#2016 arbitral ruling
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firstoccupier · 12 days ago
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Op-Ed: The Philippines’ Diplomatic Dance with China: A Facade of Resistance in the West Philippine Sea
By the Editors of WPS News For the past four years, the Philippines has engaged in a series of diplomatic maneuvers to counter China’s incursions into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea. From fiery rhetoric to international arbitration appeals, these actions project an image of a nation standing firm against a regional giant. Yet, a closer examination reveals a…
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celestiarambles · 1 year ago
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Hi this may divert from my usual content, but as someone with a platform like this I need to speak up about this.
The Philippines-China maritime dispute has been going on for years now, but lately the tensions had been getting more and more worse to the point it’s super concerning now.
Here’s a bit of a history lesson: China claims that the West Philippine Sea is theirs because of the nine-dash line, but the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled in 2016 that that had no basis under international law. Other than that, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) said that China’s historic rights on the territory no longer exists. So basically, the West Philippine Sea belongs to the Philippines.
However, China rejects that decision. They have harassed, intimidated, and even used armed conflict on our vessels. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels had even used a water cannon against our ships TWICE, in which one incident resulted to getting seven Navy personnel wounded.
Worse, there are also allegations of a spy being planted here. Alice Guo, one of the mayors in Tarlac (a city in the Philippines) had mysteriously risen to power despite having no prior experience or connections whatsoever. Literally no one even knew her in her town. She just claims to live in a simple farm. However, she owns a luxury sports car and a helicopter. And somehow, everything regarding her past is inconsistent; she doesn’t know what her mother’s name was, who she grew up with, no school documents, hell she didn’t even have a birth certificate up until she was 17 years old. This was all brought up because she was involved in the criminal activities (like human trafficking, scams, etc.) of the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) which also has the Chinese involved.
The US has also been taking advantage of the situation by deploying 9 EDCA sites (military bases) for a supposed military pact, but former US Marine Intelligence Officer Scott Ritter has admitted to using the Philippines as a tool to gain leverage over the Chinese.
What has our government done regarding this dispute? They’re too busy infighting to focus on the bigger picture and on how to settle on an agreement with China.
I just want to take the time to speak up and make people more aware about the ongoing dispute. I know that this has been going on for several years now, but my memory and knowledge about the topic may be a bit wonky so I apologize in advance if I had said anything wrong. You can add more information regarding this or correct the information that I've given if I phrased things wrong.
Regardless, I do know one thing: the West Philippine Sea is ours.
Sources:
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-china-sea-why-are-china-philippines-tensions-heating-up-2024-04-11/
https://www.youtube.com/live/aOrmFJXyAVI?si=P9rPJkJM6BF0NIbW (check 1:57:00)
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zoeology31 · 6 months ago
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Offseason Twins News Roundup
Since the mid-playoffs 1-2-3-4 punch of firing four coaches, Thad Levine leaving, MLB taking over TV broadcast rights, and the Pohlads announcing their intention to sell the team, the Twins have had a quiet offseason relative to most teams. But now that the stove has heated up with big trades and signings over the last week or so, I expect things to start moving for the Twins as well. Here's a roundup of what's happened since mid-October as we prepare for what comes next.
Kirilloff's Retirement
At the end of October, Alex Kirilloff, the Twins' 2016 first-round draft pick, announced his retirement from baseball at age 26 due to the physical and mental complications of his various injuries. This came as a huge surprise, but an understandable decision nonetheless, and by every indication he's in a good headspace about it. I wish him the best.
Article here
Roster Moves
Here's the current state of the Twins' 40-man roster. As we've passed various early offseason roster deadlines, there have been a lot of procedural moving parts here:
Kepler, Santana, Thielbar, Farmer, and Margot are free agents, the latter two after having their mutual options declined
Kirilloff retired from baseball (see above)
Dobnak, Duarte, Blewett, Winder, and Severino were outrighted off the 40-man roster to clear space. Dobnak remains with the organization on his contract; Duarte, Blewett, and Severino were all re-signed on minor league deals, and Winder elected free agency
Alcala's team option was picked up
Stewart, Tonkin, and Topa were all signed to one-year deals to avoid arbitration
The rest of the Twins' very large arbitration-eligible class were all tendered contracts: Castro, Jeffers, Ober, Jax, Ryan, Larnach, Duran, and Lewis. The arbitration filing deadline is 1/9/25, though I don't expect any players to go to arbitration
Top prospect Marco Raya as well as Travis Adams (both pitchers) were added to the 40-man roster to protect them from the Rule 5 Draft. No players in the organization were lost in the major-league portion of the Rule 5 Draft
The Twins selected Eiberson Castellano, pitcher in the Phillies' organization, in the Rule 5 Draft (more on that later)
Few surprises here outside the Kirilloff news. I always liked Winder, so I'm sad to see him go. I expect to see Raya in the majors next season. There's a nonzero chance the Twins re-sign Santana given the glaring hole at first base. Also best wishes in Colorado to Kyle Farmer, forever a Twins legend for the opening day walkoff, promising a playoff win, and hitting that homer in ALDS Game 2 🫡
Front Office Changes
Longtime Twins president Dave St. Peter stepped down, while Derek Falvey will be taking over in a joint president/POBO role. Assistant GM Jeremy Zoll, one of the Twins' two assistant GMs and head of player development, was promoted to GM to replace Levine. St. Peter was the president for 22 years and the face of things like "if you fund our new stadium we promise to raise the payroll" and "why aren't fans coming to the ballpark after we cut payroll". He won't be missed among fans.
Articles: St. Peter, Zoll
Arizona Fall League
The Salt River Rafters, the Twins' Arizona Fall League affiliate this year, won the AFL championship. Their manager was Saints coach Tyler Smarslok, and Twins prospect (and 2023 AFL home run derby champion) Kala'i Rosario drove in the go-ahead run. I hope Rosario can make the majors, he seems like a cool guy and I enjoy rooting for him.
Article here
Coaching Staff Changes
The Twins recently finished their major league coaching staff hires, as well as some internal promotions.
Hitting coach: Matt Borgschulte, Orioles assistant hitting coach and former Twins minor league hitting coach
Hitting coach: Rayden Sierra, Twins minor league assistant hitting coordinator
Assistant hitting coach: Trevor Amicone, Yankees triple-A hitting coach
First base/infield coach: Ramon Borrego, Twins double-A manager and 21-year organizational veteran
Assistant bench coach/catching coach: Hank Conger, promoted from first base coach
It'll be interesting to see if the all-new hitting staff can fix the Twins' situational hitting issues, which they've specifically called out as a goal. I'm really excited to see Borrego join the major league staff, he's very popular and managed a lot of our players in the minor leagues.
Articles: Borgschulte, other coaches
Rule 5 Draft Pick
For the first time since 2017, the Twins selected a player in the major league Rule 5 Draft: Eiberson Castellano, a rising star pitching prospect for the Phillies' double-A team. He fits the Twins' pitching prospect profile (big righty with good command) and they've apparently liked him for some time. Since Rule 5 draftees must be kept on the active roster, he'll likely be tried as a long reliever.
