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mariacallous · 2 years

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Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in trying to upgrade its major state media outlets such as China Global Television Network (CGTN), Xinhua News Agency, and China Radio International (CRI), and to make them seem more professional. It has tried to normalize them to audiences as little different from the BBC, CNN, or Al Jazeera—most likely Beijing’s preferred model—a station based in an authoritarian state but producing respected work.

For years in the 2010s, China hired respected foreign reporters to staff bureaus of outlets such as CGTN in the United States, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and other places, and initially gave them a bit of room to cover interesting stories—as long as those did not directly affect China. The global journalism market is terrible: Between 2001 and 2016, newspaper publishing in the United States lost more than half the jobs in the industry, a higher rate of loss than in coal mining, not exactly an industry of the future. China’s outlets found many willing and credentialed reporters to join. Today, the Chinese government’s funding for state media dwarfs that of any other country’s state media funding, including that of the United States. In 2018, CGTN reportedly spent around $500 million to promote the network in Australia alone; it has also engaged in extensive promotion in Europe and North America.

In an effort to expand its influence within the domestic politics and societies of other countries, China in the past decade dramatically expanded other tools of influence as well, which I chronicle in my new book, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World. These have included the use of disinformation online, payments to politicians to spout pro-China ideas, control of Chinese student associations in many countries, the funding of programs at universities, and other tactics.

But state media has been central to China’s efforts to influence other countries, control information about and protect the party, and gain what Chinese leaders and officials have called “discourse power” to amplify China’s narratives about its policies, its party, its leader, and its role in the world. Beijing’s cause is helped by a global environment in which resources for quality media are decreasing, democratic and authoritarian leaders alike are demonizing media, and publics’ trust in journalism is falling. Such a set of circumstances would seemingly make it easier for Chinese outlets to win readers, listeners, and viewers.

Yet China’s state media (excluding local-language Chinese media within specific countries), other than Xinhua, has hardly been a triumph for President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), even with money gushing in.

Indeed, Xi’s bold goal to wield state media power globally, a priority noted in CCP documents, has not worked to great effect—and that goal is fading even faster as the world sees the failure of Xi’s China model, which was heavily advertised in state media abroad. China’s global influence efforts, fueled in part by state media, have not prevented publics in many countries from souring on Beijing’s increasingly assertive diplomacy; being angry at the initial cover-up of COVID-19; fuming at how China increasingly uses economic coercion against other states, even tiny ones like Lithuania; or seeing the flaws in China’s own politics. In public opinion studies released in 2020, 2021, and 2022, such as those conducted by Pew, opinions of China in states from Sweden to South Korea to Australia turned sharply negative. Negative views of China reached historic highs in many states.

What evidence shows how China has failed to use state media effectively? China’s biggest state media outlets, other than Xinhua, have not sold many programs abroad or gained noticeable audience shares in most countries. China’s training programs for journalists, while rapidly expanding (at least before zero-COVID), have not created a shift in how foreign reporters cover China.

Take one example, the appeal of Chinese TV show exports globally. South Korea, a far smaller country, regularly outpaces the value of Chinese TV show exports. South Korea also has exported increasingly successful films and scripted shows—as well, of course, as one of the most popular bands in the world.

Similarly, while China ranked second in the Lowy Institute’s annual Asia Power Index, Beijing’s lofty numbers come mostly from its high rankings in economic relationships, diplomatic influence, and future power. The Asia Power Index’s measures of China’s influence over the region’s information landscape, including the influence from state media, show far less impressive results. The Lowy study uses influence maps based on internet search trends to assess Asians’ interest in regional media outlets. These maps have shown that CGTN is only the 10th-most popular broadcaster in the Asia-Pacific, and its reach is a fraction of outlets such as CNN. The maps show that CGTN’s “reach is inconsequential,” as noted by the coordinator of the influence maps. Other Chinese outlets save Xinhua also fare badly on these influence maps.

Using the Freedom of Information Act, I obtained more than 20 studies, produced by Gallup as a contractor for the U.S. government, of viewing habits in countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South and Central Asia, among other regions. They generally show that even though Chinese state media are widely available in many countries, they usually attract minuscule viewership or listening numbers. In Laos, for instance, a country on China’s border with a growing population of Chinese speakers, one Gallup study of viewership in Laos found only 1.2 percent of the country’s population regularly watched Chinese broadcasting, a much lower figure than those who watched Voice of America or Radio Free Asia or Thai channels.

Chinese media outlets’ audience shares and perceived credibility lag behind local news sources, the BBC, and other Western broadcasters even in regions like Africa, where public opinion toward China is not as negative. In Ivory Coast, for instance, CRI has expanded its programming, but the Gallup study I obtained shows that CRI was listened to by less than 1 percent of Ivorians weekly, among the worst figures of any radio station’s reach in the country. (The BBC was listened to by 13.7 percent of Ivorians.) In Nigeria, a bigger target for Chinese state media, both CGTN and CRI performed abysmally in a similar Gallup study. In Nigeria, CGTN had 3.7 percent viewership, a quarter the audience of the BBC.

Even in Kenya, the hub of CGTN operations in East Africa, Chinese outlets have fared poorly. Studies suggest most Kenyans who consume news do not even utilize Chinese state media.

These figures are consistent with the still-low audience shares of CGTN, CRI, and state media outlets, save Xinhua, in many other regions of the world. In Asia, Chinese broadcast and radio state media outlets have not reached a large audience. A Gallup study of the weekly reach of television stations in Vietnam found that CGTN was only watched by 0.7 percent of Vietnamese adults, far less than the BBC, CNN, France’s TV5 Monde Asie, and South Korea’s Arirang TV. Two-thirds of Vietnamese who watched the BBC said they trusted that outlet a great deal, but only about 7 percent who watched CGTN said the same.

In Western democracies, too, in Europe and North America, CGTN has largely fizzled. In the United Kingdom, which has a sizable audience of people who are fluent in Chinese, a study found that CGTN was being watched by a minimal number of Britons—even before the British government kicked CGTN off the air in 2021 because it did not have autonomy from the Chinese state. Similarly, though CGTN launched a European subsidiary in 2019 via its London hub, it has made few inroads into the continental European market. And throughout Latin America, including in several large democracies, CGTN’s Spanish-language channel has significantly expanded the number of households in which it is available over the past decade but has not proved popular. A comprehensive study of CGTN-Español, CGTN’s Spanish-language channel, by Peilei Ye and Luis A. Albornoz, suggests that the Chinese government usually releases information only about the size of the audience CGTN potentially reaches—the number of households it is available in—and not the actual audience, most likely because the actual audience size is embarrassingly low.

Why has China’s state media—other than Xinhua, which I’ll come to later—failed so badly? It simply produces, in the Xi era, content that is too boring, staid, and timid. In an era more restricted than the 1990s, one in which China has today become much more authoritarian, state media reporters now instinctively tailor their stories to ensure they do not anger anyone at headquarters back in Beijing, which makes for weak and bland reporting.

CGTN reporters note that while they had more freedoms six or seven years ago, now the biggest focus in their minds is whether the stories will prove acceptable to the top leadership in Beijing rather than news consumers in foreign countries. This is “domestic signaling,” as the Guardian called it in an exposé of China’s soft- and sharp-power efforts—“telegraphing messages [via reporting in state media] that demonstrated loyalty to the party line in order to curry favor with senior officials.”

This does not make for exciting journalism. Further, a considerable part of the state media’s efforts to reach foreign audiences was designed to advertise China as a developmental success story—Xi was the first recent Chinese leader to openly embrace a Chinese model of development. But the past three years of China’s disastrous zero-COVID strategy, protests, supply chain disruptions, and serious economic slowdowns—all visible to the world, and even more so now that protests are raging in China—have undermined that main prong of the state media’s foreign messaging.

