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U.S. vs. San Juan, G.R. No. 8502, 10 October 1913

Doctrine: 

A clergy man who performed a marriage ceremony, not knowing that one of the contracting parties is a minor, is not liable. Otherwise stated, a clergyman having no personal knowledge of the age of the parties and having in good faith made the investigation required by law to determine the fact of age, he cannot be held criminally liable although it turns out that he in fact erred.

FACTS

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the accused of performing a marriage ceremony where one of the contracting parties was under the age of consent, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of four years of suspension from practicing his profession as a minister of the National Evangelical Church of the Philippines, to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas and one-fifth of the costs. 

The information was originally filed against the spouses, the two witnesses to the marriage, and the minister performing the ceremony. At the request of the prosecuting attorney the case was dismissed with respect to the defendant Antonio de la Llana, one of the witnesses to the marriage, in order that he might be used as a witness for the Government, under the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. With respect to the defendants, Florencio San Miguel and Eulogia Dizon, the spouses, and Teofilo San Miguel, the other witness to the marriage, the case was also dismissed, under paragraph 2 of article 475 of the Penal Code, for the reason that Esteban Dizon, the father of Eulogia Dizon, the bride, having, subsequent to the ceremony, given his consent to the marriage. The only defendant remaining, therefore, is Domingo San Juan, herein defendant-appellant, the minister who performed the ceremony.

ISSUE/S

Whether the clergyman who solemnized the marriage, although he erred in determining the fact of age of the parties, shall also be acquitted upon the dismissal of the case against the spouses.

RULING

[TN: This case was decided in 1913. Although the Spanish regime created in 1889 the Central Office of Statistics, it continued only until the end of the Spanish administration in 1898. It was only in 1922 that the Civil Records Centralization Act was enacted.

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

There presents no reason why the rule applicable to the persons married should not be alike applicable to the person performing the ceremony which makes them man and wife. It is very easy to deceive an officiating clergyman as to the ages of the persons who present themselves for marriage — much easier than it is to deceive either of the spouses in relation to the same matter. Persons who are sufficiently acquainted with each other to desire marriage are naturally presumed to know the age of each other. If a man desiring to marry a woman may be excused from criminal prosecution upon the ground that he has been deceived and mistaken as to her age, it would seem that the clergyman, who knows neither of the parties and who must of necessity depend upon an independent investigation in order to determine the ages of the parties, would be in a far better position to invoke the protection of the principle than would the husband.

Having the right to determine a question upon the testimony of witnesses, it would seem strange indeed that he could be prosecuted criminally for a wrong determination of that question. The mere fact that two persons might differ as to the conclusion which ought to be reached upon a given state of facts or upon the testimony of certain witnesses is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the one whose conclusion is wrong is guilty of a crime, while he whose judgment is right is innocent. Both have exercised the same qualities, the same functions, and the same good faith. That the one may be wrong and the other right furnishes no reason for classifying the one as a criminal and the other as an innocent person.

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People vs. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, 7 September 1999

Doctrine:

Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.

In the crime of Rape, the conduct of a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim. If complainant had not been forced and intimidated into submitting to the lustful designs of accused-appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immediately as rape, for otherwise, her conduct would constitute adultery.

FACTS

Edgar Bayron, herein accused-appellant, was charged with rape by Susan Agcol, who was sleeping in her fruit and vegetable stall on the night in question. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused-appellant had entered the stall armed with a knife, cut the little finger of complainant’s left hand, and then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her against her will. The medical examination of the victim showed positive findings of spermatozoa in her vaginal canal, indicating sexual contact preceded the examination.

Bayron admitted having sex with the complainant on January 16, 1994, but claimed it was with her consent. His story is that, at around 12:30 in the early morning of that day, he went to his stall in the public market of Langihan, Butuan City; that upon entering, he was surprised to find complainant sleeping there; that although he did not know her personally, he knew her to be one of the fruit and vegetable vendors in the market. He then went out and, after about two minutes, he went back inside the stall. He then took off his clothes even as the complainant did the same. They then engaged in sexual intercourse which lasted for about two minutes during which he reached climax and ejaculated. He could not tell whether the complainant had an orgasm as she did not make any reaction during their coitus.

After three days, Bayron surrendered to the police and was detained in the city jail. According to him, the complainant visited him and asked for money for her and her children's support because her husband had left them. Bayron agreed to give the money if the complainant dropped the case against him. An inmate testified that he saw the complainant talking with Bayron on a tricycle parked beside the jail warden's office, and the complainant appeared happy and even gave Bayron cigarettes.

