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#korean centrifugation market
123567-9qaaq9 · 5 months
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Korea Centrifugation Market Future Trends to Look Out | Bis Research
Korean  Centrifugation itself refers to a process where centrifugal force is used to separate substances of different densities in a solution. 
Korea Centrifugation Overview 
Centrifugation technology in Korea encompasses a wide range of applications across various industries, including biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, food processing, and environmental science. 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals: Centrifugation plays a crucial role in biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries for tasks such as cell separation, protein purification, and DNA isolation
Food Processing: In the food industry, centrifugation is used for separating solids from liquids, clarifying juices, extracting oils, and refining various food products. 
Korea Centrifugation Market Trends and Drivers
Increasing Diagnosis of Diseases 
Increased Usage of Centrifugation Devices for Diagnosis 
Drug Development  
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Market Segmentation
Segmentation 1: by Product
Segmentation 2: by Model Type
Segmentation 3: by Application
Key Market Players 
Agilent Technologies, Inc.
Andreas Hettich GmbH & Co. KG
ARI Medical Technology Co., Ltd.
Biolab Scientific
Bioneer Corporation
And many others 
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Types of Korea Centrifugation  Market
Ultracentrifuges
High-Speed Centrifuges
Microcentrifuges
Tabletop Centrifuges
Floor-Standing Centrifuges
Refrigerated Centrifuges
Preparative Centrifuges
Recent Developments in the Korea Centrifugation Market
• In April 2023, Eppendorf, a prominent life science company, unveiled the Centrifuge 5427 R, marking the introduction of Eppendorf's inaugural microcentrifuge equipped with hydrocarbon cooling. This innovation contributes to fostering a more sustainable laboratory environment. Through this advancement, users had the capability to conduct a diverse range of molecular and cell biology applications using a refrigerated device that incorporated a natural cooling agent boasting a nearly zero Global Warming Potential (GWP). The primary goal was to safeguard both samples and the planet.
•In February 2022, Beckman Coulter Life Sciences introduced its most versatile 3-liter benchtop centrifuge to date, the Allegra V-15R refrigerated centrifuge. It featured 10 rotor configurations and 50 programmable runs, along with a comprehensive array of adapters, allowing for a wide range of workflows and applications. These capabilities extended from cell and blood separation to high-throughput screening.
Visit our LifeSciences and Biopharma page click here ! 
Key Question Answers 
Q  What is the regulatory framework in the Korea centrifugation market?
Q What are the key trends and the impact of COVID-19 on the Korea centrifugation market?
Q What are the major market drivers, challenges, and opportunities in the Korea centrifugation market?
Q How is each product segment of the Korea centrifugation market expected to grow during the forecast period 2023-2033, and what is the anticipated revenue generated by each of the segments by the end of 2033?
Conclusion 
Korea Centrifugation markets are machines used in various industries to separate components of a heterogeneous mixture by spinning it at high speeds. They utilize centrifugal force to separate substances based on their density, size, or viscosity. 
They are crucial for processes like clarification, separation, and purification of substances, offering efficiency and scalability in industrial operations.
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appliancesreviews · 5 years
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Innovative Tribest GS-P502 Greenstar Pro Commercial Masticating Juicer
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As known, the healthy eating is one of the popular trends of modern life. Of course, the use of fresh juices occupy a worthy place in this list. Therefore, juicers are very popular among fans of a healthy lifestyle. Therefore, today the market offers an abundance of different juicers. Relatively recently, centrifugal juicers dominated because of its simplicity and low prices. But they have a significant drawback. According to most experts, oxidation and high temperature due to the high rotation speed during juicing significantly reduce its beneficial properties, destroying the vitamins in the finished drink. Of course, low-speed masticating models do not have this significant drawback. As a result, their popularity has grown rapidly in recent years. The South Korean Tribest company is one of the leaders in this segment, regularly offering new models. 2018 is no exception. The company offered an innovative Tribest GreenStar Pro GS-P502 juicer.
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Of course, the design of the juicer is much easier compared to, for example, TVs or coffee machines, which have wide possibilities of using digital technologies or other innovative solutions. Nevertheless, engineers find opportunities to improve even such relatively simple equipment. The list of these trends includes the device quality, its functionality, efficiency and usability. Of course, these factors directly affect the choice of the optimal model.
Twin gears
Of course, they directly affect the efficiency and reliability of any juicer. Therefore, the company pays a lot of attention to improving this element. As a consequence, GS-P502 uses innovative stainless steel twin gears.
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Advanced heavy duty twin gears extend the juicing process from two to three stages, including crushing, mixing and pressing. This algorithm increases the juicing efficiency. Powerful 165W motor provides slow 110 rpm cold press juice extraction for minimal oxidation. Additionally, the model supports innovative bioceramic and magnetic technology for preserving living enzymes and vitamins, preventing nutrient degradation and extending shelf-life. This technology uses special neodymium magnets of natural origin, which are embedded into gears. According to the company, magnets increase the extraction degree of useful minerals from fruits and vegetables during juicing. Magnets are sealed using a unique bioceramic material with a powdery consistency. In the future, the magnetic field around them stabilize the drink. The magnets face each other with opposite poles to create active ions during gears rotation. Charged particles improve the preservation of enzymes, vitamins, macro- and microelements, and also remove from fruit and vegetables up to 90% of chemicals and heavy metals. All these factors lengthen the shelf-life of the finished juice in the refrigerator. Probably, some consumers may interpret these statements as a marketing ploy. Unfortunately, today there is no refutation or confirmation of these statements from independent experts. Of course, the remaining aspects of the new items also correspond to the highest level. Model has excellent versatility due to a wide range of various accessories, simple and convenient control, and supports reverse.
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Testing
Of course, the power consumption depends on the products and varies in the range from 130 to 170 W. The noise level is much lower compared to the work of traditional centrifugal juicers. The maximum time for continuous operation was 30 minutes. The test results showed the following results: - carrot - 140-170 W, absolutely dry cake, juice with a rich taste and color, 559 grams of juice from 1 kg in 5 min and 28 sec.
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- Granny Smith apples - 125-135 W, clear juice with a rich taste, 798 grams of juice from 1 kg in 4 min and 27 sec.
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- soft pink grapefruits with finely meshed mesh - complex juicing using reverse, 770 grams of juice from 1 kg in 8 min and 15 sec; - soft pink grapefruits with a filter with large holes - quick simple juicing, 800 grams of juice from 1 kg in 3 min and 5 sec; - cabbage - absolutely dry cake, clean juice without pulp, but a lot of foam, 782 grams of juice in 12 min and 15 sec. These great results exceed the performance of last year’s leader, the Panasonic MJ-L500. Test results with other products, including beets, greens, nuts and beans, are also very high.
Conclusion
PROS - very high efficiency of juice extraction even from greens and solid ingredients; - great warranty. The 15-year warranty for household use and 3-year warranty for commercial use strongly confirms the company's confidence in the quality of its products. - simple assembly; - express cleaning; - additional functions, including grinding, preparation of sorbet, breadsticks, noodles and mochi. CONS - very high cost, which ranges from $ 750 to $ 800; - time-consuming cleaning when juice falls on the gears. This video demonstrates simple and convenient filter cleaning with scraper attachment. Read the full article
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coolyagogato-blog · 5 years
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Global  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Industry 2019 Market Growth, Trends and Demands Research Report
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The report presents an in-depth assessment of the  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed including enabling technologies, key trends, market drivers, challenges, standardization, regulatory landscape, deployment models, operator case studies, opportunities, future roadmap, value chain, ecosystem player profiles and strategies. The report also presents forecasts for   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  investments from 2019 till 2024.
Development of   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed /devices deals with the design, fabrication and characterization of   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  technology across various   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  application. Current research & development is majorly focused on developing   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  for applications such as telecommunication, consumer electronics and healthcare.
The report presents the market competitive landscape and a corresponding detailed analysis of the major vendor/key players in the market. Top Companies in the Global   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market:Arla,    Bulla,    Dairy Farmers,    Emborg,    Lactalis,    Paysan Breton,    Cream of Creams,    Kraft,    Fonterra Foodservices,    YUMMY,    PT Ultrajaya Milk Industry Tbk,    Saputo .
 Click the link to get a free Sample Copy of the Report: https://www.acquiremarketresearch.com/sample-request/8360/
 Cream is a dairy product composed of the higher-butterfat layer skimmed from the top of milk before homogenization. In un-homogenized milk, the fat, which is less dense, will eventually rise to the top. In the industrial production of cream, this process is accelerated by using centrifuges called "separators". In many countries, cream is sold in several grades depending on the total butterfat content. Cream can be dried to a powder for shipment to distant markets. Cream has high levels of saturated fat.
Generally, cheese can be classified into natural cheese, process cheese and cheese power. Global cheese slow growth in recent years, according to the US Department of Agriculture, the consumption of cheese is about 58 million MT in 2015. Natural cheese dominated global cheese market. In Southeast Asia and Korea, the consumption of natural cheese and process cheese depend on consumption levels, living habit, etc.
With the growing interest of South Korean consumers in Western food, the demand for a wider variety of cheese has increased. In addition, to satisfy the growing demand, manufacturers have extended their assortments by introducing various cheese types and products, including imported varieties. In South Korea, domestic companies dominated natural cheese consumption market. Three major domestic companies are Seoul Dairy Cooperative, Sangha Co Ltd, and Dongwon Dairy Food Co Ltd.
The worldwide market for Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Cheese is expected to grow at a CAGR of roughly xx% over the next five years, will reach xx million US$ in 2024, from xx million US$ in 2019, according to a new   study.
This report focuses on the Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Cheese in global market, especially in North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific, South America, Middle East and Africa. This report categorizes the market based on manufacturers, regions, type and application.
 Global  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Market Split by Product Type and Applications:
This   report   segments the global   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market based on Types are:
Natural Cheese,   Process Cheese
 On the basis of Application, the Global   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market is segmented into:
  Food Services, Industrial, Retail.
Regional Analysis for  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Market:
For comprehensive understanding of market dynamics, the global   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market is analyzed across key geographies namely: United States, China, Europe, Japan, South-east Asia, India and others. Each of these regions is analyzed on basis of market findings across major countries in these regions for a macro-level understanding of the market.
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 Influence of the  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed Market report:
-Comprehensive assessment of all opportunities and risk in the   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market.
-  Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market recent innovations and major events.
-Detailed study of business strategies for growth of the   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market-leading players.
-Conclusive study about the growth plot of   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market for forthcoming years.
-In-depth understanding of   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market-particular drivers, constraints and major micro markets.
-Favorable impression inside vital technological and market latest trends striking the   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market.
 The report has 150 tables and figures browse the report description and TOC: https://www.acquiremarketresearch.com/industry-reports/cream-and-cream-cheese-and-processed-cheese-market/8360/
What are the market factors that are explained in the report?
-Key Strategic Developments: The study also includes the key strategic developments of the market, comprising R&D, new product launch, M&A, agreements, collaborations, partnerships, joint ventures, and regional growth of the leading competitors operating in the market on a global and regional scale.
-Key Market Features: The report evaluated key market features, including revenue, price, capacity, capacity utilization rate, gross, production, production rate, consumption, import/export, supply/demand, cost, market share, CAGR, and gross margin. In addition, the study offers a comprehensive study of the key market dynamics and their latest trends, along with pertinent market segments and sub-segments.
-Analytical Tools: The Global   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market report includes the accurately studied and assessed data of the key industry players and their scope in the market by means of a number of analytical tools. The analytical tools such as Porter’s five forces analysis, feasibility study, and investment return analysis have been used to analyze the growth of the key players operating in the market.
Finally,   Cream and Cream Cheese & Processed  Market report is the believable source for gaining the Market research that will exponentially accelerate your business. The report gives the principle locale, economic situations with the item value, benefit, limit, generation, supply, request and Market development rate and figure and so on. This report additionally Present new task SWOT examination, speculation attainability investigation, and venture return investigation.
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newstfionline · 7 years
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North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal Threatens China’s Path to Power
By Jane Perlez, NY Times, Sept. 5, 2017
BEIJING--The two men stood together on the reviewing stand in the North Korean capital: a top official in China’s Communist leadership wearing a tailored business suit and a young dictator in a blue jacket buttoned to his chin.
Liu Yunshan, the visiting Chinese dignitary, and Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, tried to put on a show of friendship, chatting amiably as the cameras rolled, but just as often they stood silent, staring ahead as a military parade passed before them.
Nearly two years have elapsed since that encounter, the last high-level visit between China and North Korea. The stretch of time is a sign of the distance between two nations with a torturous history: one a rising power seeking regional dominance, the other an unpredictable neighbor with its own ambitions.
China has made little secret of its long-term goal to replace the United States as the major power in Asia and assume what it considers its rightful position at the center of the fastest-growing, most dynamic region in the world.
But North Korea, which defied Beijing by testing a sixth nuclear bomb on Sunday, has emerged as an unexpected and persistent obstacle.
Other major hurdles litter China’s path. Yet North Korea--an outcast of the international order that Beijing hopes to lead, but also a nuclear state in part because of China’s own policies--presents a particularly nettlesome challenge.
