ayzhadelleruin

[ayzhadelleruin]

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

CHAPTER 3 SECTION 4 ARTICLE 1216

The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES also known as PHILIPPINE EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT AGENCY, Petitioner

vs.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Respondent

G.R. No. 233850 July 2019

FACTS:

A Five-Year Floating Rate Note Facility Agreement was entered into by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) together with other banking institutions (Series A Noteholders) and Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PhilPhos) up to the aggregate amount of ₱5 billion. PVB committed the amount of ₱1 billion in the said agreement. On the same date, Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), with Philphos’ conformity, executed a Guarantee Agreement to secure the payment of the Series A Notes whereby TIDCORP bound itself to guarantee the payment of the guaranty obligation up to 90% of the outstanding Series A Notes, including interest, on a rolling successive three-month period commencing on the first drawdown date and ending on the maturity date of the Series A Notes.

When Typhoon Yolanda hit Central Visayas and caused damage to Philphos’ manufacturing facilities, Philphos’ failed to resume its operations. Upon Philphos’ filing of a petition for Voluntary Rehabilitation under the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 20107 (FRIA) before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12, a commencement order including a stay order was issued by the said court. PVB filed its notice of claim on 5 November 2015 with TIDCORP, however, the latter refused to accept PVB’s claim by invoking the stay order issued by the Rehabilitation Court.

On 22 September 2016, PVB filed a complaint for specific performance before the RTC against TIDCORP arguing that TIDCORP agreed to guarantee payment to the Series A Noteholders to the extent of 90% of the Series A Notes and interest and waived the benefit of excussion. TIDCORP argued in its Answer with Counterclaim that said complaint cannot be tried by the court due to the Rehabilitation Court’s Stay Order. Consequently, RTC granted PVB’s Motion for Summary Judgement since there was no genuine issue as to any material fact presented by TIDCORP. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by TIDCORP assailing RTC’s Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not TIDCORP can be held solidarily liable with PHILPOS under the Guarantee Agreement by waiving the benefit of excussion.

RULING:

Yes, petitioner TIDCORP indubitably engaged to be solidarily liable with PhilPhos under the Guarantee Agreement. The Guarantee Agreement unequivocally states that petitioner TIDCORP waived its right of excussion under Article 2058 of the Civil Code and that, consequently, the Series A Noteholders can claim under the Guarantee Agreement DIRECTLY against petitioner TIDCORP without having to exhaust all the properties of PhilPhos and without need of any prior recourse against PhilPhos:

Under a normal contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion. Conversely, if this benefit of excussion is waived,  the guarantor can be directly compelled by the creditor to pay the entire debt even without the exhaustion of the debtor's properties. In other words, a guarantor who engages to directly shoulder the debt of the debtor, waiving the benefit of excussion and the requirement of prior presentment, demand, protest or notice of any kind, undoubtedly makes himself/herself solidarily liable to the creditor.

In effect, the nature of the guarantee obligation assumed by petitioner TIDCORP under the Guarantee Agreement was transformed into a suretyship. This is the case because the defining characteristic that distinguishes a guarantee from a suretyship is that in the latter, the obligor promises to pay the principal's debt if the principal will not pay, while in the former, the obligor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the principal and exhausting all of the principal's properties, may proceed against the obligor. Hence, taking together the fact that petitioner TIDCORP expressly admitted its obligations under the Guarantee Agreement, and that it failed to offer any substantial defense against the claim of respondent PVB, the RTC was not in error in holding that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact extant in the instant case. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the instant Petition for lack of merit.

(also applicable Art 2047, 2058, 2059 of Civil Code)

[ayzhadelleruin]

ADOPTION (Rescission of Adoption)

Article 186

G.R. No. 143989        July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.

JOSE MELVIN SIBULO, respondent

FACTS:

Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin.

Finally, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.

HELD:

No. In Republic vs. Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

In the case at bar, it was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

[ayzhadelleruin]

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Article 176

G.R. No. 86639        June 2, 1994

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

FACTS:

On September 18, 1953, a child name Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and correspondences.

On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto died intestate.

His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’ Accounting were approved, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.

Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child. The probate court rendered a decision compelling the decedent's heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court on the strength that, "Assuming that the probate court’s decision was true, the Court of Appeals do not believe that they satisfy the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court in affirmative. As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner’s status as a natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well and hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased in accordance with Article 283 of the Civil Code which provides, inter alia:

"Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child.

aw library (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.”

In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically be concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to conceal his paternity. No less than his younger sister, his stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were categorically informed of the relationship and they accepted the same as fact.

