#Eurozone Crisis

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Tim Ganser at The UnPopulist:

Since the end of World War II, Germans had by and large steadfastly resisted voting for far-right populists. That norm was shattered in the last decade by the success of the political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which seemed to gain more traction as it radicalized into a full-blown, hard right populist party. A year into its existence, spurred by widespread discontent with German fiscal policy, the AfD won seven seats in European Parliament. In 2017, after undergoing a hard-right turn, it won 94 seats in the German federal elections, good for third place overall. For the past year, the AfD has consistently ranked second in Politico’s poll aggregator tracking the public’s voting intentions.

In this Sunday’s European Parliament elections, roughly 1 in 6 German voters is expected to cast a ballot for the AfD, whose members have trivialized the Holocaust, encouraged their followers to chant Nazi slogans, and participated in a secret conference where they fantasized about forced deportations of naturalized citizens they derisively call “Passport Germans.” Worse still, the AfD is predicted to be the strongest party, with up to a third of the vote share, in the three elections for state parliament in Saxony and Thuringia on Sept. 1 and in Brandenburg on Sept. 22. And in generic polls for a hypothetical federal election, the AfD fares even better than it did in any previous election. How did Germany get to this point?

The AfD’s Origin Story

The AfD was founded in early 2013 by a group of conservatives, led by the economics professor, Bernd Lucke, greatly disillusioned with then-Chancellor Angela Merkel’s fiscal policy. In their view, the European debt crisis had revealed deep instability within the eurozone project as smaller nations found themselves unable to cope with the economic demands of membership, and they believed Merkel’s focus on saving the euro was coming at the expense of German economic interests. This was, however, the opposite of a populist complaint—in fact, the AfD was initially referred to as a “Professorenpartei” (a professor’s party) because of the party’s early support from various economics professors who were more interested in fiscal policy than catering to popular will. In its earliest days, the AfD could best be characterized as a cranky but respectable party of fiscal hardliners. Its anti-establishment posture stemmed entirely from its belief in the necessity of austerity. Even its name could be construed less as nationalistic and more an answer to the dictum coined by Merkel—“alternativlose Politik” (policy for which there is no alternative)—to defend her bailouts during the eurozone crisis.

Although the AfD had launched an abstract economic critique of Merkel’s policies that could be hard to parse for non-experts, its contrarian stance resonated with a significant portion of Germans. Right out of the gate, the AfD obtained the highest vote share of any new party since 1953, nearly clearing the 5% threshold for inclusion in the Bundestag, Germany’s Parliament, in its first electoral go round. Its success was also measurable in terms of membership, passing the 10,000 mark almost immediately after its formation. The rapid increase in membership, however, helped lay the groundwork for its turn toward right-wing populism. Perhaps due to pure negligence—or a combination of calculation and ambition—the party’s founders did little to stop right-wing populists from swelling its rolls. And as the German economy emerged through the European debt crisis in good financial shape, fiscal conservatism naturally faded from the public’s consciousness. However, a new European crisis having to do with migrants came to dominate the popular imagination. The AfD hardliners seized on the growing anti-migrant opinion, positioning the AfD as its champion, thereby cementing the party’s turn towards culture war issues like immigration and national identity.

Starting in late 2014, organized right-wing protesters took to the streets to loudly rail against Germany’s decision to admit Muslim migrants, many fleeing the Syrian civil war. The AfD right wing’s desire to become the political home of nativism led to a rift within the party that culminated in founder Bernd Lucke’s being ousted as leader in 2015, and his replacement with hardliner Frauke Petry. Lucke left the party entirely, citing its right-wing shift, following in the footsteps of what other party leaders had already done and more would do in the coming year. Up until this point, the AfD unwittingly helped the cause of right-wing populism. If the reactionary far-right had tried to start a party from scratch, it would have likely failed. The AfD, after all, was created within a respectable mold, trading on the credentials of its earliest founders and leaders. But with saner voices now pushed out, right-wing populists had the party with public respectability and an established name all to themselves. And they deliberately turned it into a Trojan horse for reactionary leaders who wanted to “fight the system from within.

[...]

A New Normal in Germany

As right-wing populist positions have become part of the political discourse, Germany is now in the exact same position as some of its European neighbors with established hardline populist parties. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni ascended to the premiership in October 2022 as the head of her neo-fascist Fratelli d’Italia party, which is poised to perform well in the upcoming European Parliament elections. In France, the Marine Le Pen-led far-right Rassemblement National (RN) is set to bag a third of votes in those elections, roughly double what President Macron’s governing coalition is expected to obtain.

What makes the situation in Germany especially worrisome is that, unlike in France and Italy, far-right parties had failed to garner any meaningful vote share in nationwide elections until just seven years ago; indeed, until the 2017 federal election, there had never been a right-wing populist party that had received more than six percent of the national vote in Germany. The nation’s special vigilance toward far right ethnonationalism in light of its history of Nazi atrocities was expected to spare Germany the resurgence of far-right populism. But it actually led to complacency among mainstream parties. By 2017, the AfD—already in its right-wing populist phase—received nearly 13% of the vote in the federal election to become the third-strongest parliamentary entity. And by then it had also made inroads in all state parliaments as well as the European Parliament. The norm against it was officially gone.

