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wolfliving · 5 years ago

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Chinese Artificial Intelligence vs US Artificial Intelligence

http://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-The-Question-of-Comparative-Advantage-in-Artificial-Intelligence-1.pdf

....Since Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE were added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List,15 China’s determination to pursue indigenous innovation has only intensified.16

In cases where the United States has stymied Chinese advances with unilateral export controls but substitute options remain available, China has typically managed to find workarounds or substitute components within a short timeframe.17 The challenge will be for China to replicate core innovations in semiconductor technology where no comparable substitute exists.

China’s model of development through state subsidies appears ill-suited for the semiconductor industry, which is fast moving and requires both business acumen and sizable technical expertise.18 Nearly 20 years after PRC science and technology leaders set out to develop a competitor to the x86 processor, Chinese alternatives remain limited and significantly behind U.S. counterparts. State-led pushes in the 1990s to establish a foothold in the chip fabrication market failed to produce commercially viable firms capable of keeping up with foreign leaders. China’s most successful fab, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), kept PRC’s S&T officials at arm’s length during its early development.19 The current state drive, led by the

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 7

National Integrated Circuit Fund, attempts to learn from prior mistakes and introduces more market mechanisms than in the past. However, many experts are skeptical that this state-led push will be sufficient to wean China off foreign chips.20

Regardless of the Chinese model’s efficiency, the reality is that China is building its manufacturing capacity to compete in semiconductors as the United States loses indigenous capability and outsources semiconductor manufacturing to foundries elsewhere.21 Technological trends may also play out in China’s favor. As Moore’s Law reaches its end, squeezing additional computing power out of chips will require new materials and specialized AI chip architectures.22 The United States enjoys a dominant market share in leading-edge GPU (Graphics Processing Units) and FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) design, as well as many of the top AI-relevant ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits). For the time being, China’s leading AI chip designs often incorporate U.S. and allied designs. Yet as technological progress slows and evolves, China may have an easier time catching up.

Chinese players are starting to break into the AI chip space on some fronts. China’s AI chip unicorns Cambricon and Horizon Robotics, for example, have attained multi-billion-dollar valuations within just a few years.23 Huawei has launched its own AI chip, Ascend 910, designed to process efficiently the massive amounts of data often required to train algorithms.24 Alibaba has also created a new AI chip, known as the Hanguang 800, which it claims possesses the computing capabilities of 10 GPUs.25 Alibaba’s chip subsidiary Pingtouge (平头哥) open-sourced its microcontroller design platform on GitHub in order to make chip design more accessible.26 So far, however, PRC AI chips have primarily achieved successes in “inference,” the process of running existing neural networks; the process of training continues to rely primarily on GPUs produced by NVIDIA.27 Whether Chinese companies like Huawei can compete with NVIDIA in the AI training space remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1 K. A. Konrad, “Dynamic Contests and the Discouragement Effect,” Revue d'Économie Politique (2012); C. Harris and J. Vickers, “Racing with Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies 54, 1 (1987); I. K. Wang, L. Qian, and M. Lehrer, “From Technology Race to Technology Marathon: A Behavioral Explanation of Technology Advancement,” European Management Journal 35, Issue 2 (April 2017): 187-197.

2 This policy brief is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather proposes a framework for assessing relevant data and measures that bear on current debates in AI. We are indebted to the robust research and existing literature in the field. See, e.g., Michael C. Horowitz, Gregory Allen, Elsa Kania, and Paul Scharre, “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for a New American Security, July 2018, 8.

3 Deborah J. Jackson, “What is an innovation ecosystem,” National Science Foundation, 1, 2011. On AI in particular, see “AI is a national security priority — here’s how we cultivate it,” The Hill, February 20, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/430765-ai-is-a- national-security-priority-heres-how-we-cultivate-it; For another excellent evaluation of the importance of the overall ecosystem to AI development, see: Lindsey R. Sheppard and Andrew Philip Hunter, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The Importance of the AI Ecosystem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 5, 2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security-importance-ai- ecosystem.

4 Andrew Imbrie, “Mapping the Terrain: AI Governance and the Future of Power,” Survival (blog), December 17, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival- blog/2019/12/mapping-the-terrain-ai-governance.

5 See, e.g., Andrew Imbrie, “Artificial Intelligence Meets Bureaucratic Politics,” War on the Rocks, August 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/artificial-intelligence-meets- bureaucratic-politics/; Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn, “The AI Literacy Gap Hobbling American Officialdom,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2020,https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-ai-literacy-gap-hobbling-american- officialdom/.

6 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

7 We define “AI chips” to include GPUs (Graphics Processing Units), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Array), and ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) specialized for high speed and efficiency for AI algorithms, among others.

8 See, e.g., “Re: ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies (BIS- 2018-0024),” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019-01-10-Dept-of-Commerce-GU-

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CSET-ANPRM-on-Export-Controls-for-AI.pdf. For a recent example, see Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration pressed Dutch hard to cancel China chip-equipment sale: sources,” Reuters, January 6, 2020,https://www.reuters.com/article/asml-holding-usa-china/rpt-insight-trump-administration- pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSL1N29802U.

9 “Trade war forces Chinese chipmaker Fujian Jinhua to halt output,” Financial Times, January, 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/87b5580c-22bf-11e9-8ce6- 5db4543da632.

10 For one prominent example, see the case of Fujian Jinhua. Paul Mozur, “Inside a Heist of American Chip Designs, as China Bids for Tech Power,” New York Times, June 22, 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/technology/china-micron-chips-theft.html.

11 Some U.S. firms made the move abroad in response to export controls. See “U.S.-based chip-tech group moving to Switzerland over trade curb fears,” Reuters, November 28, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-semiconductors-insight/u-s-based-chip- tech-group-moving-to-switzerland-over-trade-curb-fears-idUSKBN1XZ16L.

12 Chris Gillis, “US exporters attempt to head off new content restrictions,” American Shipper, December 9, 2019, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/us-exporters-attempt-to-head- off-new-content-restrictions.

13 Timothy P. Morgan, “Huawei Jumps into the Arms Server Chip Fray,” The Next Platform, January 8, 2019. See also Saif Khan, “Maintaining the AI Chip Advantage of the United States and its Allies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Maintaining-the-AI-Chip- Competitive-Advantage-of-the-United-States-and-its-Allies-20191206.pdf.

14 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

15 ZTE was later removed from this list. “BIS Adds ZTE Corporation and Three Affiliated Entities to the Entity List,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce,https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/oee/9-bis/carousel/1011-bis-adds-zte-corporation-and- three-affiliated-entities-to-the-entity-list; “China’s Huawei, 70 affiliates placed on U.S. trade blacklist,” Reuters, May 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china- huaweitech/chinas-huawei-70-affiliates-placed-on-us-trade-blacklist-idUSKCN1SL2W4.

16 Lorand Laskai, “Why Blacklisting Huawei Could Backfire,” Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2019,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-19/why-blacklisting-huawei- could-backfire.

17 Jason Matheny and Carrick Flynn, “ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,

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https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JDDQaWlU- u90VAl6h9sdQb_c_7EB9ftrYDOEqu12nEk/edit.

19 Doug Fuller, Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and Political Economy of China’s Technological Development (Oxford University Press, 2016), 131.

20 Junko Yoshida, “China Must Go Beyond Big Fund,” EE Times, November 11, 2019,https://www.eetimes.com/china-must-go-beyond-big-fund/#.

21 “The Decline in Semiconductor Manufacturing in the United States,” Center for Public Policy Innovation, June 2010, https://www.cppionline.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/The-Decline-of-Semiconductor-Manufacturing.pdf.

22 Will Knight, “China has never had a real chip industry. Making AI chips could change that,” MIT Technology Review, December 14, 2018,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612569/china-has-never-had-a-real-chip- industry-making-ai-chips-could-change-that/.

23 While valuations are likely inflated due in part to the influence of state-driven investments, these start-ups have achieved notable progress nonetheless. “Chinese AI chip maker Horizon Robotics raises $600 million from SK Hynix, others,” Reuters, February 27, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tech-semiconductors/chinese-ai-chip-maker- horizon-robotics-raises-600-million-from-sk-hynix-others-idUSKCN1QG0HW.

24 Dan Strumpf, “Huawei Launches AI Chip in Push to Unseat U.S. Makers,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-launches-ai-chip-in-push- to-unseat-u-s-makers-11566556836.

25 “Alibaba’s New AI Chip Can Process Nearly 80K Images Per Second,” Synced, September 25, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/09/25/alibabas-new-ai-chip- can-process-nearly-80k-images-per-second/. Arjun Kharpal, “Alibaba unveils its first A.I. chip as China pushes for its own semiconductor technology,” CNBC, September 25, 2019,https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/25/alibaba-unveils-its-first-ai-chip-called-the- hanguang-800.html.

26 “Alibaba Open-Sources Its MCU to Boost AI Research,” Synced, October 23, 2019,

https://syncedreview.com/2019/10/23/alibaba-open-sources-its-mcu-to-boost-ai- research/.

27 Lorand Laskai and Helen Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base?”, DigiChina, November 4, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/can-china-grow-its-own-ai-tech-base/.

On the obstacles to indigenizing a semiconductor industry in China, see Douglas B. Fuller,

“Growth, Upgrading, and Limited Catch-up in China’s Semiconductor Industry,” in Loren

Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., Policy, Regulation and Innovation in China’s Electricity

and Telecom Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

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28 See, e.g., Data.gov, https://www.data.gov/open-gov/; “Project Open Data,” https://project-open-data.cio.gov.

30 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Vintage, 2011), 6.

31 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Random House Audio, 2018).

32 Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Military Needs Better Data on Itself to Exploit AI,” Breaking Defense, December 12, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/us-military-needs- better-data-on-itself-to-exploit-ai/.

33 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “EXCLUSIVE Pentagon’s AI Problem Is ‘Dirty’ Data: Lt. Gen. Shanahan,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019,https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/exclusive-pentagons-ai-problem-is-dirty-data-lt- gen-shanahan/.

34 “The New Racetrack for Artificial Intelligence: China-U.S. Competition” [人工智能新赛场 -中美对比], CCID, May 2017.

35 For an instructive framework on this issue, see Matt Sheehan, “Much Ado About Data: How America and China Stack Up,” MacroPolo, July 16, 2019,https://macropolo.org/ai-data-us-china/.

36 Celia Chen and Iris Deng, “Tencent seeks to kill silo culture that gave it WeChat as it expands into AI, big data,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2018,https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2172967/tencent-seeks-kill-silo- culture-gave-it-wechat-it-expands-ai-big.

37 Emily Feng, “In China, A New Call To Protect Data Privacy,” NPR, January 5, 2020,

https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793014617/in-china-a-new-call-to-protect-data- privacy.

38 “Navigating China’s Data Maze: How Regulations Affect U.S. Companies,” The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, May 2019, https://www.amcham- shanghai.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Viewpoint%20- %20Data%20%28May%202019%29.pdf.

39 “Interpretation of the Work Plan on Promoting the Development of the Artificial Intelligence Industry through the Opening of Public Data” [关于通过公共数据开放促进人工智能产业发展的工作方案》政策解读], November 4, 2019,http://jxj.beijing.gov.cn/zcjd/zcjdlb/201912/t20191212_1088931.html.

Based on analysis of monthly user data of most valuable U.S. and Chinese tech

companies.

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40 For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities that big data presents for defense mobilization, see Li Ching [李庆], “Looking at the National Defense Mobilization Big Data Construction” [冷眼看国防动员大数据建设], China National Defense News [中国国防报], October 24, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/defense/2018- 10/24/c_1123606679.htm.

