this, he (either unintentionally or otherwise) implies that the intellectually disabled are not considered as much as everyone else. This follows from his concession regarding the amount of suffering a person is capable of over mice mattering in who gets precedence over treatment because we have already linked self-consciousness to experiencing greater forms of suffering and, by extension, pleasure. And if he does think this(^11), then it is no better than the fascist arguments to argue that one group is inferior and are not as morally relevant as the other. 

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Ok, so when I had written this, I was pretty mad; despite standing by what I said, I do not think the anger was justified. When I consider what Singer meant by intellectually disabled people here, I leave out that he originally references the severely intellectually disabled, giving credence to the idea that he was actually talking about those who have lost brain function. In future references to them, he likely drops the "severely" portion for... I dunno, convenience or something? That said, I do still take issue with this omission for the simple reason that he omits "severely" way more than he includes it. In doing so, he still brings about the implications that I outlined in the last paragraph, if to a marginally lesser extent. So while my argument still holds, I still want to clarify this to prevent any outrage that I do not think is justified.

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The last point to cover is one that shows up fairly early in his argument and has been inherent in how Singer chose to argue for his position: speciesists are fascist. Now, Singer never makes this connection explicitly; rather he makes the observation that the logical structure for the speciesist argument is identical to that of a fascist argument. The ordinary person, rightfully, detests such arguments; to insinuate that their way of thinking is in any way connected with those who committed genocide and human rights violations is deeply upsetting. In claiming that the speciesist argument is identical to that of the fascists’, it tells the reader that people who disagree with Singer have no issues supporting the logic that underpin fascism. Not only that, but Singer explicitly calls people who are more concerned with civil rights over animal welfare as having “... a prejudice no better founded than the prejudice of white slaveowners against taking the interests of their African slaves seriously,” (Singer, 55-56). Granted, he says it reflects such attitudes, but what readers will focus on is the shock of the quoted passage and how it relates to what Singer attempts to prove. He continually brings up racists when proving his arguments over and over again, and as such encourages the reader to think that when someone focuses on human rights over those of animals, they are no better than racists and, more generally, fascists. It encourages the thinking that the suffering of marginalised groups is on par with animals in factory farms, despite his concessions that would suggest otherwise. 

This approach is antithetical to the practice of philosophy, at least to a moderate extent. Emotional response is an important tool, I will admit; but when it becomes one of the main driving factors behind the convincibility of your argument, something has gone wrong. Emotional response ought to be used in conjunction with rational argument. We can’t expect people to agree with our points if all we do is imply that the opposition are fascists. And let me be very clear: the emergence of the fascist comparison is not about calling the reader a fascist. Rather, it is to tell the people Singer has convinced that the opposition rely on fascist arguments. This happens as early as chapter 2, where, to reiterate, he sees an intelligence hierarchy as a logical conclusion to the factual basis of equality when combined with the assumedly sound fascist argument(^12). This idea is reinforced by how often Singer relates fascist ideals and actions(^13) in proving his arguments, without ever really giving any logical reasoning. The reason for this, I think, is because he is operating under preference utilitarianism. Earlier, I mentioned that preference utilitarianism is a good way to logically justify extending moral consideration to animals. Despite this, Singer requires an entire chapter to… expand on it? It hardly requires it considering how strong of an argument it is. However, it is only strong if you subscribe to the arguments posited in chapter 2, which I have gone to great lengths to explain why those arguments are not that great. Without the foundations there, the rest of it falls flat, especially if you hold my view that Singer has misrepresented that which he is trying to disprove, unintentionally or otherwise. To say any further than this would simply be to speculate, for which nothing I can think of I can confidently support. Now, I believe that what Singer ultimately advocates leads to a lot of the same conclusions that I already hold, but preference utilitarianism is not required to come to this conclusion. I want to be very explicit that I have no issues with preference utilitarianism or animal welfare. In fact, the conclusions that Singer reaches already match what I believe. But the way in which Singer argues for these ideologies is downright offensive, unhelpful, and encouraging of an environment in which people who disagree with Singer’s position are dismissed as fascist and undeserving of discussion. This is evident even here, where I have to clarify that I do not think fascist ideas should be seriously considered. Not only this, but because Singer relies so heavily on this comparison to fascist ideas that was established in chapter 2, it may serve to alienate those he wants to convince, thus making his arguments weaker.

[t0ucn]

I think my favourite thing about this platform is my relationship to it. It's so unlike most other platforms for a multitude of reasons, and it leads to content that's so much more involved than anywhere else allows, save for buying a domain and starting your own blog there. I end up seeing so many creative people who present their thoughts and ideas in a way that makes me go, "I wanna do that, too!"

But then I try and it just sorta... fizzles out.

It isn't even that I believe that I can't write something that would be good. It's more a fear of putting myself out there. Which is weird, right? No one here knows who I am, and finding out who I am seems to me like a harder endeavor than other people online. This anonymity, as has been a common point of discussion, should allow me to just create and write whatever I want with no repercussion or consequential judgement. And yet, I can't help but hold my tongue; I worry about writing something that no one will enjoy. I realize how similar that fear looks to the one at the beginning of this paragraph, but I want to make them distinct for the sole reason that I can recognise good art that I can appreciate but won't enjoy.

Not to say that everything I write is good, moreso that my writing is a part of me, something that I've built up through school essays, embarrassingly enough. I grew to love the style of writing that is common in essays you'd hand in to your English teacher or, in my case, my Philosophy professors; that style presented in a more lax way is even better and what I've always wanted to post on here. And there's something scary to me about someone not enjoying that, because I'm really proud of my "voice".

Paradoxically, I like this feeling. Not the creatively stifling aspect of it, rather this idea that the way Tumblr is structured and who I see on here give it this air of quality that I cannot find on any other social media platform. Further, this air of quality manifests in a completely unique manner to me; Youtube would give a similar feeling, but text is a much more accessible format that I am more familiar with which makes me want to contribute.

So consider this post as a few things. For one, as a thank you to those who make this platform what it is. Second, as an assertion to write more. Both to this blog and in general. Thirdly, as a scream into the void. I am well aware this won't reach that many people, and it isn't meant to be. If nothing else, this is for myself. Finally, tag practice.

[t0ucn]

Are spellbooks just a wizards' college notes?