To be sure, the AfD is not on track to take over German politics. It currently has the fifth most seats among all German parties in the Bundestag, fourth most seats among German parties in the European Parliament, and is a distant eighth in party membership. Nor is it currently a threat to dominate European politics—late last month, the AfD was ousted from the Marine Le Pen-led Identity and Democracy (ID) party coalition, the most right-wing group in the European Parliament. Le Pen, herself a far-right radical, explained the AfD’s expulsion by describing the party as “clearly controlled by radical groups.” But none of the above offer good grounds for thinking the AfD will be relegated to the fringes of German or European politics.

After the election, the AfD could rejoin ID, or it could form a new, even more radical right-wing presence within the European Parliament. Some fear that the AfD could potentially join forces with Bulgaria’s ultranationalist Vazrazhdane. Its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, said that AfD’s expulsion from ID could create an opening to form “a real conservative and sovereigntist group in the European Parliament.” Also, ID’s removal of the AfD wasn’t due to its stated policy platform being out of step with Europe’s right-wing populist project. Rather, it was because the AfD’s leading candidate, Maximillian Krah, was implicated in a corruption and spying scandal involving China and Russia, and because he said he would not automatically construe a member of the Nazi Schutzstaffel (SS) to be a criminal. Absent these entirely preventable missteps, the AfD would be in good standing with right-wing populist partners in Europe.

Seeing far-right Nazi-esque Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) rise in prominence in Germany is a sad sight.

[alecdavidoff]

Watch my Psychic Tarot Reading into the future of the Euro. The psychic energy was thick and I had to use a lot of psychic strength to navigate this one.

[ccememirr]

Eurozone Crisis and Greece

Introduction

The Eurozone crisis has many sides to it. For us curious people, we know it as an economic crisis. The increasing number of unemployed people push back the progress, as constrictions in systems, institutions having problems that they can’t really solve, not being able to free flow, facing a blockade. But deep down, this is also a constitutional crisis. European economic constitution is becoming more and more unpredictable, their problem exceeding the economic stat and becoming a nation-level problem.

On this blog, i will cover issues relating to money saving politics and the Greek crisis. I also want to look from a different window, gain info on the Greek not only from disciplinary window, but a window far broader, comparative, seeing the crisis in a globalized situation.

Managing a crisis is mostly finding questions to the following: First of all, what policies are being put out and are they effective enough? Second, who is framing and showing what a crisis is? Thirdly, what larger trends are behind or having an impact on both crises and crisis management?

The political dimension is mainly gathered around the competition between supporters and opponents of reforms. The spotlight is on the examination of consequences of a crisis. This contains an evaluation of protest and voting behavior at times of money saving, things that people go through while in a crisis creates and how it is being experiences all together withing the Greek society.

[kneedeepincynade]

Hello and welcome,it's me again and today we talk about Olaf Scholz and his coming visit to China

As always the machibe translation is at the bottom and the collective is on telegram

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⚠️ OLAF SCHOLZ, CANCELLIERE TEDESCO, SI RECHERÀ IN CINA IL 4 NOVEMBRE ⚠️

🇩🇪|🇨🇳 Nonostante le pressioni da parte di numerosi leader dei paesi dell'Unione Europea, che vorrebbero costituire un "fronte unito" contro la Cina, Olaf Scholz - cancelliere tedesco - ha deciso di recarsi in Cina, sotto invito di Li Keqiang, attuale Primo Ministro della Repubblica Popolare Cinese.

✈️ Il 4 novembre, Olaf Scholz, si recherà a Pechino, dove tratterà una serie di temi con il Governo Cinese, principalmente di natura commerciale.

🇨🇳 Zhao Lijian - Portavoce del Ministero degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica Popolare Cinese - ha ricordato che proprio quest'anno ricorre il 50° anniversario dell'instaurazione di relazioni diplomatiche tra Cina e Germania.

📄 Nel corso dell'incontro, che si terrà il 4 novembre, il Governo Cinese si aspetta di approfondire lo scambio di vedute sulle relazioni bilaterali sino-tedesche, così come quelle sino-europee.

🇪🇺|⚔️|🇨🇳 L'Unione Europea, ultimamente, sta assumendo una posizione sempre più anti-cinese, con svariati paesi che parlano di "minaccia cinese", e di "concorrente che sta promuovendo una visione alternativa dell'ordine mondiale"

🇪🇺 Ad esempio, Ursula Von Der Leyen, Presidente della Commissione Europea, ha affermato l'Unione Europea ha "imparato la lezione dalla dipendenza dalla Russia" e che deve essere "vigile nei confronti della Cina", poiché "c'è il rischio della dipendenza dalle tecnologie e dalle materie prime".

🇨🇳 La Cina - ha affermato Zhao Lijian - è pronta a consolidare la fiducia reciproca e a rafforzare la cooperazione con la Germania, in linea con gli interessi di entrambe le parti.

🇩🇪|😰 La Germania, che si trova in una dura crisi economica ed energetica a causa delle sanzioni alla Federazione Russa, ha il terrore di perdere il suo primo partner commerciale.