China’s path to dominance requires an American withdrawal and a message to American allies that they cannot count on the United States for protection. But North Korea threatens to draw the United States more deeply into the region and complicate China’s effort to diminish its influence and persuade countries to live without its nuclear umbrella.
At the same time, the strategic location of the North--and its advancing nuclear capabilities--make it dangerous for China to restrain it.
“North Korea may not be the biggest problem to China, but it does add a unique and very serious dimension to China’s task of supplanting America in East Asia,” said Hugh White, a former strategist for the Australian Defense Department. “That’s because it is the only East Asian power with nuclear weapons.”
Even if the United States steps back from the region, Mr. White added, “North Korea’s capability means China can never be able to dominate the region as much as its leaders today probably hope.”
The Trump administration has bet on China to stop North Korea’s nuclear program, shunning talks with Mr. Kim and gambling that Beijing can be persuaded to use its economic leverage over the North to rein it in.
But in doing so, the White House may be misreading the complexity of China’s relationship with North Korea, one that successive generations of Chinese leaders have struggled to manage.
There is growing resentment against Mr. Kim inside China, both in the general public and the policy establishment. China keeps North Korea running with oil shipments and accounts for almost all its foreign trade. But to many Chinese, the young leader seems ungrateful.
A three-day academic seminar in Shanghai last month brought together some critics, who question North Korea’s value to Beijing as a strategic buffer against South Korea and Japan--and warn that the North could prompt them to develop nuclear weapons of their own.
“The cost is to continue to alienate Japan, enrage the United States and irritate South Korea,” said Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University. “If Japan and South Korea feel forced to go for radical options like nuclear weapons, it will badly affect regional diplomacy.”
The spread of nuclear weapons, he added, would thrust China into “a new Cold War” in Asia, perhaps with a beefed-up American military presence. That would frustrate Beijing’s ambitions for regional supremacy while also leaving it vulnerable to being labeled an enabler of nuclear proliferation, tarnishing its international reputation.
“A balance of mutually assured destruction in Northeast Asia will not be a satisfactory situation for anyone,” said Bilahari Kausikan, a former foreign secretary for Singapore. “But it will not necessarily be unstable, and it may be of some small consolation to Washington, Tokyo and Seoul that the implications for Beijing are somewhat worse.”
President Xi Jinping is said to be aware of such risks and to have privately expressed disdain for Mr. Kim.
But like his predecessors, he has resisted punishing sanctions that might cause North Korea’s collapse and lead to a destabilizing war on its border, a refugee crisis in China’s economically vulnerable northeast, or a unified Korean Peninsula controlled by American forces.
All these possibilities could pose as much a problem for China’s plans for ascendancy in Asia as an arms race in the region. And if North Korea somehow survived, it would remain on China’s border, angry and aggrieved.
From Mr. Xi’s perspective, a hostile neighbor armed with nuclear weapons may be the worst outcome.
China has more nuclear-armed neighbors than any country in the world: Russia, India, Pakistan and now North Korea. But that situation is partly one of its own making.
The origins of North Korea’s nuclear program can be traced to a deal in 1976 between an ailing Mao Zedong and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the prime minister of Pakistan.
India had tested its first nuclear bomb two years earlier, and Mr. Bhutto wanted to keep up. China viewed India as a potential threat; the two had fought a brief border war. So it agreed to help.
The particulars were ironed out by Pakistani visitors to Mao’s funeral, according to the account of A. Q. Khan, the nuclear physicist who founded the uranium enrichment program of Pakistan’s bomb project.
In 1982, China shipped weapons-grade uranium to Pakistan. And in 1990, it opened its Lop Nur test site to Pakistan and secretly let the country test its first nuclear bomb there, according to “The Nuclear Express,” a book by two veterans of the American nuclear program.
The United States, upset by China’s behavior, including its sale of missile technology across the developing world, pressed it behind the scenes to stop and persuaded it to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992.
But Beijing’s recognition of the risks of proliferation came slowly, and the genie was already out of the bottle. In 1998, when India conducted five nuclear tests, Pakistan responded with a public test of its own less than three weeks later.
At about the same time, Pakistan was sharing nuclear enrichment technology with North Korea--including centrifuges, parts, designs and fuel essential for its nuclear bombs--in exchange for Korean missile technology and design help. Pakistan later accused Mr. Khan of acting on his own, but he maintains that he had the government’s blessing.
By 2002, the trade was so brazen that Pakistan sent an American-made C-130 cargo plane to North Korea to collect a shipment of ballistic missile parts, a flight that was detected by United States satellites.
While China wanted Pakistan to counterbalance India, it is less clear how it would have benefited from the North’s obtaining nuclear technology. Beijing’s ties with South Korea were improving at the time, but its relationship with the North had hit a rocky patch--again.
Mao is often quoted in the West as saying that North Korea and China are “as close as lips and teeth.” But his actual words, an ancient Chinese idiom, are better translated, “If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold.” He was warning that China would be in danger without North Korea.
In 1950, Mao sent more than one million Chinese soldiers, including his own son, into the Korean War to help the North fight the United States. By the time the armistice was signed three years later, more than 400,000 Chinese troops had been killed and wounded, a sacrifice in blood that one might have expected to forge a lasting loyalty between the two countries.
But there has always been an edge to the relationship, bred at the start by two Communist rivalries--between Mao and North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung, and between Mao and Stalin, who both saw themselves as overlords of the new state created after World War II.
Then Kim showed who was in charge, purging a faction of senior leaders with Soviet connections in 1955 and moving the next year against more than a dozen members of an elite North Korean military group with ties to Mao. Several were arrested while a handful escaped to China.
The Soviets urged Mao to join them in retaliating against Kim. Chinese troops had not fully withdrawn from the North yet. But Mao demurred, according to a recent article by Sergey Radchenko, a professor of international studies at Cardiff University, citing newly declassified documents from Russian archives.
For the most part, Mao tolerated North Korea’s displays of disloyalty because he was afraid of losing it to the Soviet Union, which was the North’s main economic benefactor and provided it with aid that Mao could not match.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, China enjoyed more room to maneuver. In 1992, seeking trade, it established diplomatic relations with South Korea, infuriating the North, which was suddenly poorer and more isolated than ever.
From then on, according to Shen Zhihua, a historian of Chinese-Korean relations, “The treaty of alliance between China and North Korea became a piece of scrap paper.”
China now imports more goods from South Korea than it does from any other country, while the South counts China as its largest market for both exports and imports. One of President Xi Jinping’s first foreign policy initiatives sought to take advantage of those ties and weaken the South Korean alliance with the United States.
But North Korea got in the way. After the North conducted its fourth nuclear test in early 2016, South Korea’s president at the time, Park Geun-hye, tried to call Mr. Xi to ask for his help in restraining the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un.
Ms. Park’s aides were unable to arrange the call, according to local news reports. Chinese analysts said Mr. Xi was unwilling to accept Ms. Park’s demand for “the most severe” sanctions against the North.
By refusing to abandon Pyongyang, Mr. Xi lost ground in Seoul.
Ms. Park strengthened relations with Washington and agreed to deploy a missile defense system that Beijing opposed.
For more than a decade, the United States has asked China for talks to discuss what each nation would do if North Korea collapses--but China has resisted, worried that agreeing to do so would be a betrayal.
Among the most pressing questions: Where are the North’s nuclear weapons and who would secure them? How would the two countries’ military forces avoid clashing as they raced to do so? And what should the Korean Peninsula look like afterward?
The Pentagon has asked Beijing to discuss such “contingency plans” since the presidency of George W. Bush, but on each occasion, the Chinese response has been silence, according to a former United States defense official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the subject.
“The Chinese are concerned about how the North Koreans would react,” said Ralph A. Cossa, the president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. “I think it stops the conversation in the room.”
As tensions have climbed in recent weeks, questions about what China would do in a crisis remain unanswered. But there is a broad understanding that Beijing would be opposed to American forces crossing the 38th parallel that divides North and South Korea.
Global Times, a state-owned tabloid that reflects the opinion of some segments of the party elite, published an editorial last month warning North Korea that China would remain neutral if it attacked the United States.
But the editorial also said that China was prepared to stop any attempt by American and South Korean forces “to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula.”
“The common expectation,” said Yun Sun, a scholar at the Stimson Center in Washington, “is that China is prepared to intervene to preserve a functional North Korean government, as well as the survival of North Korea as a country.”
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itsfinancethings · 4 years
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It was an emotional reunion for Qi Xiaoyu, who was bouncing in anticipation even before Mickey and Donald padded into view. The 27-year-old nurse visited Shanghai Disneyland over 200 times between its 2016 opening and its closing in January due to the coronavirus.
Qi says regular trips to the theme park boost her mental well-being, which has suffered over the 15 weeks she’s spent on the front line of the coronavirus pandemic. Her only respite has been dressing up at home in one of her 20-odd Dis-ney princess costumes, she says, to escape the real world of death in her hospital. “Disney is pure happiness and takes my mind off all the pressure I feel at work,” Qi says, grinning behind her face mask as she enters Shanghai’s iteration of the Magic Kingdom on May 11, the day it reopened. “Here, everything is wonderful.”
If ever the world needed a dose of magic, it’s now. But of the dozen theme parks that Disney runs across the globe, only the Chinese park is open today. The reopened facility may be operating at 30% capacity, under strict social-distancing regulations, but in the U.S., all Disney parks remain mothballed. The company has furloughed 100,000 workers, closed stores and theme parks, and put its star-studded box-office productions on ice. Its share price has tumbled by almost a third.
Watching families in Shanghai browse $14 Winnie the Pooh mugs while Americans remain in the grip of the coronavirus, it’s hard not to wonder whether the mixed fortunes of this most iconic of American institutions indicate a broader changing of the guard. The world’s two biggest economies were already locked in a trade war that could cost the global economy $470 billion. They also spar over intellectual-property theft, cyberespionage, the North Korean nuclear threat and the incarceration of more than 1 million ethnic Muslims in China’s Far West. Differences in how each has handled the pandemic may be not only the latest rupture, but the one that shapes the future.
When the coronavirus emerged in December, China acted quickly and forcefully to halt it in its tracks. It ordered a population equivalent to a fifth of humanity to barricade themselves at home, and hoisted up the drawbridge to visitors. Those draconian measures cost China an unprecedented 6.8% drop in GDP in the first quarter, but they worked–the country’s official (though disputed) infection count is now below 85,000, compared with 1.3 million in the U.S. In the virus epicenter of Wuhan, final-year students are scheduled to go back to class on May 20. Their parents, like adults across the country, are getting back to work.
In America, President Donald Trump has encouraged states to reopen as they see fit, but the U.S. so far has lagged in providing the tools needed to do that safely–tests to detect the disease and track outbreaks. Over the course of the pandemic, the U.S. has so far tested around 9 million people, less than 3% of its population. Meanwhile, to address a new outbreak in Wuhan, China announced plans to test all 11 million of the city’s residents over the space of 10 days.
The U.S. response to COVID-19 has been so muddled, it’s not yet possible to say how much of the sluggishness is due to unreadiness, how much to incompetence, and how much to the American system of governance, with its emphasis on individual freedoms over centralized authority. What does seem clear is that the performance of the Chinese system of broad state controls–over both citizens and the economy–offers Beijing a unique chance to steal a march on the future. During a recent tour of China’s northern province of Shaanxi, President Xi Jinping instructed cadres to “turn the crisis into an opportunity.” How well it succeeds in doing so could have ramifications for the entire world order.
XI already had grand plans. The President’s “China Dream” to take “center stage of the world” includes strategies like Made in China 2025 to upgrade to hightech manufacturing, and China Standards 2035 to become the dominant writer of rules that govern future technologies. Beijing’s new goal, analysts say, is to leverage the pandemic to catalyze 10 years of reform into just two. Speaking in Shaanxi in April, Xi stressed the need to “push forward with investment in 5G, the Internet of things, artificial intelligence, the industrial Internet and other new-type infrastructure.”
China already appears to be bouncing back. Its economy–built on a combination of manufacturing expertise, connectivity and first-class infrastructure, plus the world’s largest middle class of domestic consumers–was operating at 87% of typical output on May 12, according to the Trivium National Business Activity Index. In April, though imports were down 14.2%, China’s exports were up 3.5% year on year, surpassing predictions largely because of medical products sent overseas.
But the economy won’t be the same as before. Crises act like centrifugal forces–the sturdier and well-positioned institutions can survive, but weaker outliers are likely to be ripped to shreds. And while China has taken some measures to rescue companies–tax breaks and loan deferments for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)–no grand cash injection is expected like the $586 billion plowed into state projects following the 2008 financial crisis. “The support policies introduced earlier are adequate,” Premier Li Keqiang said May 6. The message appears to be that the true way out of the crisis is investing in innovation.
Some of China’s most successful companies are helping choose winners–and reinjecting liquidity into the market. MYbank, run by Jack Ma’s online shopping colossus Alibaba, is on track to issue a record $282 billion in new loans to SMEs this year, up nearly 18% from 2019. Delivery service Meituan has been working with state banks to distribute low-interest loans totaling $2.8 billion since early February to 20,000 restaurants and retailers on its platforms, repurposing sales data to quickly assess which clients require the most urgent help.