The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment without parole). Additionally, he was ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages to the victim.

ISSUE/S

Whether the accused-appellant shall be liable for Adultery instead of rape. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

It is true the Court has sustained the defense of consensual sex in a number of rape cases. But, in those cases, evidence was presented, consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, to corroborate the claim of the accused that the alleged rape was actually a sexual intercourse between consenting adults. Here, not only is there no evidence of this nature presented but, on the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties did not know each other before the alleged tryst on January 16, 1994. If the accused-appellant's claim were to be believed, within minutes of their meeting, he and the complainant simply engaged in sexual intercourse with not even nary a word said between them. We find this claim to be highly incredible and contrary to ordinary human behavior. No woman, much less a married one with three children, would just lie with a complete stranger.

Indeed, complainant’s conduct immediately after accused-appellant had left belie the latter’s claim that they had engaged in voluntary sexual intercourse. She ran outside the stall, still fastening her pants, to ask help from the people gathering on the street. She immediately reported the matter to the Langihan police and afterwards submitted to a physical examination at the Butuan City General Hospital at 9:00 that morning. The examining physician found not only spermatozoa in complainant’s vaginal canal but also a cut in the small finger of her left hand and hematoma on the right side of her neck, confirming complainant’s allegation that accused-appellant had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.

These circumstances are consistent with the conduct of one who has just undergone a harrowing experience. As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim. If complainant had not been forced and intimidated into submitting to the lustful designs of accused-appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immediately as rape, for otherwise, her conduct would constitute adultery. 

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People vs. Alay-ay, G.R. No. 94310, 30 June 1993

Doctrine: 

Relevant discussion in the book of Reyes:

When no force or violence was employed in the taking, as victim was already heavily wounded.

In this case, the personal properties were taken after accused-appellant had already successfully carried out his primary criminal intent of killing the victim and the taking did not necessitate the use of violence or force upon the person of the victim nor force upon anything. Considering that the victim was already heavily wounded when his personal properties were taken, there was no need to employ violence against or intimidation upon his person. Accused-appellant can only be held guilty of the separate offense of theft. (People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 128286, July 20, 1999). 

FACTS

Between 5:30 and 6:00 in the morning of March 22, 1985, Felomena Franche – the victim, was tending her store at Dau Homesite, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Saldy Guela, grandson of Felomena, was staying in the same house of the victim’s daughter – Mila Pineda. Suddenly, Saldy heard a woman shouting, "Mila, Mila, somebody is hitting your mother's head." Upon hearing this, Saldy stood up and looked out the window. He saw a man inside the store hitting the head of his grandmother, Felomena Franche, with a two-foot-long piece of wood. When the man was about to get out of the store, Saldy saw his face and recognized him as "COT", who frequently drank liquor at the store. He went downstairs but upon reaching the ground, "COT" was already scaling the wall. Thus, Saldy proceeded to the store where he carried his grandmother. 

About 6:00 that same morning, Natividad de la Cruz, who was on her way to the store of Felomena Franche, saw appellant, Virgilio Alay-ay, alias "Cot" whom she had known since 1972, jump over the fence of said store. Appellant was carrying a Sanyo transistor radio which Natividad recognized as the property of Felomena, because she always saw Felomena use it whenever she Natividad went to the store. 

Meanwhile, Mila Pineda, Saldy Guela and a neighbor, Jimmy, succeeded in reviving the unconscious Felomena. Afterwards, Mila and another neighbor brought Felomena to the Pampanga Polymedic Hospital. On the way to the hospital, Mila asked her mother "Who hit you?" and she answered, "It was Cot" 

At the Pampanga Polymedic Hospital, Dr. Carmelo Mendiola attended to Felomena Franche. At past 8:00 that same morning, the case was referred to Dr. Eduardo Buencamino, who found Felomena unconscious, in shock, with multiple injuries on the face and head and blood coming out from her nose and mouth. He ordered resuscitative measures which, however, proved unsuccessful. At 10:10 that morning, Felomena Franche was declared dead. 

Virgilio Alay-Ay was found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to life imprisonment.

ISSUE/S

Whether the accused shall be convicted of the separate crimes of Homicide and Theft instead of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Citing the ruling in the case of People v. Evardo:

  . . . To sustain conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it must be established with certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and objective of the criminals. It contemplates a situation where the homicide resulted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Robante, 178 SCRA 552 [1989].

