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themostrandomfandom · 7 years

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Hi! How would you personally rank the seasons of glee from your favourite to your least favourite & why?

Hey, @sitandsingtoyou!

Since I watch Glee almost exclusively for the Brittana, it’s probably no surprise that their narrative treatment is the single biggest factor that determines how I feel about any given season.

If Brittana have a prominent, well-wrought arc from season premiere to season finale, then chances are I’ll like said season no matter what shenanigans are going on with other characters or storylines.

The same is also true in reverse.

That said, for the purpose of answering this ask, I also considered factors like the overall storytelling (beyond the Brittana of it all), the music, the presence of any standout episodes, general cohesion, etc., when making my rankings.

The final list appears after the cut.

WARNING: Here be strong feelings about Glee and more than a little bit of negativity about its writing and production. Note that the views expressed in this post are the author’s personal opinions based on her preferences, and they may very much differ from your own.

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In order from favorite to least favorite:

S6: As I discussed in this post, in addition to providing our girls with the happy ending they always deserved, S6 offers much of the best-written, most fully-developed, adorable, emotional, poignant, and narratively-satisfying Brittana we get throughout the series. We’re talking fanfic quality stuff, and not just in bits and pieces here and there but basically across the board in every episode in which Brittany and Santana feature. While there are a few things I’d change, on a whole, I can’t think of a more enjoyable canonical culmination to Brittana’s journey. As for the non-Brittana stuff, while there are, admittedly, some really low lows—many of the middling episodes of the season are an affront to screenwriting—there are also some suprisingly pleasant turns. Don’t tell anybody, but I actually love most of the New New New Directions and find the storylines that focus on them (as opposed to the adults of Lima and alumni advisers) kind of delightful. While the series finale itself somewhat underwhelms me, the flashback sequence at the end of episode 6x11 totally makes me cry. A lot of this season is about getting back to what made Glee fun and likeable in the beginning: good tunes, camp gags, and stories about a ragtag group of underdogs overcoming adversity through love and music. In general, I feel like S6 does a nice job tying up the loose ends for glee club members old and new and fulfilling the main thesis of the show (“Something is special because you are a part of it”).

S2: Brittana’s S2 storyline is one long, amazing roller coaster ride of emotion. It’s hard to describe exactly what it felt like watching it all play out for the first time as the episodes were originally airing; I hate to use the word “special” because it sounds so quaint, but it’s kind of the only term that really fits. Because the “Sex is not dating” line in episode 1x13 was initially treated like a one-and-done deal, going into S2, no one in the fandom really expected to see a fully developed Brittana romantic storyline—and yet that’s exactly what the Back Six gave us, and each successive Locker scene brought elation, heartache, fear, hope, and continued anticipation. Nothing beats S2 Brittana angst, and especially not the Hurt Locker, which is far and away the ship’s pièce de résistance. Then beyond the Brittana, the rest of the season is generally high quality, at least as far as Glee goes. There’s some nice tongue-in-cheek comedy, iconic scenes, and heartfelt character development, plus episode 2x19 is one of the show’s musical high points overall. As always with Glee, some pitchy moments sneak their ways in and a few episodes beg to be forgotten, but for the most part S2 is Glee in its stride, and it’s held up well over time.

S1: Since Brittana are not yet main characters, they don’t have a main text S1 storyline, per se. Still, when you fill in the gaps, there’s a lot going on with them on a subtextual level, enough so that rewatching S1 knowing what will eventually happen in later seasons will provide a strenuous cardio workout for any serious Brittana shipper. There’s plenty of excellent Heya improv to go around, and the classic “Brittana on the back row” can’t be beat. Plus, Brittana’s mini-arc with Finn between episodes 1x14 and 1x15 is heartbreaking. Still, the reason why I rank this season so highly has less to do with Brittana in particular than it does with overall quality: Simply put, I think that Glee had a better idea of what it was about during the first thirteen episodes of S1 than it did throughout much of the rest of the series. While later on the show would struggle to balance comedy and drama, realism and camp, trying and failing to be all things to all people, in the beginning, it was just an earnest, theatrical little show about nerdy choir kids trying to find their places in the world, and it didn’t take itself too seriously. Though many of the S1 storylines were schlocky—hello, fake Schuester pregnancy!—there were more than enough heartfelt performances and excellent character moments to balance them out. For instance, for as much as I generally dislike Finn, the “I’ll Stand by You” scene in episode 1x10 is so well done on every level. Whatever Glee became in its later seasons, in S1 it was at its core still good. It hadn’t forgotten what it was all about yet.

