#fhlb

[jrwiyuri]

I hope porter kills himself

[peronasghosts]

“the line between an oath and rage is thin.” <-only thing porter’s ever said that i like. that concept fucks

[esthersinclair]

UM WHY WOULD GRIX CAST DISINTEGRATE ON RUBEN ??

[poly-mechanisms]

THATS WHAT THE MAIDEN DETECTOR SPELL WAS FOR HOLY SHIT

whatever is required to put the girls in the palimpsest probably involves them being virgins thats why alewyn made the maiden detector spell and thats why penelope was being weird af and asking zelda if she had hooked up with gorgug holy fuck

[lingwenboobs]

fraz.....the mean....mn ok yeah shore

[dykes4timrand]

i love pvp so much. i think baron should get gorgug next so we can see some freaky mad scientist shit

[alanianatkinson]

C.R.M.: CENDOL, ROJAK & MURUKU

Jeannie made a quick stop to get some snacks before heading to Giant in Subang Jaya. She also bought cendol and rojak. The author, Alan Ian Atkinson, started with the ice cool dessert... Malaysians enjoy these snacks.

Sitting here, in the car, just next to the Mydin hypermarket in Subang Jaya ; waiting for Jeannie who just dashed into Giant, the big grocery store to pick up a couple of things. Time limit: none. Jeannie popped in at Mydin for “C.R.M.“: to pick up some of our favourite snacks before going over to Giant.. The snacks, under the brand, “Mr. Muruku”, are more popularly made by Indians. Malaysians…

[collapsedsquid]

One obvious question is: If you are “another, healthy bank” working through this weekend to buy SVB and assume its deposits, how much would you pay for the assets, which were worth $212 billion in December? [8] I am pretty sure the answer is higher than $8 billion, the amount of insured deposits: The FDIC will not be on the hook for the insured deposits. The $15 billion of FHLB advances are also quite senior and will presumably be no problem to pay back.

I would also guess — not investing or banking advice! — that the answer will also turn out to be higher than $188 billion, which is the total amount of deposits plus FHLB advances. I say this not because I have done a detailed analysis of SVB’s assets but because it seems bad for the FDIC to wind up a big high-profile bank in a way that causes significant losses for depositors, including uninsured depositors. There was a run on SVB in part because there hasn’t been a big bank run in a while, and people — venture capitalists, startups — were naturally worried that they might lose their deposits if their bank failed. Then the bank failed.

If it turns out to be true that they lose their deposits, there could be more bank runs: Lots of businesses keep uninsured deposits at lots of banks, and if the moral of SVB is “your uninsured transaction-banking deposits can vanish overnight” then those businesses will do a lot more credit analysis, move their money out of weaker banks, and put it at, like, JPMorgan. This could be self-fulfillingly bad for a lot of weaker banks. My assumption is that the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the banks who are looking at buying SVB all really don’t want that. If you are a bank looking at buying SVB, and you do a detailed analysis of its assets and conclude that they are worth $180 billion, and you come to the FDIC and say “I will take over this bank and pay the uninsured depositors 95 cents on the dollar,” the FDIC is going to look at you and say “don’t you mean 100 cents on the dollar,” and you are going to say “oh right yes of course, silly me, 100 cents on the dollar.”

Love that private banks exist with this pretense that they compete in and are disciplined by the free market.

[sataniccapitalist]

[mariacallous]

Editor's Note: A version of this op-ed was originally published by MarketWatch on March 15, 2023.

The failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is a failure of supervision as well as regulation. The two terms are used interchangeably but are different concepts: Regulation is about creating rules, supervision enforcing them. Initial reactions to SVB’s failure focused on debating whether the Trump era deregulation caused the failure, ignoring the fundamental question of whether the rules that existed were being properly enforced. The answer is that they weren’t and that the Federal Reserve failed as a bank supervisor.

The Fed supervised SVB from head to toe, with the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank in charge of both the bank and its larger parent holding company. SVB was the largest bank the SF Fed supervised. SVB’s CEO even sat on the SF Fed’s Board of Directors up until the day the bank failed. I count at least four classic red flags of the bank’s conduct that should have sent the alarm bells ringing, which the Fed appears to have slept through.

Explosive asset growth. SVB nearly quadrupled in assets in four years.

Hyper reliance on uninsured deposits. Almost all (97%) of the deposits at the bank were from customers with more than the FDIC’s limit ($250,000), often tech firms. Uninsured depositors are more likely to run, making the bank inherently less stable.

Huge interest rate risk. During the 2019-2021 period of explosive growth, SVB bought over $100 billion of mortgage backed securities issued at low interest rates. They failed to buy hedges to protect their value if interest rates rose.

Dash for cash to the Federal Home Loan Bank. As SVB needed cash they used the arcane Federal Home Loan Bank system to borrow heavily becoming the SF FHLB’s top borrower with $20 billion. The FHLB is called the lender of next to last resort, and when a bank fails the FHLB is the only entity that gets paid out ahead of the FDIC. Thus, the more in debt a bank is to the FHLB, the greater the losses born by the taxpayer if the bank fails.