In the case at bar, it cannot be said with moral certainty that accused appellant's intention was to steal the radio and money and that the killing of the victim was a mere incident to the robbery.

The testimony by Saldy Guela that the accused-appellant had been frequently drinking at the store tended by the victim for about three (3) months prior to the killing. There is also testimony by Mila Pineda that accused-appellant had always been quarreling with the victim and it could have been due in part to the fact that accused-appellant had been enamored of her.

Given these two variables, a possible scenario could have been the following:

Accused appellant, went very early to see the victim at the store that fateful day. He might have tried to physically display his affections, if one could call it that, toward the victim. She must have resisted, or worse, laughed him off, and he must have resented it. One thing might have led to another with the end result that he hit her with a piece of wood. In his escape he grabbed her Sanyo transistor radio, as a souvenir, 22 and the P100 peso-bill to provide for his fare to Bamban, Tarlac.

What the Court is pointing out is that there is a dearth of evidence to show that the accused-appellant had the intention to steal cash and other valuables in the store and that he killed the victim on occasion of the robbery. As such he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide but of two specific crimes, that of homicide and theft.

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People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. L- 27825, 30 June 1970

Doctrine: 

Criminal Law

Article 282 Grave Threats

Mode 2: Threat Without Attaining Purpose

That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the latter's person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter's family, of any wrong.

 That such wrong amounts to a crime.

That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed, even though not unlawful.

That the offender does not attain his purpose.

Criminal Procedure

The amendment which sought the correction of an obviously typographical or clerical error in the last digit of the year alleged did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did it involve any change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to cause surprise to respondent and require him to effect any material change or modification in his defense. 

FACTS

[TN: This is a Criminal Procedure case. The issue of whether the accused was guilty of the crime of Grave Threats was yet to be discussed due to the denial of the respondent Court to grant the prosecution’s motion to amend the information. Otherwise stated, waray didi issue nga “WON the accused is guilty of the crime of grave threats” kay waray pa lagi napagstoryahan kay na-hold an trial. Amo la.]

On June 20, 1966 the original information was filed with respondent court against respondent Rivera as accused, charging him for grave threats, alleged by the prosecution to have been committed as follows:

  "That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1965, in the Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, motivated by personal resentment which he entertained against one Ricardo Rivera, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and, in a letter, seriously threatened to kidnap the wife and the daughter of said Ricardo Rivera if the latter would not give him P25,000.00, the accused thus threatening to inflict upon the persons of the wife and daughter of Ricardo Rivera of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is to kidnap them, although the said accused failed to attain his purpose."

Upon arraignment held on August 24, 1966, the accused entered a "not guilty" plea. Trial was set by respondent court, with the prosecution initially presenting the complainant as a witness on February 22, 1967, who testified that the incident complained of occurred in March, 1964, (not March, 1965 as alleged in the original information).

On March 9, 1967, the prosecution filed a formal petition for admission of its amended information, the sole amendment consisting of changing the year of commission of the offense from March 2, 1965 to March 2, 1964 on the grounds of clerical error and of having the information conform to the evidence in its possession with respect to the year of commission of the crime charged.

Respondent court, on respondent’s opposition, denied on April 12, 1967 admission of the amended information, ruling that it was unfair to respondent and concerned material facts constituting the offense and would consequently be prejudicial to the substantial rights of respondent-accused. 

ISSUE/S

Whether under Rule 110, section 13 of the Rules of Court, the amendment sought after respondent-accused’s plea and during the trial, is merely formal and may be permitted without prejudice to the rights of respondent-accused.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

         The amendment sought by the prosecution merely to state the true and actual year of commission of the offense charged on March 2, 1964 rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged through oversight in the information is a matter of form which does not prejudice or impair the rights of respondent-accused.

         Here, all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 1 thereof were duly alleged in the original information, viz., (1) that respondent-accused threatened complainant with the infliction of a wrong on the latter’s wife and daughter (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime, the threat being to kidnap them and (3) the threat was made in a letter (which calls for imposition of the maximum penalty). The amendment which sought the correction of an obviously typographical or clerical error in the last digit of the year alleged (from 1965 to 1964, the month and day being left exactly the same) did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did it involve any change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to cause surprise to respondent and require him to effect any material change or modification in his defense.