Chinese state outlets are going to find it harder to gain audiences as many leading democracies put roadblocks in their way. These have included the United Kingdom pulling CGTN’s license and the United States forcing state media to register as agents of foreign influence, which drives away U.S. national and Chinese national reporters who do not want to be tagged as influence agents. Some democracies have created commissions or legislation designed to closely examine foreign investment and influence inside their borders, such as Australia and Singapore. European states, too, are assessing ways to better monitor foreign investment and influence in media and information sectors.

Xinhua, alone among China’s biggest state media outlets, has expanded significantly while also boosting its global audience and gaining some credibility. Beijing has placed a high premium on modernizing Xinhua and getting foreign news outlets to use Xinhua stories by signing content-sharing deals, in the process legitimizing Xinhua to some editors and readers. Xinhua has inked many such deals, including for stories in many languages other than Chinese, and because it covers so many topics unrelated to China, its reporters sometimes have more room from Beijing to operate. It is likely that, in the next decade, with the pandemic forcing more outlets to cut staff, and with media outlets around the globe continuing to suffer financially, the appeal of signing deals with Xinhua, a cheap or free newswire, will only increase. Indeed, Xinhua could become China’s most powerful information weapon.

As of this writing, Xinhua has not yet forged enough connections to consistently write the first draft of global news stories, as wires do. Since some major outlets such as the BBC and the New York Times do not regularly use Xinhua stories, distrusting them, Xinhua still does not circulate as widely among elite publications as stories from Reuters or The Associated Press or Bloomberg. But that may be changing rapidly. In recent years, Xinhua has inked cooperation agreements with major global and regional newswires, including Agence France-Presse; news services in Australia; Germany’s Deutsche Presse-Agentur; Poland’s Polish News Agency; Class Editori in Italy; Le Soir in Belgium; Athens News Agency in Greece; RAI, Italy’s public broadcaster; and ANSA, Italy’s leading wire service.

And on many occasions, in places where it has a massive manpower advantage, like Southeast Asia and, of course, China itself, Xinhua is beating competitors to stories or is covering stories competitors do not have the resources to cover. As Xinhua grows (and offers its service free to many outlets in developing countries), and as other newswires struggle financially, the Chinese newswire will get to more stories first—and earn editors’ and publishers’ trust. It is rapidly opening bureaus. By early 2021, Xinhua had a reported 181 bureaus globally. This would give Xinhua a reach close to that of The Associated Press, which has around 250 bureaus worldwide, or the BBC, which is a giant in Africa, Asia, and other regions. Meanwhile, the Chinese newswire has a massive advantage over most of its competitors in that it does not have to make a profit.

Xinhua also is attempting to boost its credibility in other ways in Southeast Asia and other areas physically close to China or where populations have relatively positive images of China. In Southeast Asia and Africa, where Xinhua has poured resources into expansion, the Chinese state newswire can cover stories that may not get mentioned by other media organizations such as Reuters, The Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, or large international newspapers with foreign staffs. One former U.S. official analyzing China’s expanding state media called this a “hyperlocal approach,” a strategy focused on offering detailed stories in regions that some global outlets ignore.

Eventually, if governments and news organizations do not put roadblocks in its place, Xinhua copy, via content-sharing deals, will appear in more and more news outlets, shaping public and elite opinion in a growing number of countries, as it already does in places such as Thailand. A range of evidence shows Xinhua’s growth in size and influence. There, Xinhua has signed content-sharing deals with many top Thai publications, including those of the Matichon Group, the most-respected Thai-language news organization. These deals have allowed China to shape news narratives in Thailand, where many more Thai outlets now run Xinhua copy. Overall, not only is China portrayed more positively in the Thai media than in the past, according to many Thai journalists, but serious critiques of China are vanishing from many Thai outlets.

A range of evidence shows Xinhua’s growth in size and influence. The Lowy Institute’s maps of digital influence in Asia show Xinhua is making inroads across the region. Indeed, the maps show that Xinhua has become the second-most-influential news agency regionally, behind only The Associated Press, and that Xinhua is making significant gains in influence in the media environment of several Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian states. And unlike with, say, a television station that a viewer has to actively turn on, and probably knows the channel, most print or online readers do not check the bylines of news articles—making it easier for Xinhua copy to slip through to readers.

Notably, media outlets have been signing deals to carry Xinhua even in countries where the U.S. government—and private nonprofits hailing from democratic states—have invested heavily in promoting the creation of a vibrant local media. In Afghanistan, for instance, where donors including the United States have plowed money into the local media, an International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) report shows that Xinhua has inked contracts with 25 to 30 Afghan media outlets. These deals include ones with the biggest television stations and websites in the country.

The IFJ report notes that China’s content-sharing deals have helped reshape journalists’ messaging about Beijing in multiple countries, including those known for robust local journalism. Its survey of Philippine journalists found that China’s increasingly close links with the Philippines’ state television, the Philippine News Agency, and the Philippine Information Agency, built through content-sharing and training programs, are having an effect on Philippine news outlets’ coverage of China.

Indeed, China’s closer links to Philippine media, and the spreading use of Xinhua in the Philippines, are depriving Philippine news consumers of independent reporting on Beijing. These shifts are depriving Filipinos of independent coverage even as Beijing squeezes the Philippines in the South China Sea, and even though the population as a whole in the Philippines has not become markedly more pro-China. “The way they write their stories now, they reflect the way how Xinhua or how the state media in China is writing their stories,” one Philippine journalist told IFJ. “It’s normally propaganda.” Another told IFJ, “Instead of getting insights on journalism from free countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Western Europe and even Japan, they [journalists in the Philippines] are learning state control.”

Xinhua is gaining readership in many states through such content-sharing deals, or simply because more news outlets are choosing to use Xinhua stories. And as Xinhua buys access—and gets into more websites, newspapers, and magazines—its stories will become as ubiquitous as those of The Associated Press. Then Xinhua, still a state company, still a propaganda organ that provides intelligence briefings to top Chinese leaders, will be able to shape even more of the world’s news coverage. It is indeed the only true weapon, among China’s state media, that has come of Xi’s grand desire for more control over global “discourse power.”

If Xinhua, inking more and more content-sharing deals, is able to write the first draft about stories outside of China, which is what wires provide, and set the tone and parameters for international coverage by other outlets, as wires do, it could have a huge effect on how the global public understands the news. As The Associated Press and Reuters have done for years, Xinhua would be able to initially define many news stories for the world—a dangerous proposition for free and independent media and for honest coverage of China.

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newsource21 · 23 days

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On the menu today: Tear your eyes away from campaign coverage for a few moments and contemplate a pair of bombshells regarding the Chinese government’s far-reaching efforts to influence U.S. policy and suppress critics of the regime — violently, on U.S. soil. First, the Washington Post unveils a shocking report, showcasing how agents of the regime in Beijing attempted to curb-stomp pro-democracy activists during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco last November. Then, federal prosecutors announced charges against Linda Sun, the former deputy chief of staff to Kathy Hochul, for being an agent of the Chinese government in exchange for “millions of dollars in bribes.”

You know whom I want to win the 2024 elections? American elected officials who work for Americans, not Xi Jinping. Apparently, they’re rarer than you would expect.

Who Runs the Streets of San Francisco? Apparently, the Chinese Government Does

It will not surprise you that I feel more warm and fuzzy toward the Washington Post than the typical conservative.