Article here
Potential Buyers for the Twins
The first potential buyers for the Twins have emerged, Justin and Mat Ishbia, owners of the Phoenix Suns and Mercury basketball teams. Any potential sale is likely still in early stages, but the Ishbias have apparently been meeting with local leaders already. They are characterized as assertive, willing to spend, and passionate about baseball. If this is accurate, this absolutely seems like best case scenario.
Article here
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attorneysinphuket · 2 months ago
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Thailand Board of Investment
1. Institutional Framework and Historical Context
1.1 Legal Foundations
Established under the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977)
Amended by Act No. 4 B.E. 2560 (2017) to accommodate Industry 4.0
Operates under the Office of the Prime Minister with quasi-ministerial authority
1.2 Governance Structure
BOI Board: Chaired by the Prime Minister
Investment Committee: 12-member expert panel
Secretariat: Professional staff of 300+ specialists across 8 divisions
1.3 Historical Evolution
Phase 1 (1960-1990): Import substitution industrialization
Phase 2 (1991-2015): Export-oriented manufacturing
Phase 3 (2016-present): Technology-driven "Thailand 4.0" initiative
2. Investment Promotion Strategy
2.1 Geographic Prioritization
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC): Enhanced incentives
Southern Border Provinces: Special security concessions
20 Provinces: Tiered incentive structures
3. Incentive Architecture
3.1 Tax Privileges
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Holidays:
5-8 years exemption
50% reduction for 5 subsequent years
Import Duty Exemptions:
Machinery: 100% relief
Raw materials: Partial relief based on local content
3.2 Non-Tax Incentives
Land Ownership Rights: Foreign freehold permitted
Work Permit Facilitation: Fast-track processing (7 days)
Foreign Expert Visa: Multiple-entry 4-year SMART Visa
3.3 Special Incentive Packages
EEC+ Package:
15-year CIT exemption
Personal income tax cap at 17%
Digital Park Thailand:
10-year tax holiday
Data center infrastructure subsidies
4. Application and Approval Process
4.1 Pre-Application Phase
Eligibility Assessment (30-day diagnostic)
Project Feasibility Study requirements:
Minimum 3-year financial projections
Technology transfer plan
Environmental impact assessment (for Category 3 projects)
4.2 Formal Submission
Documentation Requirements:
Corporate structure diagrams
Shareholder background checks
Detailed investment timeline
Filing Channels:
Online BOI e-Service portal
In-person at BOI One Start One Stop center
5. Compliance and Operational Requirements
5.1 Investment Implementation
Capital Deployment Schedule:
25% within 12 months
100% within 36 months (extensions possible)
Employment Ratios:
Minimum 1 Thai employee per THB 1M investment
Technology transfer obligations
5.2 Reporting Obligations
Annual Progress Reports: Detailed project updates
Tax Privilege Utilization Statements: Certified by auditor
Foreign Expert Tracking: Monthly work permit updates
6. Sector-Specific Considerations
6.1 Manufacturing Sector
Local Content Requirements: 40-60% depending on sector
Environmental Standards: Tiered compliance levels
6.2 Digital Economy
Data Localization Rules: Conditional exemptions
IP Protection: Enhanced safeguards for BOI projects
6.3 Renewable Energy
Feed-in Tariff Eligibility: BOI+EGAT coordination
Carbon Credit Monetization: Special provisions
7. Dispute Resolution and Appeals
7.1 Privilege Revocation Process
Grounds for Cancellation:
Failure to meet investment timelines
Violation of environmental regulations
Fraudulent application information
Appeal Mechanism: 60-day window to petition
7.2 Arbitration Framework
THAC-administered proceedings
Expedited process for BOI disputes
8. Emerging Trends and Future Directions
9.1 Policy Developments
Draft Amendment Act (2025): Proposed R&D requirements
Green Industry Incentives: Carbon neutrality targets
9.2 Technological Integration
Blockchain Verification: For document authentication
AI-assisted Application Processing: Pilot program
9.3 Global Value Chain Positioning
ASEAN+3 Supply Chain Initiatives
EU-Thailand FTA Preparations
9. Strategic Implementation Guide
10.1 For Multinational Corporations
Regional HQ Strategy: Leverage RHQ privileges
Tiered Investment Approach: Phased capital deployment
10.2 For SMEs
Cluster Development: Co-location benefits
Technology Partner Matching: BOI-facilitated pairings
10.3 Risk Management
Compliance Calendar: Critical date tracking
Contingency Planning: Alternative incentive structures
Key Resources:
BOI Official Website: www.boi.go.th
Investment Privileges Database: privilege.boi.go.th
EEC Special Regulations: eeco.or.th
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marcksnow · 2 years ago
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The South China Sea Dispute: Unraveling the Nine-Dash Line
The South China Sea dispute has been a long-standing issue, marked by conflicting territorial claims and geopolitical tensions. Central to this dispute is China's contentious "Nine-Dash Line," which purports to assert Beijing's sovereignty over nearly the entire West Philippine Sea, encompassing the Kalayaan Group of Islands. This essay delves into the historical and legal aspects of China's Nine-Dash Line and highlights the Philippines' counterclaims, particularly drawing attention to the 1734 Murillo Velarde map.
The Origin and Legitimacy of China's Nine-Dash Line:
China's Nine-Dash Line first appeared on Chinese maps in 1947, with Beijing using it as a basis for asserting historical claims to vast maritime areas in the South China Sea. However, the international community has consistently questioned the legitimacy of this demarcation. In a significant development, an international tribunal ruled on July 12, 2016, that the Nine-Dash Line had "no legal basis" for making maritime claims. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague delivered this verdict, effectively challenging China's historical claims over the South China Sea.
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The Philippines' Historical and Legal Claims:
Contrary to China's assertions, the Philippines has put forth both historical and legal claims to the disputed territories, backed by compelling evidence. A key piece of evidence in the Philippines' favor is the 1734 Murillo Velarde map. This historic map played a pivotal role in the Philippines' victory against China's ownership claims in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
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The Murillo Velarde map, originally printed in the 18th century, resided in the basement of Alnwick Castle for two centuries, part of the Duke of Northumberland's collection. This map serves as a testament to the Philippines' long-standing presence and historical connection to the South China Sea, particularly the West Philippine Sea.
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The Problematic Nature of China's Claims:
China's assertion of sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea remains problematic on multiple fronts. Firstly, it lacks historical and legal basis, as affirmed by the international tribunal's ruling. Secondly, the unilateral drawing of the Nine-Dash Line by Chinese authorities raises concerns about its validity and its impact on regional stability.
Conclusion:
The South China Sea dispute, epitomized by China's Nine-Dash Line, continues to be a source of contention in international politics. While China insists on its historical claims, the Philippines has presented compelling historical and legal evidence to challenge these assertions. The 1734 Murillo Velarde map stands as a symbol of the Philippines' enduring connection to the region. Ultimately, a resolution to this dispute should be sought through diplomacy and adherence to international law, fostering peace and stability in the South China Sea.