Any evidence respondent might have would be equally applicable to the information in the original form as in the amended form. It is obvious from the stated facts, and respondent makes no contrary assertion, that no defense of prescription of the offense is available to respondent whether the original information alleging the commission of the offense on March 2, 1965 stands or the same is amended to allege one year earlier, 1964, as the date of commission of the crime charged. 

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People vs. Balubar, G.R. No. 40940, 9 October 1934

Doctrine: 

Article 263. Serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

xxx

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

xxx

TN: Paragraph 3 covers any member which is not principal member of the body.

The phrase "any other part of his body" in paragraph 3 of this article should be "any other member", meaning any member other than an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, which are mentioned in paragraph 2. 

FACTS

On or about April 14, 1933, the Isidro Pizzaro - offended party, accompanied by three girls, was driving an ox cart, preceded by the cart of Ambrosio Belandres. It was the night of Good Friday, and they were going home after seeing the procession in Bangued. Balubar - defendant - stopped his-motor truck in front of his father's house, and when the two carts came up, he got out and after asking Ambrosio Belandres for Isidro Pizarro - the offended party, went to the cart driven by the latter, and struck him with the piece of iron.

As a result of this blow, the offended party suffered a lacerated wound in the upper lip and broke two teeth and fractured two others. They were cured in ten days with medical assistance and the offended person was caused a permanent deformity. The foregoing facts are duly proved by the testimony of Dr. Jose Purugganan.

According to the prosecution, the motive for the assault appears to have been the defendant's resentment because the offended party had been a witness for Paulino Belandres in a case between Belandres and the defendant.

Testifying in his own behalf, the defendant denied the allegations and declared that the offended party was drunk and insulted him; that upon hearing the insulting words he got out of his truck and caught hold of the rope on the ox driven by the offended party, and asked the offended party for an explanation; that he gave the rope a sudden jerk, and the offended party fell over in the cart; that the offended party and his companions then drove on, and the defendant returned to his truck.

The trial judge found that the defendant had committed the offense alleged in the information, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and sentenced him in accordance with subsection 3 of article 263 of the Revised Penal Code to suffer four years and two months of prision correccional and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

Defendant challenged the decision and contended that the trial court erred in admitting the alleged deformity of Pizarro as a violation of par. 3 of Art. 263 for such alleged deformity can be relieved by artificial contrivance. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the broken teeth sustained by the offended party is within the contemplation of physical injuries under par. 3 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

One who unlawfully wounds another is responsible for the consequences of his act. If as a result thereof, the offended party is impaired in his appearance in such a way that the disfigurement cannot be removed by nature, the person causing the injuries is responsible for the disfigurement, and he is not relieved of that responsibility because the offended party might, if he had the means, lessen the disfigurement by some artificial contrivance.

The offended party in the case at bar was twenty-five years old, and he was conspicuously disfigured by the loss of four front teeth. We are therefore of the opinion that the defendant is guilty of a violation of subsection 3 of article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.

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People vs. Manayao, G.R. No. L-322, 28 July 1947

Doctrine: BAND INCLUDES AID OF ARMED MEN

In appreciating the existence of a band, the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the aggravating' circumstance of band to be considered.[Whenever both par. 6 and par. 8 under Art. 14 of the RPC are alleged, par. 8 is automatically absorbed by the employment of band under par. 6.]

FACTS

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Consequently, herein appellant was found guilty and convicted of the offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs.

Dissatisfied with the decision, Manayao appealed the decision and presented as his third assignment of error the improper separate appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band.

ISSUE/S

Whether the aggravating circumstance of employment of a band under par. 6 and aid of armed men under par. 8 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code shall be appreciated separately. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that it is improper to separately take into account against appellant the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than three armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.

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Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1997

Doctrine: Article 217 Malversation of Public Funds or Property - Presumption of Malversation with cross-reference with Article 11 par. 6. 

Article 217 Malversation of Public Funds or Property

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.

Good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.

Article 11 par. 6 Justifying circumstance of Obedience to Lawful order of Superior.

Elements:

an order must have been issued by a superior;

the order must be for a lawful purpose; and

the means used by the subordinate in carrying out such order must itself be lawful. 

FACTS

Luis Tabuena — General Manager of Manila International Airport (MIAA)— was instructed over the phone by then President Marcos Sr. to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena obliged.

About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.

Withdrawals:

On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received.

Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986.

The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million.

Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. Motion for reconsideration was sought but to no avail.