The pandemic is already providing a springboard for change. Shanghai has published plans to build 100 unmanned factories by 2025, guarding against future labor disruptions. Before the crisis, online health care service JD Health took 10,000 consultations per day. But as hospitals and clinics became swamped with coronavirus patients, that rocketed to 150,000, with the firm’s own pharmacy delivering prescription medicines directly to patients’ homes. Xin Lijun, CEO of the $7 billion–valued company, says the added convenience of online health care means that muscle memory will remain after the COVID-19 crisis abates, helping ease pressure on China’s overstretched, hospital-centric health care system. “People have developed the habit of getting diagnosis and treatment online,” Xin says. “This greatly reduces the pressure on traditional hospitals.”
For Kai-Fu Lee–a venture capitalist; former Google, Microsoft and Apple executive; and author of AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order–China’s tech firms are better positioned to aid recovery as they bridge the gap between the online and physical world. “So that means the Alibaba, JD or the Meituan networks are more structurally advantaged to contribute to the economy because they have their tentacles in the offline part as well.”
China is also capitalizing on its leadership in green technology. Its apex Politburo Standing Committee has backed $1.4 trillion spending on so-called new infrastructure, including a wide range of low-carbon technologies, transitioning away from fossil fuels and expanding its economic influence. That funding includes support for technologies specifically aimed at reducing emissions, like electric-vehicle charging, high-speed rail and long-distance power transmission that brings renewable power to cities. “Undoubtedly, China has taken the lead,” former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry tells TIME of China’s pre-pandemic position in the low-carbon economy.
There are also signs China is using the economic chaos of the pandemic to go on a global shopping spree for new businesses and investments. According to the GlobalData analytics firm, China secured 57 outbound merger and acquisition deals worth $9.9 billion and 145 outbound investment deals worth $4.5 billion globally from January to April. U.S. policymakers say Beijing is exploiting economic vulnerabilities to boost its regional clout, mimicking its acquisition of an 11% stake in Australia’s distressed Rio Tinto mining company in 2008 or the strategically placed Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka in 2017. “China is a predatory firesale investor,” says Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair at the Washington-based Hudson Institute.
The pandemic is a “two-sided coin” for China, says Derek Scissors, a Chinese-economy specialist at the American Enterprise Institute. Sure, there may be some opportunities for the country to build up domestic enterprise and acquire beaten-down firms on the cheap, especially in nations desperate for export credit because of cratering demand in the northern hemisphere.
But on the flip side, China’s exportreliant economy will struggle while consumers–especially in the U.S.–aren’t buying its products. Domestic consumption cannot replace the $2.5 trillion that China sold overseas last year. Although the state’s jobs figures are notoriously unreliable, unemployment has surged during the pandemic. Lu Zhiming, whose exporting business M.H. Furniture employs 22 people at a 30,000-sq.-ft. factory in the southern Chinese city of Dongguan, says a slump in demand because of COVID-19 has already forced competitors to lay off staff and he may have to follow suit. “If the pandemic continues, it will be cata-strophic for manufacturing.”
Some analysts predict the supply-chain vulnerabilities spotlighted by the crisis will accelerate the decoupling process already under way between the U.S. and China. As the Trump Administration has piled sanctions on China, U.S. companies are attempting to shift their supply chains for goods and services to other Asian countries, to avoid exposure to tariffs. The shock of COVID-19 may bring us closer to the moment when Washington and Beijing represent separate, opposing poles of economic influence–especially as the Trump Administration casts China in hostile terms. Trump has described the coronavirus pandemic as the “worst at-tack” ever on the U.S., in his mind eclipsing even Pearl Harbor and 9/11, and has pushed the so-far unsubstantiated theory that the coronavirus originated in a Wuhan laboratory. In recent weeks, the White House and Labor Department have directed the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which controls federal retirement funds, to stop investing in Chinese companies, according to documents seen by CNBC. U.S. and British officials have accused Chinese hackers of trying to steal research into COVID-19 vaccines. Several Republican Senators introduced a bill that would allow Trump to sanction China for refusing to cooperate with investigations into the virus’s origins.
The U.S. Commerce Department also recently announced new export-control rules to prevent commercial companies in China–as well as Russia and Venezuela–from acquiring sensitive U.S. technology. For the investor Lee, decoupling may be understandable for true national-security reasons, but it stands to egregiously undercut competitiveness “if it’s done purely from lack of trust or nationalism.”
But Trump officials argue that, with China, national security blends with competitive advantage. Keith Krach, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, says Beijing is using a “three-prong strategy” of “concealment, co-option and coercion” to insert itself into crucial U.S. manufacturing supply lines, procuring proprietary foreign intellectual property (IP) in the process. He says supply chains can include 10 to 20 layers of contractors and subcontractors, making any technology therein vulnerable to theft, given that, he says, Chinese firms are obligated to share trade secrets or intellectual property with their government.
The Trump Administration’s goal, says Krach, is to “protect and diversify U.S. supply chains, particularly from overreliance” on China by exploring options like publicprivate R&D partnerships, special manufacturing zones, and cash or tax incentives to stay in the U.S. “When you build a manufacturing plant in China, you’re not just giving the blue-prints, you’re giving them process engineering and training their labor force,” he says. “You can see that, in case after case from … mobile phones to semiconductors to automobiles.”
Still, the costs of decoupling would be steep, and unwanted during a time of deep global recession. And the U.S. bullishness fails to account for the reality of how interconnected the two economies still are: China produces 97% of America’s antibiotics. Apple, the most valuable U.S. company and the world’s first trillion-dollar one, still produces the vast majority of its wares in China. And Chinese enterprise is still finding success in the U.S. Lockdown favorite videoconferencing service Zoom, for example, was created in Silicon Valley by an entrepreneur born in China’s Shandong province.
Lu, the furniture manufacturer, doubts any rival could compete with China, in manufacturing at least. He says some friends who shifted businesses to Vietnam because of rising costs have now returned to China, chastened by labor disputes and other headwinds. Meanwhile, his business partners in Copenhagen have to pay staff $25 per hour–10 times more than equivalent skilled workers in China. “With such high costs, how is it possible for manufacturing to return to Europe?”
In the early days of the coronavirus, China saw an opportunity to recast itself from being the source of the deadly pandemic to the provider of much-needed aid and expertise. It sent teams of medics to Italy, Iran and Iraq as their outbreaks spun out of control, and personal protection equipment (PPE) to allies and critics alike; on April 2, as rows of field-hospital tents were being built to treat COVID-19 patients in New York City’s Central Park, a plane carrying masks, gloves and other supplies arrived in the city from China. It followed up with 1,000 ventilators.
But the hard edges of the soft-power campaign swiftly became apparent. Masks sent to the Netherlands failed to meet international standards and were recalled. Testing kits delivered to Spain and Slovakia turned out to be inadequate.
Popular praise lavished on China by grateful ally Italy turned out to be partly fabricated; according to recent analysis by data firm Alkemy, for Italy’s Formiche media group, 46% of tweets using the hashtag #forzaCinaeItalia, which translates as “Come on China and Italy,” were generated by automated bots. For #grazieCina, meaning “Thanks China,” it was 37%.
The ham-fisted attempt at so-called mask diplomacy has proved to be inef-fective in changing minds about China. E.U. chief diplomat Josep Borrell warned in a blog post that China’s “politics of gen-erosity” concealed “a geopolitical compo-nent including a struggle for influence.” Beyond Trump’s crude attempts to shift blame by labeling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus,” a growing coalition of countries now support an investigation into the true origins of the outbreak, including Austra-lia and the E.U. Beijing has pushed back against any suggestion of deliberate de-ception. “There has never been any cover-up and we do not allow cover-ups,” China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Li-jian told a news briefing April 17.
The attempt to pose as a munificent su-perpower is in line with China’s broader attempts to fill the vacancy on the world stage left by the U.S. under Trump. It has inserted nationals into key posts in many multinational institutions–from the U.N. and Interpol to the IMF–and its contri-butions to the World Health Organization, the U.N.’s health agency, have grown by 52% since 2014, up to $86 million in 2018 and 2019 (though still only about a 10th of the U.S. contributions in the same period). China has found a willing partner in the Kremlin to reorientate the world order away from the U.S. “Being among the main victor powers in World War II and permanent members of the U.N. Se-curity Council, China and Russia shoulder the task of safeguarding global peace,” Xi told Russian President Vladimir Putin in a call on May 8.
But while China has won representation in international institutions, its val-ues often remain at odds with their goals. “As China tries to fill the void left by the U.S., we shouldn’t forget that the [Com-munist Party] prioritizes its own inter-ests over those enshrined in those institutions,” says Lucrezia Poggetti, an analyst with the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. When those interests clash, China’s tend to win out–as when Interpol’s Chinese chief Meng Hongwei was arrested in 2018 and later jailed as part of an anticorruption drive by Xi.
Trump makes no pretense of leading the world. When a global virtual summit toward finding a COVID-19 vaccine was held May 4, Washington chose not to at-tend. “The two largest, most powerful countries in the world are not participating in efforts to stop this pandemic and contribute to the knowledge base,” says Dr. Maureen Miller, an infectious-disease epidemiologist at Columbia University.
But China’s lack of interest in shared global values is not lost on the general public. According to a Pew survey pub-lished in December, Xi inspires less con-fidence than any of the current leaders of the U.S., Germany, France and Russia, at just 28%. (Though Trump scores only a single percentage point better.) Roughly two-thirds of Americans have an unfa-vorable view of China. Even the usually myopic CCP is waking up to the fact. In a report presented to Xi in early April, China’s Institutes of Contemporary In-ternational Relations, which is overseen by the Ministry of State Security, con-cluded that global anti-China sentiment is at its highest since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
This is not likely to matter much to Xi while the world remains in the shadow of the coronavirus. Beijing is acutely para-noid and puts party legitimacy above all else, and so external ambitions will al-ways be sacrificed to domestic stability–especially important as a slowing economy gnaws away at jobs and liveli-hoods. Inside China, surveillance mea-sures installed for public health will be ramped up with an eye to stemming future social strife. “This train is only moving in one direction, and that is toward increased ability to surveil and control,” says Ker Gibbs, president of the Ameri-can Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai.
Control isn’t fertile ground for creation, though. What Chinese leaders often miss is that American influence stems more from its dynamic colleges, Hollywood and the NBA than the Belt-way. Yet a defining characteristic of Xi’s “China Dream” is its inability to cultivate the kind of soft power that gives other countries a larger presence on the world stage. While South Korea has K-pop and the U.K. has Premier League soccer, China has stifling control. Last year, censors blurred the pierced earlobes of male pop stars lest their “feminism” corrupt the nation’s boys. Chinese rock musician Li Zhi had a tour canceled, his social-media ac-counts deleted and music expunged from streaming sites after he obliquely refer-enced the Tiananmen Square massacre. Even record-breaking period drama Story of Yanxi Palace–China’s equivalent of Downton Abbey–was taken off the air last year after state media decried the “negative influence on society” of its extrava-gant tales of imperial intrigue.
Instead, artists must be absurdly passive or patriotic. The latest hit from Chengdu-based rap collective CD Rev is titled “Mr. President,” and includes chest-thumping lyrics like “We don’t pick up a fight but we ain’t intimidated by hawks/ 1.4 billion people we on a warship/ maybe you strike me first try to destroy Hua-wei/ that makes me sick you full of hate.” Speaking with TIME, lead singer Wang Zixin denied all songs prop up the party: “We also do antidrugs songs and songs promoting feminism.”
Not exactly “F-ck tha Police.” Under Xi, there’s simply not enough creative space to build cultural currency out-side an ever narrowing Chinese soci-ety. China’s political system boosted its internal COVID-19 response and shields its economy, but global leadership is ham-strung by a lack of shared culture or val-ues. That is not going to change unless China opens up and reforms–a complete reversal from its current course. “China’s influence stems almost entirely from its money,” says Scott W. Harold, an East Asia expert at the U.S. policy think tank Rand Corporation. That in itself might give it a temporary boost coming out of the coronavirus, but not enough of one to transform the world.
As night set on Shanghai Disneyland, a kaleidoscope of light emblazons the Magic Castle with “thanks” in differ-ent languages to honor frontline medi-cal workers, bringing tears to the eyes of the nurse Qi. “America is the home of Disney,” Qi says. “It would be a dream to visit there one day.” If American po-litical leadership has receded, its deep cultural bonds are more difficult to re-place. That is the kryptonite to Commu-nist China’s global ambitions–to lead, it has to be liked, too.
–With reporting by KIMBERLY DOZIER, JOHN WALCOTT and JUSTIN WORLAND/WASHINGTON
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ashwinigongale-blog · 5 years
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Global Automobile Hub Bearing Market Trend, Marketing Channels, Major Industry Participants, Strategies  and Forecast To 2024
A new research report data added to the Market.biz titled Global Automobile Hub Bearing Market gives a proper understanding of the industry and it also predicts current market trends and future market trends. The report presents a detailed picture of the market by way of study, synthesis, and addition of data from multiple sources. Global Automobile Hub Bearing market analyses the report based on customer demand, supply and demand status, competitive market scenario and industry policies.