41 “China Tech Talk 76: US vs China—AI asymmetries with Jeffrey Ding,” technode, April 16, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/04/16/china-tech-talk-76-us-vs-china-ai- asymmetries-with-jeffrey-ding/.

42 “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,”https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

43 Ibid., 18.44

45 Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm, “Superhuman AI for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals,” Science 359, no. 6374 (2018): 418-424. Alan Blair and Abdallah Saffidine, “AI surpasses humans at six-player poker,” Science 365, no. 6456 (2019): 864-865.

46 Raymond Perrault, Yoav Shoham, Erik Brynjolfsson, Jack Clark, John Etchemendy, Barbara Grosz, Terah Lyons, James Manyika, Saurabh Mishra, and Juan Carlos Niebles, “The AI Index 2019 Annual Report,” AI Index Steering Committee, Human-Centered AI Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, December 2019; Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

47 Field Cady and Oren Etzione, “China May Overtake the US in AI Research,” Medium, March 13, 2019, https://medium.com/ai2-blog/china-to-overtake-us-in-ai-research- 8b6b1fe30595.

48 Karen White, “Publications Output: U.S. Trends and International Comparisons,” Science & Engineering Indicators, December 17, 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20206.

49 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface news [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

50 China accounts for 17 of the top 20 academic institutions that have been involved in patenting AI, with particular strength in deep learning, according to a study from the World Intellectual Property Organization. See “WIPO’s First ‘Technology Trends’ Study Probes

David Silver, Thomas Hubert, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Matthew Lai, Arthur

Guez, Marc Lanctot et al., “A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess,

shogi, and Go through self-play,” Science 362, no. 6419 (2018): 1140-1144.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 40

Artificial Intelligence: IBM and Microsoft are Leaders Amid Recent Global Upsurge in AI Inventive Activity,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0001.html; “WIPO Technology Trends 2019, Artificial Intelligence,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1055.pdf.

51 Sarah O’Meara, “Will China Lead the World in AI by 2030,” Nature, August 21, 2019,https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02360-7.

52 “Robust Vision Challenge,”http://www.robustvision.net/leaderboard.php?benchmark=stereo.

53 Yu Sun, Shuohuan Wang, Yukun Li, Shikun Feng, Xuyi Chen, Han Zhang, Xin Tian, Danxiang Zhu, Hao Tian, and Hua Wu, “ERNIE: Enhanced Representation through Knowledge Integration,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.09223 (2019).

54 “Baidu’s Pre-training Model ERNIE Achieves New NLP Benchmark Record,” Synced, December 11, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/12/11/baidus-pre-training- model-ernie-achieves-new-nlp-benchmark-record/.

55 See, e.g., “Global AI Talent Report 2019,” jfgagne, https://jfgagne.ai/talent-2019/.

56 “AAAI-17 Accepted Papers,”http://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/2017/aaai17accepted-papers.pdf; Sarah Zhang, “China’s Artificial-Intelligence Boom,” The Atlantic, February 16, 2017,https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/china-artificial- intelligence/516615/.

57 “Artificial Intelligence Index,” 87,https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

58 Remco Zwetsloot, Roxanne Heston, and Zachary Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_US_AI_Workforce.pdf.

59 Remco Zwetsloot, James Dunham, Zachary Arnold, and Tina Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States: Findings and Policy Options for International Graduate Student Retention,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Keeping-Top-AI-Talent-in-the-United-States.pdf.

60 Ibid.

61 Elias G. Carayannis and David FJ Campbell, eds., Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, and Use in Innovation Networks and Knowledge Clusters: A Comparative Systems Approach Across the United States, Europe, and Asia (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006); “Rapid Rise of China’s STEM Workforce Charted by National Science Board Report,” American Institute of Physics, January 31, 2018.

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62 Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

63 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

64 Zwetsloot, Dunham, Arnold, and Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States.”

65 China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

66 Ibid.

67 Joy D. Ma, “China’s AI Talent Base Is Growing, and then Leaving,” MacroPolo, July 30, 2019, https://macropolo.org/chinas-ai-talent-base-is-growing-and-then-leaving/. By one initial estimate, of the 12,500 AI graduates from Chinese universities to date, reportedly only 31 percent have stayed in China, whereas 62 percent instead departed to the United States. Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

68 Ministry of Education, “Artificial Intelligence Innovation Action Plan for Institutions of Higher Learning” [高等学校人工智能创新行动计划], April 4, 2018,http://www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/201804/t20180410_332722.html. For commentary on the topic, see Elsa Kania, “China’s AI talent ‘arms race,” The Strategist, April 23, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-ai-talent-arms-race/.

69 “This year, colleges and universities have added these specialties: artificial intelligence and big data are the hottest” [今年高��新增这些专业:人工智能与大数据最火], June 12, 2019, http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2019-06-12/doc-ihvhiews8390284.shtml.

70 “Cross National Comparisons of R&D Performance,” National Science Board,

https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/research-and- development-u-s-trends-and-international-comparisons/cross-national-comparisons-of-r-d- performance.

71 “2016–2019 Progress Report: Advancing Artificial Intelligence R&D,” November 2019,

https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/AI-Research-and-Development-Progress-Report-2016- 2019.pdf; Melissa Flagg, “America’s Future Lies in Technical Alliances,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (blog), January 8, 2020,https://cset.georgetown.edu/2020/01/08/americas-future-lies-in-technical-alliances/.

72 “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” Interim Report, November 2019,https://www.nscai.gov/about/reports-to-congress.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 42

73 Ibid.

74 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

75 Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson, Jump-starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

76 Charlotte Yang, “Chart of the Day: Another Record Year for China R&D Spending, Caixin, October 10, 2018, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-10-10/chart-of-the-day- another-record-year-for-china-rd-spending-101333479.html. See also “Is China a global leader in research and development,” China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china- research-and-development-rnd/l; Dennis Normile, “China narrows U.S. lead in R&D spending,” Science, October 19, 2018,https://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6412/276.

77 “China’s R&D expenditure is close to two trillion yuan. Which cities have more research investment?” [中国研发经费接近两万亿，哪些城市科研投入多?], CCTV, September 13, 2019,http://news.cctv.com/2019/09/13/ARTIwBtFsNMhTHQ8DXpFQHJR190913.shtml.

78 Teddy Ng and Jane Cai, “China’s funding for science and research to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2019,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2189427/chinas-funding-science- and-research-reach-25-cent-gdp-2019.

79 “Atlas of national key R & D plan funding allocation” [国家重点研发计划经费分配图谱浮现], Economic Reference [经济参考报], October 14, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2019-10/14/c_1125100297.htm.

80 Ashwin Acharya and Zachary Arnold, “Chinese Public AI R&D Spending: Provisional Findings,” CSET Issue Brief, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Chinese-Public-AI-RD-Spending-Provisional-Findings-2.pdf.

81 For instance, i

“Tianjin established a new generation of artificial intelligence industry fund with a scale of 100 billion RMB” [天津设新一代人工智

能产业基金，规模为1000亿人民币], May 16, 2018,https://m.pedaily.cn/news/431332.

82 “The National “863” Plan Computer Subject’s Thirty-Year Anniversary: Leapfrog-Style Development and the Realm of Necessity” [

n May 2018, the city of Tianjin announced the New Generation Artificial

Intelligence Industry Fund, which amounts to 100 billion RMB ($16 billion), based on a

combination of state and venture capital funding.

国家“863”计划计算机主题30年拾遗:跨

越式发展与必然王国], Science Net, February 8, 2017,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 43

“863 Plan” [

83 Ibid. “863 Plan” [ 84 “Our Nation Launched Four Major Science Research Programs” [我国启动四项重大科

学研究计划], Science and Technology Daily, November 16, 2006.

85 “The national key R&D plan for next year is basically determined! These industries are the most noteworthy” [国家明年重点研发计划基本确定!这几个产业最值得关注], October 28, 2019.

86 “National Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan Outline” (2006-2020) [国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要], Ministry of Science and Technology, February 9, 2006,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774_9.ht m.

https://www.itu.int/en/ITU- D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf.

87 See estimates from the Allen Institute.

88 “2021-2035 National Medium- and Long-term Scientific and Technological Development Plan Basic Science Development Strategy Research Project Launched in Beijing” [2021- 2035年国家中长期科技发展规划基础科学发展战略研究专题在京启动], Ministry of Science and Technology Website, May 3, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019- 05/03/content_5388386.htm.

89 Elsa B. Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence- military-revolution-and-chinas-future-military-power.

90 Jeffrey Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, March 2018, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf.

91 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知]. “MIIT’s Notice Regarding the Release of the Three Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New-Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018-2020) [工业和信息化部关于印发《促进新一代人工智能产业发展三年行动计划(2018-2020年)》的通], December 14, 2017,http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5960820/co ntent.html.

For an English translation of this plan, see Paul Triolo, Elsa Kania, and Graham Webster (translators), “Translation: Chinese government outlines AI ambitions through 2020,”

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/2/367416.shtm. See also

计划], China Education and Research Network, http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

See also

http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

863计划], China Education and Research Network,

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863

DigiChina, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinese-government-outlines-ai-ambitions-through- 2020/.

92 “Ministry of Science and Technology Notice Regarding the Issuance of National Key R&D Plan Transformative Technologies and Crux Scientific Problems Key Topic 2017 Program Application Guidelines” [科技部关于发布国家重点研发计划变革性技术关键科学问题重点专项2017年度项目申报指南的通知], Ministry of Science and Technology, September 27, 2017,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2017/201710/t20171 009_135224.htm.

93 There might be some debate about the best translations for the terms “重大工程” and“重大项目,” each of which could be rendered major/mega project/program. See National Development and Reform Commission Office Releases Notice Regarding the Implementation of the 2018 “Internet Plus,” Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development, and Digital Economy Experimental Mega-Project Notice [国家发展改革委办公厅关于组织实施2018年“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程的通知], National Development and Reform Commission, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/t20171013_863534.html.

94 “AI Innovation and Development Major Project Application Requirements” [人工智能创新发展重大工程申报要求], NDRC, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/W020171013599553259770.pdf.

95 “56 projects selected as major projects for the ‘Internet Plus,’ Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development and Digital Economy Pilot Megaprojects” [56个项目入选“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程], January 22, 2018, Xinhua,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-01/22/content_5259438.htm.

96 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知].

97 For examples, see “SDIC’s National Emerging Industry Venture Capital Guidance Fund raised a total of 17.85 billion yuan” [国投创合国家新兴产业创业投资引导基金募集规模达178.5亿元], May 10, 2017,https://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/zxzx/gsyw/2017/06/09/webinfo/phone14959552641 37396.htm.

“Guohua Military-Civil Fusion Industrial Development Fund Established” [国华军民融合产业发展基金创立],National Defense Science and Industry Bureau, September 7, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/07/content_5106111.htm.

98 Paul Triolo, “AI in China: Cutting Through the Hype,” Eurasia Group, December 6, 2017,https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/ai-in-china-cutting-through-the-hype.

99 See the Party’s report from the fourth plenum: “Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” [中国共产党第十九届中

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央委员会第四次全体会议公报], Xinhua, October 31, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/31/c_1125178024.htm.

100 “The United States of Artificial Intelligence Startups, CBInsights, November 26, 2019,https://www.cbinsights.com/research/artificial-intelligence-startup-us-map/.

101 Ibid.

102 Joanna Glasner, “AI Companies Raise More Money Across Fewer Rounds,” Crunchbase News, September 9, 2019, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/ai-companies-raise-more- money-across-fewer-rounds/.

103 For one historical perspective, see Linda Weiss, America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

104 Rachel Olney, “The Rift Between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon is Economic, not Moral,” War on the Rocks, January 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the- rift-between-silicon-valley-and-the-pentagon-is-economic-not-moral/.