S3: Now we’re getting to the bottom of the barrel. I rank S3 fourth on my list not because I really enjoy it all that much but because it’s less terrible than S5 and S4, at least imo. The season’s biggest issue is that it’s all over the place in terms of quality. Sugar was a blessing, but Rory not so much. Likewise, on the Brittana side of things, there are some really high highs—our girls officially start dating! they share their first on screen kiss! they have a fabulous time at their senior prom together!—but there is also the giant bugbear that is Santana’s “coming out” arc, which is awful on so many levels. The writing and characterization for Brittany and Santana vacillates wildly throughout the season. In some episodes, like 3x04 and 3x13, it’s really great. In others, like 3x16, it’s utterly headache-inducing. And it’s not just our girls who suffer from spotty writing throughout the season; Quinn’s storyline is a complete mess, and Sue is an unbelievable Yosemite Sam caricature of herself whose exploits are so exaggerated that they make it virtually impossible to suspend one’s disbelief enough to enjoy her scenes. While the Troubletones are a musical highlight for the whole series—and the “Rumour Has It/Someone Like You” mashup is the best musical performance in all of Glee, hands down—a good soundtrack doesn’t make up for some of the season’s more glaring deficiences, and especially not the way Santana’s storyline was treated both inside and outside the universe of the show. Though there are a handful of S3 episodes I will rewatch for my own personal enjoyment, there are many that I’d prefer not to recall. S3 was the first season of Glee to bring in new regular writing staff beyond RIB, and with all its inconsistencies and the disuniform quality of the episodes, unfortunately, the inexperience really shows.

S5: With the exception of episodes 5x12 and 5x13, I hate almost everything about S5—and, yes, that includes the majority of Santana’s NYC episodes. I get that Heather Morris was largely off the show during this season, so it’s not that I blame TPTB for pairing Santana with Dani or making her Hummelberry’s sidekick. It’s just that it breaks my heart watching Santana repeatedly throw herself against a brick wall as she tries over and over again to win Kurt and Rachel’s friendship and trust, always to no avail (see here and here). In theory, Hummelpezberry could have been a really fun brot3—god knows that myriad fanfic authors have been able to pull it off to great effect—but in canon it never really worked, largely because the writers were reluctant to stop using Santana as a convenient heavy whenever they needed to generate synthetic conflict in an episode, even though she had long since ceased to function as an antagonist in terms of her narrative arc. While there were plenty of zingers and jaunty musical numbers in the Loft, I could never really enjoy them because the happy times never lasted. Santana was made to feel like an outcast in her own home, and for someone who loves that character as much as I do, it hurt to see her feeling so lonely and ostracized. Once she ran off into the sunset with Brittany, things took a turn for the better. Still, there were really only a handful of bright spots overall. Anyone who’s read TKTD knows that my second favorite ship on Glee is Samcedes, and I did truly enjoy the cute little romcom that was their 5B storyline. I also loved the Sancedes and later Brittanacedes friendship moments on the tail end of the season. But in general, everything felt strained and disjointed, and my ultimate sense is that the tragic early loss of Cory Monteith proved an insurmountable hurdle for the season’s creativity and writing direction on a whole.

S4: I liked the production of Grease, but otherwise this season was one long fail from start to finish, and there is not a single episode out of the twenty-two that I at all care to revisit. Though I’ve been able to rationalize and justify and meta my way through the Brittana arc, doing so is just more intellectual and emotional trouble than it’s worth. Throughout S4, the depiction of every established character including our girls seems OOC, some to an incredibly noticeable degree. Sam Evans, whom I loved in S2 and S3, absolutely gets trashed, going from a goofy, lovable dork to idiot Finn Hudson Version 2.0. Episode 4x04 represents one of the worst and most misguided writing decisions I’ve ever seen made on a primetime TV show. That a group of professional screenwriters would sit down and say, “Let’s break up three of our flagship couples not for any good or compelling narrative reason but simply because we want to ‘spice things up’ and see how our heavily-invested, emotionally vulnerable, primarily teenaged and young adult audience reacts!” boggles the mind, as does the fact that they were then surprised when their viewership numbers dropped off dramatically thereafter. I do want to say that I liked Marley Rose, Unique Adams, and Kitty Wilde, though I otherwise found the New New Directions kind of meh. Overall, this season is the one that seems to stray the farthest from Glee’s original premises and spirit. There isn’t much that’s fun, triumphant, or satisfying. There’s just a lot of racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, cultural insensitivity, bad writing, and miserable story arcs in scads.

Thanks for the question!

#Crazy Brittanalyst answers #sitandsingtoyou #I also have another ask from you plus ones from deleteee and tryingtoohardddd #which I'm working on slowly but surely #though it may take me a while since this week is a busy one for me outside of the internet

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prelawland · 4 years

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Separation Of Church And State In 2020

By Patrick Duan, Duke University Class of 2023

May 11, 2020

The legal relationship between church and state has constantly been a controversial issue since the nation’s founding. Recently, this timeless matter was, again, brought to national attention when a tax-credit program in Montana that allocated donated funds to religious schools seemed to violate its state constitution. After a district court ruling, the Montana Department of Revenue appealed to its state supreme court, where the program was entirely canceled. This prompted Kendra Espinoza, and two fellow parents of children attending religious schools, to petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the Montana Department of Revenue had violated the Religion Clauses (The Free Exercise and Establishment Clause) and the Equal Protection Clause. The ruling will inevitably be momentous as it would potentially set an interpretive precedent for how much government involvement in religion should be allowed as well as clarifying the current disuniformity of religious-education laws across the states. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue awaits its decision in June, 2020, and the case has staged the Supreme Court in the crucial position of expanding or narrowing the historically-debated line between church and state.

For full article please visit

Education, Religion, And The Law In 2020: Espinoza V. Montana Department Of Revenue

North Carolina PreLaw Land

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benrleeusa · 7 years

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[Sam Bray] Finally, a court defends the national injunction

Last month, I criticized a national preliminary injunction awarded in a suit by the City of Chicago. (Chicago is suing to challenge grant conditions imposed by the Department of Justice, conditions that are part of the administration’s “sanctuary city” policy.) I noted that the district court offered only a single sentence of analysis about the injunction’s scope, and I suggested that the one-sentence analysis portended that the national injunction was becoming routine.

On Friday the district court offered a much more lengthy analysis of the question. The new opinion accompanies an order denying the DOJ’s motion for a stay of the nationwide application of the preliminary injunction.

The opinion is impressive for several reasons. One is that it rehearses all of the arguments that have been offered to date for the national injunction. Another is that for the first time a court endorsing such an injunction shows recognition of the counterarguments and the emerging literature criticizing the national injunction. (The critical articles cited are excellent work by Maureen Carroll and Michael T. Morley, as well as my own Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction.) And the district court shows a commendable concern with national injunctions becoming ordinary remedies: “Nevertheless, issuing a nationwide injunction should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be limited by the nature of the constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the courts” (p. 13).