Here, you can avail Sample Copy for Global Automobile Hub Bearing Market Report
The Automobile Hub Bearing market report presents the overall structure of the market like the major market players based on the company profile, sales revenue, the business tactics used in the global Automobile Hub Bearing market which will help the emerging market segments in making vital business decisions. Also, the report discusses business plans, sales and profit, market stations and market volume, raw material suppliers, and buyers demand information and distribution ratio.
Competitive landscape
The competitive landscape segment in the report relies on the current as well as the potential of the leading market players in the industry. It offers the in-depth company profiles, that may stay active in predestined decades, combined with company profile, product launches, product market, and gross margin, financial details, key advancements, business short-term and long-term marketing, and advertising strategies and SWOT analysis of these competitive firms.
Automobile Hub Bearing Market: Top Companies
Wanxiang Qianchao
TIMKEN
Zhejiang Zhaofeng Mechanical and Electronic
NTN
NSK
FAG
Shuanglin
Wafangdian Bearing Group
Svenska Kullagerfabriken
JTEKT
 Market Segmentation
The report provides global market segmentation based on the product type, end-users, and region. In the additional section, the report includes market division study over the significant geographies of the world such as North America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, The Middle East & Africa and the rest of the world. The report covers worldwide statistic which is focused on the global market.
Automobile Hub Bearing Product types Outlook:
1st Generation
2nd Generation
3rd Generation
 Automobile Hub Bearing Applications Outlook:
American Cars
European Cars
Japanese Cars
Korean Cars
Chinese Cars
 Geographically, the key segments of the market are:
North America
Europe
China
Japan
The Middle East & Africa
India
South America
Make an Inquiry to Get Global Automobile Hub Bearing report as your requirement
Global Automobile Hub Bearing Market Report mainly covers the following significant points:
1. An outlook of the Automobile Hub Bearing industry;
2. Market Competitive Landscape;
3. Top Players Company Profiles;
4. Analysis of the product types of Automobile Hub Bearing;
5. Analysis of the Applications/End-Users of Automobile Hub Bearing;
From the conclusion of this study, all the answers to the queries will be well guided as it focuses on analytical research and mainly includes qualitative and quantitative analysis. this analyzed report can give an in-depth summary of upcoming and ongoing which leads to market development on a global scale.
Click Below If You Want More Related Reports:
Global Biogas Power Market
Global Pneumatic Fitting Market
Global Taselin Market
Global Marine Horizontal Centrifuge Machines Market
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comm499syd · 6 years
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Navigating Asian Stereotypes Within the American Music Market As K-Pop Artists
Today’s readings center around K-Pop artists’ attempts to break into the mainstream music industry within the United States and the difficulties they faced. Additionally, Hyunjoon Shin’s piece addresses what Korean media means by “global stars” and a conflict in selling points between audiences in the United States. For BoA, Wonder Girls, and Rain the Asian and Asian American stereotypes emphasized through American media made it overwhelming difficult for the artists to gain a mainstream following in America.
Hyunjoon Shin states that the term “global star” was invented by local Korean media, and although transnationalism is most certainly obtainable, most artists focus on a regional repertoire because their fame may not always include various countries worldwide. Shin also references Will Straw, and his concept of centrifugal tendencies, “in which interest is sent outward, leading to the unexpected global circulation of national styles and artifacts,” and N-Pop where the nationality of a cultural product is dually and simultaneously concealed and revealed. The author argues in short, that K-Pop utilizes “Asianess” as a saleable commodity. However, as Eun-Young Jung argues in their piece, the “Asianess” of K-Pop’s hybridity worked against BoA, Wonder Girls, and Rain when trying to break into the American market.
Both BoA and Wonder Girls American debuts played into Asian and Asian American stereotypes. For BoA’s “Eat You Up” there were originally two versions released, a Korean version and an American version. The Korean version showed BoA as dominant and strong, while the American one played into the submissive stereotype, as BoA wore revealing clothing throughout the music video while the camera mainly provided close ups instead of showcasing BoA’s dancing. The video ultimately received a lot of backlash, especially from the Asian and Asian American community for the fact that the video appeared low production and was unauthentic toward’s BoA’s style and talent. With Wonder Girls they also took on a submissive and uniform look with “Nobody” and were particularly critiqued for having accented English. Despite working with renowned American producers and videographers, singing in English, and attempting to take on a more “American style” with their music videos, the stereotypes surrounding Asians and Asian Americans were too ingrained to not be taken into account when American audiences saw these K-Pop artists.
However, Rain did manage to find some success in the American market by challenging the stereotype that Asian males are undesirable and weak. In “Rainism”, Rain is completely in control and wills non-Asian men to obey him while he swoons White women, a complete contrast from the stereotypical Asian male characters in Hollywood films. Here, Rain redefines the image of the Asian male and while he does not dominate the American market, he does leave an impact and potential for change for future Asian artists in America.
Through these examples, we can see an immensely difficult market to break through. The stereotypes in America force Asian and Asian American artists to both throw away any sign of “Asianess” while also playing into the stereotypes. They have to be authentic and original, but not too sensitive and foreign. They have to speak perfect English despite being international artists. Because of this hypocrisy Asian and Asian American artists will have to choose between authenticity towards themselves and catering to the American market.
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U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment Market: Industry Growth Factors, Applications, Regional Analysis, Key Players and Forecasts by 2026
The U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment Market is expected to grow from USD 697.17 billion in 2017 to USD 983.73 billion by 2026, at a CAGR of 3.9% during the forecast period.
The industry for equipment manufacturing and rental services sector dramatically fell owing to sudden decrease in well count and completions in 2015 & 2016. But it is expected to return to achieve healthy growth by 2019, as the upstream sector is benefiting from the slow recovery of the oil prices and also additional export opportunities that was not available for both liquefied natural gas and crude oil. The U.S. is one of the leading five global exporters. The increasing demand for transportation fuels along with the rising complexity for clean fuels, there are legal and regulatory constraints that have actually threatened to higher global trade in many of the U.S. strategic export markets influencing the U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment market growth. The country’s exporters has been facing requirements of local contents, trade restrictions, labor requirements and rising cost along with decreasing competitiveness of U.S. exports due to growing Chinese and some European markets.
Request For Sample Copy of This Report @ http://bit.ly/2ywyZfx
The country’s abundance of shale reserves along with its increasing shale exploration and production has ultimately urged the need for high level of investment to accommodate the changing regional requirements of gas transportation; by 2019 the demand for ongoing construction will begin to ebb. Even though the projection for LNG export facilities has been clouded by the current uncertainty in crude prices market fundamentals will drive the eventual construction of many facilities over the forecast period. Many of these projects are likely to be under construction till 2020. The facilities will be the primary application sites and will drive the U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment market for a wide range of equipments including valves, pumps and compressors.
The industry participants in the country face significant competition from the Korean, German and the Chinese players. By competition, the U.S. industry participants have been particularly competitive in manufacturing of gas treating and processing equipments, compressors, automatic valves, storage tanks etc. These specific trends in manufacturing of these equipments are likely to continue with the country’s exports weighted more towards specialized high tech equipments. Hence, with such increasing production and processing of shale reserves and the country’s increasing focus on midstream industry demand for oil and gas equipments are projected to increase over the forecast period.
Make an inquiry for purchasing this report @ http://bit.ly/2ytHjNl
The report provides an extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of the market trends and growth prospects of the U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment Market, 2017–2026. This report comprises a detailed geographic distribution of the U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment market across North America, Europe, APAC and South America, and MEA. North America is further segmented into U.S., Canada. Europe is divided into Germany, UK, Italy, and Rest of Europe. Asia-Pacific is bifurcated into China, India, Japan, and Rest of Asia-Pacific.
Competitive Landscape and Key Vendors
Southwest region has the highest number of refineries in the country with many export facilities in the cost. The region has the country’s largest oil & gas reserves which create additional opportunities for processing in the field vicinities. The states of Texas and Oklahoma host 35 refineries with Texas accounting for 30 of them. Another two refineries are planned in Texas and are to be operational by 2019. These activities are expected to boost demand over the forecast period in the region.
The industry is fragmented with high level of competitiveness. Some of the leading industry participants in the U.S. Midstream Oil & Gas Equipment market include Abbot Group, Transocean, Zenith Oilfield Technology, National Oilwell Varco Incorporated, Schlumberger, Weatherford International, Halliburton Company, ENI, Baker Hughes, Cameron International, FMC Technologies, Aker Solutions.
Browse Complete Details @ http://bit.ly/2yxdlIk
Key Segments
Product Type
· Pipe
o Plastic
o Steel
· Gas Treating & Processing Equipment
· Rail Tank Cars
· Compressors
o Centrifugal Compressors
o Reciprocating & Other Compressors
· Pumps
o Positive Displacement Pumps
o Centrifugal Pumps
o Parts, Accessories, & Other Pumps
· Valves
o Conventional
o Automatic
· Instrumentation Equipment
· Storage Tanks
· Other Equipment
Application
· Gas Processing Plants
· Pipelines
· Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities
· Crude by Rail
· Other Midstream Applications
Region
· North West
· Mid-West
· West
· South West
· South East
· Mid Atlantic
· North East
About us Polaris Market Research
Polaris Market Research is a global market research and consulting company. The company specializes in providing exceptional market intelligence and in-depth business research services for our clientele spread across different enterprises. We at Polaris are obliged to serve our diverse customer base present across the industries of healthcare, technology, semi-conductors and chemicals among various other industries present around the world. We strive to provide our customers with updated information on innovative technologies, high growth markets, emerging business environments and latest business-centric applications, thereby helping them always to make informed decisions and leverage new opportunities. Adept with a highly competent, experienced and extremely qualified team of experts comprising SMEs, analysts and consultants, we at Polaris endeavor to deliver value-added business solutions to our customers.
Contact us-
Mr. Neel
Corporate Sales, USA
Polaris Market Research
Phone: 1–646–568–9980
Web: www.polarismarketresearch.com
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hodldrgn-blog · 6 years
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New Post has been published on https://cryptomoonity.com/loopring-joins-defi-network-to-build-open-financial-system/
Loopring Joins DeFi Network to Build Open Financial System
Loopring Joins DeFi Network to Build Open Financial System
Oct 16, 2018 DeFi announced Loopring joined the DeFi network among with another 11 dex teams. DeFi is created as a shared community for projects building the open financial system. DeFi community is the firm believer that the open financial system won’t be built in silos, it will require interoperability between decentralized financial protocols, which can help solve the problem of an overlap in decentralized financial protocols. The partnership with DeFi community makes the Loopring Protocol more valuable because this can help unearth new utilities that can’t be accessed by a single protocol.
About Loopring Protocol
Loopring is an open protocol for decentralized exchange. With Loopring, the building blocks of a traditional exchange are disassembled and reconstituted as different roles in a decentralized environment. These roles include wallets, relays/ring-miners, liquidity sharing consortiums, and asset tokenization services.
About DeFi
Members of DeFi including(MakerDAO ,dy/dx, Compound, CDx, Coinbase Wallet, Kyber Network, bZx, MARKET Protocol ,8x Protocol , Centrifuge , Connext , Loopring) take interoperability into account when building their projects. This helps strengthen the compounding effects of all projects as a whole. DeFi strives to create a financial system that is accessible to anyone with an internet connection and believes in a world where value flows freely, regardless of one’s geographic location. This will amplify the message and onboard new developers, users, and community members to the shared vision for a better financial system.
For more up-to-date information, sign up for Loopring’s Bi-Weekly Letter, or follow us on social media: ⭑ Twitter: twitter.com/loopring.org ⭑ Reddit: reddit.com/r/loopringorg ⭑ Telegram: t.me/loopring_en ⭑ Telegram: t.me/loopringfans (Chinese) ⭑ StackOverflow: stackoverflow.com/c/loopring ⭑ Kakao: open.kakao.com/o/gJbSZdF (Korean)
Loopring Joins DeFi Network to Build Open Financial System was originally published in Loopring Protocol on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.
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123567-9qaaq9 · 8 months
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Korean Centrifugation Market, Market Size, Market Share, Market Trends, Key Players |BIS Research 
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The Korea centrifugation market was valued at $46.1 million in 2023 and is expected to reach $80.6 million by 2033, growing at a CAGR of 5.75% between 2023 and 2033. A centrifuge is a scientific instrument designed to separate fluids, gasses, or liquids according to their density. 
In the realm of scientific and industrial processes, centrifugation stands as a pivotal technique, offering separation and purification solutions for a myriad of applications. The Korean centrifugation market, a dynamic and evolving sector, plays a crucial role in catering to diverse industries such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, food and beverages, and research laboratories. 
Market Overview:
The Korean centrifugation market has witnessed steady growth in recent years, driven by technological advancements, increasing research and development activities, and the expanding scope of applications. With a focus on efficiency, reliability, and innovation, market players are continually striving to meet the evolving demands of end-users.
Market Segmentation: 
Segmentation 1: By Product
Segmentation 2: By Model Type
Segmentation 3: By Application
Key Factors Driving Market Growth:
Biopharmaceutical Advancements: The burgeoning biopharmaceutical sector in Korea has been a significant driver of centrifugation market growth. Centrifuges play a crucial role in various bioprocessing steps, such as cell culture clarification, cell harvesting, and protein purification, contributing to the increased demand for high-performance centrifugation equipment.
Research and Development Initiatives: Korea's commitment to advancing scientific research and development has led to increased demand for cutting-edge centrifugation technologies. Researchers across various disciplines rely on centrifuges for crucial tasks like DNA and RNA isolation, creating a robust market for both laboratory and benchtop centrifuges.
Food and Beverage Industry Applications: The food and beverage industry in Korea has adopted centrifugation for processes such as clarification, separation, and purification. This includes applications in brewing, edible oil processing, and dairy production, where centrifuges enhance efficiency and product quality.
Environmental and Industrial Applications: Centrifugation finds extensive applications in environmental and industrial sectors, including wastewater treatment, mining, and chemical processing. The Korean market reflects a growing awareness of the importance of efficient separation technologies in addressing environmental challenges.
Market Challenges:
While the Korean centrifugation market presents significant opportunities, it is not without challenges. These include:
Intense Competition: The market is characterized by intense competition among key players, leading to pricing pressures and the need for continuous innovation.
Stringent Regulations: The regulatory landscape, especially in industries like biopharmaceuticals, demands compliance with strict quality standards. Adhering to these regulations can be a hurdle for market players.
Technological Complexity: The rapid evolution of centrifugation technologies poses a challenge for manufacturers to keep pace with the latest advancements, requiring substantial investments in research and development.
Download the sample page to grab more @ Korean Centrifugation Market Trends 
Some of the prominent companies in this market are:
•    Agilent Technologies, Inc. •    Andreas Hettich GmbH & Co. KG •    ARI Medical Technology Co., Ltd. •    Biolab Scientific •    Bioneer Corporation •    Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. •    Corning Incorporated
The equipment segment players leading the market captured around 72.65% of the presence in the market as of 2022. The accessories segment accounted for approximately 27.35% of the market presence in 2022. 
To have a deeper understanding have a look at our healthcare page 
Future Prospects:
The future of the Korean centrifugation market holds promise, driven by ongoing technological advancements and the increasing adoption of centrifuges across diverse industries. Key trends that are likely to shape the market include:
Automation and Integration: The integration of automation and smart technologies is expected to streamline processes and enhance the overall efficiency of centrifugation systems.
Focus on Sustainable Solutions: With a growing emphasis on sustainability, market players are likely to develop centrifugation systems that are energy-efficient and eco-friendly.
Collaborations and Partnerships: Collaboration between industry players, research institutions, and government bodies is anticipated to foster innovation and address complex challenges.
Conclusion:
The Korean centrifugation market presents a dynamic landscape, shaped by technological innovations, industry collaborations, and the diverse needs of end-users. As the market continues to evolve, stakeholders must remain agile and adaptive to capitalize on emerging opportunities and overcome challenges. The future of the Korean centrifugation market holds immense potential, driven by a commitment to advancing scientific research and addressing the needs of a wide range of industries.
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appliancesreviews · 5 years
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Innovative Hurom H-AI self-feeding slow juicer Review
For several decades, a healthy lifestyle is one of the most popular trends in modern life. Of course, it essentially depends on nutrition. According to almost all modern nutritionists, optimally balanced nutrition directly affects the well-being of a person. Of course, fresh juices help solve this problem. As a result, the popularity of juicers, vacuum blenders for making smoothies, smart weights for self control, etc is constantly growing among fans of a healthy lifestyle. The market responds adequately to high demand, offering many different devices in this segment. But juicers traditionally occupy one of the leading positions in this list. Relatively recently, centrifugal juicers dominated because of their simplicity and low price. But this operation principle has a significant drawback. According to most experts, the high temperature due to the high rotation speed during juicing significantly reduces its beneficial properties, destroying vitamins and enzymes in the finished drink. Of course, juicing at low speed completely solves this problem. As a result, the popularity of low-speed masticating juicers has grown rapidly in recent years. The design of the juicer is much easier compared to, for example, TVs or coffee machines, which have wide possibilities of using digital technology. However, engineers are finding opportunities to improve even such relatively simple equipment by expanding their functionality and increasing efficiency. Of course, these factors directly affect the choice of the optimal juicer.
Hurom H-AI self-feeding slow juicer
HUROM brand needs no introduction. This South Korean company was founded in 1974 under the name Dong Ah Industry and has been specializing in the development and production of juicers for almost 40 years. As a result, today it is one of the leaders in this segment. For example, HUROM developed and patented the revolutionary Low Speed Technology System with a slower auger rotation. Currently, this technology is patented in the USA, Hong Kong, Japan, China, etc. Of course, the company continues to improve its models, developing new technologies. 2018 is no exception. HUROM proposed the innovative Hurom H-AI self-feeding slow juicer. Of course, Hurom H-AI is one of the most popular models in 2018. Its stylish design will decorate the interior of any kitchen. Its capacity reaches 500ml or 16.9 fl oz. All its parts are made 100% BPA-free. The model uses a very quiet engine with a rotational speed in the range from 43 to 60 rpm and with 10-year warranty. Today it's one of the best values for this segment. Furthermore, the juicer requires little space due to the vertical layout and a small base area (only 6.3 x 11.7 inches). The company offers Hurom H-AI in Silver, Rose Gold or Slate Blue color. But for the European market this model is also available in red.
Innovations
The model uses several new engineering solutions. Of course, Self-Feeding smart hopper is its main innovation. The spinning blade of complex construction inside the self-feeding smart hopper crushes and automatically moves ingredients down into the double-winged auger. Actually, juicing requires only filling the hopper with vegetables and fruits. In addition, the large diameter makes it unnecessary to pre-cut. Moreover, the model uses the technology of two-speed counter-rotating mode, which is based on the rotation in the opposite directions of the auger and basket with strainer. For example, the auger rotates clockwise at a speed of 60 rpm, and the basket rotates counterclockwise at a speed of 23 rpm. It further increases the juicing efficiency. But Hurom H-AI also has a dual hopper for adding ingredients in manual mode. Its lateral feed hole easily passes large vegetables and fruits, and the vertical opening with a small diameter is convenient for long fruits, for example, carrots, cucumbers or greens. Tilted chamber with juice outlet is also very successful engineering solution. This tilt of 3 degree significantly increases the efficiency of juice draining, simplifying further cleaning. Vertical pulp outlet is another good solution. Previous Hurom juicers pushed out pulp out through a side vent, which could lead to clogs. The vertical option eliminates this risk, provides greater compactness and simplifies cleaning. Model has fine and coarse strainer. Making pulp free juice uses fine strainer. A coarse strainer provides perfectly pulpy juice.
Conclusion
Of course, Hurom H-AI self-feeding slow juicer is one of the most innovative models in 2018. Self-feeding smart hopper, 3 degree tilt and vertical pulp outlet set a new standard for usability in modern juicers. Unfortunately, the very high price that reaches $ 700 is its only, but serious drawback. This video demonstrates great features of Hurom H-AI One Stop. Read the full article
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investmart007 · 6 years
Text
TEHRAN, Iran | Iran weighs response as US sanctions bite
New Post has been published on https://is.gd/94Ahfk
TEHRAN, Iran | Iran weighs response as US sanctions bite
TEHRAN, Iran — As Iranians awoke Tuesday to renewed U.S. sanctions that had been lifted by Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers, the question on everyone’s mind remained: What happens now?
From deciphering President Donald Trump’s tweets on Iran — including one demanding “WORLD PEACE” — to trying to figure out how much their cratering currency is worth, Iranians on the streets appear divided on how to respond.
The same goes for inside its theocratic government. President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate, has taken an increasingly confrontational line in recent weeks, applauded by the hard-liners who had long opposed him. Meanwhile, Rouhani seemed to suggest on live television the night before that direct talks with Trump could be possible — something of which North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-hu, who visited Tehran on Tuesday, has personal experience.
Whether Iran should choose a Singapore-style photo-op with the American president who backed out of the nuclear deal or abandon the unraveling accord and increase its uranium enrichment remains a fiercely debated question. But everyone agrees something has to be done soon, as sporadic, leaderless protests across the country of 80 million people only add to the pressure.
“Their sanctions are very effective, as you can see, the government should find a solution,” said Mahmoud, a 62-year-old former civil servant who only gave his first name. “They should first solve domestic problems because people are really drowning in poverty and misery.”
The newly imposed American sanctions target U.S. dollar financial transactions, Iran’s automotive sector, and the purchase of commercial planes and metals, including gold. Even-stronger sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector and central bank are to be re-imposed in early November.
As uncertainty over the Iran nuclear deal grew after Trump entered the White House, Iran’s already-anemic economy nosedived. The country’s monthly inflation rate has hit double digits again and the national unemployment rate is 12.5 percent. Among youth, it is even worse, with around 25 percent out of a job.
Iran’s currency, the rial, now trades over double its government-set rate to the U.S. dollar. Trying to stem the loss, the Iranian government five months ago shut down all private currency exchange shops, but the black market has thrived.
On Tuesday, however, new central bank chief Abdolnasser Hemmati allowed private currency exchanges to reopen. Shops welcomed customers, though some displayed no exchange rates late into the morning amid confusion over how much the troubled rial was truly worth.
“The situation is not good right now; nothing is clear,” said carpenter Ebrahim Gholamnejad, 41. “The economy is turning into a jungle.”
Iranian authorities recently arrested 45 people, including the central bank’s deputy chief, as part of a crackdown on financial fraud, according to judiciary spokesman Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehi.
On Tuesday, Iran’s state-controlled television aired a 30-minute documentary applauding the central bank’s new economic decisions. The hard-line Keyhan newspaper, which previously lampooned Rouhani, bore his picture on the front page with a large headline quoting him saying: “The way we can surpass all sanctions is to have unity.”
But what to do next remains an open question. Iran continues to abide by the 2015 nuclear deal it struck with the Obama administration and other world powers, which limits its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, and makes it impossible for Iran to quickly develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has always said its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
In recent weeks, Iran has prominently displayed its centrifuges and threatened to resume enriching uranium at higher rates. Rouhani, whose administration struck the deal, also has taken a harder line himself, at one point renewing a long-standing Iranian threat to close off the Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of all oil traded by sea passes.
Trump for his part has ricocheted between threats and promises to speak with Iranian officials without preconditions, offering mixed messages to both the Iranian public and its government. That continued Tuesday, as he described American actions in a tweet as “the most biting sanctions ever imposed, and in November they ratchet up to yet another level.”
“Anyone doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business with the United States,” he wrote. “I am asking for WORLD PEACE, nothing less!”
Though Iranians already are angered by Trump putting their nation on his travel ban list, some say talks with the American president might be necessary. Others insist that Iran, which has weathered decades of previous sanctions, should stand its ground.
“I believe America cannot do a damn thing,” said Farzaneh, a 54-year-old housewife who declined to give her last name out of privacy concerns. “It can’t do anything, because Iranians are backing each other.”
Direct talks with the U.S. also would challenge the Islamic Republic leadership, which for nearly 40 years has encouraged flag-burning demonstrations against “the Great Satan.” On Tuesday, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-hu visited Tehran and met its leadership. It’s unclear what he discussed with them, though he was involved in Pyongyang’s Singapore talks with Trump.
For now though, Iranians say they can only wait for the next Trump tweet or their government’s decision on how to respond.
“People should just keep calm, because the other party wants to disrupt our peace,” said Gholamnejad, the carpenter. “America, who imposed the sanctions, wants to create chaos.”
By AMIR VAHDAT and MEHDI FATTAHI , Associated Press
0 notes
newestbalance · 6 years
Text
Why Hackers Aren’t Afraid of Us
WASHINGTON — Ask finance ministers and central bankers around the world about their worst nightmare and the answer is almost always the same: Sometime soon the North Koreans or the Russians will improve on the two huge cyberattacks they pulled off last year. One temporarily crippled the British health care system and the other devastated Ukraine before rippling across the world, disrupting shipping and shutting factories — a billion-dollar cyberattack the White House called “the most destructive and costly in history.”
The fact that no intelligence agency saw either attack coming — and that countries were so fumbling in their responses — led a group of finance ministers to simulate a similar attack that shut down financial markets and froze global transactions. By several accounts, it quickly spun into farce: No one wanted to admit how much damage could be done or how helpless they would be to deter it.
Cyberattacks have been around for two decades, appearing in plotlines from “Die Hard” movies to the new novel by Bill Clinton and James Patterson. But in the real world, something has changed since 2008, when the United States and Israel mounted the most sophisticated cyberattack in history on Iran’s nuclear program, temporarily crippling it in hopes of forcing Iran to the bargaining table. (The two countries never acknowledged responsibility for the attack.)
As President Barack Obama once feared, a cyberarms race of historic but hidden proportions has taken off. In less than a decade, the sophistication of cyberweapons has so improved that many of the attacks that once shocked us — like the denial-of-service attacks Iran mounted against Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and other banks in 2012, or North Korea’s hacking of Sony in 2014 — look like tiny skirmishes compared with the daily cybercombat of today.