🧾 Fonte

🌸 Iscriviti 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

⚠️ OLAF SCHOLZ, GERMAN CHANCELLOR, WILL GO TO CHINA ON 4 NOVEMBER ⚠️

🇩🇪 | 🇨🇳 Despite pressure from numerous leaders of the European Union countries, who would like to establish a "united front" against China, Olaf Scholz - German Chancellor - has decided to go to China, at the invitation of Li Keqiang , current Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China.

✈️ On November 4th, Olaf Scholz will travel to Beijing, where he will discuss a series of issues with the Chinese government, mainly of a commercial nature.

🇨🇳 Zhao Lijian - Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China - recalled that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Germany.

📄 During the meeting, which will be held on November 4, the Chinese government expects to deepen the exchange of views on Sino-German bilateral relations, as well as Sino-European ones.

🇪🇺 | ⚔️ | 🇨🇳 The European Union, lately, is taking an increasingly anti-Chinese stance, with several countries talking about a "Chinese threat", and a "competitor who is promoting an alternative vision of the world order"

🇪🇺 For example, Ursula Von Der Leyen, President of the European Commission, said the European Union has "learned the lesson from dependence on Russia" and that it must be "vigilant towards China", since "there is a risk dependence on technologies and raw materials ".

🇨🇳 China - said Zhao Lijian - is ready to consolidate mutual trust and strengthen cooperation with Germany, in line with the interests of both sides.

🇩🇪 | 😰 Germany, which is in a severe economic and energy crisis due to sanctions on the Russian Federation, is terrified of losing its first trading partner.

🧾 Source

🌸 Subscribe 👉 @collectivoshaoshan

[mariacallous]

SONNEBERG, GERMANY—First, in true German fashion, the rules were outlined: no alcohol on site, flagpoles capped at three meters, no protesting past 8 p.m. The demonstration followed, with hundreds congregated in the town square shouting insults at the incumbent government; cracking jokes at the expense of refugees, the LGBTQ+ community, and the media; and waving a sea of German flags, with a few Russian ones dotted among them.

“Anyone who dares call us Nazis will be reported to the police,” one of the protesters shouted from a makeshift stage propped up outside Sonneberg’s City Hall, a white mansion built between the world wars. “Germany first,” the protester continued, beckoning the crowds to join in singing the national anthem under a rainy, dark sky.

At 8 p.m. sharp, the crowd quickly dispersed—but they’ll be back next Monday, as they are every week. During the COVID-19 pandemic, they rallied against lockdowns. Now, they call for the overthrow of the current government coalition, and in recent months, the numbers of agitators have started to swell. Many are affiliated with the right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD), and although members say they strongly reject what Nazi Germany stood for, a regional chair of the party, Björn Höcke, is on trial for concluding a 2021 speech with the phrase “Everything for Germany”—a slogan widely used by the Nazis. (Under German law, the use of speech, propaganda, and symbolism associated with the Nazi Party and other terrorist groups is prohibited.)

Sonneberg district, home to 56,000 people, is where AfD has celebrated its biggest success to date: Last year, Robert Sesselmann, 51, was elected as the district administrator in a runoff with 52.8 percent of the vote, making Sonneberg the first county in Germany to elect a far-right candidate since the Nazi era. But Thuringia’s AfD branch—where Sonneberg is located—has already been questioning the legitimacy of state institutions and asserted that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a sovereign state, but rather controlled by external powers.

The Thuringia branch of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution has legally classified the AfD’s Thuringia branch as “right-wing extremist,” and the federal office is now deciding whether the party may be classified as a suspected case of right-wing extremism on the national level.

The question is pertinent, since the AfD is gaining in popularity not just in Thuringia, but nationwide. This trend picked up around the time of Germany’s last federal elections in 2021. Nationally, the AfD’s support base has grown to 22 percent, compared to 10.4 percent in 2021. Three states in the east—Thuringia, as well as Brandenburg and Saxony—head to the polls this fall, and a win for the AfD looks likely, as it’s polling around 30 percent in all three states.

“This is a stress test for Germany, and 2024 is a defining year,” said Olaf Sundermeyer, an editor at the Berlin-Brandenburg Broadcast (RBB) and longtime expert on right-wing extremism in Germany. Sundermeyer said that since the AfD was founded in 2013, “the party has continuously radicalized.”

Initially starting out as a euroskeptic party that primarily criticized the European Union’s handling of the eurozone crisis, the party—and its leadership—have continuously shifted toward more nationalist and populist positions, especially since 2015, when former Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed around 1 million refugees into the country.

The legacy and shame of Nazi Germany continue to influence the nation’s politics, and until the AfD’s rise, German society strongly rejected far-right ideologies. But the economic impact of both the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis have—at least partially—resulted in shifting public perceptions.

“The AfD has successfully managed to alter people’s perception of right-wing extremism, moving it away from its historically charged stigma of Nazism and thus effectively rendering it socially acceptable,” Sundermeyer told Foreign Policy. This, he said, is exactly what has happened in Sonneberg.

The AfD’s new heartland, a remote part of the countryside, was part of the communist German Democratic Republic until reunification in 1990. Surrounded by hills in the Thuringian Forest, Sonneberg’s cobblestone main street and stately houses date back to the Wilhelminian era before the First World War. The nearest major highway is about a half-hour’s drive.