The Petition is Granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Proof of Filiation

Article 172

G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents

FACTS:

Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married to Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. Macadangdang filed his answer opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal.  The lower court dismissed the complaint filed by Mejias.

Mejias appealed the decision of the Court of the First Instance to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in its decision reversed the lowers court’s decision thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang.

The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the petitioner filed this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate son of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.

HELD:

Yes. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the respondent and her husband.

It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of Baptism. Baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, but they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates specified. In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence.

This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly questionable character. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her own son.

Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it provides thus:

Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Wherefore, the Decision of the Court of Appeals and Resolution are Reversed and Set Aside.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

Article 147

GR No. 143286, 2004-04-14

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, petitioner

v. 

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents 

FACTS:

Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion. Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income.

Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.

Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.

In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas' illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties.

Plaintiff, then complained to the Brgy Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence the said official issued a certification to file action but still no settlement was reached by both party.

The trial court rendered its Decision in favor of Eusebia but the petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. Eusebia died and her heirs substituted her pursuant to the resolution of the CA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the court denied.

ISSUE:

Whether on Not the Subject Properties Are Conjugal.

HELD:

Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya and against defendants Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya and Pacita Villanueva:

Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint as conjugal properties of the spouses plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the defendant Nicolas Retuya;

Ordering the transfer of the sole administration of conjugal properties of the spouses Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in accordance with Art. 124 of the Family Code to the plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya;

Ordering defendant Procopio Villanueva to account and turnover all proceeds or rentals or income of the conjugal properties from January 27, 1985 when he took over as 'administrator' thereof and until he shall have ceased administering the same in accordance with the judgment of this Court;

Ordering defendants jointly and severally to reconvey the parcel of land situated at Tipolo, Mandaue City now in the name of defendant Pacita Villanueva under tax dec. No. 01450 and transfer the same into the names of the conjugal partners Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas

[ayzhadelleruin]

Charges Upon and Obligations of the Conjugal Partnership

Article 121

G.R. NO. L-51283 JULY 7, 1989

LOURDES MARIANO, petitioner

vs

COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

FACTS:

The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.

The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies’ ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.

Esther del Rosario's husband has filed a complaint for annulment of the execution of her divorce. Daniel Sanchez alleged that conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils, were exempt from execution. ISSUE: 

WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez’s wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses

HELD:

In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husband’s consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife’s obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Exclusive Property of Each Spouse

Article 109

G.R. No. L-31287 December 27, 1929

HARTSKE, petitioners-appellants

V.

FRANEL AND PHIL. TRUST CO., appellees 

FACTS:

Eugene Fischler executed her last will and testament, and died in Manila, 1924. By its terms she bequeathed to Charles Albert Robinson, a grandnephew, P10,000. The residue of her estate, both real and personal, went to her nieces Anna Hartske and Clara Webber.

On November 2, 1926, the Philippine Trust Company, which was later appointed administrator of the estate, filed the "Final Accounts and Project of Partition". Fred Frankel claimed to be an heir of his deceased brother, Herman Frankel, husband of the deceased wife, filed a petition to set aside the order approving the Final Accounts and Project of Partition claiming that he was entitled to the conjugal half of the estate of the deceased wife.

December 7, 1926, it was agreed between the attorneys "that the hearing be continued to a new setting to be fixed by this Honorable Court, in order to give the petitioner time to take depositions in the United States in support of his petition."

The deposition of Fred Frankel was filed in the Court of the First Instance and the case was set for hearing before the clerk, at which objections were made by the residuary heirs of the deceased wife in the ground that it is not a true transcript of the proceedings to which it pretends to relate.

Upon the merits of the court rendered the following decisions:

Fred Frankel is the son of Srul Frankel and Chaje Frankel, and that he has four brothers and one sister. According to the records, Mr. and Mrs. Herman Frankel had no issue. Fred Frankel being the only surviving brother, he must be declared the sole heir of his father-in-law.

Herman Frankel, as husband, has an interest in the property left by his wife. No liquidation of the conjugal partnership was made; neither was any liquidation made at any time subsequent to the death of Mrs. R. Frankel. The community property, if any, has been left undivided all this time.

It is an admitted fact that Herman Frankel and Mrs. R. H. Frankel were legally married, although the evidence is contradictory as to the place where the marriage took place. As no proof has been introduced to the contrary, it is presumed that they have entered upon the regime of legal conjugal partnership

The parties have agreed, however, Torrens title No. 3374, registry of Manila, was issued to Eugene Fischler, the wife of Herman Frankel; also another title was issued on June 20, 1921, in favor of Eugene Fischler, married to Herman Frankel. Also, they have agreed that the money now deposited in the International Banking Corporation was deposited by Eugene Fischler Frankel, and that the same amount was withdrawn by her one year thereafter and redeposited in the same bank under her name, and has remained there since.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in holding Exhibit A fraudulent and in holding that all property left by the deceased was conjugal property, one-half of which should go to Fred Frankel.