Yet in this arms race, the United States has often been its own worst enemy. Because our government has been so incompetent at protecting its highly sophisticated cyberweapons, those weapons have been stolen out of the electronic vaults of the National Security Agency and the C.I.A. and shot right back at us. That’s what happened with the WannaCry ransomware attack by North Korea last year, which used some of the sophisticated tools the N.S.A. had developed. No wonder the agency has refused to admit that the weapons were made in America: It raised the game of its attackers.
Nuclear weapons are still the ultimate currency of national power, as the meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore last week showed. But they cannot be used without causing the end of human civilization — or at least of a regime. So it’s no surprise that hackers working for North Korea, Iran’s mullahs, Vladimir V. Putin in Russia and the People’s Liberation Army of China have all learned that the great advantage of cyberweapons is that they are the opposite of a nuke: hard to detect, easy to deny and increasingly finely targeted. And therefore, extraordinarily hard to deter.
That is why cyberweapons have emerged as such effective tools for states of all sizes: a way to disrupt and exercise power or influence without starting a shooting war. Cyberattacks have long been hard to stop because determining where they come from takes time — and sometimes the mystery is never solved. But even as the United States has gotten better at attributing attacks, its responses have failed to keep pace.
Today cyberattackers believe there is almost no risk that the United States or any other power would retaliate with significant sanctions, much less bombs, troops or even a counter cyberattack. And though Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has said the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons to deter a huge non-nuclear attack, including using cyberweapons, against its electric grid and other infrastructure, most experts consider the threat hollow.
At his confirmation hearings in March to become director of the N.S.A. and commander of the United States Cyber Command, Gen. Paul Nakasone was asked whether our adversaries think they will suffer if they strike us with cyberweapons. “They don’t fear us,” General Nakasone replied.
So while the United States remains the greatest cyberpower on earth, it is increasingly losing daily cyberconflicts. The range of American targets is so wide and deep that it is almost impossible to understand all of the vulnerabilities. And because most of those targets don’t belong to the government — banks, power grids, shipping systems, hospitals and internet-linked security cameras, cars and appliances — confusion reigns over who is responsible for defending them and who will decide when to strike back. We have the most fearsome cyberweaponry on the planet, yet we’re afraid to use it for fear of what will come next.
Consider the Russian cyberattacks that preceded the well-known hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s computers in 2015 and 2016. Just before, Russian hackers had taken up residence in the unclassified servers at the State Department and the White House, and later deep inside the systems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the State Department, the eviction took weeks, shutting down systems during negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal. The hackers were even bolder at the White House. Instead of disappearing when they were exposed, they fought back, looking to install new malware as soon as the old versions were neutralized. “It was basically hand-to-hand combat,” recalled Richard Ledgett, the deputy director of the N.S.A. at the time. It appears the attackers just wanted to prove they could go, and stay, anywhere in the American government’s network.
Yet out of a reflexive secrecy about cyberoperations — motivated by an unwillingness to acknowledge both our vulnerabilities and our detection abilities — the United States never called out the Russians for what they were doing. Nor did we exact any punishment. That proved to be a huge mistake.
If Mr. Putin thought there was no price to be paid for invading White House systems, why wouldn’t he attack the Democratic National Committee? And as the Russian attacks continued, no one in the American government detected the larger pattern or Russia’s ambitions to affect the election. Most officials assumed it was plain old espionage.
“It wasn’t that we had our radar off to these kinds of attacks,” a senior official told me. “We hadn’t even built the radar.”
By the summer of 2016, some Obama administration officials, waking to the threat, proposed counterstrikes that included exposing Mr. Putin’s hidden bank accounts and his ties to the oligarchs and cutting off Russia’s banking system. But the potential for escalation caused Mr. Obama and his top aides to reject the plan.
“It was an enormously satisfying response,” a senior American official told me later, “until we began to think about what it would do to the Europeans.”
Mr. Obama also understandably feared that anything the United States did might provoke Mr. Putin to tinker with election systems just enough to give credence to Donald Trump’s warning that the system was “rigged.”
Since the election, the American retaliation has included closing some Russian consulates and recreation centers and expelling spies — actions one Obama national security official called “the perfect 19th-century solution to a 21st-century problem.” President Trump has signed off on some additional economic sanctions against individual Russians.
But the United States’ problem isn’t toughness — it’s an absence of strategy. The larger lesson of the past few years is that unless we get smarter a lot faster about deterring these pernicious, hard-to-find forms of cyberaggression, much of what binds our digitally connected society will be eaten away. We have spent so much time worrying about a “cyber Pearl Harbor,’’ the attack that takes out the power grid, that we have focused far too little on the subtle manipulation of data that can mean that no election, medical record or self-driving car can be truly trusted. And ultimately that absence of trust will destroy the glue of American society the way the Stuxnet computer worm destroyed those Iranian centrifuges. It will cause them to spin out of control.
So what is to be done?
First, the United States must significantly improve its cyberdefenses. The wide-open vulnerabilities in America’s networks have essentially deterred the United States from credibly threatening retaliation against the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Iranians. One way to start is to make sure no new equipment goes on the market unless it meets basic security requirements. We won’t let cars on the road without airbags, so why do we do less with the systems that connect them to the internet?
Second, we must decide what networks we care most about defending — and make those priorities clear. Mr. Mattis’s threat to turn to nuclear weapons hardly seems credible — unless the cyberattack would create an existential threat to America. That requires an intensive public review of what is critical to our nation’s survival. President Trump forfeited the perfect opportunity when he decided against a commission to learn the larger lessons from the 2016 election. Our politics have gotten in the way of our safety.
Finally, the United States needs to end the reflexive secrecy surrounding its cyberoperations. We need to explain to the world why we have cyberweapons, what they are capable of and, most important, what we will not use them for. Clearly, it is in the nation’s interests to develop global norms clarifying that some targets are off limits: election systems, hospitals and emergency communications systems, and maybe even electric power grids and other civilian targets.
Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, has proposed digital Geneva Conventions that begin to establish those norms, outside the structure of governments and treaties. It’s an imperfect solution, but a start. Intelligence agencies hate this idea: They want the most latitude possible for future operations in an uncertain world. But in any arms control negotiation, to create limits on others, you need to give up something. Otherwise, we will remain trapped in an endlessly escalating war, one we may well lose.
David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent for The New York Times. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.”
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTopinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.
The post Why Hackers Aren’t Afraid of Us appeared first on World The News.
from World The News https://ift.tt/2HXMqqP via Everyday News
0 notes
dani-qrt · 6 years
Text
Why Hackers Aren’t Afraid of Us
WASHINGTON — Ask finance ministers and central bankers around the world about their worst nightmare and the answer is almost always the same: Sometime soon the North Koreans or the Russians will improve on the two huge cyberattacks they pulled off last year. One temporarily crippled the British health care system and the other devastated Ukraine before rippling across the world, disrupting shipping and shutting factories — a billion-dollar cyberattack the White House called “the most destructive and costly in history.”
The fact that no intelligence agency saw either attack coming — and that countries were so fumbling in their responses — led a group of finance ministers to simulate a similar attack that shut down financial markets and froze global transactions. By several accounts, it quickly spun into farce: No one wanted to admit how much damage could be done or how helpless they would be to deter it.
Cyberattacks have been around for two decades, appearing in plotlines from “Die Hard” movies to the new novel by Bill Clinton and James Patterson. But in the real world, something has changed since 2008, when the United States and Israel mounted the most sophisticated cyberattack in history on Iran’s nuclear program, temporarily crippling it in hopes of forcing Iran to the bargaining table. (The two countries never acknowledged responsibility for the attack.)
As President Barack Obama once feared, a cyberarms race of historic but hidden proportions has taken off. In less than a decade, the sophistication of cyberweapons has so improved that many of the attacks that once shocked us — like the denial-of-service attacks Iran mounted against Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and other banks in 2012, or North Korea’s hacking of Sony in 2014 — look like tiny skirmishes compared with the daily cybercombat of today.
Yet in this arms race, the United States has often been its own worst enemy. Because our government has been so incompetent at protecting its highly sophisticated cyberweapons, those weapons have been stolen out of the electronic vaults of the National Security Agency and the C.I.A. and shot right back at us. That’s what happened with the WannaCry ransomware attack by North Korea last year, which used some of the sophisticated tools the N.S.A. had developed. No wonder the agency has refused to admit that the weapons were made in America: It raised the game of its attackers.
Nuclear weapons are still the ultimate currency of national power, as the meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore last week showed. But they cannot be used without causing the end of human civilization — or at least of a regime. So it’s no surprise that hackers working for North Korea, Iran’s mullahs, Vladimir V. Putin in Russia and the People’s Liberation Army of China have all learned that the great advantage of cyberweapons is that they are the opposite of a nuke: hard to detect, easy to deny and increasingly finely targeted. And therefore, extraordinarily hard to deter.
That is why cyberweapons have emerged as such effective tools for states of all sizes: a way to disrupt and exercise power or influence without starting a shooting war. Cyberattacks have long been hard to stop because determining where they come from takes time — and sometimes the mystery is never solved. But even as the United States has gotten better at attributing attacks, its responses have failed to keep pace.
Today cyberattackers believe there is almost no risk that the United States or any other power would retaliate with significant sanctions, much less bombs, troops or even a counter cyberattack. And though Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has said the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons to deter a huge non-nuclear attack, including using cyberweapons, against its electric grid and other infrastructure, most experts consider the threat hollow.
At his confirmation hearings in March to become director of the N.S.A. and commander of the United States Cyber Command, Gen. Paul Nakasone was asked whether our adversaries think they will suffer if they strike us with cyberweapons. “They don’t fear us,” General Nakasone replied.
So while the United States remains the greatest cyberpower on earth, it is increasingly losing daily cyberconflicts. The range of American targets is so wide and deep that it is almost impossible to understand all of the vulnerabilities. And because most of those targets don’t belong to the government — banks, power grids, shipping systems, hospitals and internet-linked security cameras, cars and appliances — confusion reigns over who is responsible for defending them and who will decide when to strike back. We have the most fearsome cyberweaponry on the planet, yet we’re afraid to use it for fear of what will come next.
Consider the Russian cyberattacks that preceded the well-known hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s computers in 2015 and 2016. Just before, Russian hackers had taken up residence in the unclassified servers at the State Department and the White House, and later deep inside the systems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the State Department, the eviction took weeks, shutting down systems during negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal. The hackers were even bolder at the White House. Instead of disappearing when they were exposed, they fought back, looking to install new malware as soon as the old versions were neutralized. “It was basically hand-to-hand combat,” recalled Richard Ledgett, the deputy director of the N.S.A. at the time. It appears the attackers just wanted to prove they could go, and stay, anywhere in the American government’s network.
Yet out of a reflexive secrecy about cyberoperations — motivated by an unwillingness to acknowledge both our vulnerabilities and our detection abilities — the United States never called out the Russians for what they were doing. Nor did we exact any punishment. That proved to be a huge mistake.
If Mr. Putin thought there was no price to be paid for invading White House systems, why wouldn’t he attack the Democratic National Committee? And as the Russian attacks continued, no one in the American government detected the larger pattern or Russia’s ambitions to affect the election. Most officials assumed it was plain old espionage.
“It wasn’t that we had our radar off to these kinds of attacks,” a senior official told me. “We hadn’t even built the radar.”
By the summer of 2016, some Obama administration officials, waking to the threat, proposed counterstrikes that included exposing Mr. Putin’s hidden bank accounts and his ties to the oligarchs and cutting off Russia’s banking system. But the potential for escalation caused Mr. Obama and his top aides to reject the plan.
“It was an enormously satisfying response,” a senior American official told me later, “until we began to think about what it would do to the Europeans.”
Mr. Obama also understandably feared that anything the United States did might provoke Mr. Putin to tinker with election systems just enough to give credence to Donald Trump’s warning that the system was “rigged.”
Since the election, the American retaliation has included closing some Russian consulates and recreation centers and expelling spies — actions one Obama national security official called “the perfect 19th-century solution to a 21st-century problem.” President Trump has signed off on some additional economic sanctions against individual Russians.
But the United States’ problem isn’t toughness — it’s an absence of strategy. The larger lesson of the past few years is that unless we get smarter a lot faster about deterring these pernicious, hard-to-find forms of cyberaggression, much of what binds our digitally connected society will be eaten away. We have spent so much time worrying about a “cyber Pearl Harbor,’’ the attack that takes out the power grid, that we have focused far too little on the subtle manipulation of data that can mean that no election, medical record or self-driving car can be truly trusted. And ultimately that absence of trust will destroy the glue of American society the way the Stuxnet computer worm destroyed those Iranian centrifuges. It will cause them to spin out of control.
So what is to be done?
First, the United States must significantly improve its cyberdefenses. The wide-open vulnerabilities in America’s networks have essentially deterred the United States from credibly threatening retaliation against the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Iranians. One way to start is to make sure no new equipment goes on the market unless it meets basic security requirements. We won’t let cars on the road without airbags, so why do we do less with the systems that connect them to the internet?