Since reunification, scores of people have migrated westward, leaving many homes empty. Residents say that young people here struggle with drug abuse; that there are few places for them to hang out; and that public transport isn’t adequately connecting the district’s farther, remote villages, making it more difficult to access educational and job opportunities. Since reunification, the country’s east has been catching up to the former West Germany in terms of economic opportunities, but in Sonneberg—and throughout former East Germany—many people continue to feel acutely disadvantaged.

A group of young men lingering after the demonstration echoed these complaints as they chain-smoked Marlboros and packed up whistles and flags. They had opted to move into practical professions—such as construction work, plumbing, and roofing—one explained, to help “build Sonneberg, and Germany overall.”

Attending the demonstration wearing their company uniforms—grey overalls and work pants—the men were initially hesitant to speak to the Lügenpresse, or “lying, mainstream press,” as they described it. “No names please,” they asked politely after agreeing to talk. (“Lügenpresse,” a term used by the Nazis, has resurfaced in Germany’s right-wing circles, as well as among allies of former U.S. President Donald Trump.)

“People call us ‘rats,’ just because we support the AfD,” one of the men said. “There’s no freedom of speech here, no freedom of thoughts. Our country gets involved in wars we don’t want to be part of. The government manipulates the press, our German culture, and our traditions are vanishing due to mass immigration—food and energy prices have skyrocketed. It’s worse than during the German Democratic Republic, and we desperately need change—we need an alternative.” He paused to take a long drag on his cigarette, then added: “Germany is for Germans first—we can’t help others if we’re not helping ourselves.”

“It’s a possibility that the party drifts too far to the right,” he said, “and that’s certainly not what we want. We don’t want a return of Nazi times, but we need change.”

The party’s policy platform is unabashedly far right. For instance, AfD’s stance on immigration is that “the ideology of multiculturalism is a serious threat to peace and to the continued existence of the nation as a cultural unit.” The party advocates for a “German dominant culture” based on the values of Christianity instead of multiculturalism. Africa, the party’s website states, is a “house of poverty,” arguing that migration from the continent needs to be capped.

During a covert meeting last November, uncovered by independent German investigative outlet Correctiv, AfD politicians, together with neo-Nazis and several wealthy business owners, discussed the “remigration” of millions of people—including German citizen—on the basis of racial and religious criteria.

The group of young men in Sonneberg who spoke with Foreign Policy talked about the need for the “remigration” of immigrants, too, and some even had written it on signs. After the rally, though, they headed to dinner at the only restaurant still open: a kebab house owned by an Iraqi Kurd. Their waiter was a Syrian man who arrived in Germany three years ago.

According to the Federal Statistical Office, at least 28.7 percent of Germany’s population—more than 1 in 4 people—have a migration background, meaning that they immigrated to Germany themselves or were born into families with a history of migration. Migration is on the up, with 2.1 million people arriving in Germany in 2015, and 2.6 million in 2022. Germany’s coalition government has said it aims to attract 400,000 qualified workers from abroad annually to tackle labor shortages and demographic imbalances.

The desire for strong leadership is also on the rise in Germany as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. Several of the AfD’s members have called for a separation from NATO and even the EU; many have turned to Russia, at least rhetorically, arguing that Germany needs to work with its neighbors. Sundermeyer told Foreign Policy that “the AfD is deeply anti-American but pro- Russian; anti-NATO and -EU, but in favor of turning toward alternative government structures such as authoritarianism.”

Meanwhile, German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser continuously calls right-wing extremism the “greatest extremist threat to Germany’s democracy.”

Still, for all the Sonneberg residents who voted for the AfD’s candidate, Sesselmann—who did not respond to interview requests by Foreign Policy—there are almost as many people who did not. And unless it’s during the weekly Monday demonstrations, people don’t usually flaunt their political opinions. The day after the weekly protest, at a food stall selling bratwursts during the lunch hour, conversations revolved around work, the weather, increased food and energy prices, and even Germany’s reunification—“before it, everything was better,” several people agreed.

“In Sonneberg, many voted AfD out of spite, while others don’t take an interest in politics but cast their votes for the AfD regardless,” said Regina Müller, a 61-year-old Green Party voter who owns an organic store decorated with anti-war slogans.

But, she added, “what many here don’t see is that [the AfD] are wolves in sheep’s clothing.”

[tanadrin]

can't wait until they make a new EU currency bc the Euro's too devalued (not anytime soon but yknow. eventually.) and they call it the Neuro

IIRC from a macroeconomic perspective the Euro was a pretty big mistake. over such a large area with such a big wealth disparity, being able to devalue your currency to make exports cheaper is really important, and there aren't enough transfer payments to make up for the limits that a single currency places on macroeconomic policy. like, there are similarly-sized wealth disparities inside big countries like the US, but there are also a ton of transfer payments from the federal government that make up for the fact mississippi can't devalue its currency to entice people to buy more of its exports.

this is one of those problems that the eurozone crisis really highlighted, and is the reason why basically none of the countries which are theoretically obligated to adopt the euro have really done so since.

but it is nice not having to change money when you travel i guess!