HELD:

No. Herman Frankel and Eugene Fischler, deceased spouses of Edward A. Carlstrom, died on the same day that Herman Frankel conveyed their property to Edward Carlstrom. It is contended that such conveyances should be construed together, and that when so construed, they were made for the sole purpose and intent of divesting the conjugal partnership of the property and for such reasons, it is null and void as against public policy.

Be that as it may, upon that point we prefer to base this opinion on the recitals made in the Spanish notarial certificate, and the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, that the property described in Exhibit A was purchased by the wife with her own personal money. There is no evidence to overcome the legal force and effect of that certificate. 

That Exhibit A  was a good and valid conveyance to the deceased wife, and that it was and is legally binding on both the husband and his heirs.

The judgment of the lower court as to the real property described in Exhibit A is reversed, and it is held to be the sole and separate property of the wife and of her estate. In all other things and respects, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, 

[ayzhadelleruin]

Family Home

ARTICLE 153

G.R. NO. 213972    February 05, 2018

FELICITAS SALAZAR, Petitioner

 v. 

REMEDIOS FELIAS, Respondent

FACTS:

Private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Felisa) seeking to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).

Romualdo died during the trial of the case. Consequently, a Motion for Substitution was filed by the decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto Lastimosa (Recto), Rizalina Ramirez (Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa (Heirs of Lastimosa).

On a Decision the Heirs of Nivera were declared as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, thereby ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and surrender possession thereof.

The Heirs of Lastimosa did not file an appeal against the trial court's ruling. However, Salazar, daughter of Romualdo, Recto and Rizalina filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA seeking the nullification Decision and the corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant to it. 

The Petition for Annulment of Judgment was dismissed by the CA. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. The court’s ruling became final, as per Entry of Judgment.

The Heirs of Lastimosa filed an Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making Demolition but was denied by RTC.

The Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the lower court. The appeal was denied. Felicitas then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the same Decision, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution. Hence, Felicitas filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the assailed CA decision and resolution contending that the execution cannot continue as the Writ of Execution is being enforced against property that is exempt from execution, as what is sought to be demolished is her family home. In this regard, Article 155 of the Family Code ordains that the family home shall be exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject family home is exempt from the Writ of Execution as claimed by Felicitas to be hers.

HELD:

No. The petition is bereft of merit. 

Indeed, the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence.

A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.

Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must perforce be given effect.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

As cited in Art 36

G.R. NO. 188400           March 8, 2017

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

V.

RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

FACTS:

Maria Teresa married Rodolfo despite noticing that the latter was an introvert, prone to jealousy and appeared to have no ambition. They had two children. During their marriage, Rodolfo’s attitude worsened, treated  Maria Teresa as a sex slave and even poked a gun in her head due to jealousy which led her to leave their conjugal house together with their children. Maria Teresa supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by reason of the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo before the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion; No collusion was found during the investigation of the Office of the City Prosecutor, and thus was recommended the case on its merits.

A clinical psychologist was presented as an expert witness who conducted interviewed both the spouses and testified that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality but was not enough to constitute psychological incapacity and diagnosed Rodolfo with paranoid personality disorder manifested by the latter’s damaging behavior which constitute a severe form of personality disorder. Thus recommended the marriage of spouses Maria Teresa and Rodolfo be annulled due to the latter’s incapacity to perform marital obligation

The office of the Solicitor general failed to comply with the trial court’s order thus the case was submitted for decision. The trial court promulgated its Decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Office of the Solicitor filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals when its Motion for Reconsideration was denied for being deemed moot and academic. The said appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals and reversed the decision of the trial court; ruling that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez’s finding that Rodolfo’s behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari when her motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion was needed to prove psychological incapacity

Issue: 

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because the petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

Held:

Yes. The Court finds that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals was also mistaken for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez. Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychological incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party’s psychological condition. Dr. Lopez’s testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that the respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The respondent’s paranoid personality disorder incapacitated him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Petition is granted and the marriage of Maria Teresa Tani - De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared Null and Void. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Reversed  and Set Aside and the Decision of RTC of Quezon city is Reinstated.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime

Article 100

G.R. NO. 72321      December 8, 1988

DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMINO, ELPDIO, AIDA, all surnamed CUENCA, Petitioners,

Vs

RESTITUTO CUENCA, respondent

FACTS: 

Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte. 