When the mainstream media does good and important journalism, I think conservatives ought to applaud and encourage more of it, and yesterday, the Post unveiled a doozy, showcasing the scale and range of violence during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November — violence that appears to have been directed and facilitated by agents of the Chinese government, targeting democracy activists and critics of the regime. Among the highlights:

While there was aggression from both sides, the most extreme violence was instigated by pro-CCP activists and carried out by coordinated groups of young men embedded among them, verified videos show. Anti-Xi protesters were attacked with extended flagpoles and chemical spray, punched, kicked and had fistfuls of sand thrown in their faces.

The Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles paid for supporters’ hotels and meals as an incentive to participate, according to messages shared in WeChat groups reviewed by The Post. At least 35 pro-CCP Chinese diaspora groups showed up to the APEC summit protests — including groups from New York, Pennsylvania and Washington state.

Videos show at least four Chinese diplomats from the consulates in Los Angeles and San Francisco among the crowd of pro-CCP protesters, sometimes directly interacting with aggressive actors over four days of protests from Nov. 14-17. Some Chinese diaspora group leaders with ties to the Chinese state participated in some of the violence, the videos show.

Chinese diplomats hired at least 60 private security guards to “protect” Chinese diaspora groups gathered to welcome Xi, according to seven people involved in the arrangement.

The FBI is investigating the violence at the APEC summit, according to two officials familiar with the matter.

This isn’t over in Beijing or Hong Kong or Wuhan. This is on the streets of San Francisco — U.S. soil. This is America, where you have every right to say, “F*** Xi Jinping” without some Beijing-financed thugs leaving you bloody and unconscious in the street. That happened!

This isn’t really a foreign-policy issue anymore. This is a question of sovereignty, and whether the Chinese government gets veto power over certain American citizens’ rights to free speech and free assembly.

This is the sort of thing that ought to outrage every American, and none more so than the self-described “America First” nationalists. (My guess is that today you’ll hear them spending more time complaining about Brian Stelter returning to CNN.) I notice that, as of this writing, very few other publications or news organizations have picked up the report from the Post. I’ve heard the argument that modern nationalist populism is obsessed with “enemies within,” but can never get around to rousing itself over enemies outside our borders. How many people who perceive every temporary suspension of a social-media account as an assault on the First Amendment will even notice the Chinese regime’s assault — its literal, physical assault! — on the First Amendment rights of our fellow citizens?

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government is saying that its people were the victims, and those big, mean, pro-democracy activists were the real bullies assaulting people:

In response to extensive questions from The Post, Liu Pengyu, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, and spokespeople from the Chinese consulates in New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles sent identical emailed statements, stating that members of Chinese communities traveled to San Francisco voluntarily to welcome Xi and were instead the ones subject to “multiple incidents of provocations and violence.” “A few U.S. organizations and agencies have been piecing together fabricated ‘evidence’ to make defamatory assumptions and groundless ‘investigations’ about the voluntary welcoming groups, as well as smearing allusions to Chinese diplomats and consulates in the U.S.,” the emailed statements said. “Such narratives are sheer political maneuvering, which China strongly opposes. The Chinese side urges the U.S. side to immediately stop the erroneous practices of hyping up falsehoods.”

Contacting multiple representatives of a regime and getting the same statement emailed back over and over again is perfect symbolism. The Chinese government might as well make its embassies and consulates look like giant windowless cubes.

This puts San Francisco’s herculean effort to clean up its streets before Xi Jinping’s visit into a new light, doesn’t it? It was always an embarrassment that the city government could “clear out the tent cities of homeless, remove the human feces and hypodermic needles from the sidewalks, and make the downtown look sparking clean and shiny in just a matter of days” for a visiting dictator, but couldn’t or wouldn’t make the same effort for its own citizens. The Chinese government acts as if San Francisco is de facto territory it controls, and apparently quite a few San Francisco city officials see the matter the same way.

But the Post story was only the second most egregious example of illicit and threatening Chinese government influence on American life to come to light Tuesday:

Linda Sun, a former aide to New York governor Kathy Hochul, acted at the direction of Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party officials while serving in state government, federal prosecutors alleged in an indictment Tuesday. In a statement, the U.S. attorney’s office in the Eastern District of New York said that Sun was arrested Tuesday morning with her husband, Christopher Hu. They were expected to be arraigned later in the day. Sun is a former deputy chief of staff to Kathy Hochul and has served in numerous roles throughout New York State government since her first post under the administration of former governor Andrew Cuomo in 2012. Before that, she served as Representative Grace Meng’s chief of staff, when the Queens Democrat served in the New York State assembly. “As alleged, while appearing to serve the people of New York as deputy chief of staff within the New York State Executive Chamber, the defendant and her husband actually worked to further the interests of the Chinese government and the CCP,” U.S. Attorney Breon Peace said. The federal government is alleging that Sun was an unregistered agent of the Chinese government and that her husband engaged in money-laundering while they benefited from millions of dollars in bribes from Chinese officials.

As I lamented yesterday afternoon, “Hard to get mad at the Chinese government for buying our elected officials when so many of them are for sale.”

When we see the Biden administration contradicting congressional findings and insisting that the People’s Republic of China is subsidizing the export of fentanyl analogues and precursors; when bipartisan leadership in Congress call the Biden administration’s response to escalating repression in Hong Kong “not adequate”; when we see the late senator Dianne Feinstein’s driver and Representative Eric Swalwell’s special friend “Fang Fang” . . . are we certain our elected officials still work for us?

Pound for pound, the very best reporter on the China beat is our Jimmy Quinn. He had the story on Chinese backing of the assaults in San Francisco back at the end of July, and the story on the FBI’s raid of Sun’s home a week earlier.

In just the past month, Jimmy has uncovered another example of Chinese diplomatic “private security” violently assaulting protesters:

A Chinese man who protested in front of China’s consulate general in Manhattan was allegedly knocked unconscious by a private security guard who pushed him last month. . . . [Yonghong] Wang says he left China in 2019 after the authorities there detained and harassed him over his participation in a pro-democracy group and his decision to report corruption in the ranks of a state-owned railway corporation.

And have you noticed that as newspaper vending machines for big-name papers have disappeared from city street corners, the number of China Daily machines is growing like mushrooms after a heavy rain? Jimmy noticed:

They’ve become such an ordinary part of the streetscape in midtown Manhattan, downtown D.C., and a few other American cities that we’ve forgotten just how unusual this is: China has placed communist propaganda newspaper boxes on dozens of streetcorners. . . . Chen Weihua, China Daily’s EU bureau chief and therefore a central propaganda department official, replied to my post and said that the newspaper boxes are intended “to keep you informed and not brainwashed by crazy warmongers in Washington.” Those are the words of a foreign dictatorship that knows it can get away with brazen propaganda campaigns on U.S. soil. So far, it has.

Who runs the streets of American cities? Right now, it kinda looks like the Chinese government does.

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eb3yr · 3 months

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Give us your sources on the supposed ‘Uyghur genocide’, with the caveat that you cannot use British (colonized and brutalized China to the point where they got mass swathes of the population addicted to opium so the Chinese would be forced to rely on them) or American (be fucking for real, the average US lapdog would rather blow his brains out than give China a single ounce of the praise that it deserves) state media, so no BBC, no FOX, and no CNN. You have 1 hour, which is more than generous enough to find all these supposed ‘sources’ that back your lies up.

Lmao fuck off, just like the US and UK your precious CCP isn't immune to being a corrupt piece of shit. It's obvious who you are, there's no need to hide behind anon.

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ahopkins1965 · 6 months

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COVID-19 naming

ADD ARTICLE DESCRIPTION

During the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the disease and virus were sometimes called "coronavirus", "Wuhan coronavirus", or "Wuhan pneumonia".