[thoughtlessarse]

Recent developments in Germany and Hungary linked to irregular migration have cast serious doubts over the future of the Schengen Area. Is the Schengen Area, the passport-free zone that binds together 420 million people and represents one of the most tangible and recognisable achievements of European integration, in the throes of death? The question would have appeared radical a decade ago when the European Union was knee-deep in a financial crisis bending over backwards to salvage another of its greatest feats, the eurozone. Back then, Schengen was, if anything, a valued cushion to fall into to keep seamless trade going. But the mass arrival of asylum seekers in 2015 flipped the political agenda upside down and pushed migration to the very fore, opening a volatile, embittered conversation where governments gave priority to short-term measures to placate a furious electorate. Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden and Denmark were among those citing the unprecedented influx of migrants as a reason to re-introduce temporary checks at their borders, shattering the illusion that Schengen was untouchable. The COVID-19 pandemic dealt another blow to Schengen, with countries rushing to shut down borders in an attempt to contain the virus spread. Brussels thought that, once vaccination began and infections plunged, movement across the bloc would return to its normal state of seamlessness. The hope materialised, though not for long. The end of the health crisis prompted a steady rise in migration flows towards the EU, putting the combustive subject firmly back on the table. Asylum applications reached 1.12 million in 2023, the highest figure since 2016, and local authorities, from the Netherlands to Italy, complained reception centres were being overwhelmed. Support for hard- and far-right parties grew at the polls and the once-unthinkable idea of offshoring asylum procedures to faraway destinations went mainstream.

continue reading

[maaarine]

news coverage of Cop28 has been emphasizing the importance of the language used in the final agreement

so much so that one is left wondering if people at that summit spent entire days bickering about semantics while islands in the pacific are disappearing off the map because of sea rise

"should we say 'phase-out' or 'transition away', lads? we can't go for brunch until this is settled — come on Saudi Arabia, stop being such a cunt"

The Guardian:

I was reminded of Yanis Varoufakis' account of his meetings with the finance ministers of the eurozone, during the "debt crisis" that sank Greece

it was a constant negotiation over which words to use in communiqués, and it would have made me jump out the window had I been at those meetings

in that story it's Jeroen Dijsselbloem (Dutch finance minister at the time) who's the cunt

Adults in the Room: My Battle with the European and American Deep Establishment (Yanis Varoufakis, 2017)

"Instead of specificity, we were looking for language that was sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy both parties without exposing the rifts that remained between us. At this stage avoiding each side’s red lines was essential if there was to be any progress. Euclid reminded me of the term often credited to Henry Kissinger for this diplomatic technique: ‘constructive ambiguity’. (…) Christine Lagarde intervened. She acknowledged the Greek government’s right ‘to be heard’ and made some polite noises about our debt but without challenging Wolfgang. Thanks to her intervention a new adjective emerged as a possible substitute for ‘amended.’ ‘Would you commit to an adjusted programme?’ I was asked. Thinking on my feet, I decided to be flexible. It was a poor alternative – ‘adjustments’ implied the programme was fundamentally sound, whereas it was because the programme had failed and was impossible to complete that it needed real amendment – but we could accept this new adjective in return for a specific addition to the communiqué. In the spirit of cooperation with the Eurogroup, I said I could recommend to the Greek prime minister that we commit to completing an ‘adjusted programme’ as long as the communiqué also committed the Eurogroup to working with our government to address the humanitarian crisis that was now afflicting our people as a result of the programme. ‘I cannot accept this,’ Jeroen said. ‘The term “humanitarian crisis” is too political!’ ‘There is nothing more political, Jeroen,’ I snapped back, ‘than the attempt to overlook a humanitarian crisis because it would be too political to acknowledge it.’ It was clear that we were at an impasse."

[upcomingtradera]

[beardedmrbean]

GERB unveiled its management program, with party leader Boyko Borisov expressing readiness to negotiate with any party that acknowledges GERB's agenda after the June 9 elections. During the event, Borissov emphasized that the political crisis should be resolved with a comprehensive management mandate and a prominent political leader heading the cabinet.

Raya Nazaryan, the deputy chairperson of the GERB parliamentary group, described Borissov as the "brightest political figure," implying his candidacy for prime minister. This message is a key component of GERB's pre-election campaign, alongside the need to end "unsuccessful experiments," as stated by Tomislav Donchev. He reiterated that the leading political force would establish a government.

The management program highlights four factors for effective governance:

Ending the political crisis with a full management mandate

Establishing a government with political accountability

Ensuring reconciliation, stability, and consistent effort

Providing authentic leadership capable of making sound decisions

GERB's program focuses on six main areas: education and labor market, healthcare, modernization and digitalization, industrialization and infrastructure, security and defense, and legal reform.

Former Education Minister Krasimir Valchev declared education as the main priority, emphasizing the need for a long-term commitment. Key proposals include promoting dual education, funding student internships, and increasing student classes in businesses. Valchev stressed the importance of long-term parliaments to implement these reforms.

Other educational priorities include raising salaries for teachers and university professors above the national average, expanding nursery and kindergarten places, and renovating educational facilities.

In healthcare, GERB plans to establish a National Center for screening and preventing significant diseases, create a new National Program for transplants, and introduce telemedicine, mobile medical teams, and mobile pharmacies.