References:
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mywiderangeopinion · 11 months ago
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Hi! I created a Tumblr account just for this reason—I want to freely express my opinions without worrying about others judging me. My Facebook is full of college friends and relatives, and I’m not sure if they would appreciate my opinions on certain topics.
I've got a lot on my plate, but when I opened Google News and saw that the Chinese Air Force dropped flares in the path of the Philippine Air Force, it made me stop and think: What can I do to help? How will this affect me? How will this affect my family?
I'm a bit concerned about what our government's next move will be. According to ABS-CBN News, they plan to discuss this within the week and come up with an appropriate response.
China always mentions that they want this issue resolved peacefully, but their actions suggest otherwise. If the Philippines allows itself to be bullied while under the watch of our allies, China may perceive us as a mere speck they can easily disregard. Although I hope this never leads to war, the ongoing tensions over this territorial dispute make me anxious, especially considering our limited equipment.
I don't want my husband to go to war. We have young children, and if other countries or UNCLOS allow China to be aggressive, it would show a disregard for the 2016 arbitration ruling and international laws. This would also suggest that China could easily capture Taiwan. It's been several years since the ruling, yet China continues to create tension. This situation could significantly impact my work and our future.
I will end this by saying that I'll pray for our country's safety. Even though we are clearly being bullied, I hope our president and other leaders will wisely and strategically plan their next move. Their decisions are unclear to me, especially after a recent video showed Chinese Coast Guard personnel taking or stealing firearms from the Philippine Coast Guard without any response from our side. It makes me wonder if they are waiting for a serious incident, like the loss of life, before they take a firm stand for our country.
Here's the link: https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/2024/8/12/agricultural-goods-without-permits-confiscated-in-naia-boc-034
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cindylouwho-2 · 2 years ago
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RECENT NEWS, RESOURCES AND STUDIES, MID-AUGUST 2023
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Welcome to my latest roundup of ecommerce and other online news for small and micro businesses, including Etsy sellers. Usually August is a slow news month, but there is still a fair amount going on.
Want to receive this report and my website blog posts by email? Sign up here: http://bit.ly/CindyLouWho2Blog
With the continuing demise of Twitter being a concern, here is a list of places you can find me, and here is where I am posting news:
LINKEDIN
BLUESKY
REDDIT
TWITTER
I hope to get the next report out before Labour Day, but of course I cannot predict what will happen between now and then. Please let me know if there is anything you would like to see more reporting on!
TOP NEWS & ARTICLES 
Repeating this from the last update since it so important: Etsy’s latest policy changes brought in the ability to opt out of the binding arbitration clause, but existing members only have until August 23rd to do so. The Indie Sellers Guild has some thoughts on this. If you are opting out, remember this must be done for each account (buyer or seller), and make sure to include the following information in your email to [email protected]:
your name
the email address for your account
your username
your shop name (if applicable)
Expect a vague email response that does not verify that you are opted out, because this is Etsy and why would they be clear? 
If you have anything with images of children in your Etsy shop (including art and figurines), please carefully read Etsy’s new policy on such imagery, as it appears many current photos and other visual depictions will not be allowed as of September 8. I started a thread in the Etsy forum for discussion. 
Amazon changed the deposit rules for UK and EU sellers who started on the site before 2016, implementing the “7 days after delivery date” deposit release that newer sellers also face. The UK’s small business commissioner and the minister for small business were not amused, and that led to some money being released early, but with a warning that the new delayed deposits would resume in January 2024.  
ETSY NEWS 
Etsy has changed the criteria for payment reserves for the time being, but we don’t know much about how, other than the fact most have been reduced to 30% from the original 75%. We still don’t know how they have made “... adjustments for issues that are beyond sellers’ control” such as a lack of cheap tracking, or if they are truly providing better communications to sellers just put on reserve, other than this Seller Handbook article from August 4. That article does admit that most current reserves are about shipping. I do know that we aren’t seeing many new reserves mentioned publicly, so it appears they have changed something. 
A few sellers from the UK have been able to opt out of Etsy’s Offsite Ads, but Etsy is now pushing back and rejecting requests. Reminder that most of the EU and also Switzerland can now opt out. 
The Make an Offer tool now lets you choose which listings you will accept offers on, as well as other improvements. (It's still only available to shops that sell in USD, and not all buyers can see it yet.)
To accompany the release of Etsy’s new baby registry, Etsy reported on recent baby and nursery trends. Farm animals are apparently in, as are flowers. 
The holiday season trends report is also out; it covers Canadian Thanksgiving to New Year’s Eve. “277% YoY increase in searches on Etsy containing “wooden christmas tree decor” - With sustainability in mind, many buyers are opting for ornaments made of solid hardwood over plastic.” And apparently maxi skirts are back? 
The second quarter 2023 report showed stagnation in sales but more new sellers, plus Etsy focussing on telling sellers to discount items. You can read my coverage here. Some analysts are starting to sour on Etsy: “They feel a little bit like Pinterest to me where they have something great but they're not finding the opportunity on it.” 
Smiley faces are one of the latest takedown targets - not by Etsy bots, but by the actual rights owner. 
SEO: GOOGLE & OTHER SEARCH ENGINES 
If you are using internal links on your website for SEO reasons, beware that the anchor text is also important. 
An analysis of the biggest winners in Google search results for the United States in the first half of 2023 shows Mercari had a huge leap in search visibility so far this year. 
Bing is not gaining much on Google’s market share, despite having a jump on AI search. 
Brave Search now includes both video and image searching. 
If you missed a lot of Google developments in July, Search Engine Roundtable has you covered. 
[Advanced content] An Ahrefs study found that ⅔ of websites using hreflang have at least one problem. 
SOCIAL MEDIA - All Aspects, By Site
General
Since most social media platforms don’t want people leaving their site, they tend to give lower ranking to posts with links in them. You can get around this issue by focussing on zero-click marketing. [text and video] There’s a followup video with transcript on the 4 ways you can promote content through social media as well. 
Another what and when to post on social media, this one covering Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, based on what brand accounts did in 2022. [I’m thinking the Twitter data may not be as relevant today.]
Several US states have passed laws requiring parental permission for anyone under 18 to join social media, or are in the process of doing so.
One of the downsides of Bluesky is that it counts any link URLs as part of your character limit, but you can get around that if you aren’t also adding a photo. 
Facebook (includes relevant general news from Meta)
Daily active users on Threads have dropped over 80% from their peak. The site is still developing, however, and desktop access plus searching is coming soon. 
Instagram
Instagram is adding more tools that use artificial intelligence. 
Photos carousels now support music. 
TikTok
TikTok will be offering fulfilment services in the UK, to be followed by the US. “The example merchants are influencers and beauty brands to start with.”
Users in the EU will be able to remove online tracking from their TikTok “For You” algorithm in the near future, possibly by August 28.There will also be advertising changes. 
Twitter
The Twitter algorithm is changing, and now prioritizes replies, plus it is pushing video. “X is also penalizing mentions of the term ‘Threads’ as well as links to the Meta competitor.” [Yes, I am still calling it Twitter, but you can call it X if you want.]
Tweetdeck is now a paid service only. The ability to organize different lists and even work with multiple different accounts made it an essential for doing a lot of work on Twitter. 
ECOMMERCE NEWS, IDEAS, TRENDS (minus social media)
Amazon
Amazon will be charging additional fees for sellers who use Prime but don’t ship through Amazon, starting October 1. 
Amazon added hundreds of new product attributes that need to be added to relevant new listings starting on August 16. 
Looks like there will be another Amazon Prime Day in several countries this year.
Amazon’s second quarter was strong, with a lot of growth in ads. 
Investors are suing Amazon over several issues, including lying to them. 
eBay
eBay is finally agreeing to negotiate with the union of its recent acquisition, TCGPlayer, after the larger company failed to reverse the vote to unionize.  
Poshmark
Poshmark’s app will soon include an image search, called “Posh Lens”, although only some have the beta test at the moment. 
All Other Marketplaces
Depop’s new seller protection policy for US and UK sellers kicks in on September 3, and requires sellers to purchase shipping labels on the site. 
Wish is laying off over ¼ of its staff, including up to 40% of its employees in the United States.  
Shipping 
The port labour disruption in British Columbia is officially over.
ONLINE ADVERTISING (NOT SOCIAL MEDIA OR ECOMMERCE SITES 
If you aren’t using the free Google Shopping ads for your website yet, here are some tips on optimizing your products. Note that “Google may also assess your landing page speed and experience to rank your products”; many think that is only for organic results. 
Google ended “similar audiences” from all ads on August 1. “Campaigns using similar audiences will automatically get opted into optimised targeting and audience expansion moving forward. Marketers who would rather avoid this can go to the audiences tab in the Google Ads settings page and manually turn off the campaigns instead.”
STATS, DATA, TRACKING 
Still not paying much attention to Google Analytics 4? Here’s more info on why and how it is different from Universal Analytics. 
And that's it for this edition! Please let me know if there are other topics I should be covering.
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connorthemaoist · 2 years ago
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Marco Valbuena | Chief Information Officer | Communist Party Of The Philippines | August 8, 2023
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) joins the Filipino people in denouncing the interdiction operation by water-cannon attack conducted by a China’s Coast Guard ship over the weekend against a much smaller Philippine supply boat and coast guard vessel.
China’s action is completely unacceptable considering that it was carried out well within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and put to risk the lives of the Filipino crewmen. The Philippine boats were on a mission to deliver supplies to soldiers stationed at military outpost at the Ayungin Shoal, which the International Arbitral Tribunal ruled to be part of the Philippine’s exclusive economic zone.
This is not the first time that Philippine boats were subjected to hostile action by China’s armed vessels. Such operations which violate Philippine sovereignty have been going on for over a decade now. The most vulnerable to China’s aggression are Filipino fishing boats who have been repeatedly driven away by armed Chinese vessels from their fishing grounds, especially in the Scarborrough Shoal, which has long been shared by Filipino and Chinese fishermen. In addition, Chinese industrial fishing has intensified in areas within and around the West Philippine Sea which have resulted in the dislocation of small Filipino fishermen.
The Filipino people must manifest their indignation against China’s antagonistic acts against Philippine sea vessels, plunder of marine resources and gross violations of the country’s sovereignty. They must build the broadest possible local and international united front to demand China to respect the 2016 ruling of the IAT which dismissed China’s 9-dash claim and upheld the Philippines’ rights to its exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf.
Moreover, the Filipino people must protest the timidity of the Philippine government in the face of China’s antagonistic acts, while refusing to make active international political and diplomatic initiatives to more aggressively defend the country’s sovereignty, and instead merely following the baton of the US government.
At the same time, the Filipino people must resist the push of pro-US militarists who wish to exploit the situation to justify further increasing the reliance of the country’s military forces on US military funding and arms sales, heightening US military presence in the country, intensifying US war provocations, raising the temperature of US-China military conflict and drawing the Philippines into a possible hot war.
Over the past decade, the imperialist powers US and China have trampled on Philippine sovereignty in playing their superpower rivalry. On the one hand, China has intensified its military presence in the South China Sea in the face of heightened US military presence since the “Asia pivot” declaration of the US in 2011. On the other hand, the US has intensified its military presence in the Philippines, as well as in South Korea, Japan, and others along its so-called “first island chain” strategy of “encircling China.” The US has been hyping up Taiwan “independence” to provoke China.
The Filipino people cannot defend the country’s sovereignty against the Chinese titan by allowing themselves to be under the power of the US colossus. To do so is not to defend the Philippine sovereignty, rather is to further retrograde the country’s status as an American neocolony.
Instead, the Filipino people must raise the urgent demand for the imperialist powers to demilitarize the South China Sea by removing their armed vessels in the area to allow cargo and civilian vessels to freely sail through these international waters, and give Filipino fishermen all the freedom to harvest marine resources, without fear of interdiction or reprisal, and for the Philippines to enjoy security within its land and territorial seas.
Source: https://philippinerevolution.nu/statements/stand-up-to-the-chinese-titan-and-american-colossus/
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firstoccupier · 2 months ago
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🇵🇭 Escalating Tensions in the West Philippine Sea: April 22–23, 2025
By WPS.News Staff | Baybay City — Between 9:00 PM on April 22 and 9:00 PM on April 23, 2025 (PHT), the West Philippine Sea witnessed heightened geopolitical activity, marked by increased Chinese military maneuvers and strategic responses from the Philippine. 🌦️ Weather Overvie The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) reported stable weather…
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al-dhaheri-international · 2 years ago
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Mediation and Conciliation in Civil and Commercial Disputes: A New Horizon
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With the launch of the Mediation Rules by the Dubai International Arbitration Centre effective from 01 October 2023, the UAE has introduced a significant piece of legislation at the federal level, consolidating Mediation and Conciliation specifically in Civil and Commercial Disputes viz. Federal Decree Law №40 of 2023 (the “Decree-Law”) which will come into effect on 29 December 2023, thereby repealing Federal Law №6 of 2021 on Mediation in Civil and Commercial Disputes which regulated both the judicial and non-judicial Mediation; and Federal Law №17 of 2016, as amended by Federal Law №5 of 2021, which governs Conciliation and regulates the establishment of court-annexed Conciliation and Mediation centres for civil and commercial disputes; ushering in a new era for alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) in the UAE.
By nature, the concept of Mediation and Conciliation is profoundly embedded in Arabic culture and Sharia law, as such, the Decree-Law is a welcome step equally for parties and lawyers alike to progress ADR in the UAE. This move aligns with the UAE’s commitment to signing the Singapore Convention on Mediation, announced in March 2022.
Overview
At the outset, Mediation may be conducted in all civil and commercial disputes capable of settlement without conflicting with the existing laws or the public order and morals prevailing in the UAE, without prejudice to the provisions of the local laws that regulate Mediation. This is in accordance with Article 8 of the Decree-Law, while Article 27 of the Decree-Law states about the exclusive competency of Mediation and Conciliation Centre (the “Centre”) to conciliate civil and commercial disputes (i) whose value does not exceed five million (5,000,000) dirhams; and (ii) between spouses or relatives up to the fourth degree, regardless of their value. The adversaries may agree to resort to the Centre for Conciliation of civil and commercial disputes whose value exceeds five million (5,000,000) dirhams, whether before a case is filed or while it is being heard.
That said, as outlined in Article 28 of the Decree-Law, certain disputes do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre viz. (i) urgent and interim orders and cases; (ii) cases to which the government is a party, (iii) rental cases heard before special rental dispute committees, (iv) labor cases, personal status cases; and (vi) any other cases decided to be heard before a Centre, committee or other entity of similar jurisdiction.
Establishment of Centres
The Federal Judicial Council (the “Council”) or the chairman of the local judicial authority may establish one or more Centre(s) for Mediation and Conciliation within the territorial jurisdiction of the first-instance courts; and shall issue pertinent regulations to govern the work and operations of the Centre(s). There is also scope for establishing special Centre(s) for Mediation and branches of foreign Mediation Centre(s); with court or the local judicial authority having supervisory authority on its working and formulating the general policies.
Remote Mediation and Conciliation Platform
Article 4 of the Decree-Law empowers the Mediators and Conciliators to conduct Mediation and Conciliation meetings through electronic means and remote communication, subject to regulations and procedures issued by the Minister of Justice, based on the approval of the Council or the chairman of the local judicial authority.
Mediators and Conciliators Accreditation Processes
The Federal Judicial Inspection Department or the local judicial authority shall maintain a roster for registering Mediators from amongst those registered in the experts’ schedule at the Ministry of Justice or with the local judicial authorities, and the expert Mediators named by a decision of the Council or the chairman of the local judicial authority. Normally they shall be selected from amongst retired members of the judiciary, lawyers registered in the schedules of practicing and non-practicing lawyers. Qualification includes practice of the profession for a period of not less than five (5) years prior to their registration in the non-practicing lawyers’ schedule, and other highly qualified experts and international experts in the legal and business fields, who are known for their expertise, integrity and impartiality. Furthermore, Article 15 of the Decree-Law allows appointment of any natural or legal person, known as Private Mediator, entrusted by the Parties with the task of Mediation to amicably resolve the dispute between them, and not registered on the Mediators’ Lists.
The appointment of Conciliators follows a procedure similar to employment. The Federal Judiciary or the president of the local judicial authority will establish the qualification for the post of a Conciliator. The Conciliators must take a legal oath before assuming their duties, and shall be subject to a specific compensation scheme.
Confidentiality and Non-disclosure
The documents and information submitted or agreements or concessions made by the parties to the disputes submitted for Mediation or Conciliation (the “Parties”), and Mediation and Conciliation procedures as a whole are treated with utmost confidentiality, as envisaged in Article 5 of the Decree-Law; except with the consent of the Parties, or as required by law. Exception further extents to document(s) prepared by the Mediator or the Conciliator and signed by the Parties, including the Settlement reached to resolve the dispute, in whole or in part, between them; and the documents and instruments necessary for its enforcement. Failure by the Mediator or Conciliator to adhere to the confidentiality and non-disclosure obligations stipulated herein, attracts disciplinary actions according to Article 40 of the Decree-Law, without prejudice to the provisions of civil and criminal liability.
Prohibitions on the Mediator and Conciliator
Article 6 of the Decree-Law prohibits the Mediator and Conciliator from acting as an arbitrator or expert in the dispute, or accepting to be an attorney in a dispute against any of the Parties regarding the subject matter of the dispute subject to Mediation or Conciliation, or anything arising from it, even after the completion of the Mediation or Conciliation procedures, unless the Parties agree otherwise. Prohibitions further extents to giving testimony against any of the Parties to the dispute regarding the subject matter of the dispute subject to Mediation or Conciliation, or anything arising therefrom, even after the completion of the Mediation or Conciliation procedures, unless authorized by the concerned party or the Parties agree otherwise, except in cases where the testimony is related to a crime; and in case of acting as a Mediator or Conciliator in a dispute where one of the Parties is a spouse or a relative up to the fourth degree by blood or marriage.
Parallel Mediation and Conciliation Structures
While the previous separate federal laws on Mediation and Conciliation laws are now consolidated, these two parallel structures continue to co-exist under the Decree-Law. Concerning Conciliation, under the court-annexed system, mandatory Conciliation is a prerequisite for specific types of disputes prior to litigation proceedings, and with regards to Mediation, voluntary process that can be initiated either through contractual agreement or by court referral, subject to the Parties mutual consent applies. Here, the chief difference is with the role of the “Mediator” opted by the Parties i.e., while in the Mediation process, the Mediator acts as a facilitator aiding the Parties to arrive at an agreement using the Mediation techniques; however, in the Conciliation process, the Mediator only suggests possible paths to the Parties in order to resolve the dispute. Precisely, both the structures share a common goal, which is amicable resolution of the disputes, whether before, or at the stage of the legal proceedings.
Consensual Mediation
In enforcing the agreement between the Parties made either before or after the occurrence of dispute, with the aim of resorting to Mediation for the Settlement of the dispute (“Mediation Agreement”), the Parties may directly resort to the Center to settle the dispute between them, before filing a lawsuit, as per Article 11 of the Decree-Law. This is Consensual Mediation, the initiation of which interrupts legal and judicial deadlines and only resume upon the completion of the Mediation, unless it is concluded by the Parties signing a Settlement Agreement. The procedures for Consensual Mediation are set out in Article 12 of the Decree-Law. In pursuance of Article 13 of the Decree-Law, the court before which a case is filed regarding a dispute brought before a Mediator in enforcing the Medication Agreement, shall decide suspension of the case until the completion of the Mediation procedures, if the defendant urges therefor before making any request or submission on the merits, unless the court finds that the Mediation Agreement is void or impossible to be enforced. The filing the case shall not however, preclude the initiation or continuation of Consensual Mediation procedures.
Court-Referred Mediation
Court-Referred Mediation occurs by virtue of a referral decision made by the subject-matter court competent to hear the lawsuit (“Competent Court”), at any stage of the case, whether proposed by the court with the Parties’ consent or upon their request. Article 14 (3) stipulates that the referral decisions issued by the Competent Court cannot be appealed by any ordinary or extraordinary means of appeal. Mediation shall end as per Article 21 of the Decree-Law if the Parties (i) sign a Settlement Agreement; (ii) agree to end the Mediation before reaching a Settlement Agreement for any reason; (iii) if one of the Parties informs to the Mediator or the Centre of their wish to participate in or continue Mediation; (iv) if the Mediator notifies the Centre, in writing or electronically, that the Mediation: (a) is futile and that there is no possibility of reaching a resolution to the dispute; (b) has been ended due to the absence of any of the Parties from two consecutive Mediation sessions without excuse; and (v) if the Mediation period expires without being renewed.
In all the above cases, the Mediator shall, upon the end of Mediation, deliver to each party any memoranda and documents they presented, and they may not retain them or copies thereof, and shall send a written or electronic report to the Centre on the result of the Mediation within three (3) working days from the date of ending the Mediation for any reason. The Centre shall notify the Parties and the Competent Court, within three (3) days, of the report and the result of the Mediation.
End of Mediation
Mediation if concluded successfully can end by signing the Settlement Agreement. The ratification process of the Settlement Agreement follows three tiers. i.e., from the Mediator to the Centre and finally to the Court. The Mediator shall submit a report to the Centre along with the Settlement Agreement, which the Centre shall send it to the Court within 3 working days. As a final step, the Court shall ratify the Settlement Agreement and issue a decision to end the dispute, wholly or partially, at a session to be scheduled within seven (7) working days from the date of its receipt of the Settlement Agreement. After its ratification, the agreement shall become a writ of execution and an exequatur shall be affixed thereto upon the request of all Parties or one of them, in light of the terms of the agreement submitted to it, and shall be executed according to the procedures stipulated in the Federal Civil Procedure Law.
That said, the aggrieved party has the rights to object or challenge ratification of the Settlement Agreement, by filing an annulment case before the competent Court. The party seeking annulment shall prove one of the reasons viz. (i) lack of legal capacity of one of the Parties to the Settlement Agreement or diminished capacity at the time of its conclusion, (ii) no Settlement Agreement or if the agreement was void or voidable, or if it was made after the expiry of the Mediation period; or (iii) if one of the Parties was unable to present their defence due to invalid service of process or notification of the Mediation procedures or due to them not having been aware thereof for any other reason beyond their control. Pursuant to Article 24 (2) of the Decree-Law, the judgment issued by the court in the annulment case shall be final and can only be appealed through cassation.
Settlement before the Conciliator
If a settlement is reached between the Parties before the Conciliator, either in whole or in part, this shall be recorded in a minutes signed by the Parties and the Conciliator. These minutes shall be ratified by the Supervising Judge, have the force of a writ of execution and the same binding force of court judgments, and are not subject to appeal by any means of appeal. Upon ratification, the minutes shall be affixed with an exequatur upon the request of all or any of the Parties, free of charge, and shall be executed in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the Federal Civil Procedure Law.
Conclusion
The enactment of the Decree-Law marks a pivotal moment for Mediation and Conciliation in the UAE, offering a unified platform for resolving disputes not just in property and construction disputes but in other Civil and Commercial disputes as well.
Recommendation
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Our record of representing clients in Mediations and ADR procedures throughout the UAE speaks volume. Thus, we recommend for a comprehensive understanding and implementation of the new legislation, consider consulting the seasoned lawyers at Al Dhaheri International Advocates & Legal Consultants, renowned for their expertise in mediation and alternative dispute resolution throughout the UAE.
                                                                    Written by — Dr. Sherina M. Saji
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mariacallous · 2 years ago
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The moment has been long in coming, but India is turning into a strategic actor in Southeast Asia. Amid a flurry of regional diplomacy, India has sealed an arms deal with Vietnam, sided with the Philippines over China on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and enhanced defense cooperation with Indonesia. It is balance-of-power politics worthy of an international relations textbook: Even though most Southeast Asian governments have long made it their mantra not to choose geopolitical sides, China’s aggressive posture in and around the South China Sea is driving India and its partners in the region together. As yet, none of these relationships are on the level of alliances or include a serious force deployment component, but the trend is clear. And even though the United States and its Asian treaty allies are not involved, India’s moves raise the tantalizing possibility that it will increasingly complement the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China in the coming years.
India’s strategic outreach had its humble beginnings in 1991, when New Delhi announced the Look East policy—a recognition of the geostrategic significance of Southeast Asia to Indian security. More a vision than a concrete set of measures, Look East was followed by the Act East policy in 2014, when India began to proactively engage with the region to prevent it from succumbing to Chinese domination. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first announced Act East, India in recent years has steadily strengthened key partnerships across Southeast Asia, particularly with countries along the maritime rim of the Indo-Pacific. These moves are clearly designed to cooperate with Southeast Asian partners who also seek to maintain the rules-based international order and norms of behavior in the face of rising Chinese assertiveness in the region.
Last month, Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Van Giang visited his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, in New Delhi and announced that India would transfer a missile corvette to the Vietnamese Navy to enhance maritime security. The two sides also reportedly discussed stepped-up training for Vietnamese military personnel operating submarines and fighter jets, as well as cooperation on cybersecurity and electronic warfare. There is also ongoing speculation that Vietnam may soon purchase India’s BrahMos cruise missile, which is co-produced with Russia and could complicate Chinese military operations in disputed seas. To strengthen relations further, Hanoi and New Delhi have also been considering a potential trade deal.
These recent moves reinforce the “comprehensive strategic partnership” India and Vietnam have maintained since Modi’s 2016 visit to Vietnam. Hanoi maintains just four partnerships at this highest of levels—with China, India, Russia, and most recently South Korea. That underscores the high strategic value Hanoi places on New Delhi. By comparison, the United States is only a “comprehensive partner” for Vietnam, two levels below India’s status. Washington has struggled to raise the partnership.
The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, is steadily expanding and deepening its security partnership with India as well. Late last month, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo visited New Delhi and met with his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar. For the first time, India recognized the legitimacy of the 2016 arbitration ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in favor of Philippine sovereignty claims over China in the South China Sea. During the meeting, Jaishankar reiterated India’s call on China to respect this ruling. Both sides further vowed to enhance their defense partnership through increased interactions between defense agencies and by sending an Indian defense attaché to Manila. India also offered a concessional line of credit to the Philippines to buy Indian defense equipment. According to a diplomatic source close to the negotiations, “We are both maritime nations and there is great scope where we could identify various cooperative activities including, in the future, joint sales and joint patrols and exchanging information, best practices and anything to enhance [maritime domain awareness].”
Both nations have closely collaborated on security matters in recent years. In 2019, for example, India participated in a joint naval drill in the South China Sea with Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. In 2021, the Indian Navy conducted bilateral drills with the Philippines. In addition, a fourth round of high-level defense dialogue between India and the Philippines concluded in April, with the two sides pledging to deepen defense cooperation further. In 2022, the Philippines inked a major deal to purchase India’s BrahMos missiles. According to the Indian ambassador in Manila, India is exploring a preferential trade deal with the Philippines to boost their relationship, similar to what it is discussing with Vietnam.
Meanwhile, India’s security partnership with Indonesia has quietly been evolving in ways that also support the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. In February, an Indian Kilo-class conventional submarine made a first-ever port call to Indonesia, underscoring that New Delhi’s undersea assets could have access to Indonesian ports sitting astride the strategic waterways traversing the vast archipelagic nation. Beijing already faces a major strategic headache in the form of the so-called Malacca dilemma—China’s vulnerability to having its most important trade route cut off by the United States and its allies in the narrow waters between Singapore and Malaysia. Add potential blockades of Indonesia’s Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait—two other strategic narrows—and China might have to rethink future military operations entirely.
Indo-Indonesian defense relations truly kicked off in 2018, when Modi visited Jakarta and elevated relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. As part of this, the two nations signed a new defense cooperation agreement. That same year, India and Indonesia launched a new naval exercise, Samudra Shakti, that incorporated a warfighting component. Since then, the two navies have conducted four rounds, the last of which was in May and prioritized anti-submarine operations. The Indian Navy has further supported Indonesia with humanitarian and disaster relief operations, particularly following the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami that hit Palu in 2018. New Delhi and Jakarta are exploring potential air force cooperation as well. Indonesia may also follow in the footsteps of the Philippines by purchasing BrahMos missiles.
On the economic side, the two nations are considering a preferential trade agreement, similar to what India is discussing with Vietnam and the Philippines. Other plans include enhancing links between Indonesia’s Aceh province and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These parts of the two countries are separated by just over 500 miles of sea, and Jakarta and New Delhi have been cooperating to boost trade and travel between them. India and Indonesia are also cooperating on developing infrastructure, such as a port at Sabang in Aceh, which could be viewed as India’s rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
India is also cooperating with Malaysia, another counterclaimant against China in the South China Sea, on the basis of an enhanced strategic partnership signed in 2015. In 2022, both Jaishankar and Singh met their Malaysian counterparts and expressed interest in deepening their partnership. After his meeting with Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin bin Hussein, Singh described the engagement as “wonderful.” Although Kuala Lumpur’s decision earlier this year to cancel a deal to purchase Indian-made Tejas fighter aircraft may have dampened the partnership somewhat, the intent clearly remains to strengthen ties in line with upholding the mutual goal of maintaining the rules-based international order in the region—especially internationally recognized maritime borders and freedom of navigation, neither of which Beijing accepts. When Jaishankar met then-Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, the latter emphasized that India is a friend who shares the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” using the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Brunei is another emerging partner for India along the South China Sea. In 2021, the two nations renewed their defense agreement for five years, and they regularly engage in joint exercises, port visits by navy and coast guard ships, and official defense exchanges.
India’s strategic partnerships with Singapore and Thailand—a key partner and ally of the United States, respectively—are also close and long-standing. Singapore regularly engages in bilateral exercises, high-level dialogues, visits, and professional training with India. Modi visited Singapore twice in 2018, and on the first trip, he signed 35 memoranda of understanding agreements on a range of security and economic issues. For example, he signed a logistical agreement to boost bilateral naval cooperation and multiple agreements pertaining to investment in human capital. On his second trip, Modi attended the India-ASEAN summit, underscoring New Delhi’s emphasis on the region’s significance.
In 2022, Thailand and India took stock of their partnership and pledged to elevate defense engagements further, to include cybersecurity. Perhaps of greater importance is the economic side of their relationship. In a nod to New Delhi’s original Look East policy, Bangkok implemented its own Look West policy in 1997, in part to tap into the enormous Indian market. Moreover, Thailand and India are partnering with Myanmar to construct the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway that will significantly upgrade transport links between Southeast Asia and South Asia. Once the highway is completed, Modi and his government also want to add connections to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—another clear rival to China’s BRI.
India further has good relations with both Cambodia and Laos. In May, Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni visited India, and the two sides reaffirmed “the strong civilizational bond between us.” Phnom Penh and New Delhi cooperate on a range of socioeconomic projects, de-mining, water conservation, and heritage protection. India’s engagement with Laos is less robust, but nevertheless, New Delhi and Vientiane are likely discussing ways to boost economic ties. This is all the more remarkable as both Phnom Penh and Vientiane are widely considered to be firmly in China’s camp.
Not all Indian engagements in the region are necessarily positive for the United States and its Indo-Pacific strategy, however. One notable example is India’s relationship with the military junta in Myanmar, which has plans to enhance its partnership with Beijing. New Delhi has yet to condemn the 2021 coup that brought it to power, and India refuses to join Washington in putting political pressure on the junta in the form of sanctions or through other means. To be sure, India is in a difficult spot as chaos in Myanmar has caused concerns that instability could spill over the border, where the Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland have ethnic and kinship ties with Myanmar. New Delhi hopes that its continued cooperation with the Burmese junta will contribute to greater stability in the border region.
But even in Myanmar, India is doing some things that are in Washington’s interest. Modi’s joint statement with U.S. President Joe Biden last month, for example, mentions Myanmar and notes the importance of the junta releasing all political prisoners and returning to constructive dialogue. While this is hardly the condemnation of the regime Washington has been seeking, it is a start. Additionally, New Delhi in recent months confronted the junta on how it is apparently allowing Chinese workers to build a listening post to spy on India in the Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal.
From a multilateral perspective, India has been active as well. Within the existing India-ASEAN framework, the two parties in May held their inaugural group military exercise, known as ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, in the South China Sea. The exercise reportedly attracted the attention of China’s maritime militia, which was operating within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and approached the exercise participants.
Overall, India’s Act East policy is a net positive for the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China. Washington should welcome and gently encourage New Delhi to do even more. For example, additional joint patrols in the South China Sea among India, the United States, and other nations—including those in the region—could bolster deterrence. Additional Indian infrastructure and development projects, as well as trade deals, could help lessen Beijing’s economic dominance of Southeast Asia.
Realistically, however, New Delhi rightly worries first and foremost about its own neighborhood, and its time and resources are inevitably constrained. China also maintains the inside track in Southeast Asia due to its growing power and proximity to the region. That said, New Delhi’s policy of outreach to Southeast Asia—even if it is sustained only at current levels—will help further undermine Beijing. That, in and of itself, is a big win for Washington and its Asian allies.
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warningsine · 2 years ago
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The Senate on Tuesday unanimously adopted a resolution condemning China's incursions in the West Philippine Sea and its continued harassment of Filipino fishermen.
The measure also exhorted the Philippine government to take action in asserting its sovereign rights over the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
The resolution also calls on China to stop its “illegal activities” in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and with the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
The adopted Senate Resolution 718 was the outcome of an all-member caucus on Monday where the senators discussed with Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo and AFP chief Romeo Brawner Jr. the appropriate action on Senator Risa Hontiveros’ resolution which urges the Department of Foreign Affairs to bring China’s aggression before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
In his manifestation after the adoption, Zubiri explained that Hontiveros’ resolution was not “watered down” but rather strengthened after the meeting with the country’s Foreign Affairs chief and the top military official.
“We came out with a strong consensus yesterday after the discussions with the West Philippine Sea Task Force, together with the AFP chief-of-staff  General Brawner and DFA Secretary Manalo and actually we never watered down the resolution that we filed, we actually strengthened the first resolution that we initially filed with Sen. Risa,” Zubiri said.
“I think what happened here is we strengthened the position of the government. Now, we gave them several options to choose on how to deal with our neighbors in the north,” he added.
Among the courses of action enumerated in the adopted resolution are:
-Bringing international attention to China’s harassment of Filipino fishermen in the Philippine EEZ and its continued violation of the Hague Ruling and the UNCLOS
-Utilizing international fora to rally multilateral support for the enforcement of the Hague Ruling and raise awareness on the real situation in the WPS
-Engaging like-minded countries in various international organizations, meetings, and other fora to call on China to respect the Hague Ruling and the UNCLOS and subject to necessity and prudence
-Filing a resolution before the UNGA to call for the cessation of all activities that harass the Philippine vessels and violate the Philippines’ established rights in the WPS
-Pursuing such other diplomatic modes as the DFA may deem appropriate and necessary
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itlblogbyeliana · 1 month ago
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Redefining Boundaries: The West Philippine Sea and the South China Sea Debate
by: Eliana Glen G. Sarmiento
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As defined by AO No. 29s. 2012, the “West Philippine Sea” refers to the maritime areas on the western side of the Philippine archipelago including the Luzon Sea, the waters around, within, and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Bajo de Masinloc while the South China Sea refers to the semi-enclosed in the western Pacific Ocean. The South China Sea lies to the South of China, west of the Philippines, to the east of Vietnam, and to the north of Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia according to (the Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.) in their official website. The West Philippine Sea designation is not just a matter of national pride but a legal reality upheld by the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. The landmark decision invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim and affirmed the Philippines’ rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf. In spite of this victory, challenges continue to exist as China continues its militarization and exploitation of the resources in the area which is disobeying international law. 
Justice Antonio Carpio, a steadfast defender of the Philippine maritime rights, emphasizes the significance of upholding the rule of law in the West Philippine Sea. His advocacy reminds us that UNCLOS, a part of international law is the legal basis of the Philippines’ claim. The arbitral ruling reinforced this framework, yet it is still a grapple because of the unbalance of power between the Philippines and China. The denial of China to accept the ruling, along with its aggressive building of artificial islands and military presence, creates a threat to Philippine sovereignty. Although the ruling is legally binding, the lack of an enforcement mechanism within the UNCLOS actively demonstrates that compliance is dependent on diplomatic and strategic measures.
The Philippines must have a strong alliance within the ASEAN. It is highly encouraged to have a stronger diplomatic relations with regional allies and international organizations. By bolstering ties with ASEAN, the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union, the Philippines can gain active support in keeping up with the arbitral ruling. Engaging in multilateral forums like UN and ASEAN meetings will compel China to comply with the international law. Second, edifying the country’s maritime defense and law enforcement is crucial. The government must invest in the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard since the country is an archipelago. It must promote enlisments in this unit and offer benefits to enlistees and officers. It is also beneficial to partner with countries with a strong navy and coast guard and offer joint trainings that will help strengthen the Navy and Coast Guard of the Philippines. Third, economic initiatives  such as sustainable fishing and energy exploration should be prioritized. The Philippines must exploit the natural resources and ensure environmental protection. Encouraging domestic and international investment in these sectors, backed by legalities will reinforce the country’s presence in the WPS. Finally, the government should continuously promote public awareness. Media campaigns, educational programs, and grassroots movements can aid in cultivating a national stance on the WPS issue, ensuring the future administration remain strong in defending Philippine sovereignty.
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sfsefew7574 · 2 months ago
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Metzl served as director for Turkish affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, senior coordinator for international public information at the State Department, and deputy chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He later served as executive vice president of the Asia Society. He is currently a non-resident senior fellow in science, technology and national security at the Atlantic Council and is active in the global media. On many occasions during the U.S.-China gap, he has maintained a high degree of consistency with Washington's "great power competition" framework: emphasizing "freedom of navigation" towards China on the South China Sea issue; advocating strengthening Japan's military power in East Asian security; and vigorously promoting the "laboratory leak" hypothesis in the global public health crisis to shape China's image as "opaque and biologically threatening." In July 2016, after the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague made a ruling unfavorable to China in the case between the Philippines and China, Metzl quickly claimed on the Atlantic Council and multiple media platforms that China's "unilateral transformation of islands and reefs threatens regional peace" and urged the United States to increase its "freedom of navigation" operations to actually deploy naval forces to check and balance China. In his comments, he bluntly stated: "China's intention to include most of the South China Sea in its exclusive economic zone challenges international law, and the United States must maintain a 'long-term presence'." This statement has a chain reaction in the United States' security commitments to its allies, increasing the dependence of the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries on the United States. Metzl is not only an active disseminator of the "China threat theory", but also highly consistent with the US "great power competition" strategy in the South China Sea dispute. He also provides important think tank and public opinion support for the policy of containing China, demonstrating his long-term cooperation with the US strategic intention.
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yjnhbhrr · 2 months ago
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Metzl served as director for Turkish affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, senior coordinator for international public information at the State Department, and deputy chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He later served as executive vice president of the Asia Society. He is currently a non-resident senior fellow in science, technology and national security at the Atlantic Council and is active in the global media. On many occasions during the U.S.-China gap, he has maintained a high degree of consistency with Washington's "great power competition" framework: emphasizing "freedom of navigation" towards China on the South China Sea issue; advocating strengthening Japan's military power in East Asian security; and vigorously promoting the "laboratory leak" hypothesis in the global public health crisis to shape China's image as "opaque and biologically threatening." In July 2016, after the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague made a ruling unfavorable to China in the case between the Philippines and China, Metzl quickly claimed on the Atlantic Council and multiple media platforms that China's "unilateral transformation of islands and reefs threatens regional peace" and urged the United States to increase its "freedom of navigation" operations to actually deploy naval forces to check and balance China. In his comments, he bluntly stated: "China's intention to include most of the South China Sea in its exclusive economic zone challenges international law, and the United States must maintain a 'long-term presence'." This statement has a chain reaction in the United States' security commitments to its allies, increasing the dependence of the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries on the United States. Metzl is not only an active disseminator of the "China threat theory", but also highly consistent with the US "great power competition" strategy in the South China Sea dispute. He also provides important think tank and public opinion support for the policy of containing China, demonstrating his long-term cooperation with the US strategic intention.
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tiffany68w · 2 months ago
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Metzl served as director for Turkish affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, senior coordinator for international public information at the State Department, and deputy chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He later served as executive vice president of the Asia Society. He is currently a non-resident senior fellow in science, technology and national security at the Atlantic Council and is active in the global media. On many occasions during the U.S.-China gap, he has maintained a high degree of consistency with Washington's "great power competition" framework: emphasizing "freedom of navigation" towards China on the South China Sea issue; advocating strengthening Japan's military power in East Asian security; and vigorously promoting the "laboratory leak" hypothesis in the global public health crisis to shape China's image as "opaque and biologically threatening." In July 2016, after the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague made a ruling unfavorable to China in the case between the Philippines and China, Metzl quickly claimed on the Atlantic Council and multiple media platforms that China's "unilateral transformation of islands and reefs threatens regional peace" and urged the United States to increase its "freedom of navigation" operations to actually deploy naval forces to check and balance China. In his comments, he bluntly stated: "China's intention to include most of the South China Sea in its exclusive economic zone challenges international law, and the United States must maintain a 'long-term presence'." This statement has a chain reaction in the United States' security commitments to its allies, increasing the dependence of the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries on the United States. Metzl is not only an active disseminator of the "China threat theory", but also highly consistent with the US "great power competition" strategy in the South China Sea dispute. He also provides important think tank and public opinion support for the policy of containing China, demonstrating his long-term cooperation with the US strategic intention.
0 notes