In January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) tentatively named it "2019-nCoV", short for "2019 Novel Coronavirus", or "2019 Novel Coronavirus Acute Respiratory Disease". This naming was based on the organization's 2015 guidelines for naming novel viruses and diseases, avoiding the use of geographic locations (such as Wuhan), in part to prevent social stigma. A similar structure has also been used by the AP when referring to virus variants, for example, referring to it as the "Delta variant" rather than the "South African variant".

On 11 February 2020, the WHO named the disease COVID-19 (short for coronavirus disease 2019). That same day, the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) formally announced it had named the causative virus as SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) based upon its genetic similarity to the 2003 SARS-CoV. The separation between the disease and the causative virus is based on the same nomenclature policies that separate AIDS and the virus which causes it, HIV.

WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus explained that CO stands for coronavirus, VI for virus, and D stands for disease, while 19 stands for the year, 2019, that the outbreak was first detected. As such, there has never been a "COVID-1" or any other "COVID-" series disease with a number below 19.

Chinese virus

From January to March 2020, US President Donald Trump repeatedly described the virus as the "Chinese virus". In March 2020, the president claimed to have abandoned the term, telling Fox News "we shouldn't make any more of a big deal out of it". On March 18 and 19, 2020, Trump twice defended using the term "Chinese virus" amid instances of bigotry against Asians in the United States. Trump referred to it as "the China Virus" at least as late as January 2021.

This description was also used by members of the Spanish far-right political party Vox, especially by its leader Santiago Abascal in March 2020.

CCP virus

The Epoch Times has reportedly funded right-wing groups promoting the use of the term "CCP virus" to lay blame on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the pandemic. Chinese-born New Zealand sculptor Chen Weiming created a 20-foot statue in Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California, depicting Chinese leader and CCP general secretary Xi Jinping with spike proteins as his hair, naming it "CCP virus".

Stylization

Stylization of the term has varied since the virus's and disease's discovery. The World Health Organization (WHO) stylizes the disease as COVID-19 with all letters capitalized and many other organizations have followed their lead. The AP Stylebook, Chicago Manual of Style, and the Modern Language Association (MLA) have styled it similarly. Several observers have noted the importance of proper stylization, despite the seeming ridiculousness of worrying over such matters "at a time like this" (during the early days of the pandemic), recalling the confusion and prejudice which resulted from unclear or inconsistent naming as was the case with AIDS (which was called GRID/HTLV-III/LAV at various times) and non-A, non-B Hepatitis. They have also pointed out that future researchers will benefit from consistency when reviewing past data and research.

However, stylization as "Covid-19" has become common as well. Numerous news sources including The New York Times, CNN, Politico, The Wall Street Journal, NBCNews have presented the term with a capital C but all other letters as lower case. As a result, use of "Covid-19" has become commonplace and even the accepted standard in some cases. Use of "Covid-19" in news sources from the United Kingdom like The Guardian has also been the norm since most British newspapers only capitalize an entire acronym if the acronym is typically spelled out like "B-B-C" or "N-H-S" while acronyms which are pronounced as words, like "Nasa" or "Unicef" have their first letter capitalized and all subsequent letters lowercase.

While COVID-19 refers to the disease and SARS-CoV-2 refers to the virus which causes it, referring to the "COVID-19 virus" has been accepted. Reference to SARS-CoV-2 as "the coronavirus" has become somewhat accepted despite such use implying that there is only one coronavirus species. Similarly, use of "COVID" for the disease (if the first rendered as COVID-19) has been tolerated. Use of "the Coronavirus" to refer to the COVID-19 pandemic which began in December 2019 has also been accepted. Although such use does not specify the year or which coronavirus-related disease is being referred to, given its all-encompassing impact at the time, such references have been deemed justifiable. Use of "the" when referring to the disease, virus, or 2019 pandemic has been quite varied with some requiring use of "the" while others have not. The Oxford English Dictionary noted that "the" is typically not used when referring to the disease, COVID-19, but is not uncommon when referring to the virus.

Reference to the virus and/or the disease as "corona", "the corona", and "the rona" has also arisen in various parts of the world.

Colloquial names

2022-09-13 phylogenetic tree of life of COVID-19 using the PANGO nomenclature; only a few of these variants have come to public notice

Numerous mutations and variants of SARS-CoV-2 have acquired colloquial vis-à-vis scientific labels for ease of pronunciation and usage, both in the lab and to some extent in mass media. The nomenclature draws from the corpus of mythology (both Greek and Scandinavian and astronomy.

Public messaging has been a concern given that these elements of popular reportage can be at variance with the Greek alphabet nomenclature established by the WHO; other schemes have been proposed.

Variants

Arcturus (XBB.1.16) was named on social media after the star; Kraken (XBB.1.5), Cerberus (BQ.1.1), Typhon (BQ.1), and Gryphon (XBB) were coined by evolutionary biologist T. Ryan Gregory (from his own personal nomenclature of mythical creatures); whereas Pelican, Quail, and Mockingbird (variants of 20I/501Y.V1), have not gained wider usage. The BA.2.86 variant was named 'pirola' (sic) by a group of scientists on social media in late 2023, and was brought to public attention by an August edition of the Wall Street Journal. (Inasmuch as the World Health Organization has suggested using astronomy for its plethora of names, the Twitter user @JPWeiland suggested the obscure Jovian asteroid 1082 Pirola "for its uniqueness" and the possibility of shifting the nomenclaure to Pi or Rho if needed.)

Mutations

Nicknames have also arisen for mutations such as Nelly (N501Y), Doug (and Douglas) (D614G), and even Eeek (E484K), initially meant as convenient labels in University of Bern lab discourse.

See also

Virus classification

References

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Shi Zhengli

Chinese researcher at the Wuhan Institute of Virology

COVID-19 pandemic

Pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2

SARS-CoV-2

Virus that causes COVID-19

Content is available under CC BY-SA 4.0 unless otherwise noted.

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owlmygod · 6 months

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In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party’s ambition to dominate global hegemony has become clearer and more explicit, with the Chinese government becoming more radical and aggressive in its attempts to suppress and persecute those who do not agree with them or share different values, aiming to completely silence voices different from the government.

Domestically, they have set out to purge dissidents and eliminate diverse voices. For example, for the Uighurs in Xinjiang, the CCP has built numerous “re-education camps,” using technology for massive cultural cleansing. Additionally, China has erected the “Great Firewall,” preventing Chinese citizens from accessing foreign information and strictly monitoring major internet communities like Weibo, WeChat, and NetEase to block sensitive topics’ discussion and spread.

However, the CCP’s suppression of freedom of speech is not limited to within its borders; it actively uses various means to harm the public opinion environment in other countries. A recent CNN report revealed that the Chinese government has been organizing large-scale online fake news attacks, investing billions of dollars to influence foreign public opinion and suppress criticism of Beijing. In recent years, they have used pro-China hacker groups for rigorous and increasingly blatant intimidation to harass U.S. residents, smear U.S. politicians, and American companies.

A 2022 report by cybersecurity company Mandiant even pointed out that China created at least 72 fake news websites in 11 languages to spread false information in line with the Chinese government’s narrative. These news sites, masquerading as Western media, were found to be built using Chinese HTML web structures and transcribing a large amount of content from Chinese and Russian official media, aiming to create chaos and affect people’s confidence in their own countries and systems, leading them to doubt democracy and embrace authoritarianism.

Freedom of speech and civil society are the cornerstones of a well-functioning society and are indispensable to democratic countries. However, China’s ambition to become a world leader and universal ruler has made “freedom of speech” a thorn in their side - domestically, they must suppress and purge dissenting voices, and internationally, they seek to remove international public opinion unfavorable to them. China’s various actions and methods are a serious infringement on freedom.