With a full four-year mandate, GERB promises full membership in Schengen, the Eurozone, and the OECD, GDP growth to 120 billion euros, and income growth to 75-80% of the European average. They propose a new Public-Private Partnership Law, 15 industrial parks, and easier land expropriation processes.

In digitization, GERB advocates for a digital identity law to replace electronic signatures, improved e-ticket sales services, and using artificial intelligence to address traffic congestion.

GERB also aims to introduce the concept of "water poverty," support for those in need, improve water quality, and encourage investments in renewable energy installations.

In legal reform, GERB pledges to continue anti-corruption efforts, adopt a new Penal Code, and introduce more restrictions for young drivers.

At the end of the program presentation, Boyko Borissov noted that the plans would remain unimplemented without clear governance partners. Although he didn't specify potential partners, DPS chairman Delyan Peevski later discouraged Borissov from planning to govern with "We Continue the Change," accusing them of financial misconduct.

Borissov criticized his former partners from "We Continue the Change - Democratic Bulgaria," accusing them of seeking new elections in the fall. He called for post-election unity among parties to advance the country's development, warning against continued political fragmentation.

[collapsedsquid]

“Das ist nicht fair.” That is not fair, the German chancellor said angrily, tears welling in her eyes. “Ich bringe mich nicht selbst um.” I am not going to commit suicide. For those who witnessed the breakdown in a small conference room in the French seaside resort of Cannes, it was shocking enough to watch Europe’s most powerful and emotionally controlled leader brought to tears. But the scene was even more remarkable, those present said, for the two objects of her ire: the man sitting next to her, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the other across the table, US President Barack Obama. It would be the low point in a brutal, recrimination-filled night, one many participants would recall as the nadir of the three-year eurozone crisis. Mr Sarkozy had hoped his leadership of the Group of 20 summit would cement his standing on the global stage en route to re-election. Instead, everything was falling apart. Greece was imploding politically; Italy, a country too big to bail out, appeared just days away from being cut off from global financial markets; and Ms Merkel, try as Mr Sarkozy and Mr Obama might, could not be convinced to increase German contributions to the eurozone’s “firewall” – the “big bazooka” or “wall of money” they believed had to grow dramatically to fend off attacks by panicking bond traders. Instead, a cornered Ms Merkel threw the French and American criticism back in their faces. If Mr Sarkozy or Mr Obama did not like the way her government ran, they had only themselves to blame. After all, it was their allied militaries that had “imposed” the German constitution on a defeated wartime foe six decades earlier.

If only the allies had kept germany a dictatorship?

[fuzzysparrow]

Who did Angela Merkel succeed as Chancellor of Germany in 2005?

Gerhard Schröder (born 1944) is a German politician who served as the Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005. Schröder began his political career in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and was elected to the Bundestag in 1980.

Schröder's time as Chancellor was marked by significant reforms, including labour market and welfare reforms, as well as the introduction of the euro currency. He also played a key role in Germany's response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, supporting the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

However, Schröder's tenure was also marked by controversy, particularly his close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his support for the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine and Poland and goes directly from Russia to Germany. Critics argue that this pipeline undermines European energy security and strengthens Russia's geopolitical influence.

Schröder left politics in 2005 and was replaced by Angela Merkel (born 1954), who served as the Chancellor of Germany until 2021. Merkel's time as Chancellor was marked by her leadership during the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis. She also played a key role in strengthening Germany's relationships with other European countries and the United States. Merkel is widely respected for her leadership and is known for her commitment to human rights and environmental protection.

[aroundtheworldiej]

The impact of the British Newspaper

By Tom Courrel

Although the importance of the British press has declined recently, mostly because of the rise of new ways to inform and the expand of television news channels, the major British dailies continue to play a significant role in shaping public opinion in Britain.

Source : Googlelmages

During the Thatcher years, the daily circulation of The Sun was close to, and at times exceeded, four million copies. About 50% more than the sales of 2012.

It's great rival for popular readership : The Daily Mirror, at it's peak in the mid-1960s, sold over 5 millions copies per day. In the 2000's, The Daily Telegraph and The Daily Express still sell over one million copies. With such figures, the power of influence of the major dailies and Sunday papers was huge. 

In 1992, The Sun boasted on it's front page that it had prevented a Labour Party victory in the general election. Five years later, the same paper called for a Labour vote, and facilitated (but certainly did not make possible) Tony Blair's victory. The reversal of the rather conservative paper was probably linked to it's populist line, and it's desire to maintain influence on the British government at a time when Blair was at the highest of his popularity. A successful gamble if Tony Blair's words to the Leveson Inquiry are anything to go by.

Brexit and eurosceptism

The British Conservative press is largely in the hands of foreign or non-UK domiciled owners or Eurosceptic groups, who have made Europe a scapegoat for all problems over the years. Given this constant bad press, the British have for long been unenthusiastic about the European Union. Since 2011, the Euro crisis has allowed much of the populist press to justify their positions by pointing to the "wastefulness" of Brussels, the economic incompetence of some countries, and the good sense of the British who chose to stay out of the Eurozone. On the other hand, the successes and achievements of European integration have often been overlooked.