105 “The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition,” Ronald Reagan Institute, December 2019,https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355312/the_contest_for_innovation_report.p df.

106 Ibid.

107 The levels of funding are high enough that the founder of one Chinese AI start-up characterized this as a negative. As he remarked to one of the authors, there is “too much money chasing too few good ideas.”

108 “China Is Starting To Edge Out The US In AI Investment,” CB Insights, February 12, 2019,

https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups- tech/.

109 Jing Shuiyu, “AI startups see record financing in H1,” China Daily, August 3, 2017,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2017-08/03/content_30340585.htm.

110 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

111 “China VC investment hits record high in 2018: Report,” Xinhua, February 1, 2019,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/01/WS5c53e434a3106c65c34e7cb2.html.

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112 See, e.g., “Used cars and AI come out on top as China's startup funding slumps,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 3, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Used-cars-and- AI-come-out-on-top-as-China-s-startup-funding-slumps.

113 “China recruits Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent to AI ‘national team,’” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2120913/china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team.

114 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “AI “national team” Xiong’nn Debut! Will Change Your Life” [人工智能“国家队”雄安登场!将改变你的生活], Xiong’an, November 30, 2017, http://www.xiongan.gov.cn/2017- 11/30/c_129766243.htm.

115 “Rise Of China’s Big Tech In AI: What Baidu, Alibaba, And Tencent Are Working On,” CB Insights, April 26, 2018, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-baidu-alibaba- tencent-artificial-intelligence-dominance/.

116 Patrick Foulis, “Across the West powerful firms are becoming even more powerful,” The Economist, November 15, 2018, https://www.economist.com/special- report/2018/11/15/across-the-west-powerful-firms-are-becoming-even-more-powerful; John Mauldin, “America Has a Monopoly Problem,” Forbes, April 11, 2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/04/11/america-has-a-monopoly- problem/; Jonathan Tepper, The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition (John Wiley & Sons, 2018).

117 Mark Z. Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

118 Martin Kenney and Urs Von Burg, “Technology, entrepreneurship and path dependence: industrial clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128.” Industrial and corporate change 8, no. 1 (1999): 67-103; Aaron Chatterji, Edward Glaeser, and William Kerr, “Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation,” Innovation Policy and the Economy 14, no. 1 (2014): 129-166.

119 Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/future-american- power.

120

121 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

Mariana Mazzucato, “The entrepreneurial state,” Soundings 49, no. 49 (2011): 131-

142.

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122 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

123 For a good analysis on the topic, see Yukon Huang and Jeremy Smith, “China’s Record on Intellectual Property Rights Is Getting Better and Better,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/16/china-intellectual-property-theft- progress/.

124 “State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Support Platforms” [国务院关于加快构建大众创业万众创新支撑平台的指导意见], September 25, 2016,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-09/26/content_10183.htm.

125 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined. Estimates often vary depending on what is defined as an “AI enterprise.”

126 Minghe Hu and Zen Soo, “China’s reliance on US-origin platforms for deep learning raises questions about country’s AI push,” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3038772/chinas-reliance-us-origin- platforms-deep-learning-raises-questions.

127 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “Five Major National-Level Open Innovation Platforms Revealed” [五大国家级人工智能开放创新平台将集体亮相 “], January 18, 2019. See also “Ten Major National New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platforms Released in Shanghai [十大国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台在沪发布], Science Network, August 29, 2019,http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2019/8/429964.shtm.

128 Ministry of Science and Technology Notice on the Publication of the Guidance on National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platform Construction Work [科技部关于印发《国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台建设工作指引》的通知], September 17, 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Ministry-and- Science-and-Technology-Notice-on-Publication-of-Guidance-1.pdf.

129 Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

130 For updates on its capabilities, see, e.g. “Baidu PaddlePaddle Releases 21 New Capabilities to Accelerate Industry-Grade Model Development,” November 14, 2019,http://research.baidu.com/Blog/index-view?id=126.

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131 Chris Udemans, “Alibaba Cloud opens source code for machine-learning platform Alink,” technode, November 28, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/11/28/alibaba-cloud- machine-learning-platform-open-source/.

132 “CSRankings: Computer Science Rankings,” http://csrankings.org/#/index?all. 133 Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of

False Prophecies (New York: Liveright., 2013), 172-188.

134 John Timmer, “US computer science grads outperforming those in other key nations,” ArsTechnica, March 23, 2019, https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/03/us-computer- science-grads-outperforming-those-in-other-key-nations/.

135

Journal of Education and Work

136 Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012).

137 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Adams B. Nager and Robert D. Atkinson, “Ten Myths of High-Skilled Immigration,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, April 2015, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2015,0420-Atkinson.pdf.

138 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014),https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10208.html.

139 Cary Funk and Kim Parker, “Most Americans evaluate STEM education as middling compared with other developed nations,” Pew Research Center, January 9, 2018,https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/09/5-most-americans-evaluate-stem- education-as-middling-compared-with-other-developed-nations/.

140 “Research Reveals Boys’ Interest in STEM Careers Declining; Girls’ Interest Unchanged,” Junior Achievement USA, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja-usa/press- releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/research-reveals-boys’-interest-in- stem-careers-declining-girls’-interest-unchanged; “Survey: Teen Girls’ Interest in STEM Careers Declines,” Junior Achievement, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja- usa/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/survey-teen-girls’- interest-in-stem-careers-declines.

141 Ibid.

142 Normile, Dennis, “One in Three Chinese Children Faces an Education Apocalypse. An

Ambitious Experiment Hopes to Save Them,” Science 21 (2017).143

Adam Gamoran and Sarah K. Bruch, “Educational inequality in the United States: can we

reverse the tide?”

“Chapter 4: Shanghai and Hong Kong: Two Distinct Examples of Education Reform in

China,” in Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA for

30, no. 7 (2017): 777-792.

the United States, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

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http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3343,en_2649_35845621_46538637_1_1_1

_1,00.html.

144 “Chinese university graduates rise exponentially, have diverse career options,” Xinhua, June 24, 2019,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/24/WS5d1080bca3103dbf14329e9f.html.

145 For a good overview, see “Seizing the laurels: Tsinghua University may soon top the world league in science research,” The Economist, November 17, 201,https://www.economist.com/china/2018/11/17/tsinghua-university-may-soon-top-the- world-league-in-science-research.

146 For a comparative perspective, see

147 Ricky Ye, “While US STEM education market declines, China invests heavily,” The Next Web, June 19, 2017, https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2017/06/19/us-stem- education-market-declines-china-invests-heavily/.

148 See initial results reported in a survey from Tsinghua University. China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

149 Yi-Ling Liu, “China’s AI Dreams Aren’t for Everyone,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2019,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/13/china-artificial-intelligence-dreams-arent-for- everyone-data-privacy-economic-inequality/.

150 iFlytek, Deeply Ploughing Education for Fifteen Years” [科大讯飞深耕教育15年] November 21, 2019, Beijing Report [新京报], https://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2019-11- 21/doc-iihnzahi2260676.shtml.

151 Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

152 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”153 Ibid., 5.

154 “Fewer foreign students coming to the United States for the second year in row, survey finds,” Reuters, November 13, 2018,https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/fewer-foreign-students-coming-united- states-second-year-row-survey-n935701; Zachary Arnold, Roxanne Heston, Remco Zwetsloot, and Tina Huang, “Immigration Policy and the U.S. AI Sector: A Preliminary

Wang, Yan, Jari Lavonen, and Kirsi Tirri, “Aims for

learning 21st century competencies in national primary science curricula in China and

Finland,” Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science & Technology Education (2018).

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Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019, 2-4,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_Immigration_Policy_and_AI.pdf.

155 Ibid., Section 3.

156 Alana Semeuls, “Tech Companies Say It’s Too Hard to Hire High-Skilled Immigrants in the U.S. — So They're Growing in Canada Instead,” Time, July 25, 2019,https://time.com/5634351/canada-high-skilled-labor-immigrants/.

157 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”

158 At present, China’s fertility rates are below replacement levels, and even the recent changes to the one-child policy won’t compensate for these adverse trends. See also Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

159 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

160 William Hannas and Huey-meei Chang, “China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology: An Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/CSET_China_Access_To_Foreign_Technology.pdf.

161 Meng Jing, “Chinese firms fight to lure top artificial intelligence talent from Silicon Valley,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2084171/chinese-firms-fight-lure-top-artificial-intelligence-talent-silicon.

162 Remco Zwetsloot and Dahlia Peterson, “The US-China Tech Wars: China’s Immigration Disadvantage,” The Diplomat, December 31, 2019,https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-us-china-tech-wars-chinas-immigration- disadvantage/.

163 See MIT’s description of these engagements: Adam Conner-Simons, “CSAIL launches new five-year collaboration with iFlyTek,” MIT News, https://news.mit.edu/2018/csail- launches-five-year-collaboration-with-iflytek-0615.

164 Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” Parameters 47, Issue 2 (Summer 2017): 15-30.

165 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). See also Niall Ferguson, “The False Prophecy of Hyperconnection,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/false-prophecy-hyperconnection; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Organization 63, Issue 3 (July 2009): 559-592,https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/network- analysis-for-international-relations/DE2910979C1B5C44C4CC13F336C5DE97.

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166 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/americas-edge.

167 Ibid.

168 James Carse, Finite and Infinite Games (New York: Free Press, 1986); Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).

169 “China AI Development Report 2018,” China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University.

170 See, e.g., Felicia Schwartz and Dov Lieber, “Chinese Investment in Israel Raises Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese- investment-in-israel-raises-security-fears-11549881000.

171 “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf.

172 For context, see “CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews,” Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf.

173 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” January 2018,https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.

174 China and the Philippines established a “Data port” in September 2018. China also initiated the Digital Silk Road International Industry Alliance. For more information, see “China's big data companies embark on the “Belt and Road”” [中国大数据企业走上“一带一路”], Xinhua, December 14, 2018, http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018- 12/14/c_137663769.html; “Digital Economy and Digital Silk Road International Conference proposes to jointly build digital silk road,” Zhejiang Daily, September 19, 2018.

175 See, e.g., “BRI helps participating countries with technological innovation,” People’s Daily, April 26, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0426/c90000-9572518.html.

176 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution.

177 “China and France’s top universities build ‘AI Alliance’ to promote artificial intelligence international cooperation,” Xinhua, January 18, 2018.

178 “AI, Another Breakthrough in Sino-UK Innovation Cooperation” [ 人工智能中英创新合作又一风口], People’s Daily, November 3, 2018,http://world.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/1103/c1002-30380012.html.

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179 “China and Russia big data base will be built in Harbin at the end of the year” [中俄大数据基地年底将在哈尔滨建成], Harbin Daily, March 11, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/https://zj.zjol.com.cn/news.html?id=890364.

The project has been successfully supported by the 2017 National Development and Reform Commission Digital Economy Pilot Major Project. a major project of Heilongjiang Province

180 “Lecture Series on “China-Russia Economic and Trade Cooperation Database and Russian-Chinese Intelligent Integrated Service Platform”” [“中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台”项目系列讲座中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台], November 1, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/http://yuyanziyuan.blcu.edu.cn/info/1066/1259.htm.

181 Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Preventing, and Mitigation,” February 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07228.pdf.

182 Andrew Imbrie and Elsa B. Kania, “AI Safety, Security, and Stability Among Great Powers: Options, Challenges, and Lessons Learned for Pragmatic Engagement,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/AI-Safety-Security-and-Stability-Among-the-Great-Powers.pdf.

183 William J. Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2019; Ronan Farrow, War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).

184 Elsa B. Kania,” The Right to Speak: Discourse and Chinese Power,” Center for Advanced China Research, 27, 2018. See also Joel Wuthnow, “The concept of soft power in China’s strategic discourse,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 1-28.