More importantly, the CCP’s continuous restriction of freedom of speech and execution of cross-border suppression aims to completely silence domestic dissent, creating a stark contrast with the United States, which is divided due to presidential elections. Xi Jinping hopes to see the United States and the Western world in chaos, too preoccupied to pay attention to China’s actions. We must recognize the threat of China, be aware of any CCP tactics, and bravely defend our democracy and freedom.

#China #politics #usa #uk

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444namesplus · 6 months

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kzc kzd kzf kzg kzh kzi kzj kzk kzl kzm kzn kzp kzr kzs kzt kzu kzv kzz lbb lbc lbd lbf lbg lbh lbi lbj lbk lbl lbm lbn lbp lbr lbs lbt lbu lbv lbz lcb lcc lcd lcf lcg lch lci lcj lck lcl lcm lcn lcp lcr lcs lct lcu lcv lcz ldb ldc ldd ldf ldg ldh ldi ldj ldk ldl ldm ldn ldp ldr lds ldt ldu ldv ldz lfb lfc lfd lff lfg lfh lfi lfj lfk lfl lfm lfn lfp lfr lfs lft lfu lfv lfz lgb lgc lgd lgf lgg lgh lgi lgj lgk lgl lgm lgn lgp lgr lgs lgt lgu lgv lhb lhc lhd lhf lhg lhh lhi lhj lhk lhl lhm lhn lhp lhr lhs lht lhu lhv lhz lib lic lid lif lig lih lii lij lik lil lin lip lir lis lit liu liv liz ljb ljc ljd ljf ljg ljh lji ljj ljk ljl ljm ljn ljp ljr ljs ljt lju ljv ljz lkb lkc lkd lkf lkg lkh lki lkj lkk lkl lkm lkn lkp lkr lks lkt lku lkv lkz llb llc lld llf llg llh lli llj llk lll llm lln llp llr lls llt llu llv llz lmb lmc lmd lmf lmg lmh lmi lmj lmk lml lmm lmn lmp lmr lms lmt lmu lmv lmz lnb lnc lnd lnf lng lnh lni lnj lnk lnl lnm lnn lnp lnr lns lnt lnu lnv lnz lpb lpc lpd lpf lpg lph lpi lpj lpk lpl lpm lpn lpp lpr lps lpt lpu lpv lpz lrb lrc lrd lrg lrh lri lrj lrk lrl lrm lrn lrp lrr lrs lrt lru lrv lrz lsb lsc lsd lsf lsg lsh lsi lsj lsk lsl lsm lsn lsp lsr lss lst lsu lsv lsz ltb ltc ltd ltf ltg lth lti ltj ltk ltl ltm ltn ltp ltr lts ltt ltu ltv ltz lub luc lud luf lug luh lui luj luk lul lum lun lup lur lus lut luv luz lvb lvc lvd lvf lvg lvh lvi lvj lvk lvl lvm lvn lvp lvr lvs lvt lvu lvv lvz lzb lzc lzd lzf lzg lzh lzi lzj lzk lzl lzm lzn lzp lzr lzs lzt lzu lzv lzz mbb mbc mbd mbf mbg mbh mbi mbj mbk mbl mbm mbn mbp mbr mbs mbt mbu mbv mbz mcb mcc mcd mcf mcg mch mci mcj mck mcl mcm mcn mcp mcr mcs mct mcu mcv mcz mdb mdc mdd mdf mdg mdh mdi mdj mdk mdl mdm mdn mdp mdr mds mdt mdu mdv mdz mfb mfc mfd mff mfg mfh mfi mfj mfk mfl mfm mfn mfp mfr mfs

mft mfu mfv mfz mgb mgc mgd mgf mgg mgh mgi mgj mgk mgl mgm mgn mgp mgr mgs mgt mgu mgv mhb mhc mhd mhf mhg mhh mhi mhj mhk mhl mhm mhn mhp mhr mhs mht mhu mhv mhz mib mic mid mif mig mih mii mij mik mil mim min mip mir mis mit miu miv miz mjb mjc mjd mjf mjg mjh mji mjj mjk mjl mjm mjn mjp mjr mjs mjt mju mjv mjz mkb mkc mkd mkf mkg mkh mki mkj mkk mkl mkm mkn mkp mkr mks mkt mku mkv mkz mlb mlc mld mlf mlg mlh mli mlj mlk mll mlm mln mlp mlr mls mlt mlu mlv mlz mmb mmc mmd mmf mmg mmh mmi mmj mmk mml mmm mmn mmp mmr mms mmt mmu mmv mmz mnb mnc mnd mnf mng mnh mni mnj mnk mnl mnm mnn mnp mnr mns mnt mnu mnv mnz mpb mpc mpd mpf mpg mph mpi mpj mpk mpl mpm mpn mpp mpr mps mpt mpu mpv mpz mrc mrd mrf mrg mrh mri mrj mrk mrl mrm mrn mrp mrr

mrs mrt mru mrv mrz msb msc msd msf msg msh msi msj msk msm msn msp msr mss mst msu msv msz mtb mtc mtd mtf mtg mth mti mtj mtk mtl mtm mtn mtp mtr mts mtt mtu mtv mtz mub muc mud mug muh mui muj muk mul mum mun mup mur mus mut muv muz mvb mvc mvd mvf mvg mvh mvi mvj mvk mvl mvm mvn mvp mvr mvs mvt mvu mvv mvz mzb mzc mzd mzf mzg mzh mzi mzl mzm mzn mzp mzr mzs mzt mzu mzv mzz nbc nbd nbf nbg nbh nbi nbj nbk nbl nbm nbn nbp nbr nbs nbt nbu nbv nbz ncb ncc ncd ncf ncg nch nci ncj nck ncl ncm ncn ncp ncr ncs nct ncu ncv ncz ndb ndc ndd ndf ndg ndh ndi ndj ndk ndl ndm ndn ndp ndr nds ndt ndu ndv ndz nfb nfc nfd nff nfg nfh nfi nfj nfk nfl nfm nfn nfp nfr nfs nft nfu nfv nfz ngb ngc ngd ngf ngg ngh ngi ngj ngk ngl ngm ngn ngp ngr ngs ngt ngu ngv ngz nhb nhc nhd nhf nhg nhh nhi nhj nhk nhl nhm nhn nhp nhr nhs nht nhu nhv nhz nib nic nid nif nig nih nii nij nik nil nim nin nip nir nis nit niu niv niz njb njc njd njf njg njh nji njj njk njl njm njn njp njr njs njt nju njv njz nkb nkc nkd nkf nkg nkh nki nkj nkk nkl nkm nkn nkp nkr nks nkt nku nkz nlb nlc nld nlf nlg nlh nli nlj nlk nll nlm nln nlp nlr nls nlt nlu nlv nlz nmb nmc nmd nmf nmg nmh nmi nmj nmk nml nmm nmn nmp nms nmt nmu nmv nmz nnb nnc nnd nnf nng nnh nni nnj nnk nnl nnm nnn nnp nnr nns nnt nnu nnv nnz npb npc npd npf npg nph npi npj npk npl npm npn npp npr nps npt npu npv npz nrb nrc nrd nrf nrg nrh nri nrj nrk nrl nrm nrn nrp nrr nrs nrt nru nrv nrz nsb nsc nsd nsf nsg nsh nsi nsj nsk nsl nsm nsn nsp nsr nss nst nsu nsv nsz ntb ntd ntf ntg nth nti ntj ntk ntl ntm ntn ntp ntr nts ntt ntu ntv ntz nub nuc nud nuf nug nuh nui nuj nuk nul num nun nup nur nus nut nuu nuv nuz nvb nvc nvd nvf nvg nvh nvi nvj nvk nvl nvm nvn nvp nvr nvs nvt nvu nvv nvz nzb nzc nzd nzf nzg nzh nzi nzj nzk nzl nzm nzn nzp nzr nzs nzt nzu nzv nzz pbb pbc pbd pbf pbg