Each of these red flags should have triggered greater scrutiny from the Federal Reserve. Combined, they become a red laser beam screaming for greater scrutiny. After all, SVB is not a Main Street bank and never was. Regional banks of its size ($200B) have around 1,000 branches: SVB had 16.  This does not even include more potential red flags about the relationship between SVB’s venture capital arm and the bank’s customer base, a potential red flag the Fed’s regulation of the bank holding company should have analyzed.

The Fed has already launched an inquiry into its own failure, but that is likely to be insufficient. Past Fed self investigations of failures of its regional banks failed to discover leaked information by the Richmond Bank president (the FBI found it and he resigned in disgrace) and failed to publicly disclose dates of unethical trading by both the Dallas and Boston Bank presidents.

The Fed is ultimately accountable to Congress. Congress needs to investigate what happened with its own investigation. Simply asking the Fed Regional Banks to fix themselves will likely be insufficient. A law requiring the Fed to integrate their boards passed in the 1970s was widely ignored; the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank did not integrate its all white Board until 1992.

Improving Fed governance is important but insufficient. Bank regulators guard their supervisory reports from the public, so we never know what conditions the banks are in or whether the regulators are doing a good job. Bank regulators should make these reports known as CAMELS public so that we can all judge both how the banks are doing and how well the agencies are supervising them. Learning what grade the SF Fed gave SVB would go a long way to understanding how badly they mis-supervised the bank.

Congress writes financial regulation with two possible outcomes: setting specific rules in law or empowering regulators to figure out the details. In both cases Congress relies on regulators to enforce the rules. Congress cannot legislate judgement or competence. Our current financial regulatory system places substantial confidence in the judgement and competence of bank regulators, particularly the most powerful: the Federal Reserve. In the case of Silicon Valley Bank that was misplaced.

The Fed has continually been tasked with more responsibility as monetary policy setter, bank regulator, lender of last resort, payment system operator and regulator, producer of economic research and statistics, and more. Perhaps it is time to fundamentally re-think the role of the central bank. An oft forgotten fact is that Senator Dodd’s original proposal, in the law that became Dodd-Frank, envisioned moving regulation of banks like SVB out of the Fed. That idea was voted down 91-9 and the law ultimately expanded the Fed’s authority and power over the nation’s banking system. In the case of Silicon Valley Bank, that has been a failure.

[jrwiyuri]

WHY has this bitch been a hater since day one for RIZ of all people 😭😭

[peronasghosts]

fabian should end fhjy using she/her pronouns

[cointahmin]

ABD’deki bankacılık krizinin ikinci dalgası konuşulurken, JPMorgan yöneticisinden olaylara dair açıklama geldi.JPMorgan Asset Management’ın CIO’su, “Bunun yalnızca First Republic ile sonlu olduğunu söylemenin saflık” olacağını söyledi. CIO’ya nazaran kriz yalnızca tek bankada yok.JPMorgan Yöneticisi Bankacılık Krizinin Derinleşeceğini DüşünüyorABD’de geçtiğimiz aylarda yaşanan bankacılık krizinin tesirleri hala atlatılamamışken, kriz derinleşiyor. Silicon Valley Bank ve Signature Bank’in akabinde First Republic Bank de meseleler yaşıyor.JPMorgan Asset Management’taki bir yönetici, Federal Mevduat Sigorta Şirketi (FDIC) ve Federal Konut Kredisi Bankası (FHLB) acil kredi programları sona erdiğinde daha fazla bankanın sorun yaşayabileceğini söyledi.JPMorgan yöneticisi, 27 Nisan Bloomberg televizyon röportajında açıklamalarda bulundu. JPMorgan Asset Management CIO’su Bob Michele, First Republic’in değerli mevduat çıkışlarından kaynaklanan likidite sıkıntılarının tesirinin yalnızca bankanın kendisi ile hudutlu olmadığını, bu durumun bankacılık bölümünü etkileyebileceğini aktardı.Michele, bunu “First Republic sorunu mu yoksa bankacılık sorunu” olarak mı gördüğü sorulduğunda şu tabirleri kullandı:“Bunun First Republic ile sonlu olduğunu söylemek biraz saflık olur.”

[todaynowreport]

First Republic’s crisis is not an isolated incident: JPMorgan exec

An executive at J.P. Morgan Asset Management is unsure how United States regional banks are “going to operate” when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) emergency lending programs expire, warning that the possible collapse of First Republic Bank may cause a domino effect. In an April 27 Bloomberg television interview, Bob Michele, the chief…

[poly-mechanisms]

ITS ACTUALLY HIS DAD??? HOLY FUCK

WHAT AN INSANE PAYOFF TO A DUMB FUCKING BIT

[lingwenboobs]

HANGMAN GOT JUMPED BY GNOMES