Source : Googlelmages

Since the Brexit, to which it largely contributed, the right-wing populist press, in particular The Mail and The Express, has been raging against everyone. Parliamentarians, elected representatives, associations, other newspapers, parties, economists, and ordinary citizens who point out that the Brexit is not irreversible and who highlight it's harmful consequences for Britain.

Compared to the audiovisual media, the written press often provides more detailed information, and because of it's written form it allows the reader to remain active in his or her search for information and therefore to have a certain critical distance from event.  

[ifreakingloveroyals]

Through the Years → Felipe VI of Spain (1,330/∞)

16 November 2012 | King Juan Carlos of Spain, and his son, Prince Felipe of Spain, during the opening ceremony of the XXII Ibero-American Summit at Falla Theatre in Cadiz, Spain. The 22nd Ibero-American Summit is Mariano Rajoy's first as President of Spain and will be attended by 16 Foreign Affairs ministers. The main issues of the meeting will be the economic crisis and how Latin American countries can contribute to the Eurozone recovery. (Photo by Pablo Blazquez Dominguez/Getty Images)

[mariacallous]

In a move that left political observers scratching their heads, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently called early elections for July 23, five months ahead of schedule. Sánchez cited his left-wing coalition’s poor performance in May 28 local and regional elections as the impetus for his decision, taking personal responsibility for defeats by the conservative opposition. “Spaniards should clarify which political forces they want to take the lead,” Sánchez said after the results were announced.

By moving up the national vote, Sánchez is sacrificing valuable campaign time that could allow him to shore up his base and attack the opposition. He also risks angering the public by dominating the summer with what is expected to be an intensely fought political campaign; Spain has never before held a general election in the middle of the season, raising concerns about low turnout.

At first glance, Sánchez’s decision to call for early elections seems baffling—and potentially self-defeating. But there is a fair bit of strategy behind his decision.

Sánchez leads the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, or PSOE, which has ruled Spain longer than any other party since the country became a democracy in 1977 following the death of its longtime dictator, Gen. Francisco Franco. The party has been the engine behind Spain’s most important political, economic, and social changes over the years. PSOE’s accomplishments include shaping key provisions in Spain’s democratic constitution that was enacted by a 1978 referendum, such as a stipulation allowing for regional self-governance; guiding the country’s 1986 accession to the European Economic Community, a precursor to the European Union; and ushering in a revolution in social rights, including legalizing divorce, abortion, gay marriage, and euthanasia.

The PSOE has kept social democracy a viable political force in Spain at a time when it has struggled for relevance elsewhere in Western Europe. While social democratic parties in Italy, France, and Germany have in recent years either collapsed or become shadows of their former selves, the PSOE has thrived by shifting right on the economy—embracing some austerity measures—while pushing hard on cultural issues like LGBTQ+ rights, social justice, and gender parity.

Sánchez has been in power since 2018, following the ouster of then-Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy—a member of the conservative People’s Party (PP)—by a no-confidence vote triggered by a party-wide corruption scandal. That year, Sánchez made history in Spain by introducing a female-dominated cabinet. He then won a general election in November 2019 and was able to form a coalition with an electoral alliance led by Podemos, a left-wing populist party. It was Spain’s first coalition government since re-democratization.

For many voters, the prime minister has lost the luster of his initial years in office. A big culprit is COVID-19. Spain was hit especially hard by the pandemic, forcing Sánchez to implement one of Europe’s strictest lockdowns. Although an economic recovery is underway—Spain’s economy is projected to grow faster this year than the Eurozone average—this statistic is of little consolation to those hit by inflation and other economic ills. Sánchez also has yet to solve the Catalonia crisis: The prime minister has been willing to engage in negotiations with the region’s separatists but has refused to offer them the official independence referendum they seek.

Now, Sánchez hopes to use early elections to stop the political bleeding from his base—and prevent an implosion of his left-wing coalition. In the May 28 local and regional elections, the PSOE and Podemos sustained losses virtually everywhere, including in traditional strongholds such as Valencia and Andalusia.

Most observers expect a tight national race between the PSOE and the PP, and some polls show the PP ahead. The PP is benefiting from new leadership in the form of Alberto Núñez Feijóo, a former president of the Galicia region. Feijóo took over the party after the scandal-prone and divisive leadership of Pablo Casado, Sánchez’s principal opponent in the 2019 general elections. But polls indicate the PP will not be able to form a government without support from the far-right Vox party, which is currently registering a little over 10 percent in national opinion surveys. By calling early elections and catching the PP off guard, Sánchez believes he can weaken his conservative opponents as they deliberate on how to approach Vox.

Vox currently controls 52 seats in the Spanish Congress of Deputies—the third-largest force in that chamber—and, like most far-right parties, is extremely controversial. The party opposes LGBTQ+ rights, gender parity, and ongoing efforts to help Spain cope with the dark legacies of the Franco period. In particular, Vox has called for revoking the Law of Historical Memory, a landmark piece of legislation the PSOE enacted in 2007 that offered reparations to the victims of the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s political repression and deemed Franco’s regime illegitimate; and the 2022 Democratic Memory Law, which voided all court rulings issued under the old dictatorship, compelled the government to exhume the remains of those killed during the Civil War and the dictatorship and buried in mass graves, and banned the Francisco Franco National Foundation, which had promoted Franco’s legacy in democratic Spain. Vox has deemed both laws divisive and an attempt to rewrite history.

Vox’s political platform also includes erecting a wall around Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in northern Africa that have become flashpoints in EU migration policy. Even more controversial is Vox’s proposal to hold a national referendum to ban separatist parties, such as the Republican Left of Catalonia, one of the parties responsible for the illegal 2017 referendum on Catalan independence. Banning separatist parties would likely be illegal, since Spanish law only allows for barring parties involved in criminal activity. (In the post-Franco era, only one party has been banned by the courts: Batasuna, the political wing of the Basque terrorist organization ETA, in 2003.)

There is little sign that Vox intends to moderate its stances going into the elections. “Kicking out Pedro Sánchez to repeal each and every one of his policies” will be the party’s focus, Santiago Abascal, Vox’s leader, said in reaction to the prime minister’s call for early elections. Feijóo, who hails from the moderate wing of the PP, is wary of embracing Vox. But he is also refusing to say whether he would welcome Vox as a political partner, knowing that he might need the party to form a government. As a sign that Feijóo might welcome a national coalition with Vox, he last year approved Vox’s entry into a coalition with the PP to govern the conservative region of Castilla y León in north-central Spain.

On the campaign trail, Sánchez is working overtime to tie Feijóo to Vox. Sánchez is also ramping up his rhetoric about the danger a Vox entry into national government would pose for Spain, even as a junior partner to the more moderate PP. He has warned that Vox could undo or weaken legal protections for abortion and same-sex marriage and rekindle the country’s fascist past. He has even framed the upcoming election as a choice between democracy and autocracy, referencing recent elections in the United States and Brazil. “Spaniards need to decide if they want a government on the side of Biden or Trump,” Sánchez told PSOE members when justifying his call for early elections.

Sánchez is hoping that early elections will help consolidate Spain’s left—the only way he could win reelection. His strategy is already working: Podemos and Sumar—another progressive left-wing party—announced on June 9 that they will run as a single entity along with 13 other left-wing parties. The deal was struck just hours before political parties were required to register for the July 23 elections.

Sumar is an offshoot of Podemos and is a part of Sánchez’s coalition. Its leader, Yolanda Díaz, is Sánchez’s minister of labor and Spain’s most popular politician. She is credited with negotiating a popular pandemic-era program that kept as many as 7 million Spaniards dependent on the state for their income, including furloughed workers and those on medical leave. She also spearheaded Spain’s 2022 labor reform, which cracked down on short-term contracts and secured new union protections. Díaz and other progressives in the Sánchez government are credited with securing the “Iberian exception,” which allows Spain and Portugal to cap electricity prices rather than tie them to the free market—something no other EU member states are permitted to do.

In pressuring Podemos and Sumar to run together, Sánchez hopes to overwhelm any possible coalition the PP could form after the elections. Spain’s electoral law rewards large parties and intraparty coalitions. A poll from El País found that if Sumar and Podemos ran separately, they would win 26 and 3 parliamentary seats, respectively, while a unified platform would net 41 seats—vastly improving the prospects of the left remaining in power.

Undoubtedly, winning reelection will be Sánchez’s biggest challenge to date. He is facing an emboldened right, a splintered left, and restless separatists. But he should not be underestimated. Sánchez’s political obituary has been written before, most notably in 2016, when he was removed from his position as PSOE president. He regained the position a year later and rose to power in 2018. Shortly thereafter, he survived a Catalan separatist attempt to sink his government by forcing him into new elections. It is within him to pull off another victory.

[head-post]

Bulgaria considers leaving EU, joining BRICS

Bulgaria’s Revival party urged the country to leave the European Union and become a member of BRICS, according to Euractiv.

On Wednesday, Revival called for a referendum to delay the country’s membership of the eurozone until at least 2043. However, the pro-European formations GERB, PP-DB, and MRF rejected the proposal to undermine Bulgaria’s full integration into the EU.

The debate took place ahead of the next parliamentary elections, which would be held on 27 October. Revival leader Kostadin Kostadinov risked and explicitly called for Bulgaria to withdraw from the EU and NATO.

If we want to have a future, we have no place in these agonising structures, which are the EU in this format and NATO. If the EU is not reformed, we must leave it because we will not die with it.

The party’s new electoral thesis is that Bulgaria should become a member of BRICS. Revival also started sending its representatives to the organisation’s forums.

Meanwhile, most experts say that a realistic deadline for Bulgaria to join the eurozone is not earlier than 2026 due to the ongoing political crisis in the country. According to the latest polls, Bulgarians are split 50-50 in favour of adopting the euro, with the main concern being price increases.

The latest World Bank data shows that Bulgaria’s GDP per capita is higher than that of any BRICS country except the oil-rich UAE. Although Sofia still has the lowest GDP per capita in the EU. Revival MP Tsoncho Ganev stated:

You dare to say that the Bulgarian people are not competent to make such decisions. Do you hear what you are saying? the Bulgarian people are competent to make such a decision.

Read more HERE