pbh pbi pbj pbk pbl pbm pbn pbp pbr pbs pbt pbu pbv pbz pcb pcc pcf pcg pch pci pcj pck pcl pcm pcn pcp pcr pcs pct pcu pcv pcz pdb pdc pdd pdf pdg pdh pdi pdj pdk pdl pdm pdn pdp pdr pds pdt pdv pdz pfb pfc pff pfg pfh pfi pfj pfk pfl pfm pfn pfp pfr pfs pft pfu pfv pfz pgb pgc pgd pgf pgg pgh pgi pgj pgk pgl pgm pgn pgp pgr pgs pgt pgv pgz phb phc phd phf phg phh phi phj phk phl phm phn php phr phs pht phu phv phz pib pic pid pif pig pih pii pij pik pil pim pin pip pir pis pit piu piv piz pjb pjc pjd pjf pjg pjh pji pjj pjk pjl pjm pjn pjp pjr pjs pjt pju pjv pjz pkb pkc pkd pkf pkg pkh pki pkj pkk pkl pkm pkn pkp pks pkt pku pkv pkz plb plc pld plf plg plh pli plj plk pll plm pln plp plr pls plt plu plv plz pmb pmc pmd pmf pmg pmh pmi pmj pmk pml pmm pmn pmp pmr pms pmt pmu pmv pmz pnb pnc pnd pnf png pnh pni pnj pnk pnl pnm pnn pnp pnr pns pnt pnu pnv pnz ppb ppc ppd ppf ppg pph ppi ppj ppk ppl ppm ppn ppp ppr pps ppt ppu ppz prb prc prd prf prg prh pri prj prk prl prm prn prp prr prs prt pru prv prz psb psc psd psf psg psh psi psj psk psl psm psn psp psr pss pst psu psv psz ptb ptc ptd ptf ptg pth pti ptj ptk ptl ptm ptn ptp ptr pts ptt ptu ptv ptz pub puc pud puf pug puh pui puj puk pul pum pun pup pur pus put puu puv puz pvb pvc pvd pvf pvg pvh pvi

pvj pvk pvl pvm pvn pvp pvr pvs pvt pvu pvv pvz pzb pzc pzd pzf pzg pzh pzi pzj pzk pzl pzm pzn pzp pzr pzs pzt pzu pzv pzz rbb rbc rbd rbf rbg rbh rbi rbj rbk rbl rbm rbn rbp rbs rbt rbu rbv rbz rcc rcd rcf rcg rch rci rcj rck rcl rcm rcn rcp rcr rcs rct rcu rcv rcz rdb rdc rdd rdf rdg rdh rdi rdj rdk rdl rdm rdn rdp rdr rds rdt rdu rdv rdz rfb rfc rfd rff rfg rfh rfi rfj rfk rfl rfm rfn rfp rfr rfs rft rfu rfv rfz rgb rgc rgd rgf rgg rgh rgi rgj rgk rgl rgm rgn rgp rgr rgs rgt rgu rgv rgz rhb rhc rhd rhf rhg rhh rhi rhj rhk rhl rhm rhn rhp rhr rhs rht rhu rhv rhz rib ric rid rif rig rih rij rik ril rim rin rip rir ris rit riu riv riz rjb rjc rjd rjf rjg rjh rji rjj rjk rjl rjm rjn rjp rjr rjs rjt rju rjv rjz rkb rkd rkf rkg rkh rki rkj rkk rkl rkm rkn rkp rkr rks rkt rku rkv rkz rlb rlc rld rlf rlg rlh rli rlj rlk rll rlm rln rlp rlr rls rlt rlu rlv rlz rmb rmc rmd rmf rmg rmh rmi rmj rmk rml rmm rmn rmp rmr rms rmt rmu rmv rmz rnb rnc rnd rnf rng rnh rni rnj rnk rnl rnm rnn rnp rnr rns rnt rnu rnv rnz rpb rpc rpd rpf rpg rph rpi rpj rpk rpl rpm rpn rpp rpr rps rpt rpu rpv rpz rrb rrc rrd rrf rrg rrh rri rrj rrk rrl rrm rrn rrp rrr rrs rrt rru rrv rrz rsb rsc rsd rsf rsg rsh rsi rsj rsl rsm rsn rsp rsr rss rst rsu rsv rsz rtb rtc rtd rtf rtg rth rti rtj rtk rtl rtm rtn rtp rtr rts rtt rtu rtv rtz rub ruc rud ruf rug ruh rui ruj ruk rul rum run rup rur rus ruu ruv ruz rvb rvc rvd rvf rvg rvi rvj rvk rvl rvm rvn rvp rvr rvs rvt rvu rvv rvz rzb rzc rzd rzf rzg rzh rzi rzj rzk rzl rzm rzn rzp rzr rzs rzt rzu rzv rzz sbb sbc sbd sbf sbg sbh sbi sbj sbk sbl sbm sbn sbp sbr sbs sbt sbu sbv sbz scb scc scd scf scg sch sci scj sck scl scm scn scp scr scs sct scu scv scz sdb sdc sdd sdf sdg sdh sdi sdj sdk sdm sdn sdp sdr sds sdt sdu sdv sdz sfb sfc sfd sff sfg sfh sfi sfj sfk sfl sfm sfn sfp sfr sfs sft sfu sfv sfz sgb sgc sgd sgf sgg sgh sgi sgj sgk sgl sgm sgn sgp sgr sgs sgt sgu sgv sgz shb shc shd shf shg

shh shj shk shl shm shn shp shr shs sht shu shv shz sib sic sid sif sig sih sii sij sik sil sim sin sip sir sis sit siu siv siz sjc sjd sjf sjg sjh sji sjj sjk sjl sjm sjn sjp sjr sjs sjt sju sjv sjz skb skc skd skf skg skh ski skj skk skl skm skn skp skr sks skt sku skv skz slb slc sld slf slg slh sli slj slk sll slm sln slp slr sls slt slu slv slz smb smc smd smf smg smh smi smj smk sml smm smn smp smr sms smt smu smv smz snb snc snd snf sng snh sni snj snk snl snm snn snp snr sns snt snu snv snz spb spc spd spf spg sph spi spj spk spl spm spn spp spr sps spt spu spv spz srb src srd srf srg srh sri srj srk srl srm srn srp srr srs srt sru srv srz ssb ssc ssd ssf ssg ssh ssi ssj ssk ssl ssm ssn ssp ssr sss sst ssu ssv ssz stb stc std stf stg sth sti stj stk stl stm stn stp str sts stt stu stv stz sub suc sud suf sug suh sui suj suk sul sum sun sup sur sus sut suu suv suz svb svc svd svf svg svh svi svj svk svl svm svn svp svr

svs svt svu svv svz szb szc szd szf szg szh szi szj szk szl szm szn szp szr szs szt szu szv szz tbb tbc tbd tbf tbg tbh tbi tbj tbk tbl tbm tbn tbp tbr tbs tbt tbu tbv tbz tcb tcc tcf tcg tch tci tcj tck tcl tcm tcn tcp tcr tcs tct tcu tcv tcz tdb tdc tdd tdf tdg tdh tdi tdj tdk tdl tdm tdn tdp tdr tds tdt tdu tdv tdz tfb tfc tfd tff tfg tfh tfi tfj tfk tfl tfm tfn tfp tfr tfs tft tfu tfv tfz tgb tgc tgd tgf tgg tgh tgi tgj tgk tgl tgm tgn tgp tgr tgs tgt tgu tgv tgz thb thc thd thf thg thh thi thj thk thl thm thn thp thr ths tht thu thv thz tib tic tid tif tig tih tij tik til tim tin tip tir tis tit tiu tiv tiz tjc tjd tjf tjg tjh tji tjj tjk tjl tjm tjn tjp tjr tjs tjt tju tjv tjz tkb tkc tkd tkf tkg tkh tki tkj tkk tkl tkm tkn tkp tkr tks tkt tku tkv tkz tlb tlc tld tlf tlg tlh tli tlj tlk tll tlm tln tlp tlr tls tlt tlu tlv tlz tmb tmc tmd tmf tmg tmh tmi tmj tmk tml tmm tmn tmp tmr tms tmt tmu tmv tmz tnb tnc tnd tnf tng tnh tni tnj tnk tnl tnm tnn tnr tns tnt tnu tnv tnz tpb tpc tpd tpf tpg tph tpi tpj tpk tpl tpm tpn tpp tps tpt tpu tpv tpz trb trc trd trf trg trh tri trj trk trl trm trn trp trr trs trt tru trv trz tsb tsc tsd tsf tsg tsh tsj tsk tsl tsm tsn tsp tsr tss tst tsu tsv tsz ttb ttc ttd ttf ttg tth tti ttj ttk ttl ttm ttn ttp ttr tts ttt ttu ttv ttz tub tuc tud tuf tug tuh tui tuj tuk tul tum tun tup tur tus tut tuu tuv tvb tvc tvd tvf tvg tvh tvi tvj tvk tvl tvm tvn tvr tvs tvt tvu tvv tvz tzc tzd tzf tzg tzh tzi tzj tzk tzl tzm tzn tzp tzr tzs tzt tzu tzv tzz ubb ubc ubd ubf ubg ubh ubi ubj ubk ubl ubm ubn ubp ubr ubs ubt ubu ubv ubz ucb ucc ucd ucf ucg uch uci ucj uck ucl ucm ucn ucp ucr ucs uct ucu ucv ucz udb udc udd udf udg udh udi udj udk udl udm udn udp udr uds udt udu udv udz ufb ufc ufd uff ufg ufh ufi ufk ufl ufm ufn ufp ufr ufs uft ufu ufv ufz

ugb ugc ugd ugf ugg ugh ugi ugj ugk ugl ugm ugn ugp ugr ugs ugt ugu ugv ugz uhb uhc uhd uhf uhg uhh uhi uhj uhk uhl uhm uhn uhp uhr uht uhu uhv uhz uib uic uid uif uig uih uii uij uik uim uin uip uir uis uit uiu uiv uiz ujb ujc ujd ujf ujg ujh uji ujj ujk ujl ujm ujn ujp ujr ujs ujt uju ujv ujz ukb ukc ukd ukf ukg ukh uki ukj ukk ukl ukm ukn ukp ukr uks ukt uku ukv ukz ulb ulc uld ulf ulg ulh uli ulj ulk ull ulm uln ulp ulr uls ult ulu ulv ulz umb umc umd umf umg umh umi umj umk uml umm umn ump umr ums umt umu umv umz unb unc und unf ung unh uni unj unk unl unm unn unp unr uns unt unu unv unz upb upc upd upf upg uph upi upj upk upl upm upn upp upr ups upt upu upv upz urb urc urf urg urh uri urj urk url urm urn urp urr urs urt uru urv urz usb usc usd usf usg ush usi usj usk usl usm usn usp usr uss ust usu usv usz utb utc utd utf utg uth uti utj utk utl utm utn utp utr uts utt utu utv utz uub uuc uud uuf uug uuh uui uuj uuk uul uum uun uup uur uus uut uuu uuv uuz uvb uvc uvd uvf uvg uvh uvi uvj uvk uvl uvm

uvn uvp uvs uvt uvu uvv uvz uzb uzc uzd uzf uzg uzh uzi uzj uzk uzl uzm uzn uzp uzr uzs uzt uzu uzv uzz vbb vbc vbd vbf vbg vbh vbi vbj vbk vbl vbm vbn vbp vbr vbs vbt vbu vbv vbz vcb vcc vcd vcf vcg vch vci vcj vck vcl vcm vcn vcp vcr vcs vct vcu vcv vcz vdb vdc vdd vdf vdg vdh vdi vdj vdk vdl vdm vdn vdp vdr vds vdt vdu vdv vdz vfb vfc vff vfg vfh vfi vfj vfk vfl vfm vfn vfp vfr vfs vft vfu vfv vfz vgb vgc vgd vgf vgg vgh vgi vgj vgk vgl vgm vgn vgp vgr vgs vgt vgu vgv vgz vhb vhc vhd vhf vhg vhh vhi vhj vhk vhl vhm vhn vhp vhr vhs vht vhu vhv vhz vib vic vid vif vig vih vii vij vik vil vim vin vip vir vis vit viu viv viz vjb vjc vjd vjf vjg vjh vji vjj vjk vjl vjm vjn vjp vjr vjs vjt vju vjv vjz vkb vkc vkd vkf vkg vkh vki vkj vkk vkl vkm vkn vkp vkr vks vkt vku vkv vkz vlb vlc vld vlf vlg vlh vli vlj vlk vll vlm vln vlp vlr vls vlt vlu vlv vlz vmb vmc vmd vmf vmg vmh vmi vmj vmk vml vmm vmn vmp vmr vms vmu vmv vmz vnb vnc vnd vnf vng vnh vni vnj vnk vnl vnm vnn vnp vnr vns vnt vnu vnv vnz vpb vpc vpd vpf vpg vph vpi vpj vpk vpl vpm vpn vpp vpr vps vpt vpu vpv vpz vrb vrc vrd vrf vrg vrh vri vrj vrk vrl vrm vrn vrp vrr vrs vrt vru vrv vrz vsb vsc vsd vsf vsg vsh vsi vsj vsk vsl vsm vsn vsp vsr vss vst vsu vsv vsz vtb vtc vtd vtf vtg vth vti vtj vtk vtl vtm vtn vtp vtr vts vtt vtu vtv vtz vub vuc vud vuf vug vuh vui vuj vuk vul vum vun vup vur vus vut vuu vuv vuz vvb vvc vvd vvf vvg vvh vvi vvj vvk vvl vvm vvn vvp vvr vvs vvt vvu vvv vvz vzb vzc vzd vzf vzg vzh vzi vzj vzk vzl vzm vzn vzp vzr vzs vzt vzu vzv vzz zbb zbc zbd zbf zbg zbh zbi zbj zbk zbl zbm zbn zbp zbr zbs zbt zbu zbv zbz zcb zcc zcd zcf zcg zch zci zcj zck zcl zcm zcn zcp zcr zcs zct zcu zcv zcz zdb zdc zdd zdf zdg zdh zdi zdj zdk zdl zdm zdn zdp zdr zds zdt zdv zdz zfb zfc zfd zff zfg zfh zfi zfj zfk zfl zfm zfn zfp zfr zfs zft zfu zfv zfz zgb zgc zgd zgf zgg zgh zgi zgj zgk zgl zgm zgn zgp zgr zgs zgt zgu zgv zgz zhb zhc zhd zhf zhg zhh zhi zhj zhk zhl zhm zhn zhp zhr zhs zht zhu zhv zhz zib zic zid zif zig zih zii zij zik zil zim zin zip zir zis zit ziu ziv ziz zjb zjc zjd zjf zjg zjh zji zjj zjk zjl zjm zjn zjp zjr zjs zjt zju zjv zjz zkb zkc zkd zkf zkg zkh zki zkj zkk zkl zkm zkn zkp zkr zks zkt zku zkv zkz zlb zlc zld zlf zlg zlh zli zlj zlk zll zlm zln zlp zlr zls zlt zlu zlv zlz zmb zmc zmd zmf zmg zmh zmi zmj zmk zml zmm zmn zmp zmr zms zmt zmu zmv zmz znb znc znd znf zng zni znj znk znl znm znn znp znr zns znt znu znv znz zpb zpc zpd zpf zpg zph zpi zpj zpk zpl zpm zpn zpp zpr zps zpt zpu zpv zpz zrb zrc zrd zrf zrg zrh zri zrj zrk zrl zrm zrn zrp zrr zrs zrt zru zrv zrz zsb zsc zsd zsf zsg zsh zsi zsj zsk zsl zsm zsn zsp zsr zss zst zsu zsv zsz ztb ztc ztd ztf ztg zth zti ztj ztk ztl ztm ztn ztp ztr zts ztt ztu ztv ztz zub zuc zud zuf zug zuh zui zuj