Restituto Cuenca was proclaimed as the absolute and exclusive owner of that parcel of land known in Butuan containing an area of 6 hectares. On November 26, 1984, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents.

Respondents claimed ownership over the property on the ground that they are legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon (both deceased) They argue that some parcels are owned by Maria and all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agriptino.

Petitioners denied the legitimacy of the marriage of Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of plaintiffs as children ofthe couple. They argued that Agripino and their mother Engracia were legally married and that they are legitimate children. They contest that the parcels of land in question are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the ground of new found evidences which shows that: A certified true copy of the register of birth of Diosdidit, which proved that he is indeed a legitimate child. Aside from this, 8 sketch maps were obtained alleging that the parcels of land in questioned were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved when Agripino was already married to their mother, Engracia as indicated in the documents. Hence, there is a presumption that these parcels of land are part of their conjugal properties. Therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties. 

ISSUES: 

WON the lands in Butuan are conjugal properties of spouses Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre.

HELD:

 No. Ratio Decidendi: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.”

This actually refers only to properties acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The documents that were presented do not show that the claims to the subject of parcels of land consisting of homestead lands were acquired during the marriage of Agripino and Engracia Basadre. 

The sketch maps do not show that the claimed to the homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of petitioner’s parents. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered at the time of acquisition of the properties which was during the marriage of Agripino and Maria (parents of Restituto and Meladora).

Decisions of appellate course are affirmed and the instant petition is Dismissed.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Marriage

Article 48 and 60

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861

MARGIE MARCIAS CORPUS, Complainant

Vs.

JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, Respondent

FACTS:

On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S.  Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC.  The case was raffled to the respondent’s court. On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.

Mrs. Macias filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied by the respondent and reset the hearing. After the scheduled hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision.

Various motions and manifestation, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the respondent judge. One was denied while the rest were ignored and the respondent proceeded with the hearing without resolving the other motions and manifestation.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before the OCA. Also in the complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte directing the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the subject case and imposing an administrative sanction against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process.

HELD: 

Yes. The Court rules that the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias’ right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules.  A Judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence. When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitute gross ignorance.

The respondent judge also disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule  18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.” 

It is also worth noting that the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.

Wherefore, Judge Ochotorena is found Guilty of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby fined.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Nullity of Marriage

Article 40 

G.R. No. 183805     July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Et. Al., Respondents

FACTS:

 On June 28, 2004, petitioner, James Walter P. Capili, was charged with the crime of bigamy in information as follows: 

On or about December 8, 1999, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Kar;a Y. Medina Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner, thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as prejudicial question in that instant criminal case.

In Order, the petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss were granted.

In the opposition filed the private prosecutor to the motion among others, was that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this case and that the resolution of the issues in the said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

After a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, the Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the motion to dismiss filed case since the 2nd marriage was already nullified.

The private respondent filed an appeal to CA and in the Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

The petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said decision but he same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy.

HELD: 

No. As defined in Art 349, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the information was filed.

It was undisputed that a second marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between the petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili. Notably, the RTC itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between the petitioner and private respondent.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. 

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are Affirmed.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Case Digest # 1

As cited in Article 2,3,4 of Title I of Family Code of the Philippines

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner

Vs.

Court of Appeals, respondents

(256 SCRA 158 (1998)

FACTS

In this case, a petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the CA with regard to the petition filed by Ma. Victoria L. Tuazon for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage with Emilio R. Tuazon on the grounds that the latter was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation which only manifested later on in their marriage.

During the trial of the petition filed by Ma. Victoria Tuazon, the now petitioner, failed to appear in court on the scheduled hearings With this the court declared that the petitioner waived his right to present evidence and deem the case submitted for the decision based on the evidence presented.

Since no action was taken by the counsel of the petitioner or by the petitioner himself during the reglementary period the decision annulling the said marriage become final and executory.

Later on, the petitioner filed a petition with the trial court but was denied. The petitioner then appealed before the Court of appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment. The appeal was dismissed. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case.

Held:

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence.

Under the Rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the trial court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial, and meritorious defense or cause of action.

In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of due process when he failed to appear in the two hearings. He justifies that his absence was on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons. The records, however, shown that his former counsel did not inform the trial court of this confinement and when the court rendered the decision there was no appeal taken.

The failure by the petitioner’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal was negligence which is not excusable. The petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court.

The Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.

Wherefore, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Case Digest#6

As cited in Art 72

HERADIO F. DONADO, Plaintiff-Appelee

V.