Second, we must decide what networks we care most about defending — and make those priorities clear. Mr. Mattis’s threat to turn to nuclear weapons hardly seems credible — unless the cyberattack would create an existential threat to America. That requires an intensive public review of what is critical to our nation’s survival. President Trump forfeited the perfect opportunity when he decided against a commission to learn the larger lessons from the 2016 election. Our politics have gotten in the way of our safety.
Finally, the United States needs to end the reflexive secrecy surrounding its cyberoperations. We need to explain to the world why we have cyberweapons, what they are capable of and, most important, what we will not use them for. Clearly, it is in the nation’s interests to develop global norms clarifying that some targets are off limits: election systems, hospitals and emergency communications systems, and maybe even electric power grids and other civilian targets.
Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, has proposed digital Geneva Conventions that begin to establish those norms, outside the structure of governments and treaties. It’s an imperfect solution, but a start. Intelligence agencies hate this idea: They want the most latitude possible for future operations in an uncertain world. But in any arms control negotiation, to create limits on others, you need to give up something. Otherwise, we will remain trapped in an endlessly escalating war, one we may well lose.
David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent for The New York Times. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.”
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTopinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.
The post Why Hackers Aren’t Afraid of Us appeared first on World The News.
from World The News https://ift.tt/2HXMqqP via Online News
0 notes
cleopatrarps · 6 years
Text
Why Hackers Aren’t Afraid of Us
WASHINGTON — Ask finance ministers and central bankers around the world about their worst nightmare and the answer is almost always the same: Sometime soon the North Koreans or the Russians will improve on the two huge cyberattacks they pulled off last year. One temporarily crippled the British health care system and the other devastated Ukraine before rippling across the world, disrupting shipping and shutting factories — a billion-dollar cyberattack the White House called “the most destructive and costly in history.”
The fact that no intelligence agency saw either attack coming — and that countries were so fumbling in their responses — led a group of finance ministers to simulate a similar attack that shut down financial markets and froze global transactions. By several accounts, it quickly spun into farce: No one wanted to admit how much damage could be done or how helpless they would be to deter it.
Cyberattacks have been around for two decades, appearing in plotlines from “Die Hard” movies to the new novel by Bill Clinton and James Patterson. But in the real world, something has changed since 2008, when the United States and Israel mounted the most sophisticated cyberattack in history on Iran’s nuclear program, temporarily crippling it in hopes of forcing Iran to the bargaining table. (The two countries never acknowledged responsibility for the attack.)
As President Barack Obama once feared, a cyberarms race of historic but hidden proportions has taken off. In less than a decade, the sophistication of cyberweapons has so improved that many of the attacks that once shocked us — like the denial-of-service attacks Iran mounted against Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and other banks in 2012, or North Korea’s hacking of Sony in 2014 — look like tiny skirmishes compared with the daily cybercombat of today.
Yet in this arms race, the United States has often been its own worst enemy. Because our government has been so incompetent at protecting its highly sophisticated cyberweapons, those weapons have been stolen out of the electronic vaults of the National Security Agency and the C.I.A. and shot right back at us. That’s what happened with the WannaCry ransomware attack by North Korea last year, which used some of the sophisticated tools the N.S.A. had developed. No wonder the agency has refused to admit that the weapons were made in America: It raised the game of its attackers.
Nuclear weapons are still the ultimate currency of national power, as the meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore last week showed. But they cannot be used without causing the end of human civilization — or at least of a regime. So it’s no surprise that hackers working for North Korea, Iran’s mullahs, Vladimir V. Putin in Russia and the People’s Liberation Army of China have all learned that the great advantage of cyberweapons is that they are the opposite of a nuke: hard to detect, easy to deny and increasingly finely targeted. And therefore, extraordinarily hard to deter.
That is why cyberweapons have emerged as such effective tools for states of all sizes: a way to disrupt and exercise power or influence without starting a shooting war. Cyberattacks have long been hard to stop because determining where they come from takes time — and sometimes the mystery is never solved. But even as the United States has gotten better at attributing attacks, its responses have failed to keep pace.
Today cyberattackers believe there is almost no risk that the United States or any other power would retaliate with significant sanctions, much less bombs, troops or even a counter cyberattack. And though Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has said the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons to deter a huge non-nuclear attack, including using cyberweapons, against its electric grid and other infrastructure, most experts consider the threat hollow.
At his confirmation hearings in March to become director of the N.S.A. and commander of the United States Cyber Command, Gen. Paul Nakasone was asked whether our adversaries think they will suffer if they strike us with cyberweapons. “They don’t fear us,” General Nakasone replied.
So while the United States remains the greatest cyberpower on earth, it is increasingly losing daily cyberconflicts. The range of American targets is so wide and deep that it is almost impossible to understand all of the vulnerabilities. And because most of those targets don’t belong to the government — banks, power grids, shipping systems, hospitals and internet-linked security cameras, cars and appliances — confusion reigns over who is responsible for defending them and who will decide when to strike back. We have the most fearsome cyberweaponry on the planet, yet we’re afraid to use it for fear of what will come next.
Consider the Russian cyberattacks that preceded the well-known hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s computers in 2015 and 2016. Just before, Russian hackers had taken up residence in the unclassified servers at the State Department and the White House, and later deep inside the systems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the State Department, the eviction took weeks, shutting down systems during negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal. The hackers were even bolder at the White House. Instead of disappearing when they were exposed, they fought back, looking to install new malware as soon as the old versions were neutralized. “It was basically hand-to-hand combat,” recalled Richard Ledgett, the deputy director of the N.S.A. at the time. It appears the attackers just wanted to prove they could go, and stay, anywhere in the American government’s network.
Yet out of a reflexive secrecy about cyberoperations — motivated by an unwillingness to acknowledge both our vulnerabilities and our detection abilities — the United States never called out the Russians for what they were doing. Nor did we exact any punishment. That proved to be a huge mistake.
If Mr. Putin thought there was no price to be paid for invading White House systems, why wouldn’t he attack the Democratic National Committee? And as the Russian attacks continued, no one in the American government detected the larger pattern or Russia’s ambitions to affect the election. Most officials assumed it was plain old espionage.
“It wasn’t that we had our radar off to these kinds of attacks,” a senior official told me. “We hadn’t even built the radar.”
By the summer of 2016, some Obama administration officials, waking to the threat, proposed counterstrikes that included exposing Mr. Putin’s hidden bank accounts and his ties to the oligarchs and cutting off Russia’s banking system. But the potential for escalation caused Mr. Obama and his top aides to reject the plan.
“It was an enormously satisfying response,” a senior American official told me later, “until we began to think about what it would do to the Europeans.”
Mr. Obama also understandably feared that anything the United States did might provoke Mr. Putin to tinker with election systems just enough to give credence to Donald Trump’s warning that the system was “rigged.”
Since the election, the American retaliation has included closing some Russian consulates and recreation centers and expelling spies — actions one Obama national security official called “the perfect 19th-century solution to a 21st-century problem.” President Trump has signed off on some additional economic sanctions against individual Russians.
But the United States’ problem isn’t toughness — it’s an absence of strategy. The larger lesson of the past few years is that unless we get smarter a lot faster about deterring these pernicious, hard-to-find forms of cyberaggression, much of what binds our digitally connected society will be eaten away. We have spent so much time worrying about a “cyber Pearl Harbor,’’ the attack that takes out the power grid, that we have focused far too little on the subtle manipulation of data that can mean that no election, medical record or self-driving car can be truly trusted. And ultimately that absence of trust will destroy the glue of American society the way the Stuxnet computer worm destroyed those Iranian centrifuges. It will cause them to spin out of control.
So what is to be done?
First, the United States must significantly improve its cyberdefenses. The wide-open vulnerabilities in America’s networks have essentially deterred the United States from credibly threatening retaliation against the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Iranians. One way to start is to make sure no new equipment goes on the market unless it meets basic security requirements. We won’t let cars on the road without airbags, so why do we do less with the systems that connect them to the internet?
Second, we must decide what networks we care most about defending — and make those priorities clear. Mr. Mattis’s threat to turn to nuclear weapons hardly seems credible — unless the cyberattack would create an existential threat to America. That requires an intensive public review of what is critical to our nation’s survival. President Trump forfeited the perfect opportunity when he decided against a commission to learn the larger lessons from the 2016 election. Our politics have gotten in the way of our safety.
Finally, the United States needs to end the reflexive secrecy surrounding its cyberoperations. We need to explain to the world why we have cyberweapons, what they are capable of and, most important, what we will not use them for. Clearly, it is in the nation’s interests to develop global norms clarifying that some targets are off limits: election systems, hospitals and emergency communications systems, and maybe even electric power grids and other civilian targets.
Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, has proposed digital Geneva Conventions that begin to establish those norms, outside the structure of governments and treaties. It’s an imperfect solution, but a start. Intelligence agencies hate this idea: They want the most latitude possible for future operations in an uncertain world. But in any arms control negotiation, to create limits on others, you need to give up something. Otherwise, we will remain trapped in an endlessly escalating war, one we may well lose.
David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent for The New York Times. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.”
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President Trump is readying to negotiate the future of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a historic meeting in Singapore on Tuesday. The specific agenda of the meeting isn’t totally clear, but limiting nuclear enrichment was a key element in past negotiations with North Korea and will likely be integral to any future deal.
The summit comes just a week after Iran announced plans to build a new facility to make hardware used to enrich uranium, a hint that it would move forward with assembling centrifuges to potentially build nuclear weapons if the deal Trump pulled the US out of falls apart.
It’s shaping up to be the most dramatic — and perhaps dangerous — moment of Trump’s presidency so far, with the future of Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs, and their uranium enrichment activities specifically, hanging in the balance.
Enriching nuclear material is a crucial step in harnessing the atom to generate electricity and in building the most devastating weapon humanity has ever devised, the atomic bomb. A couple dozen countries in the world have nuclear power plants, but 13 have figured out how to do nuclear enrichment themselves, and nine of them have built nuclear weapons.
Given the extraordinary destructive power of a nuclear weapon, keeping a close eye on enrichment around the world is crucial to global security. But in the decades since the Manhattan Project, the enrichment process has gone from a massive, power-hungry, brute-force operation to a sophisticated and potentially clandestine affair.
Since it’s immensely important in international diplomacy right now, it’s worthwhile to understand what goes into enriching nuclear material, how the nuclear process works, and the strategies for keeping it in check.
Like the spark that ignites a fire, a nuclear chain reaction can propagate from a very small input. And like a controlled flame, a nuclear reaction can provide useful energy. Unharnessed, it can destroy cities.
However, specific starting materials, most commonly uranium and plutonium, must be processed or enriched to drive a chain reaction.
Here are some of the basics: Uranium is the heaviest naturally occurring element in the periodic table, with an atomic number of 92, representing the number of protons in its nucleus.
It’s scattered in trace amounts in “virtually all soil, rock and water,” according to the US Environmental Protection Agency. Some countries have tried to extract uranium from seawater, but right now it’s far more cost-effective to mine it in mineral deposits.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, about 55,000 metric tons of uranium are mined every year. The top producers are Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia — which account for two-thirds of the world’s uranium mining.
Plutonium, on the other hand, is a synthetic element. It has an atomic number of 94 and is formed in nuclear reactors as a byproduct of neutrons being captured by uranium. Plutonium can be acquired from reprocessing spent fuel from conventional nuclear power plants, or reactors can be designed specifically to produce plutonium for use in weapons.
But making plutonium usually requires a reactor to begin with, so uranium remains the choke point for both uranium-based and plutonium-based weapons.
So you have your uranium (or plutonium). Can you now make a bomb?
Not quite. Let’s wade into the history and science of splitting atoms to set the stage for nuclear negotiations today.
Researchers found since the 1930s that they could bombard uranium with neutrons to create heavier isotopes and form new elements that have never before been seen in nature, like plutonium.
An isotope is a variety of an element with the same chemical structure but a different internal composition. In comparing isotopes of an element like uranium, the atomic number stays the same, but the isotope number — the sum of the protons and neutrons in a nucleus — can differ. Uranium-235 (U-235), for example, has three fewer neutrons than uranium-238 (U-238), but they undergo the same chemical reactions.
In their experiments, German scientists Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner, and Fritz Strassmann in 1938 found another curious result. Among the atoms resulting from neutron bombardment were much smaller atoms like barium, which has an atomic number of 56. Meitner, along with Austrian scientist Otto Frisch, realized that this was the result of splitting the uranium atom into smaller atoms, a phenomenon that also emits a huge amount of energy. The finding marked the dawn of the nuclear age.
Isotopes of atoms that can split apart (undergo fission) are described as fissile. When there are enough fissile atoms close together — a quantity known as critical mass — the particles ejected by fission can strike other fissile atoms, triggering more atoms to split apart and so on. The energy released in the process can generate heat to boil water to spin a turbine or wreak devastation from a bomb.
But not all uranium atoms can easily split apart and trigger a chain reaction. In fact, most can’t. In nature, about 99.7 percent of uranium is in the form of the non-fissile isotope U-238.
Only about 0.7 percent of uranium occurs in the fissile form of U-235. And in nature, U-235 is in such a low concentration that even if a stray neutron were to strike it with enough force to break it apart, it’s unlikely that the resulting neutrons would find another U-235 atom nearby to continue the reaction.