185 Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, “People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations,” Center for a New American Security, May 14, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peoples-republic-of-the- united-nations.

186 See, e.g., Elsa B. Kania, “China’s play for global 5G dominance—standards and the ‘Digital Silk Road’,” The Strategist, ASPI, June 27, 2018,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-play-for-global-5g-dominance-standards-and- the-digital-silk-road/.

187 Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “China’s Plan to Lead in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America, August 1, 2017,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose- prospects-and-problems/.

188 For authoritative reporting on these issues, see Paul Mozur, “One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority,” New York Times, April 14, 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial- intelligence-racial-profiling.html.

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189 “Beijing AI Principles,” May 29, https://www.baai.ac.cn/blog/beijing-ai-principles. See also “China Hosts Conference to Promote Ethical AI Standards,” China Daily, June 19, 2019,http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/19/WS5d098cdfa3103dbf14329084.html; Will Knight, “Why Does Beijing Suddenly Care About AI Ethics?” MIT Technology Review,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613610/why-does-china-suddenly-care-about-ai- ethics-and-privacy/.

190 See, e.g., “World Artificial Intelligence Conference,”http://www.worldaic.com.cn/portal/en/index.html; “Global Artificial Intelligence Conference,” https://gaitc.caai.cn/en.

191 See, e.g., “Countering High-Tech Illiberalism,” https://www.cnas.org/press/press- release/countering-high-tech-illiberalism. See also Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism. For a policy brief on the topic, see Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting digital authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190826_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole .pdf.

192 Samantha Hoffman, “Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China,” in Nicholas D. Wright, ed., AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, A Strategic Multiyear Assessment Periodic Publication, 2018, 42, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/AI-China-Russia-Global-WP_FINAL.pdf.

193 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016.

194 However, the realization of this potential advantage requires the effective use of this data.195 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower.” 196 Ibid.

197 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower”; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security, 43, Issue 3 (Winter 2018/19): 141-189.

198 “Costs of War,” Watson Institute, Brown University,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/.

199 See the Defense Innovation Board’s project and report on the topic: “Software is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage,” May 13, 2019. “Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) Study,”https://innovation.defense.gov/software/.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 54

200 “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, September 2018,https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND- STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE- AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.

201 Xi Jinping Discusses Military-Civil Fusion” [习近平谈军民融合], Seeking Truth [求是], October 16, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/rdjj/2018- 10/16/c_1123565364.htm. See also Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate,” The Strategy Bridge, August 27, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil- fusion-china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate.

202 Ibid.

203 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence,” Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2019,https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/chinese-military-innovation- in-artificial-intelligence.

204 CETC Military-Civil Fusion Network Information Systems Appear at Zhuhai Airshow [中国电科军民融合的网络信息体系亮相珠海航展], February 25, 2019,http://www.cetcd.cn/html/2019-02/7435.html.

205 Ibid.206 Ibid.

207 State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知], July 20, 2017,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm; Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “Full Translation: China's ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017),” New America,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation- chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/; “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” White House, February 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining- american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/.

208 For an excellent resource on the topic, see the 2019 AI Index Report. This Index provides tools and datasets to evaluate progress in AI, which is available through Stanford’s initiative on Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. For more information, see “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,” https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2019.

209 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (Ayer Company Publishers, 1995).

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 55

210 Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Vol. 1 (Anthem Press, 2015).

211 For context, see “DARPA Electronics Resurgence Initiative,”https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/electronics-resurgence-initiative.

212 Such an initiative could build upon antecedents. See “Public-Private Partnerships for Semiconductor Research,” https://www.nist.gov/industry-impacts/public-private- partnerships-semiconductor-research.

213 See future research forthcoming from CSET by Remco Zwetsloot et al. that will provide a more detailed analysis of this policy issue.

214 Eliezer Geisler and Wagdy Abdallah, The Metrics of Science and Technology (Quorum Books, 2000); OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Outlook, 2014 (OECD Publishing, 2014).

215 For an excellent overview of this issue, see “Campaign for an AI Ready Force,”

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204191/-1/- 1/0/CAMPAIGN_FOR_AN_AI_READY_FORCE.PDF.

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antoine-roquentin · 6 years ago

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It was a warm evening this past July when Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau shared a drink with the world’s most powerful intelligence network.

Spy chiefs from the Five Eyes nations had come to a secure resort in coastal Nova Scotia for an informal evening after intense talks in nearby Ottawa.

Trudeau, who’d spent part of the day pledging to fix a “death trap” highway in the Atlantic province, dropped in on the gathering to share some thoughts about geopolitical threats.

When he left, as the lobster dinner was being served, the conversation returned to a debate that began well before this annual meeting and would run long after it: should the agencies go public with their concerns about China?

In the months that followed that July 17 dinner, an unprecedented campaign has been waged by those present – Australia, the US, Canada, New Zealand and the UK – to block Chinese tech giant Huawei from supplying equipment for their next-generation wireless networks.

This increasingly muscular posture towards Beijing culminated in last week’s arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, in Vancouver, over alleged breaches of US sanctions with Iran. Meng, the daughter of the Huawei’s founder Ren Zhengfei, was granted bail on Wednesday ahead of efforts to extradite her to the US.

As the spy bosses sat down to savour Nova Scotia’s famous lobster that evening with a glass of local wine, their recent clash with Russia was seen as a template for the power of working collectively. The British delegation led by MI6 boss Alex Younger – a man who signs official documents in green ink with a single letter “C” – had detailed evidence of the brazen attacks in Salisbury, where Moscow had used a military-grade chemical weapon on UK soil.

In the aftermath the British went public and the Five Eyes coordinated the largest ever expulsion of Russian intelligence officers from NATO and partner states. All agreed this would significantly degrade Russia’s intelligence capability.

That episode reminded everyone that espionage and foreign interference continues to be a pervasive threat. Some believed since 9/11 that mission had been obscured by the fight against terrorism and so at their own pace each had concluded the greatest emerging threat was China’s Communist Party.

They also knew that to contend with this challenge there was no other group of nations that enjoyed such shared knowledge, cultural affinity and technical expertise.

Not all agreed to speak publicly about China when they returned home, but all were determined to act. And the Five Eyes network would include allies like Japan and Germany in the conversation.

This coming in from the cold was viewed as a countermeasure to China and its many proxies, who have long argued fears over its rising power and influence were a fiction, or worse still, signs of xenophobia.

Since that July meeting there has been a series of rare public speeches by intelligence chiefs and a coordinated effort on banning Huawei from 5G networks. It began with one of Malcolm Turnbull’s last acts as Prime Minister.

The Sunday before he was deposed Turnbull rang the US President Donald Trump to tell him of Australia’s decision to exclude Huawei and China’s second largest telecommunications equipment maker ZTE from the 5G rollout.

Australia’s statement on the rules it would apply to building next-generation wireless networks was released on August 23 and largely lost in the leadership maelstrom.

Huawei was not named but it ruled out equipment being supplied by “vendors who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government”.

Mike Burgess put Huawei back on the national agenda when on October 29 he became the first Director-General of the Australian Signals Directorate to make a public speech in the organisation’s 70 year history.

Listening attentively from the head table that night was the Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Duncan Lewis and his counterpart at the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Paul Symon.

All three men were at the meetings in Canada. Again, Burgess never named Huawei or ZTE but said the stakes with 5G “could not be higher” as it “will underpin the communications that Australians rely on every day.”

The man who runs an agency that unlocks electronic secrets had a poacher’s view of the threat: “Offence informs defence and defence informs offence. Or to put it another way, to catch a thief, you will need to think like one (or perhaps, be one).”

Since then he has given a TV interview and opened a Twitter account with a lively first post; “Hi internet, ASD here. Long time listener, first time caller.”

Burgess has even dabbled in some light trolling of Huawei. On November 21 when a Huawei executive boasted of successfully separating the core and access parts of a 5G network in New Zealand he tagged the ASD boss on his post.

To the surprise of most Burgess replied; “Thanks for sharing. In my business I’ve never seen anything “fully isolated...”.

Seven days later New Zealand banned Huawei from supplying 5G equipment to mobile phone company Spark.

Then on December 6, the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, who had hosted the annual Five Eyes gathering, used his first ever public speech to warn of an emerging threat.

“CSIS has seen a trend of state-sponsored espionage in fields that are crucial to Canada’s ability to build and sustain a prosperous, knowledge-based economy,” he said.

“I’m talking about areas such as AI [artificial intelligence], quantum technology, 5G, biopharma and clean tech. In other words, the foundation of Canada’s future growth.”

No one was in any doubt he was talking about China. A formal ban on Huawei and ZTE from Ottawa is expected within weeks.

A day after the Canadian spy boss spoke, the head of MI6 was on his feet at his old Scottish university, St Andrews.

In a speech described as “rare” he warned that “much of the evolving state threat is about our opponents’ increasingly innovative exploitation of modern technology”.

The United Kingdom posed a particular problem for the Five Eyes as, 15 years earlier, British Telecom had struck a partnership with Huawei and that example was routinely used to counter arguments it posed a threat.

In answer to a question Younger took direct aim at Britain’s Huawei problem.

“We need to decide the extent to which we are going to be comfortable with Chinese ownership of these technologies and these platforms in an environment where some of our allies have taken a very definite position,” he said.

On the same day the BT Group announced it was stripping Huawei's equipment out of the core of its existing 3G and 4G mobile operations and would not use its technology in the 5G network.

But no country has been more aggressive than the United States, represented at the Canadian meetings by Gina Haspel.

The newly appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency was battle hardened by a life spent in the shadows. She shed some light on that in a bruising Senate confirmation hearing in May saying she had “excelled in finding and acquiring secret information that I obtained in brush passes, dead drops, or in meetings in dusty alleys of third world capitals.”

Well before her arrival at the helm of the CIA, the US has been focused on Beijing and the proceedings against Huawei’s Meng are just one front in its efforts to bring China to heel.

Washington’s sharp focus on Beijing plays into Trump’s obsession with trade wars but it would be wrong to think it’s solely driven by the President. Over the past two years Republicans and Democrats in Congress and the Departments of Defence, State and the security agencies have come to the conclusion China is a strategic threat.

US prosecutors have filed charges against Chinese hackers and, in an audacious sting in April, American agents lured Chinese Ministry of State Security deputy director Yanjun Xu to Belgium, where he was arrested for orchestrating the theft of military secrets.

There is also speculation further indictments are imminent over a concerted Chinese hacking campaign known as “Operation Cloud Hopper”, which is believed to have penetrated networks across the globe, including Australia.

In addition the White House used its bi-annual report on China, last month to say Beijing had "fundamentally" failed to change its behaviour around cyber espionage giving it unfair access to intellectual property, trade secrets, negotiating positions and the internal communications of business.

The report added weight to revelations in The Age and Sydney Morning Herald the same week that China had diverted internet traffic heading to Sydney and its peak security agency had overseen a surge in attacks on Australian companies.

This industrial scale cyber theft is just part of a form guide which convinced the Five Eyes intelligence chiefs that Beijing would not hesitate to recruit Huawei to its cause and the company would have no choice but to comply.

All the evidence before the spy bosses at the dinner in Canada pointed to a rising superpower mounting the most comprehensive campaign of espionage and foreign interference that any had witnessed.

The Party was aggressively exporting a worldview that was hostile to democracy and actively sought to undermine it.

A new Great Game was afoot and the West had been slow to act. But it is acting now.

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allfirmwareos · 3 years ago

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ZTE Open C Firefox Stock Firmware ROM (Flash File)

ZTE Open C Firefox Stock Firmware Download For Your ZTE Device. We provide original Android Rom all the Stock Rom files. Get it from the official website. The zip file contains ZTE Software File, Flash Tool, and How-to Flash Guide. Use Miracle Box Flash Tool for flash Firmware on this device. [*] Model: Open C Firefox. [*] Driver: MTP USB Drivers. [*] Flash Tool: Miracle Box. ZTE Open C Firefox…

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mellissanews · 3 years ago

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How to Root ZTE Open C with Magisk without TWRP

Today I am going to teach you how to root ZTE Open C via Magisk patched boot.img. Even though the device from this OEM is usually not supported in custom development, they got a niche segment of their own. Nowadays their popularity is increasing gradually. Mostly among the tech experts. Read More – Does Rooting or Unlocking void your Android Phone Warranty However, there is a prerequisite you…

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loraamy48 · 3 years ago

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How to Wipe Cache Partition on ZTE Open C

Wipe Cache Partition on ZTE Open C – In a nutshell, an app cache is a different type of storage that contains frequently accessed files and data. It facilitates future functions of that particular app by fastening the loading. But the disadvantage of cache storage is that it occupies the storage space. Read More – App Cache vs App Data Vs System Cach on ZTE Open C Wipe Cache Partition on ZTE…

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natashanews · 3 years ago

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How to boot into safe mode on ZTE Open C

As you know, ZTE Open C is the most popular and powerful in the world today. If you are a newcomer to the ZTE world then you will get some little problems because of your knowledge of ZTE Open C. If You think these problems seem complex. Don’t think like that. It’s all about your experience. If you are a new user precisely you will think like that.. Read More – ADDING IR SENSOR | AS…

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nerdygladiatorvoid · 4 years ago

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USB Power Delivery is the fastest way to charge iPhone and Android devices

With the current generation of smartphones and their much faster processors and vivid, high-resolution displays, and always-on connectivity, demands on battery performance are now higher than ever.

You may have noticed that, while you are on the road, you're quickly running out of juice. If you have this problem, portable batteries and PD fast charger than what may have come in the box with your device may be the solution.

But not all portable batteries are the same, even though they might use similar Lithium Polymer (LiPo) and Lithium-Ion (Lion) cells for capacity and look very much alike. Plus, modern smartphone hardware from Apple and various Android manufacturers support faster-charging rates than what was previously supported.

If you use the charger that comes in the box of the current-generation iPhone hardware, or if you buy just any portable battery pack on the market, you're going to be disappointed. Ideally, you want to match your charger, battery, and even the charging cable to the optimal charging speeds that your device supports.

There are three different high-speed USB charging standards currently on the market. While all will work with your device using a standard legacy charge mode, you will want to match up the right technology to optimize the speed in which you can top off your phone, tablet, or even your laptop. Let's start by explaining the differences between them.

Legacy USB-A 2.0 and 3.0 charging

If your Android device or accessory still has the USB Micro B connector (the dreaded fragile trapezoid that's impossible to connect in the dark), you can fast-charge it using an inexpensive USB-A-to-USB Micro B cable.

If the device and the 20W USB C PD fast charger white port both support the USB 2.0 standard (pretty much the least common denominator these days for entry-level Android smartphones), you can charge it at 1.5A/5V. Some consumer electronics, such as higher-end vape batteries that use the Evolv DNA chipset, can charge at 2A. A USB 3.0/3.1 charge port on one of these batteries can supply 3.0A/5V -- if the device supports it.

If you are charging an accessory, such as an inexpensive pair of wireless earbuds or another Bluetooth device, and it doesn't support either of the USB-A fast charging specs, it will slow charge at either 500mA or 900mA, which is about the same you can expect from directly connecting it to most PCs.

Many of the portable batteries on the market have both USB-C and multiple USB-A ports. Some of them have USB-A ports that can deliver the same voltage, while others feature one fast (2.4A) and one slow (1A).

So, you will want to make sure you plug the device into the battery port that can charge it at the fastest rate, if you're going to top off the device as quickly as possible.

USB Power Delivery

USB Power Delivery (USB PD) is a relatively new fast charge standard that was introduced by the USB Implementers Forum, the creators of the USB standard. It is an industry-standard open specification that provides high-speed charging with variable voltage up to 20V using intelligent device negotiation up to 5A at 100W.

It scales up from smartphones to notebook computers, provided they use a USB-C connector and a USB-C power controller on the client and host.

Batteries and 3 port PD fast charger that employ USB PD can charge devices up to 100W output using a USB-C connector -- however, most output at 30W because that is on the upper range of what most smartphones and tablets can handle. In contrast, laptops require adapters and batteries that can output at a higher wattage.

Apple introduced USB PD charging with iOS devices with the launch of the 2015 iPad Pro 12.9 and with OS X laptops in the MacBook Pro as of 2016. Apple's smartphones beginning with the iPhone 8 can rapidly charge with USB PD using any USB PD charging accessory; you don't have to use Apple's OEM USB-C 29W or its 61W power adapters.

In 2019, Apple released an 18W USB-C Power Adapter, which comes with the iPhone 11 Pro and 11 Pro Max. Although Apple's charger works just fine, you'll probably want to consider a third-party wall charger for the regular iPhone 11 or an earlier model. The regular iPhone 11 and the iPhone SE only come with a 5W USB-A charger, which is woefully inadequate for getting your device charged up quickly. And the current rumor mill seems to indicate that the iPhone 12 may not even ship with a charger in the box at all.

Fast-charging an iPhone requires the use of a USB-C to Lightning cable, which, until February 2019, needed Apple's OEM MKQ42AM/A (1m ) or MD818ZM/A (2m) USB-C to Lightning cables. Unfortunately, they're a tad expensive at around $19 to $35 from various online retailers such as Amazon.

There are cheaper third-party USB-C to Lightning cables. I am currently partial to USB-C-to-Lightning cables from Anker, which are highly durable and MFI-certified for use with Apple's devices.

It should be noted that, if you intend to use your smartphone with either Apple's CarPlay and Google's Android Auto, your vehicle will probably still require a USB-A to USB-C or a USB-A-to-Lightning cable if it doesn't support these screen projection technologies wirelessly. You can't fast-charge with either of these types of cables in most cars, and there is no way to pass-through a fast charge to a 12V USB PD accessory while being connected to a data cable, either.

Qualcomm Quick Charge

Qualcomm's Snapdragon SoCs are used in many popular smartphones and tablets. It's fast-charging standard, Quick Charge, has been through multiple iterations.

The current implementation is Quick Charge 4.0, which is backward-compatible with older Quick Charge accessories and devices. Unlike USB PD, Quick Charge 2.0 and 3.0 can be delivered using the USB-A connector. Quick Charge 4.0 is exclusive to USB-C.

Quick Charge 4.0 is only present in phones that use the Qualcomm Snapdragon 8xx, and it's present in many North American tier 1 OEM Android devices made by Samsung, LG, Motorola, OnePlus, ZTE, and Google.

The Xiaomi, ZTE Nubia and the Sony Xperia devices also use QC 4.0, but they aren't sold in the US market. Huawei's phones utilize Kirin 970/980/990 chips, which use its own Supercharge standard, but they are backward-compatible with the 18W USB PD standard. Similarly, Oppo's phones have SuperVOOC, and OnePlus uses Warp Charge, and issue its compatible charger accessories if you want to take advantage of higher wattage (30W/40W/100W) charge rates.

Like USB PD, QC 3.0 and QC 4.0 are variable voltage technologies and will intelligently ramp up your device for optimal charging speeds and safety. However, Quick Charge 3.0 and 4.0 differ from USB PD in that it has some additional features for thermal management and voltage stepping with the current-generation Qualcomm Snapdragon SoCs to optimize for reduced heat footprint while charging.

It also uses a different variable voltage selection and negotiation protocol than USB PD, which Qualcomm advertises as better/safer for its own SoCs.

And for devices that use Qualcomm's current chipsets, Quick Charge 4.0 is about 25% faster than Quick Charge 3.0. The company advertises five hours of usage time on the device for five minutes of charge time.

However, while it is present in (some of) the USB C dual PD fast charger that ship with the devices themselves, and a few third-party solutions, Quick Charge 4 is not in any battery products yet. It is not just competing with USB Power Delivery; it is also compatible with USB Power Delivery.

Qualcomm's technology and ICs have to be licensed at considerable additional expense to the OEMs, whereas USB PD is an open standard.

If you compound this with Google recommending OEMs conform to USB PD over Quick Charge for Android-based products, it sounds like USB PD is the way to go, right?

Well, sort of. If you have a Quick Charge 3.0 device, definitely get a Quick Charge 3.0 battery. But if you have a Quick Charge 4.0 device or an iOS device, get at USB PD battery for now.

Which battery should you buy?

Now that you understand the fundamental charging technologies, which battery should you buy? When the first version of this article released in 2018, the product selection on the market was much more limited -- there are now dozens of vendors currently manufacturing USB PD products.

USB-C connectors have been designed hand-in-hand with USB-C Power Delivery, to handle these new high levels of power. USB-C circuit boards are specially designed to carry this increased wattage without being damaged or overheating, for enhanced safety to users and their devices.

Older connectors, such as USB-A, were first introduced in 1996, when much less power was needed than that required by today’s smartphones and tablets. This older technology is less suited to handle this increased wattage and may not have the ability to monitor heat and circuitry abnormalities.

Whether it’s a small phone or a large laptop, the USB C PD fast charger detects the connected device to deliver the right amount of power to charge that device as fast as possible. This ensures fast charging without delivering too much power which could damage circuitry.

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a2znewsplace · 4 years ago

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The ZTE Axon 30 5G open sales start tomorrow at $500

Did you see the camera samples we posted from the Axon 30 5G? If you did and liked what you saw, you should know that the phone goes on sale around the world tomorrow. You will be able to grab one from the official site, ztedevices.com. Axon 30 5G box contents: phone, USB-C cable, charger and protective case The base 8/128 GB model will cost you $500/€500/£430, while the version with more memory…

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holdingsload4 · 4 years ago

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Download C-map USB Devices Driver

Google is committed to advancing racial equity for Black communities. See how.

Download C-map Usb Devices Drivers

Install Driver For Usb Device

Unknown Usb Device Driver Download

Usb Device Drivers Windows 10

If you are developing on Windows and want to connect a device for testing,then you need to install the appropriate USB driver. This pageprovides links to the web sites for several original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),where you can download the appropriate USB driver for your device.

If you're developing on Mac OS X or Linux, then you shouldn't need a USB driver.Instead read Using Hardware Devices.

Downloads - SCUF Vantage USB PC Driver. Many PC games allow you to put down your keyboard and mouse to play with a controller. With our USB PC Driver for the SCUF Vantage, PC games that support PlayStation® 4 controllers are now playable on Windows 7 and Windows 10. Locate the Headset Earphone device labeled as SCUF Controller and right. Cancel Agree and Download Experience Drive on any device Drive works on all major platforms, enabling you to work seamlessly across your browser, mobile device, tablet, and computer. All drivers support the following OS. Windows 10, 8.1, 8, 7 with Service Pack 1 (SP1) Windows Server 2016, 2012, 2008 R2. When you plug the device into your USB, Windows will look for the associated driver, if it cannot find this driver then you will be prompted to insert the driver disc that came with your device. Common USB Device errors are ‘ usb port not working ‘, ‘device descriptor request failed error’ or ‘bugcodeusbdriver’ issues.

To connect and debug with any of the Google Nexus devices using Windows, youneed to install the Google USB driver.

Install a USB driver

First, find the appropriate driver for your device from the OEM driverstable below.

Once you've downloaded your USB driver, follow the instructions below to install or upgrade thedriver, based on your version of Windows and whether you're installing for the first timeor upgrading an existing driver. Then see Using Hardware Devices forother important information about using an Android device fordevelopment.

Caution:You may make changes to android_winusb.inf file found insideusb_driver (for example, to add support for other devices),however, this will lead to security warnings when you install or upgrade thedriver. Making any other changes to the driver files may break the installationprocess.

Windows 10

To install the Android USB driver on Windows 10 for the first time, do the following:

Connect your Android device to your computer's USB port.

From Windows Explorer, open Computer Management.

In the Computer Management left pane, select Device Manager.

In the Device Manager right pane, locate and expand Portable Devices or Other Devices, depending on which one you see.

Right-click the name of the device you connected, and then select Update Driver Software.

In the Hardware Update wizard, select Browse my computer for driver software and click Next.

Click Browse and then locate the USB driver folder. For example, the Google USB Driver is located in android_sdkextrasgoogleusb_driver.

Click Next to install the driver.

Windows 8.1

To install the Android USB driver on Windows 8.1 for the first time, do the following:

Connect your Android device to your computer's USB port.

Access search, as follows:

Touch screen: On your computer, swipe in from the right edge of the screen and tap Search.

Using a mouse: Point to the lower-right corner of the screen, move the mouse pointer up, and then click Search.

In the search box, type into and then click Device Manager.

Double-click the device category, and then double-click the device you want.

Click the Driver tab, click Update Driver, and follow the instructions.

Windows 7

To install the Android USB driver on Windows 7 for the first time, do the following:

Connect your Android device to your computer's USB port.

Right-click on Computer from your desktop or Windows Explorer, and select Manage.

Select Devices in the left pane.

Locate and expand Other device in the right pane.

Right-click the device name (such as Nexus S) and select Update Driver Software. This will launch the Hardware Update Wizard.

Select Browse my computer for driver software and click Next.

Click Browse and locate the USB driver folder. (The Google USBDriver is located in android_sdkextrasgoogleusb_driver.)

Click Next to install the driver.

Or, to upgrade an existing Android USB driver on Windows 7 and higher with the newdriver:

Connect your Android device to your computer's USB port.

Right-click on Computer from your desktop or Windows Explorer, and select Manage.

Select Device Manager in the left pane of the Computer Management window.

Locate and expand Android Phone in the right pane.

Right-click on Android Composite ADB Interface and select Update Driver. This will launch the Hardware Update Wizard.

Select Install from a list or specific location and click Next.

Select Search for the best driver in these locations; uncheckSearch removable media; and check Include this location in thesearch.

Click Browse and locate the USB driver folder. (The Google USBDriver is located in android_sdkextrasgoogleusb_driver.)

Click Next to upgrade the driver.

Get OEM drivers

OEMDriver URL Acer http://www.acer.com/worldwide/support/ alcatel one touch http://www.alcatelonetouch.com/global-en/support/ Asus https://www.asus.com/support/Download-Center/ Blackberry https://swdownloads.blackberry.com/Downloads/entry.do?code=4EE0932F46276313B51570F46266A608 Dell http://support.dell.com/support/downloads/index.aspx?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs&~ck=anavml Fujitsu http://www.fmworld.net/product/phone/sp/android/develop/ HTC http://www.htc.com/support Huawei http://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/index.htm Intel http://www.intel.com/software/android Kyocera http://www.kyocera-wireless.com/support/phone_drivers.htm Lenovo http://support.lenovo.com/us/en/GlobalProductSelector LGE http://www.lg.com/us/support/software-firmware Motorola https://motorola-global-portal.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/88481/ MTK http://online.mediatek.com/Public%20Documents/MTK_Android_USB_Driver.zip (ZIP download) Samsung http://developer.samsung.com/galaxy/others/android-usb-driver-for-windows Sharp http://k-tai.sharp.co.jp/support/ Sony Mobile Communications http://developer.sonymobile.com/downloads/drivers/ Toshiba http://support.toshiba.com/sscontent?docId=4001814 Xiaomi http://www.xiaomi.com/c/driver/index.html ZTE http://support.zte.com.cn/support/news/NewsDetail.aspx?newsId=1000442

If you don't see a link for the manufacturer of your device here, go to the support section of the manufacturer's website and search for USB driver downloads for your device.

-->

This topic is intended for OEMs who want to build a Windows 10 system with USB Type-C connector and want to leverage OS features that allow for faster charging, power delivery, dual role, alternate modes, and error notifications through Billboard devices.

A traditional USB connection uses a cable with a USB A and USB B connector on each end. The USB A connector always plugs in to the host side and the USB B connector connects the function side, which is a device (phone) or peripheral (mouse, keyboard). By using those connectors, you can only connect a host to a function; never a host to another host or a function to another function. The host is the power source provider and the function consumes power from the host.

The traditional configuration limits some scenarios. For example, if a mobile device wants to connect to a peripheral, the device must act as the host and deliver power to the connected device.

The USB Type-C connector, introduced by the USB-IF, defined in the USB 3.1 specification, addresses those limitations. Windows 10 introduces native support for those features.

Feature summary

Allows for faster charging up to 100W with Power Delivery over USB Type-C.

Single connector for both USB Hosts and USB Devices.

Can switch USB roles to support a USB host or device.

Can switch power roles between sourcing and sinking power.

Supports other protocols like DisplayPort and Thunderbolt over USB Type-C.

Introduces USB Billboard device class to provide error notifications for Alternate Modes.

Official specifications

Hardware design

USB Type-C connector is reversible and symmetric.

The main component are: the USB Type-C connector and its port or PD controller that manages the CC pin logic for the connector. Such systems typically have a dual-role controller that can swap the USB role from host to function. It has Display-Out module that allows video signal to be transmitted over USB. Optionally it can support BC1.2 charger detection.

Consider recommendations for the design and development of USB components, including minimum hardware requirements, Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirements, and other recommendations that build on those requirements.Hardware component guidelines USB

Choose a driver model

Use this flow chart to determine a solution for your USB Type-C system.

If your system...Recommended solution...Does not implement PD state machinesWrite a client driver to the UcmTcpciCx class extension. Write a USB Type-C port controller driverImplements PD state machines in hardware or firmware and support USB Type-C Connector System Software Interface (UCSI) over ACPILoad the Microsoft provided in-box drivers, UcmUcsiCx.sys and UcmUcsiAcpiClient.sys. See UCSI driver.Implements PD state machines in hardware or firmware, but either does not support UCSI, or support UCSI but requires a transport other than ACPIWrite a client driver for the UcmCx class extension. Write a USB Type-C connector driver Write a USB Type-C Policy Manager client driverImplements UCSI but requires a transport other than ACPIWrite a client driver to the UcmUcsiCx class extension. Use this sample template and modify it based on a transport that your hardware uses. Write a UCSI client driver

Bring up drivers

USB Function driver bring-up is only required if you support USB Function mode. If you previously implemented a USB Function driver for a USB micro-B connector, describe the appropriate connectors as USB Type-C in the ACPI tables for the USB Function driver to continue working.

For more information, see instructions about writing a USB Function driver.

USB Role-Switch driver bring-up is only required for devices that have a Dual Role controller that assumes both Host and Function roles. To bring-up the USB Role-Switch driver, you need to modify the ACPI tables to enable the Microsoft in-box USB role-switch driver.

For more information, see the guidance for bringing up the USB Role Switch Driver.

A USB Connector Manager Driver is required for Windows to manage the USB Type-C ports on a system. The bring-up tasks for a USB Connector Manager driver depend on the driver that you choose for the USB Type-C ports: The Microsoft in-box UCSI (UcmUcsiCx.sys and UcmUcsiAcpiClient.sys) driver, a UcmCx client driver, or a UcmTcpciCx client driver. For more information, see the links in the preceding section that describe how to choose the right solution for your USB Type-C system.

Test

Perform various functional and stress tests on systems and devices that expose a USB Type-C connector.

Download C-map Usb Devices Drivers

Test USB Type-C systems with USB Type-C ConnEx - Run USB tests included in the Windows Hardware Lab Kit (HLK) for Windows 10.

Install Driver For Usb Device

Run USB function HLK tests with a C-to-A cable (search for Windows USB Device in the HLK

Unknown Usb Device Driver Download

Certification/ComplianceAttend Power Delivery and USB Type-C compliance workshops hosted by the standards bodies.

Usb Device Drivers Windows 10

See also

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mellissanews · 3 years ago

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Uninstall Magisk and Unroot your ZTE Open C

Hello, my dear friends! After a long time, isn’t it? Today I am well prepared with another guide for you. The title of the article is How to Uninstall Magisk and Unroot ZTE Open C. Now you might be wondering that what am I going to do today. I am going to help you with another common problem for Android users. That is the boot loop issue. I am pretty sure that around 50% of android users have…

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natashanews · 3 years ago

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[Solved] - Disable Safe Mode on ZTE Open C

[Solved] – Disable Safe Mode on ZTE Open C

Disable Safe Mode on ZTE Open C – You can go into Safe Mode on your device by following some different ways. But if you can’t back of it then you will set at naught. Don’t fear. Those are some kind of bad features of Safe Mode. This article will help you to solve your all kind of Safe Mode problems and get back your device to the normal mode that you loved. Read More – ADDING IR SENSOR | AS…

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loadingheritage292 · 4 years ago

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How To Unlock Reliance Cdma Phone

These carriers will not work with your unlock phone:

Afghanistan

Afghan Telecom

Enjoy the Freedom of an Unlocked CDMA Android Phone. The Android operating system affords a great deal of freedom for cell phone users. An unlocked CDMA Android phone offers you even more freedom because you can pick the service provider that you want. EBay offers a wide variety of these phones so that you can find the phone that you want on the network that you want.

If you have an Android phone, you can use T-Mobile's Device Unlock app to request T-Mobile unlock your phone. Others will need to contact customer support at 877-746-0909. Others will need to.

Sep 01, 2020 However, not all phones are compatible, so you can otherwise unlock your phone through a live chat with a T-Mobile customer representative, or by calling 611 from a T-Mobile device, or 877-746. If you have an Android phone, you can use T-Mobile's Device Unlock app to request T-Mobile unlock your phone. Others will need to contact customer support at 877-746-0909. Others will need to. Reliance cdma netconnect zte mg880. I am try unlock the modem. But no success. Any solution Pl'z help. Suppose modem unlock i use gsm any net work sim card is possible.

Wasel

Algeria

Mobilis

Angola

Movicel (please contact your service provider to verify if the have switch to GSM)

Argentina

CoTeCal

Nextel

Aruba

MIO

Azerbaijan

Aztrank

Bangladesh

Citycell

RanksTel

Bermuda

CellularOne

M3 Wireless

Brazil

Nextel

Brunei Darussalam

B-mobile

Progresif Cellular

TelBru

Cambodia

Seatel

Cameroon

YooMee

Canada

MTS

Chile

WOM

China

Unlock Cdma Phone For Free

China Telecom

Colombia

Avantel

Democratic Republic of Congo

Tatem Telecom

Denmark

Net 1

Dominican Republic

Tricom

Ecuador

CNT

Ethiopia

Ethiotelecom

Gambia

Gamtel

Georgia

Silknet

Ghana

Expresso Telecom

Gibraltar

Cts Mobile

Ghana

Expresso Telecom

Guam

Docomo Pacific

Iceland

Nova

India

MTS

Reliance

Indonesia

Smartfren

Esia

Iraq

Omnnea

Israel

Pelephone

Rami Levy Communication

Japan

NTT docomo

SoftBank

Y!Mobile

eAccess

Disney Mobile

B-Mobile

Kazakhstan

Altel

Kenya

Flashcom

Popote

Kyrgyzstan

Fonex

Katel

Nexi

Sapat Mobile

Latvia

Triatel

Luxembourg

LOL Mobile

Macau

China Telecom

Madagascar

Telma

Malawi

Access Communications

TNM

Malaysia

U Mobile

Buzz me

FRiENDi Mobile

Telin Malaysia

YS mobile

Malta

Melita

Mauritius

MTML

México

Nextel

Moldova

Unité

Interdnestrcom

Mongolia

Skytel

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G-Mobile

Morocco

Inwi

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MPT

Ooredoo

New Zeland

Telecom

Spark

Slingshot

Skinny

Nigeria

Bourdex

Multilinks

NITEL

Odu’a Telecom

Starcomms

Visafone

Zoom

North Korea

Koryonlink

Northern Mariana Islands

Docomo Pacific

IT&E

Perú

Entel

Puerto Rico

Open Mobile

Romania

DigiMobil

Russian Federation

Sotel

Tula

Comstar

Sierra Leone

Sierratel

Slovenia

T-2

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Neotel

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Olleh

LG U+

Sudan

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Sweden

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TTCL

Benson Informatics

MyCell

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Intertelecom

TriMob

PeopleNet

United States

Affinity Cellular

Airlink

Appalachian Wireless

Armed Forces Wireless

Bendbroadband

Blue Wireless

Bluegrass Cellular

Boost Mobile

Breakaway Wireless

Bristol Bay Cellular

BZRMobile

C Spire

Carolina West Wireless

Cellcom

CellularOne

Chariton Valley

Chat Mobility

Chit Chat Mobile

Clear Talk

Convergence Technologies

Copper Valley Telecom

Credo Mobile

CTC Wireless

Custer Telephone

Defense Mobile (please contact Defense Mobile to verify, depends on your location)

Eco Mobile

Envie Mobile

Español Mobile

Expo Mobile

Family Talk Wireless (please contact Family Talk to verify, depends on your location)

Flash Wireless

FMP Comuunications

FreedomPop

Good2Go Mobile (please contact Good2Go to verify, depends on your location)

GreatCall

Infinium Wireless (please contact Infinium to verify, depends on your location)

Inland Cellular

Kajeet

Ketchikan Public Utilities

Madstar Mobile

Matanuska Telephone Association

Mid-Rivers Wireless

nTelos

Nemont

Net10 Wireless (please contact Net10 to verify, depends on your location)

NetZero

Northwest Missouri

OTG Mobile (please contact OTG Mobile to verify, depends on your location)

Page Plus Cellular

Pioneer Cellular

Pix Wireless

Project Fi (please contact Project Fi to verify, depends on your location)

Proven Wireless (please contact Proven Wireless to verify, depends on your location)

Puppy Wireless

Ready Mobile

Red Pocket (please contact RedPocket to verify, depends on your location)

Republic Wireless

Ring Plus

ROK Mobile (please contact ROK Mobile to verify, depends on your location)

Sagebrush Cellular

Select Wireless

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Speed Talk Mobile

Sprint

Sprocket Wireless

Straight Talk (please contact Straight Talk to verify, depends on your location)

Strata Networks

S & R Communications

Tempo Telecom (please contact Tempo Telecom to verify, depends on your location)

TextNow

Thumb Cellular

Ting (please contact Ting to verify, depends on your location)

Total Call Mobile

TotalWireless

TotoWireless

Touch Mobile

TracFone (please contact TracFone to verify, depends on your location)

UWT Mobile (please contact UWT Mobile to verify, depends on your location)

Verizon

Virgin Mobile

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S-Fone

Uzbekistan

Uzmobile

Perfectum

Yemen

Yemen Mobile

Verizon is one of the largest wireless service providers in the world and, as such, has a pretty strong grip on the mobile space. Indeed, it has had its share of exclusive phones over the years.

Why do carriers lock phones?

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One of the main reasons that carriers lock phones down is to get customers to purchase device through them. In some cases you’ll find a particular model that’s exclusive to a network. In other words, you must buy the phone through that provider if you want to use it. Another reason for locking is to prevent fraud and mitigate theft.

READ:Where can I buy an unlocked phone?

The concept of exclusive phones was much bigger a few years back but it still happens from time to time with the top carriers. The Motorola Droid line is an example Verizon exclusivity. Nevertheless, you have the right to unlock your phone.

Why unlock a Verizon phone?

While Verizon phones operate on a CDMA it does offer dual CDMA/GSM devices, meaning international coverage is potentially an option. Unlocking a Verizon phone gives you freedom to take it to prepaid and MVNO brands like GreatCall, Net10, Staight Talk, Total Wireless, and Visible.

How To Unlock Reliance Cdma Phone Plans

Also worth noting, you should still be able to use an unlocked Verizon LTE phone on AT&T or T-Mobile — or their MVNO brands. More and more we’re finding their handsets to be compatible with both carriers’ LTE bands.

READ:Cheap phone plans that use Verizon’s network

Unlocking Verizon phones: Prerequisites

Verizon makes it very easy to unlock your phone. In fact, as of summer 2019 it automatically unlocks its customer’s devices after 60 days as long as certain criteria is met. There are a few things you should know need to do first. Before unlocking, ensure the following is in order.

You are 60 days after phone purchase

The phone must not be reported as stolen, lost, or associated with fraud

How to unlock your Verizon phone

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Okay, so this one is pretty much a non-starter. As long as you adhere to the aforementioned details, you should have no problem with getting your device unlocked. But, if you have any issues, reach out to Verizon for help.

In the event you have a phone that was purchased prior to July 2019, it may already be unlocked. Simply put in a SIM card from a different carrier and you’ll know whether it is. If not, give Verizon a ring and you’ll be just fine.

Note: Select outbound links may include affiliate tracking codes. Revenue generated from any potential purchases is used to fund AndroidGuys. Read our policy.

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saltytimetravelcollection · 4 years ago

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Drivers Transics USB Devices

[2020 Updated] Download USB Drivers for Any Android (Samsung/ Motorola /Sony/ LG/ HTC/ ASUS/ Huawei and others): .Here we are sharing all the latest Android USB Drivers for Windows and Mac. You can download them from the download section below and install them on your PC or Mac

USB Drivers are one of the must-have tools to be installed on your PC or Mac. Because of that, your mobile device interacts with your PC.These work as Bridge between your Phone and your computer. The USB drivers help us to connect our phone to the computer and perform tasks like transferring data, syncing your device with a PC. They help us to connect our Android devices to tools like Odin, Sony Flash tool, and SuperOneClick.

The USB driver is outdated; The USB Driver is missing; Or even a corrupted driver; While you can't be so sure what the exact problem is there are solutions you can adopt to fix the issue once and for all. Read on to find quick fixes to resolve the problem. 1# Fix Prolific USB to Serial Driver not Working Solution: Roll your Prolific USB to. Click Browse and locate the USB driver folder. (The Google USB Driver is located in androidsdk extras google usbdriver.) Click Next to install the driver. Or, to upgrade an existing Android USB driver on Windows 7 and higher with the new driver: Connect your Android device to your computer's USB port. Transcend's StoreJet 25M3C ruggedized external hard drive features the USB 3.1 Gen 1 interface and a USB Type-C port for unmatched transfer rates, and comes with both a USB Type-C cable as well as a Type-C to Type-A cable for max compatibility across devices. Supreme shock-resistant qualities ensure superior protection for data stored on the drive.

Virtual COM port (VCP) drivers cause the USB device to appear as an additional COM port available to the PC. Application software can access the USB device in the This page contains the VCP drivers currently available for FTDI devices. For D2XX Direct drivers, please click here.

Below, we are sharing the links to USB drivers for most of the popular Android device manufacturers like Samsung, LG, Sony, Google, HTC, Motorola, Dell, etc. These USB drivers are safe to use as they are from their respective manufacturers. All the links are valid and official. We recommend you to download the latest USB drivers

[note type=”important”]It is highly recommended to Enable USB debugging on android smartphones before performing any task in the fastboot mode. [/note]

Download USB Drivers for Android

I.Download USB Drivers for Android

Samsung USB Drivers

Latest Samsung DriversDownloadDownload Latest Samsung KiesDownloadSamsung Android ADB Interface Driver v2.9.510.0Download

OnePlus USB Drivers

Latest OnePlus USB Drivers (Windows and Mac)Download

For MediaTek VCOM Driver

MediaTek VCOM MTK Drivers (Updated)Download

Motorola USB Driver

Latest Motorola USB Drivers (Win & Mac)Download

Google USB Drivers

Latest Google USB DriversDownload

HTC USB Drivers

Latest HTC USB Drivers 4.17.0.001DownloadHTC Sync ManagerDownload

Sony USB Drivers

Latest Sony USB DriversDownloadSony PC CompanionDownloadSony Bridge for MacDownload

LG USB Drivers

Latest LG USB DriversDownloadLG Flash and LG UP ToolDownloadLG UpperCut ToolDownload

LG United Drivers for Verizon | Mirror

Dell USB Drivers

Latest Dell USB DriversDownload

Go to the link and choose your mobile device or tablet to download the specific version USB drivers.

Intel Android USB Drivers

Latest Intell Android USB DriversDownload

ZTE USB Drivers

Latest ZTE USB DriversDownload

LeEco USB Drivers

Latest LeEco USB DriversDownload

ASUS USB Drivers

Download Asus PC suite PC Link (drivers included)Download

Huawei USB Drivers

Latest Huawei USB DriversDownload (Check below)

Download HiSuite (drivers included) || Windows | Mac

Acer USB Drivers

Latest Acer USB DriversDownload

Sharp USB Drivers

Amazon USB Drivers

Latest Amazon USB DriversDownload

Drivers Transics Usb Devices Adapter

Pantech USB Drivers

Latest Pantech USB Drivers (PC Suit)Download

XIAOMI USB Drivers

Download Mi Phone Manager (PC Suite) | Mirror

Lenovo USB Drivers

Latest Lenovo USB DriversDownload

Micromax USB Drivers

Latest Micromax USB DriversDownload

Video Guide: Enable Developer Options, USB Debugging and OEM Unlock On Android

[note type=”important”]

In case the above drivers do not work for you, do as described below:

Go to the official site of the manufacturer

Type the name and model of your device in the search box.

Select your device and click the Support tab/button.

You will get the download link for the specific USB Drivers for your device.

Download the drivers and install onto your computer. [/note]

If you have any question, feel free to ask in the comment below.

Rootmygalaxy a.k.a RMG was started in 2015 with a solo goal of Helping users with easy How-to guides. Slowly the website started sharing exclusive Leaks and Tech News. In these 5 years, we have been credited by the likes of Forbes, CNBC, Gizmodo, TechCrunch, Engadget, Android Authority, GSM Arena and many others. Want to know more about us? Check out ourAbout Us pageor connect with us ViaTwitter, Facebook, YoutubeorTelegram.

Google is committed to advancing racial equity for Black communities. See how.

The Google USB Driver is required for Windows if you want to performadb debugging with Google devices. Windows drivers forall other devices are provided by the respective hardware manufacturer, as listed in theOEM USB Drivers document.

Note:If you're developing on Mac OS X or Linux, then you do not need to install a USBdriver. Instead seeUsing Hardware Devices.

You can download the Google USB Driver for Windows in one of two ways:

Or, get it from the Android SDK Manager as follows:

In Android Studio, click Tools > SDK Manager.

Click the SDK Tools tab.

Select Google USB Driver and click OK.

Figure 1. The SDK Manager with the Google USB Driver selected

Proceed to install the package. When done, the driver files are downloaded into the android_sdkextrasgoogleusb_driver directory.

Using the SDK Managerhelps you keep the driver up to date by notifying you when your current driveris out of date.

For installation information, readInstall a USB Driver.

Download the Google USB driver

Before downloading, you must agree to the following terms and conditions.

Terms and Conditions

This is the Android Software Development Kit License Agreement

1. Introduction

1.1 The Android Software Development Kit (referred to in the License Agreement as the 'SDK' and specifically including the Android system files, packaged APIs, and Google APIs add-ons) is licensed to you subject to the terms of the License Agreement. The License Agreement forms a legally binding contract between you and Google in relation to your use of the SDK.1.2 'Android' means the Android software stack for devices, as made available under the Android Open Source Project, which is located at the following URL: https://source.android.com/, as updated from time to time.1.3 A 'compatible implementation' means any Android device that (i) complies with the Android Compatibility Definition document, which can be found at the Android compatibility website (https://source.android.com/compatibility) and which may be updated from time to time; and (ii) successfully passes the Android Compatibility Test Suite (CTS).1.4 'Google' means Google LLC, organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, USA, and operating under the laws of the USA with principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.

2. Accepting this License Agreement

2.1 In order to use the SDK, you must first agree to the License Agreement. You may not use the SDK if you do not accept the License Agreement.2.2 By clicking to accept and/or using this SDK, you hereby agree to the terms of the License Agreement.2.3 You may not use the SDK and may not accept the License Agreement if you are a person barred from receiving the SDK under the laws of the United States or other countries, including the country in which you are resident or from which you use the SDK.2.4 If you are agreeing to be bound by the License Agreement on behalf of your employer or other entity, you represent and warrant that you have full legal authority to bind your employer or such entity to the License Agreement. If you do not have the requisite authority, you may not accept the License Agreement or use the SDK on behalf of your employer or other entity.

Drivers Transics Usb Devices Pc Camera

3. SDK License from Google

3.1 Subject to the terms of the License Agreement, Google grants you a limited, worldwide, royalty-free, non-assignable, non-exclusive, and non-sublicensable license to use the SDK solely to develop applications for compatible implementations of Android.3.2 You may not use this SDK to develop applications for other platforms (including non-compatible implementations of Android) or to develop another SDK. You are of course free to develop applications for other platforms, including non-compatible implementations of Android, provided that this SDK is not used for that purpose.3.3 You agree that Google or third parties own all legal right, title and interest in and to the SDK, including any Intellectual Property Rights that subsist in the SDK. 'Intellectual Property Rights' means any and all rights under patent law, copyright law, trade secret law, trademark law, and any and all other proprietary rights. Google reserves all rights not expressly granted to you.3.4 You may not use the SDK for any purpose not expressly permitted by the License Agreement. Except to the extent required by applicable third party licenses, you may not copy (except for backup purposes), modify, adapt, redistribute, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, or create derivative works of the SDK or any part of the SDK.3.5 Use, reproduction and distribution of components of the SDK licensed under an open source software license are governed solely by the terms of that open source software license and not the License Agreement.3.6 You agree that the form and nature of the SDK that Google provides may change without prior notice to you and that future versions of the SDK may be incompatible with applications developed on previous versions of the SDK. You agree that Google may stop (permanently or temporarily) providing the SDK (or any features within the SDK) to you or to users generally at Google's sole discretion, without prior notice to you.3.7 Nothing in the License Agreement gives you a right to use any of Google's trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, domain names, or other distinctive brand features.3.8 You agree that you will not remove, obscure, or alter any proprietary rights notices (including copyright and trademark notices) that may be affixed to or contained within the SDK.

4. Use of the SDK by You

4.1 Google agrees that it obtains no right, title or interest from you (or your licensors) under the License Agreement in or to any software applications that you develop using the SDK, including any intellectual property rights that subsist in those applications.4.2 You agree to use the SDK and write applications only for purposes that are permitted by (a) the License Agreement and (b) any applicable law, regulation or generally accepted practices or guidelines in the relevant jurisdictions (including any laws regarding the export of data or software to and from the United States or other relevant countries).4.3 You agree that if you use the SDK to develop applications for general public users, you will protect the privacy and legal rights of those users. If the users provide you with user names, passwords, or other login information or personal information, you must make the users aware that the information will be available to your application, and you must provide legally adequate privacy notice and protection for those users. If your application stores personal or sensitive information provided by users, it must do so securely. If the user provides your application with Google Account information, your application may only use that information to access the user's Google Account when, and for the limited purposes for which, the user has given you permission to do so.4.4 You agree that you will not engage in any activity with the SDK, including the development or distribution of an application, that interferes with, disrupts, damages, or accesses in an unauthorized manner the servers, networks, or other properties or services of any third party including, but not limited to, Google or any mobile communications carrier.4.5 You agree that you are solely responsible for (and that Google has no responsibility to you or to any third party for) any data, content, or resources that you create, transmit or display through Android and/or applications for Android, and for the consequences of your actions (including any loss or damage which Google may suffer) by doing so.4.6 You agree that you are solely responsible for (and that Google has no responsibility to you or to any third party for) any breach of your obligations under the License Agreement, any applicable third party contract or Terms of Service, or any applicable law or regulation, and for the consequences (including any loss or damage which Google or any third party may suffer) of any such breach.

5. Your Developer Credentials

5.1 You agree that you are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of any developer credentials that may be issued to you by Google or which you may choose yourself and that you will be solely responsible for all applications that are developed under your developer credentials.

6. Privacy and Information

6.1 In order to continually innovate and improve the SDK, Google may collect certain usage statistics from the software including but not limited to a unique identifier, associated IP address, version number of the software, and information on which tools and/or services in the SDK are being used and how they are being used. Before any of this information is collected, the SDK will notify you and seek your consent. If you withhold consent, the information will not be collected.6.2 The data collected is examined in the aggregate to improve the SDK and is maintained in accordance with Google's Privacy Policy.6.3 Anonymized and aggregated sets of the data may be shared with Google partners to improve the SDK.

7. Third Party Applications

7.1 If you use the SDK to run applications developed by a third party or that access data, content or resources provided by a third party, you agree that Google is not responsible for those applications, data, content, or resources. You understand that all data, content or resources which you may access through such third party applications are the sole responsibility of the person from which they originated and that Google is not liable for any loss or damage that you may experience as a result of the use or access of any of those third party applications, data, content, or resources.7.2 You should be aware the data, content, and resources presented to you through such a third party application may be protected by intellectual property rights which are owned by the providers (or by other persons or companies on their behalf). You may not modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute or create derivative works based on these data, content, or resources (either in whole or in part) unless you have been specifically given permission to do so by the relevant owners.7.3 You acknowledge that your use of such third party applications, data, content, or resources may be subject to separate terms between you and the relevant third party. In that case, the License Agreement does not affect your legal relationship with these third parties.

8. Using Android APIs

8.1 Google Data APIs8.1.1 If you use any API to retrieve data from Google, you acknowledge that the data may be protected by intellectual property rights which are owned by Google or those parties that provide the data (or by other persons or companies on their behalf). Your use of any such API may be subject to additional Terms of Service. You may not modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute or create derivative works based on this data (either in whole or in part) unless allowed by the relevant Terms of Service.8.1.2 If you use any API to retrieve a user's data from Google, you acknowledge and agree that you shall retrieve data only with the user's explicit consent and only when, and for the limited purposes for which, the user has given you permission to do so. If you use the Android Recognition Service API, documented at the following URL: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/speech/RecognitionService, as updated from time to time, you acknowledge that the use of the API is subject to the Data Processing Addendum for Products where Google is a Data Processor, which is located at the following URL: https://privacy.google.com/businesses/gdprprocessorterms/, as updated from time to time. By clicking to accept, you hereby agree to the terms of the Data Processing Addendum for Products where Google is a Data Processor.

9. Terminating this License Agreement

9.1 The License Agreement will continue to apply until terminated by either you or Google as set out below.9.2 If you want to terminate the License Agreement, you may do so by ceasing your use of the SDK and any relevant developer credentials.9.3 Google may at any time, terminate the License Agreement with you if:(A) you have breached any provision of the License Agreement; or(B) Google is required to do so by law; or(C) the partner with whom Google offered certain parts of SDK (such as APIs) to you has terminated its relationship with Google or ceased to offer certain parts of the SDK to you; or(D) Google decides to no longer provide the SDK or certain parts of the SDK to users in the country in which you are resident or from which you use the service, or the provision of the SDK or certain SDK services to you by Google is, in Google's sole discretion, no longer commercially viable.9.4 When the License Agreement comes to an end, all of the legal rights, obligations and liabilities that you and Google have benefited from, been subject to (or which have accrued over time whilst the License Agreement has been in force) or which are expressed to continue indefinitely, shall be unaffected by this cessation, and the provisions of paragraph 14.7 shall continue to apply to such rights, obligations and liabilities indefinitely.

10. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES

10.1 YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF THE SDK IS AT YOUR SOLE RISK AND THAT THE SDK IS PROVIDED 'AS IS' AND 'AS AVAILABLE' WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND FROM GOOGLE.10.2 YOUR USE OF THE SDK AND ANY MATERIAL DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE SDK IS AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION AND RISK AND YOU ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE TO YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER DEVICE OR LOSS OF DATA THAT RESULTS FROM SUCH USE.10.3 GOOGLE FURTHER EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT.

11. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

11.1 YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT GOOGLE, ITS SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES, AND ITS LICENSORS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU UNDER ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES THAT MAY BE INCURRED BY YOU, INCLUDING ANY LOSS OF DATA, WHETHER OR NOT GOOGLE OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY SUCH LOSSES ARISING.

12. Indemnification

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13. Changes to the License Agreement

13.1 Google may make changes to the License Agreement as it distributes new versions of the SDK. When these changes are made, Google will make a new version of the License Agreement available on the website where the SDK is made available.

14. General Legal Terms

14.1 The License Agreement constitutes the whole legal agreement between you and Google and governs your use of the SDK (excluding any services which Google may provide to you under a separate written agreement), and completely replaces any prior agreements between you and Google in relation to the SDK.14.2 You agree that if Google does not exercise or enforce any legal right or remedy which is contained in the License Agreement (or which Google has the benefit of under any applicable law), this will not be taken to be a formal waiver of Google's rights and that those rights or remedies will still be available to Google.14.3 If any court of law, having the jurisdiction to decide on this matter, rules that any provision of the License Agreement is invalid, then that provision will be removed from the License Agreement without affecting the rest of the License Agreement. The remaining provisions of the License Agreement will continue to be valid and enforceable.14.4 You acknowledge and agree that each member of the group of companies of which Google is the parent shall be third party beneficiaries to the License Agreement and that such other companies shall be entitled to directly enforce, and rely upon, any provision of the License Agreement that confers a benefit on (or rights in favor of) them. Other than this, no other person or company shall be third party beneficiaries to the License Agreement.14.5 EXPORT RESTRICTIONS. THE SDK IS SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES EXPORT LAWS AND REGULATIONS. YOU MUST COMPLY WITH ALL DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EXPORT LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT APPLY TO THE SDK. THESE LAWS INCLUDE RESTRICTIONS ON DESTINATIONS, END USERS AND END USE.14.6 The rights granted in the License Agreement may not be assigned or transferred by either you or Google without the prior written approval of the other party. Neither you nor Google shall be permitted to delegate their responsibilities or obligations under the License Agreement without the prior written approval of the other party.14.7 The License Agreement, and your relationship with Google under the License Agreement, shall be governed by the laws of the State of California without regard to its conflict of laws provisions. You and Google agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located within the county of Santa Clara, California to resolve any legal matter arising from the License Agreement. Notwithstanding this, you agree that Google shall still be allowed to apply for injunctive remedies (or an equivalent type of urgent legal relief) in any jurisdiction.January 16, 2019I have read and agree with the above terms and conditions

latest_usb_driver_windows.zip

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