But the opinion is impressive for one more reason. It shows with utter clarity the logic of the national injunction. The court’s argument boils down to a simple proposition: If the extent of the violation is nationwide, the scope of the remedy should be nationwide. Once that proposition is accepted, the national injunction will have become the norm for all challenges to the validity of a federal statute, regulation, or order. Indeed, that there is no limit to this proposition is clear because of the justification given by the court: Its national injunction is required by the rule of law. In the court’s words, “The rule of law is undermined where a court holds that the Attorney General is likely engaging in legally unauthorized conduct, but nevertheless allows that conduct in other jurisdictions across the country” (p. 14).

The intuition behind this is understandable, and I consider it at length in my article. It is the “someone is wrong on the Internet” theory of the national injunction: “Something unconstitutional is happening somewhere.” We could have a legal system built on the premise that one district judge should try to determine the law for the entire country. But we don’t. We have a legal system where each court is supposed to decide the case and remedy the wrong of the parties. Then gradually, through appeals and precedent, the answer will be settled. But not right away, and not by the first court to decide a case.

Moreover, the court’s reasoning is inconsistent with the very existence of class actions for injunctive relief. Those class actions are based on the premise that the remedy for a class of plaintiffs is broader than the remedy for one plaintiff.

Here is part of the analysis in my article on the national injunction:

In our system of courts — both federal and state, and with the federal courts divided among circuits — the choice has been made to allow some disuniformity in the law. The only way to avoid it entirely is to have a single court for the United States. Failing that, the next closest thing would be to have lots of courts and allow whichever one took the case first to decide it for the nation. Once we are committed to seeking only eventual uniformity, then it is not a knock-out objection that the rule advanced here allows for disuniformity.

The question should be about the right moment to achieve uniformity — at what point should the uncertainty be liquidated, by what legal actor, and in what posture? With the question posed that way, it is impossible to think the best legal actor is a single district judge selected through forum shopping. Nor is the best posture a decision by the Supreme Court on a motion to stay the preliminary injunction issued by a district court selected thus. The better way to resolve the question is either through the unanimous alignment of lower courts or through disagreement among the lower courts followed by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court. In other words, the way to resolve legal questions for nonparties is through precedent, not through injunctions.

Later, in the conclusion to the article, I raise the choice between resolving legal questions “quickly, comprehensively, and with immediate finality” or resolving them “slowly, piecemeal, and with a resolution that was only eventually final”:

This choice is a deep problem that will never be solved. Each legal system can pick its poison, tending toward the vices of immediate, final resolution or the vices of slow, provisional resolution. In this regard, there is a sharp contrast between the English Chancery and the federal courts. A medieval Chancellor spoke on behalf of God and King; an early modern Chancellor spoke on behalf of conscience and King. These claims of epistemic certainty and political authority fit hand-in-ermine-lined-glove with the existence of a single Chancellor. But the authority of federal judges is different. Power in the American political system is pervasively divided — through federalism, through the separation of powers, and through the sprawling system of federal courts. A legal question is resolved through patience and the consideration of many minds. Which system is better, if starting from scratch, is a difficult question. The question of which system obtains in the United States is easy to answer: a fragmented, many-minds system. In a system like ours, there is no room for the national injunction.

The national injunction could be ended by the Supreme Court or Congress. It should be.

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nancyedimick · 7 years

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Finally, a court defends the national injunction

Here is part of the analysis in my article on the national injunction:

The national injunction could be ended by the Supreme Court or Congress. It should be.

Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/14/finally-a-court-defends-the-national-injunction/

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wolfandpravato · 7 years

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Finally, a court defends the national injunction

Here is part of the analysis in my article on the national injunction:

The national injunction could be ended by the Supreme Court or Congress. It should be.

Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/14/finally-a-court-defends-the-national-injunction/

#Law #Lawyer

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maxwellyjordan · 6 years

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Argument preview: Do “slight force” robberies count for enhancing Armed Career Criminal Act sentences?