MATILDE MENENDEZ DONATO, ET. AL., Dependants-Appellants

(55 PHIL. 861)

FACTS

The present proceedings originated in the two complaints filed by Heradio F. Donado, one of which was against Matilde Menendez Donado Et. Al., and the other against Mercedes Montehermoso Et. Al., praying that he be adjudged entitled to participate in the estate left by his deceased mother Gertrudis Donado, as well as in the property inherited by the latter and the defendant Matilde Menendez from their mother, Marcela Donado, and that the aforementioned defendants, Mercedes Montehermoso and Matilde Menendez Donado, be ordered to render an accounting of the products obtained from said property, and meanwhile to pay said plaintiff his share of such products to which he is entitled by law, upon the ground that he is a natural son voluntarily acknowledged by his deceased mother, who at the time of his conception had legal capacity to marry.

Mercedes Montehermoso, one of the defendants was born the only legitimate surviving child of the spouses Bernado Montehermoso and Gertrudis Donado, who were married in the year 1877. Two or three years after the death of Bernado Montehermoso, Gertrudis Donado gave birth to the plaintiff. Gertrudis Donado raised the plaintiff and defrayed the expenses of his education, clothing, and food. Gertrudis Donado died about 25th or 26th of April.

The Plaintiff presented at the trial a copy of the decision of the Court of the First Instance of Antique, making mention of Heradio F. Donado as a minor child of Gertrudis Donado; certified copies of the complaints filed in the three cases instituted by Gertrudis Donado wherein the latter alleged that she was the guardian and administrator of the property of his son, Heradio F. Donado and a copy of power of attorney executed by Heradio F. Donado in favor of his mother, authorizing her to sell certain animals the credentials of which were in his name.

The defendant adduced the following evidence: “Matilde Menendez Donald, elder sister of Gertrudis Donado, had permitted to do so, would have testified that she knew the plaintiff to be the son of FR. Justo Firmiza, with whom she lived and who had presented the plaintiff to his intimate friends as his son, and Matilde Menendez was told several times by Fr. Firmiza that the plaintiff was his son. The defendants also offered in evidence through Tomas Lamberto that, hat the court permitted the latter, he would have testified that the plaintiff is the son of Fr. Firmiza; that the latter lived maritally with Gertrudes Donado and that Fr. Firmiza admitted in the presence of several persons that he was the plaintiff’s father.

Issue:

Whether or not Heradio F. Donado has the right to participate in the inheritance of his mother, Gertrudis Donado by virtue of a voluntary acknowledgment made in a public document.

Held:

Yes. According to Cosio v Pili and Manresa’s opinion, acknowledgment made in a public or private document need nor be direct, but may even incidentally admit that the person whose name appears in the document in question is the subscriber’s child. Also, the witnesses, Honorio Nuevacubeta and Angle Flores, testified that they saw Gertrudis Donado giving birth to the plaintiff and that Gertrudis nursed and brought up the plaintiff, whose education she paid for; and that after his marriage he continued to live in his mother’s house and Gertrudis always considered the plaintiff as her son. These statements made in the public documents and the testimony of those who were present at the birth and saw the child nursed and reared by the mother and later living with her, are conclusive evidence of the identity of Heradio F. Donado as Gertrudis Donado’s son.

Since the plaintiff-appellee’s right to inherit from his mother, Gertrudis Donado, originated in the latter’s acknowledgment made in a public document, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code and Gertrudis Donado having died while the Code was in force, the aforesaid Heradio F. Donado is entitled to the portion of the inheritance assigned to him by the Civil Code, in accordance with the transitory provision of the said Code.

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it adjudges the plaintiff Heradio F. Donado the right to participate in the inheritance of his mother, Gertrudis Donado, and reversed in so far as it orders the partition of said property; and let the cause be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without special pronouncement of cost.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Case Digest # 2

Article 26 of Title I of Family Code of the Philippines

G.R. 167109  FEBRUARY 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner

v.

Court of Appeals, Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza

 FACTS:

Felicitas Amor-Catalan and  Orlando B. Catalan were married, migrated to the United States of America, and allegedly became naturalized. After 38 years of marriage, they got divorced. Orlando then got Married to Merope Calasiao. The petitioner, contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and Merope. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Orlando then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case.

The petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review after her motion for reconsideration as denied raising that she has the required standing in court to question the nullity of the marriage between respondents.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondent on  the grounds of bigamy, However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

 ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

 RULING:

Both the  RTC and the court of Appeals found that the petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized America citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree. However, after careful review of the records, the said courts noted that other than the allegations in the complaint and testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

A divorce obtained abroad by alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleadings must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the case was REPRIMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition.