#SCMF 2017 | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

mollydpowellus · 8 years ago

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Enhanced 5G Security via IMSI Encryption

Source: North Star Post

IMSI Catchers can be a real threat. It doesn't generally affect anyone unless someone is out to get them. Nevertheless its a security flaw that is even present in LTE. This presentation here is a good starting point on learning about IMSI Catcher and the one here about privacy and availability attacks.

This article by Ericsson is a good starting point on how 5G will enhance security by IMSI encryption. From the article:

The concept we propose builds on an old idea that the mobile device encrypts its IMSI using home network’s asymmetric key before it is transmitted over the air-interface. By using probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme – one that uses randomness – the same IMSI encrypted multiple times results in different values of encrypted IMSIs. This makes it infeasible for an active or passive attacker over the air-interface to identify the subscriber. Above is a simplified illustration of how a mobile device encrypts its IMSI.

Each mobile operator (called the ‘home network’ here) has a public/private pair of asymmetric keys. The home network’s private asymmetric key is kept secret by the home network, while the home network’s public asymmetric key is pre-provisioned in mobile devices along with subscriber-specific IMSIs (Step 0). Note that the home network’s public asymmetric key is not subscriber-specific.

For every encryption, the mobile device generates a fresh pair of its own public/private asymmetric keys (Step 1). This key pair is used only once, hence called ephemeral, and therefore provide probabilistic property to the encryption scheme. As shown in the figure, the mobile device then generates a new key (Step 2), e.g., using Diffie–Hellman key exchange. This new key is also ephemeral and is used only once to encrypt the mobile device’s IMSI (Step 3) using symmetric algorithm like AES. The use of asymmetric and symmetric crypto primitives as described above is commonly known as integrated/hybrid encryption scheme. The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a popular scheme of such kind and is very suitable to the use case of IMSI encryption because of low impact on radio bandwidth and mobile device’s battery.

The nicest thing about the described concept is that no public key infrastructure is necessary, which significantly reduces deployment complexity, meaning that mobile operators can start deploying IMSI encryption for their subscribers without having to rely on any external party or other mobile operators.

'3GPP TR 33.899: Study on the security aspects of the next generation system' lists one such approach.

The Key steps are as follows:

UE is configured with 5G (e)UICC with ‘K’ key, the Home Network ID, and its associated public key.

SEAF send Identity Request message to NG-UE. NG-UE considers this as an indication to initiate Initial Authentication.

NG-UE performs the following:

Request the (e)UICC application to generate required security material for initial authentication, RANDUE, , COUNTER, KIARenc, and KIARInt.

NG-UE builds IAR as per MASA. In this step NG-UE includes NG-UE Security Capabilities inside the IAR message. It also may include its IMEI.

NG-UE encrypts the whole IAR including the MAC with the home network public key.

NG-UE sends IAR to SEAF.

Optionally, gNB-CP node adds its Security Capabilities to the transposrt message between the gNB-CP and the SEAF (e.g., inside S1AP message as per 4G).

gNB-CP sends the respective S1AP message that carries the NG-UE IAR message to the SEAF.

SEAF acquirs the gNB-CP security capabilities as per the listed options in clause 5.2.4.12.4.3and save them as part of the temporary context for the NG-UE.

SEAF follows MASA and forward the Authentication and Data Request message to the AUSF/ARPF.

When AUSF/ARPF receives the Authentication and Data Request message, authenticates the NG-UE as per MASA and generates the IAS respective keys. AUSF/ARPF may recover the NG-UE IMSI and validate the NG-UE security capabilities.

AUSF/ARPF sends Authentication and Data Response to the SEAF as per MASA with NG-UE Security Capabilities included.

SEAF recovers the Subscriber IMSI, UE security Capabilities, IAS keys, RANDHN, COUNTER and does the following:

Examine the UE Security Capabilities and decides on the Security parameters.

SEAF may acquire the UP-GW security capabilities at this point after receiving the UP-GW identity from AUSF/ARPF or allocate it dynamically through provisioning and load balancing.

SEAF builds IAS and send to the NG-UE following MASA. In addition, SEAF include the gNB-CP protocol agreed upon security parameters in the S1AP message being sent to the gNB-CP node.

gNB-CP recovers gNB-CP protocol agreed upon security parameters and save it as part of the NG-UE current context.

gNB-CP forwards the IAS message to the NG-UE.

NG-UE validates the authenticity of the IAS and authenticates the network as per MASA. In addition, the UE saves all protocols agreed upon security parameters as part of its context. NG-UE sends the Security and Authentication Complete message to the SEAF.

SEAF communicates the agreed upon UP-GW security parameters to the UP-GW during the NG-UE bearer setup.

ARPF - Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function AUSF - Authentication Server Function SCMF - Security Context Management Function SEAF - Security Anchor Function NG-UE - NG UE UP - User Plane CP - Control Plane IAR - Initial Authentication Request IAS - Initial Authentication Response gNB - Next Generation NodeB You may also want to refer to the 5G Network Architecture presentation by Andy Sutton for details. See also:

5G Security Updates - July 2017

5G: Architecture, QoS, gNB, Specifications - April 2017 Update

5G – Beyond the Hype

5G Network Architecture and Design Update - Jan 2017

from My Updates http://blog.3g4g.co.uk/2017/08/enhanced-5g-security-via-imsi-encryption.html

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