Questions arising under the Armed Career Criminal Act have plagued the Supreme Court since the statute was enacted in 1984 and amended in 1986. The statute imposes a 15-year mandatory-minimum imprisonment sentence on federal firearms offenders who have three prior “serious” drug or “violent” felony convictions, even if the prior convictions were under state law. But there is a remarkable variety among the 50 states regarding precisely how state criminal statutes are written, and how exactly those statutes are then interpreted by state courts across the nation. On October 9, the court will spend two hours considering three cases (two are consolidated for the second hour) that reveal, once again, the vagaries of the ACCA. It seems likely that the justices will have all three cases (as well as their prior expressions of unhappiness with the ACCA) in mind during the arguments. So the preview in United States v. Stitt and Sims, as well as this one, should be read for a full picture of the justices’ perspectives.

The first case on the October 9 docket is Stokeling v. United States. The question is what state law crimes of “robbery” should count as prior “violent felonies” under the ACCA. Denard Stokeling was convicted of an unarmed robbery in Florida in 1997; then in 2016 he was convicted federally for being a “felon in possession” of a firearm. If Stokeling’s 1997 prior robbery conviction counts as a “violent felony,” then his federal prison sentence in the current case would increase dramatically, from a 10-year maximum to the ACCA’s 15-year minimum.

The ACCA lists a few specific crimes, such as burglary, arson and extortion, that count as “violent felonies” for the statutory enhancement. Robbery is not on the list (although it was in 1984, before Congress deleted it in 1986). But in addition to listing specific felonies, the ACCA provides a general definition of qualifying “violent felon[ies]:” “[A]ny crime” punishable by more than a year in prison that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” To apply this definition, one might think that a court could look at the facts of Stokeling’s 1997 robbery to see whether it involved physical force. But 28 years ago in Taylor v. United States (1990), the court ruled that because the ACCA definition requires that “an element” of the crime must include physical force, federal courts must use a “categorical” approach to decide whether state-law crimes meet the ACCA definition. In other words, the question for an ACCA “violent felony” becomes whether the state statute that defines the crime, as construed by definitive state-court cases, includes a requirement of physical force. If the state has defined a crime so that it can theoretically be committed without “physical force,” then it does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA, regardless of how the crime was actually committed by any particular defendant.

Thus for Stokeling, an examination of Florida’s definition of “robbery” (by statute as well as in Florida caselaw) is required. Does it “categorically” require the sort of “physical force” that the ACCA requires?

This is where Stokeling’s case gets murky. In another ACCA case from 2010 (Curtis Johnson v. United States — which is not same Supreme Court ACCA case as the Samuel Johnson v. United States decision from 2015, in which the court struck down as unconstitutionally vague another ACCA definitional section, the “residual clause”), the court defined “physical force” for purposes of the ACCA. Curtis Johnson held that “the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force – that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury” — in other words, “force strong enough to constitute ‘power.’” Now, like most states, Florida’s robbery statute defines robbery as taking property from another by “the use of force … or … fear.” In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that there must be “resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the offender.” But this is not the end of the debate. Instead – and this is why the case is here — Stokeling argues that Florida caselaw also makes it clear that even “slight force” is sufficient to prove robbery (saying “any degree of force,” in one case). This relatively common doctrine has been developed by some states (but not all) over the years to ensure that “robbery” can reach “snatchings,” such as quickly taking a necklace off a person’s neck or grabbing cash out of their hand. Stokeling argues that Florida state robbery caselaw encompasses such “slight force” robberies, and that it therefore does not “categorically” meet the ACCA’s higher standard of “violent force” under Curtis Johnson.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled in Stokeling’s case that the Florida state robbery crime does categorically meet the ACCA definition. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit recently ruled to the contrary (in United States v. Geozos, in 2017), finding that only “minimal” force is required under Florida law. Because Florida robbers apparently travel all across the country, the ACCA is invoked wherever they may subsequently commit a federal firearms crime. Certiorari was granted to resolve the circuit split.

At this point, lawyers may recall differing cases and hypotheticals from their 1L Criminal Law class: Does snatching a purse or chain or cash constitute “robbery”? Cases and definitions on this question of “how much force?” are split across the country. The answer is necessary in most states to distinguish simple theft from robbery, which can elevate a misdemeanor to a felony as well as make the difference between probation and prison time. Moreover, the ruling will apply to any other states that define “robbery” as Florida does. Thus the question presented in Stokeling is nationally important, and will affect the administration of the ACCA in federal courts around the country.

For his part, Stokeling points to a number of Florida state-court robbery cases that he says involved “only a slight degree of force.” He argues that the 11th Circuit’s view ignored not only the words but also the definitional spirit of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 2010 Curtis Johnson opinion, in which the “violent” in the ACCA’s “violent felony” was emphasized. He points out that in a subsequent decision (United States v. Castleman, in 2014), the court cited Johnson for the proposition that “the word ‘violent’ … standing alone ‘connotes a substantial degree of force.’” He argues that he should prevail on “a straightforward application of Curtis Johnson.”

Yet the U.S. solicitor general contends that its position is the true Johnson position, and that it is Stokeling who seeks to “deviate from,” “rewrite” or “narrow” that precedent. The government argues that “force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance” – the Florida definition of robbery force – “is necessarily ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury’” (internal quote from Johnson). The government places much reliance on that phrase from Johnson, and then parses the facts of three Florida cash-snatching robbery cases to argue that each involved force “capable of causing injury.” The government argues that, upon such careful analysis, Florida law definitely distinguishes forceful robberies from thefts involving no force, such that all Florida robberies must involve ACCA force. Finally, the government argues that the Supreme Court should accept the 11th Circuit’s assessment of Florida state law, asserting that “this Court typically defers to regional courts of appeal on … construction of state law.” But that unremarkable general idea does not distinguish the “regional court of appeal” construction of Florida law offered by the 9th Circuit in Geozos, which the government’s briefing markedly ignores.

Perhaps most interestingly, the government’s brief places great weight on the legislative history of the ACCA. The original 1984 version specifically listed “robbery” as a violent felony, but in 1986 the statute was amended to omit the term in favor of the current, general definition. As usual, one might draw different conclusions from this fact. The justice most dismissive of legislative history, who wrote Curtis Johnson and was a driving force in many of the court’s other ACCA precedents, was Scalia, now gone. It will be interesting to hear, at argument, what the current justices think of such legislative history reliance.

Ultimately this case may produce just a simple resolution of whether “slight force” robberies should, or should not, satisfy the ACCA’s violent-felony standard. A short and clear answer will leave the lower federal courts with useful certainty, whichever way it goes.

But as I have previously explained for this blog, the “categorical” approach to the ACCA has been questioned by a number of justices. Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas have consistently argued that it is not definitively required by the statute — and last term Justice Neil Gorsuch stated in Sessions v. Dimaya (concurring) that he “remain[s] open to different arguments about our precedent and the proper reading of language” in the statute. Chief Justice John Roberts also disagreed in Dimaya with the way the “categorical” approach was applied (albeit to a slightly different statute); and Gorsuch noted that “Congress remains free at any time … to write” new statutory definitions. The justices’ discontent with ACCA, and the many circuit splits it produces due to state-law disuniformity, has been growing. Thus, if only eight justices are on the bench to hear argument on October 9, I think there is a possibility of a 4-4 tie here, which could result either in automatic affirmance (the result when the Supreme Court is evenly divided) or (as happened in the 2015 Johnson) in a reargument once the court is back to nine justices. In the 2015 Johnson decision, the justices’ discontent boiled over to declare a nearby definitional section of the ACCA unconstitutionally vague. The October 9 arguments seem likely to provide more fuel for the ACCA fire.

The post Argument preview: Do “slight force” robberies count for enhancing Armed Career Criminal Act sentences? appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

from Law http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-preview-do-slight-force-robberies-count-for-enhancing-armed-career-criminal-act-sentences/ via http://www.rssmix.com/

#law #justice

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