zuk zul zum zun zup zur zus zut zuu zuv zuz zvb zvc zvd zvf zvg zvh zvi zvj zvk zvl zvm zvn zvp zvr zvs zvt zvu zvv zvz zzb zzc zzd zzf zzg zzh zzi zzj zzk zzl zzm zzn zzp zzr zzt zzu zzv zzz

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xtruss · 6 months

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TikTok Threat Is Purely Hypothetical, U.S. Intelligence Admits

“We Have Nothing to Add,” the FBI Said, When Asked For Evidence of TikTok’s Actual Threat.

— Ken Klippenstein | March 16 2024

A TikTok Advertisement at a Metro station in Washington, DC, US, on Thursday, March 30, 2023. “Singaporean NOT Chinese TikToks Chief Executive” Appearance in Congress Last Week Did Little to Calm the Bipartisan Fury Directed at the Viral Video-Sharing Service. Photographer: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg via Getty Images

The Purported Threat of TikTok to U.S. National Security has Inflated into a Hysteria of Chinese Spy Balloon Proportions, but the official record tells a different story: U.S. intelligence has produced no evidence that the popular social media site has ever coordinated with Beijing. That fact hasn’t stopped many in Congress and even President Joe Biden from touting legislation that would force the sale of the app, as the TikTok frenzy fills the news pages with empty conjecture and innuendo.

In interviews and testimony to Congress about TikTok, leaders of the FBI, CIA, and the director of national intelligence have in fact been careful to qualify the national security threat posed by TikTok as purely hypothetical. With access to much of the government’s most sensitive intelligence, they are well placed to know.

The basic charge is that TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, a Chinese company, could be compelled by the government in Beijing to use their app in targeted operations to manipulate public opinion, collect mass data on Americans, and even spy on individual users. (TikTok says it has never shared U.S. user data with the Chinese government and would not do so if asked. This week, TikTok CEO Shou Chew said that “there’s no CCP ownership” of ByteDance, referring to the Chinese Communist Party.)

Though top national security officials seem happy to echo these allegations of Chinese control of TikTok, they stop short of saying that China has ever actually coordinated with the company.

Typical is an interview CIA Director William Burns gave to CNN in 2022, where he said it was “troubling to see what the Chinese government could do to manipulate TikTok.” Not what the Chinese government has done, but what it could do.

What China could do turns out to be a recurring theme in the statements of the top national security officials.

FBI Director Christopher Wray said during a 2022 talk at the University of Michigan that TikTok’s “parent company is controlled by the Chinese government, and it gives them the potential [emphasis added] to leverage the app in ways that I think should concern us.” Wray went on to cite TikTok’s ability to control its recommendation algorithm, which he said “allows them to manipulate content and if they want to [emphasis added], to use it for influence operations.”

In the same talk, Wray three times referred to the Chinese government’s “ability” to spy on TikTok users but once again stopped short of saying that they do so.

“They also have the ability to collect data through it on users which can be used for traditional espionage operations, for example,” Wray said. “They also have the ability on it to get access, they have essential access to software devices. So you’re talking about millions of devices and that gives them the ability to engage in different kinds of malicious cyber activity through that.”

Wray is referring to the potential ability, according to U.S. intelligence, to commandeer phones and computers connecting to TikTok through apps and the website.

In testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee in November 2022, Wray was even more circumspect, stressing that the Chinese government could use TikTok for foreign influence operations but only “if they so chose.” When asked by Rep. Diana Harshbarger, R-Tenn., if the Chinese government has used TikTok to collect information about Americans for purposes other than targeted ads and content, Wray only could acknowledge that it was a “possibility.”

“I would say we do have national security concerns, at least from the FBI’s end, about TikTok,” Wray said. “They include the possibility that the Chinese government could use it to control data collection on millions of users or control the recommendation algorithm which could be used for foreign influence operations if they so chose.”

The lack of evidence is not for lack of trying, as Wray alluded to during the same hearing. When asked by Harshbarger what is being done to investigate the Chinese government’s involvement in TikTok, Wray replied that he would see whether “any specific investigative work … could be incorporated into the classified briefing I referred to.”

The FBI, when asked by The Intercept if it has any evidence that TikTok has coordinated with the Chinese government, referred to Wray’s prior statements — many of which are quoted in this article. “We have nothing to add to the Director’s comments,” an FBI spokesperson said.

The fiscal year 2025 FBI budget request to Congress, which outlines its resource priorities in the coming year, was unveiled this week but makes no mention of TikTok in its 94 pages. In fact, it makes no mention of China whatsoever.

Since at least 2020, the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has investigated the implications of ByteDance’s acquisition of TikTok. The investigation followed an executive order by former President Donald Trump that sought to force TikTok to divest from its parent company. When that investigation failed to force a sale, a frustrated Congress decided to get involved, with the House passing legislation on Wednesday that would force ByteDance to sell TikTok.

In testimony to the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, the highest-ranking intelligence official in the U.S. government, was asked about the possibility that China might use TikTok to influence the upcoming 2024 presidential elections. Haines said only that it could not be discounted.

“We cannot rule out that the CCP could use it,” Haines said.

The relatively measured tone adopted by top intelligence officials contrasts sharply with the alarmism emanating from Congress. In 2022, Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., deemed TikTok “digital fentanyl,” going on to co-author a column in the Washington Post with Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., calling for TikTok to be banned. Gallagher and Rubio later introduced legislation to do so, and 39 states have, as of this writing, banned the use of TikTok on government devices.

None of this is to say that China hasn’t used TikTok to influence public opinion and even, it turns out, to try to interfere in American elections. “TikTok accounts run by a [People’s Republic of China] propaganda arm reportedly targeted candidates from both political parties during the U.S. midterm election cycle in 2022,” says the annual Intelligence Community threat assessment released on Monday. But the assessment provides no evidence that TikTok coordinated with the Chinese government. In fact, governments — including the United States — are known to use social media to influence public opinion abroad.

“The problem with TikTok isn’t related to their ownership; it’s a problem of surveillance capitalism and it’s true of all social media companies,” computer security expert Bruce Schneier told The Intercept. “In 2016 Russia did this with Facebook and they didn’t have to own Facebook — they just bought ads like everybody else.”

This week, Reuters reported that as president, Trump signed a covert action order authorizing the CIA to use social media to influence and manipulate domestic Chinese public opinion and views on China. Other covert American cyber influence programs are known to exist with regard to Russia, Iran, terrorist groups, and other foreign actors.

In other words, everybody’s doing it.

#TikTok #Threat | Purely Hypothetical #US Intelligence | Admission #FBI #U.S. National Security #Chinese Spy Balloon

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