Javier Zarracina/Vox
To produce a chain reaction, you need to increase the concentration of U-235 relative to U-238. This is called enrichment.
For plutonium, all isotopes are fissile, but some are easier to use in nuclear weapons than others. Plutonium rich in the isotope Pu-239, called weapons-grade plutonium, poses the fewest technical challenges and can be extracted from nuclear fuel that is only irradiated in a reactor for a short time.
Enrichment is the sorting problem from hell.
Instead of uranium atoms, imagine you have a bag filled with 1,000 marbles, each identical in material, size, shape, color, and texture. However, there are seven marbles in the bag that weigh 1.3 percent less than the others. For 5-gram, 1.5-centimeter diameter marbles, we’re talking about a difference of about 65 milligrams for the light marbles, or the weight of a few grains of sand.
Since it’s tedious to weigh each individual marble, you’ll want to come up with some sort of group sorting mechanism. But weight is the only thing setting them apart and the difference between desired and undesired marbles is small, so the sorting process won’t be perfect and you’ll still have a mixture of light and heavy marbles at the end. So you run the results through the sorter again. And again. And again.
Enrichment is a difficult sorting process. pocket83/YouTube
With each iteration, you have a higher percentage of lighter marbles, but every repetition costs time, money, and energy.
And remember, the marbles in this analogy are atoms, the smallest unit of matter, so they’re that much more difficult to manipulate, and it takes far longer to get the quantities you need when you’re trying to go from atoms of uranium to tons of it.
For a nuclear reactor cooled with ordinary water, you need only about 3 to 5 percent U-235 enrichment, but you need it by the ton. A 1-gigawatt nuclear reactor uses 27 tons of nuclear fuel per year. A comparable coal-fired plant burns 2.5 million tons of coal per year.
Uranium with more than 20 percent U-235 is considered highly enriched. Conversely, the residual uranium with U-235 removed is called depleted (this is the uranium used in armor-piercing ammunition).
A nuclear weapon, on the other hand, requires even higher enrichment, typically around 90 percent, though it needs much less mass than a reactor. The Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, used 141 pounds of highly enriched uranium, though only 2 percent actually underwent fission due to inefficiencies in the design of the bomb. The Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki used just 14 pounds of plutonium.
Physicist Harold Agnew holding the plutonium core of the Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945. RareHistoricalPhotos.com
The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a “significant quantity” of nuclear material for a weapon to be 55 pounds of U-235 within a quantity of highly enriched uranium, or 17.6 pounds of plutonium.
Some countries with civilian nuclear reactors, like South Korea, don’t bother with the whole enrichment process and have opted instead to buy their nuclear fuel on the open international market. But for others, like France, mastering the fuel cycle is a vital pillar of their energy strategy.
Both Iran and North Korea have developed surreptitious enrichment networks for producing nuclear material. These facilities are hard to detect and easy to reconfigure, so without regular inspections and monitoring, the possibility of a clandestine nuclear weapons program remains.
This wasn’t always the case.
The Manhattan Project marked the first successful effort to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. One of the earliest and most primitive enrichment techniques used in this endeavor was gaseous diffusion. Here, uranium is reacted with fluorine to make uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). The gas is then pumped through membranes, the idea being that lighter isotopes of uranium would diffuse faster than heavier isotopes (fluorine has only one naturally occurring isotope, so any differences in the mass of the gas come from uranium).
But each stage of the process could only separate a tiny amount of uranium, so gaseous diffusion required huge buildings and devoured energy to power the pumps needed to move the gas through the separation stages.
“The original ways of doing it were very inefficient,” said Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “They required very large amounts of land, lots of power.”
For example, the K-25 gaseous diffusion building in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was completed in 1945 at a cost of $500 million. It was half a mile long and 1,000 feet wide, making it the largest building under one roof at the time. The facility employed 12,000 workers at its peak and consumed enough electricity to power 20,000 homes for a year.
An aerial photo of the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. K-25 Virtual Museum
These days, uranium enrichment is much more subtle. The most common tool is the gas centrifuge. This is where uranium hexafluoride gas is fed into a column spinning at upward of 100,000 rotations per minute.
Source: Reuters Javier Zarracina/Vox
As the centrifuge spins, the heavier isotopes push harder against its wall than the lighter ones. The centrifuge also induces the gas to circulate within the device, further increasing separation. The output of one centrifuge is then fed into another and another in an arrangement called a cascade.
Reuters
Centrifuges are more energy-efficient than other enrichment techniques and are harder to detect. The centrifuges themselves don’t take up much floor space, so their plants have a much smaller physical footprint than gaseous diffusion facilities. They also don’t draw as much electricity, nor do they leave much of a heat signature.
A declassified 1960 report from a contractor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory noted that “it would not be too difficult to build a relatively small clandestine gas centrifuge plant capable of producing sufficient enriched uranium for a small number of nuclear weapons.”
A uranium enrichment centrifuge cascade. US Department of Energy/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images
The point is a primitive enrichment apparatus is massive; a modern one is small.
“Centrifuges are the only [enrichment process] today that makes economic sense,” said R. Scott Kemp, director of the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy at MIT. “[A centrifuge plant] capable of producing a weapon can fit in a garage or a small office building, and the energy consumption is less than typical office lighting per square foot.”
That’s why arms control discussions focus so much on centrifuges, and why the Iran nuclear deal — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA — went to great lengths to specify the number and type of centrifuges allowed, as well as how closely they are monitored. Centrifuges are the key variable in how long it takes to enrich a usable quantity of uranium, whether for fuel or for weapons.
To produce nuclear energy, where you need tons of uranium but at low levels of enrichment, an enrichment operation would need many parallel cascades, but only a handful of enrichment stages. For a weapon, which demands kilograms of uranium but at much higher enrichment, it’s almost the reverse: You would only need a few parallel cascades, but those cascades would involve dozens of stages. With enough centrifuges, getting enough usable uranium for either would only take a few weeks.
The term of art for the amount of effort required to enrich uranium is a separative work unit, or SWU. It’s built on a complicated formula, and it’s useful for describing the efficiency of a centrifuge cascade. It takes about 120,000 SWU per year to produce enough fuel for a 1-gigawatt nuclear reactor, but it only takes about 5,000 SWU to have enough material for a nuclear weapon. So a country with enough enrichment capacity to sustain a small nuclear energy program theoretically has enough throughput to build dozens of weapons.
And switching between a nuclear fuel centrifuge arrangement and a nuclear weapon arrangement isn’t all that difficult or time-consuming. It’s a matter of changing how pipes are routed, so converting a plant from supplying energy material to supplying weapons material could take no more than a few months.
“That’s the real danger,” the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Lyman said. “Whether or not you can enrich to ‘highly enriched’ just really depends on if you have enough [centrifuges] to string them together.”
So how do you design an enrichment system that can produce nuclear energy but not a nuclear weapon?
You can’t, really.
The expertise and technology overlap too much. This was the fundamental technical challenge behind the Iran nuclear deal. Iran remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; North Korea withdrew in 2003. India, Israel, and Pakistan also have nuclear weapons but haven’t signed the NPT.
Under the NPT, countries that don’t currently possess nuclear weapons are prevented from developing or spreading nuclear weapons technologies, but they can pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes like research or energy.
In 2003, Iran was found to have violated nuclear activity reporting requirements in the NPT, which spurred the international effort to get Iran to suspend its enrichment work. The US has argued that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium since it was caught violating some of the safeguards imposed by the NPT, though Iran has not violated the treaty itself.
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors supervise a centrifuge cascade at the Natanz enrichment facility in Iran. Kazen Ghane/AFP/Getty Images
The goal of the six countries that signed the JCPOA with Iran in 2015 was to limit what is called “breakout time.” That is, how long it would take Iran to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon if the country suddenly decided to ditch all international agreements and aggressively ramp up enrichment.
Prior to the agreement, Iran’s breakout time was estimated at four to six weeks. The provisions of the deal (Vox’s Zack Beauchamp put together an excellent explainer on this) aimed to extend this to more than a year, which would give international observers time to detect such a shift and enact countermeasures.
In short, the agreement made Iran limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent and decommission about 14,000 of its centrifuges, allowing just roughly 5,000 of Iran’s first-generation units to keep spinning. These IR-1 centrifuges produce between 0.75 and 1 SWU per device, whereas the IR-8 centrifuges Iran was developing at the time of the deal could theoretically manage 24 SWU, making them much more efficient.
Iran also gave up much of its low-enriched uranium stockpile, going from 25,000 pounds to 660 pounds. Iranian officials also agreed to pour concrete into their Arak reactor, a potential source of plutonium for nuclear weapons.
In addition, the JCPOA requires round-the-clock monitoring of Iran’s enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz, with only the Natanz facility allowed to operate. These are likely the only places where Iran can enrich uranium for a weapon.
“I think in Iran, we are pretty confident that there is no undeclared plant,” said Alex Glaser, director of the Nuclear Futures Laboratory at Princeton University.
International observers are also monitoring Iran’s uranium mining operations.
As it stands, the agreement effectively eliminates Iran’s prospects for enriching enough uranium for a civilian nuclear program and makes it much more tedious to gather the material required for a weapon. What little enrichment Iran is allowed under the deal is effectively a face-saving measure. But, critics argue, pausing Iran’s entire nuclear enrichment apparatus only extends the breakout time by a few months since the country could just rebuild or reinstall its centrifuges if it decided to leave the agreement.
In fact, it might be beneficial for observers to keep a small enrichment program in place. “If they shut down the nuclear program entirely, actually your insight into what’s going on in Iran drops precipitously,” Kemp said. Surveillance — both open and clandestine — remains key. Highly skilled nuclear workers remain employed at monitored sites. Whatever phone lines are tapped are still operating. The informants who were recruited remain in place. “If you shut all that down, all that disappears, and it actually becomes much easier to open a secret plant in the future,” Kemp said.
When Trump withdrew the US from the international accord in early May, Iran was in compliance, according to the IAEA. But Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a speech last week that Iran is now looking to enhance its enrichment capabilities.
Iranian nation & government will not stand being under both sanctions & nuclear restrictions. The Atomic Energy Organization of #Iran must immediately make the preparations for achieving 190K SWU– for now within #JCPOA– starting tomorrow.#IranDeal
— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) June 4, 2018
“The Atomic Energy Organisation is obliged to quickly make preparations to reach to 190,000 SWU within the nuclear agreement,” he said. “The Iranian nation and its government will not tolerate to be both subject to sanctions and have its nuclear programme restricted and imprisoned.”
Iranian officials also announced that they are constructing a new plant to build components for advanced centrifuges. Under the deal, Iran is allowed to manufacture parts for centrifuges but isn’t allowed to install them for 10 years.
In the runup to the June 12 summit, President Trump said he would “like to see normalization with North Korea.”
But the key challenge of negotiating with North Korea is devising a way to downscale an enrichment program that has already produced material for what is estimated to be dozens of nuclear weapons, with the added complication that we may not know where all the enrichment facilities actually are. That gives the North Koreans tremendous leverage in negotiations.
“In North Korea, the train has left the station, so to speak,” Glaser said. “Everyone in our community is working on this right now and trying to come up with ideas. Unfortunately, we don’t know what [North] Korea is going to ask for.”
A satellite photo of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility, North Korea DigitalGlobe/Getty Images
There is a distinct possibility that North Korea could have one or more hardened, secret enrichment sites capable of producing a nuclear weapon. The first steps in a negotiation would likely involve asking the North Koreans how much enriched uranium they have on hand and to cease enriching more nuclear material, but even those demands are difficult to verify.
“We would have to take their word for it in the beginning,” Glaser said.
So before negotiators even start talking about the number of centrifuges, uranium stockpiles, or monitoring, much of the discussions with North Korea are likely to snag on access — simply on finding out what’s going on. And, by the way, Trump is heading to the North Korea summit without a nuclear physics expert or science adviser by his side. He is the first president since 1941 not to name a science adviser.
And it seems the US and North Korea are not even on the same page as to the scope of the discussion in Singapore. The US wants North Korea to dismantle its weapons and to deconstruct its entire network for building new ones (“complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization”). North Korea wants an international drawdown of nuclear weapons, including US capability.
Negotiators have their work cut out for them, and any practical limits to North Korea’s nuclear program via treaty would likely take months, if not years, to come to fruition.
But like with Iran, a deal with North Korea will likely be a compromise of sorts, where the US doesn’t get everything it wants. Even if North Korea conceded much of its enrichment apparatus in an agreement, its government has backed out of international agreements before — both openly and in secret — and could do so again.
If Trump is hoping for a big, single deal that solves the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons forever, he likely will be disappointed. The reality is that once a country develops enrichment capabilities, the specter of a mushroom cloud never leaves the picture. The knowhow is always there; it’s just a matter of will.
The process for crafting a denuclearization agreement with North Korea may drag on as all parties patiently work to build up fragile trust. But negotiations, however tedious and imperfect, are surely better than the tensions of late 2017 — when North Korea was proceeding headlong in a race to perfect its intercontinental ballistic missile technology and threatening to bomb Guam. Peace is at the door, but science holds the key.
Original Source -> Uranium enrichment will be a key point in talks with North Korea. Here’s what it is.
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