Hence, this petition for review. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the petitioners committed the crijme of malversation of public funds or property penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Under Article 11 par. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose do not incur criminal liability. There is no crime committed for the act is justified. Congruent with this express provision, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta shall be acquitted of the crime of malversation. 

The petitioners should be acquitted because they were merely obeying the order of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to deliver “thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA’s account” with the Philippine National Construction Company.  

First, Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior—the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.”  The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

Indeed, since the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor avafor its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. Besides, the case could not be detached from the realities then prevailing.

[Disclaimer of the ponente – Justice Fernandez:Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a “dangerous precedent” and an actual violation of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.]

(Note: If you have time, I suggest you read the dissenting opinion of Justice Puno. The dissenting opinions of Justice Davide and Justice Romero are equally great especially on procedural matters, but Justice Puno’s piece is PERFECTION. Beautifully written — showing the intertwine of logic, application of legal precepts, and loyalty to the rule of law. Brief and concise, without dispensing the weight of each assailed matter.) 

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People vs. Hong Din Chu, G.R. No. L-27830, 29 May 1970

Doctrine: Article 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; Penalty. - The following are vagrants:

Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or trampling or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

Any idle or dissolute person who ledges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;

Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;

Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Thesis Statement

Hong Din Chu was charged with grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Instantaneously, the case was dismissed on the ground that the information was not signed by the private complainant. On appeal, the prosecution contended that the allegations of the complaint charged the accused of having specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of the crime of prostitution, which is a public crime, therefore can be prosecuted de oficio. Appeal was granted and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS

Hong Din Chu was charged with grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Manila following abusive and slanderous remarks and expression uttered against Mercedes Japco Ong, to wit:

“Your daughter is a prostitute, and she is a prostitute because you too are a prostitute.”

thereby imputing to the said Mercedes Japco Ong, a married woman of chaste virtues, good moral character and of high social standing, unchaste acts, loose virtues, tending to bring said Mercedes Japco Ong into public discredit, disrepute, contempt and ridicule, as she. was .in fact brought into public discredit, disrepute, contempt and ridicule.

On 8 May 1967, and over the objection of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, as prayed for the accused; reasoning that under Section 4 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court a case for defamation involving an offense that cannot be prosecuted de oficio has to be made out upon the complaint of the offended party. The signature of the offended party being wanting in the information, the court held that the prosecution cannot file grave oral defamation against the accused for remarks imputing upon the offended party commission of the crime of adultery, thereby conferring no jurisdiction to court over the case.

Hence, this appeal by the prosecution. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the defamation of the accused imputed upon the offended party the commission of the crime of prostitution, which is a public crime, therefore can be prosecuted de oficio.

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. It must be remembered that what determines the offense of which the accused stands charged are the allegations in the information, the actual recital of facts made therein. The information in this case averred that the accused, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the virtue, honor, character and reputation of Mercedes Japco Ong, a married woman, uttered against the latter, publicly and in the presence of many people, the remarks—"Your daughter is a prostitute and she is a prostitute because you too are a prostitute". While the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission of adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the disreputable conduct she was particularly charged with was the crime of prostitution, not adultery. 

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged defamatory remark by the accused specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime that can be prosecuted de oficio, the information filed under the signature of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court to try the case.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

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Caubang vs. People, G.R. No. 62634, 26 June 1992

Doctrine:

ARTICLE 172 Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents Par. 1

Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document.

ARTICLE 171 Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister Par. 2:

Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

Thesis Statement:

The petitioner, acting as an authorized representative of BCASSI, was charged and convicted of the crime of falsification of a public document punished under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 for submitting falsified Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SALN) and Articles of Incorporation of the company BCASSI to Securities and Exchange Commission.

FACTS

On December 18, 1974, the officials of Banganga Mutual Association (BMA), which the petitioner was a part owner of, and East Coast Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc. (ECASSI) agreed to merge and executed the Articles of Incorporation for the newly formed Banganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Incorporated (BCASSI), and elected Baltazar Pagaduan as treasurer. For failure to receive P500.00 as initial payment of subscription from each of the incorporators, the merger did not push through.

Subsequently, petitioner was requested and authorized to file the Articles of Incorporation of BCASSI and the Treasurer’s Affidavit, and to present P2,500.00 paid-up capital for registration of the newly formed company with the SEC. Petitioner agreed and brought the papers to Manila on January 14, 1975. Not long after, the corporation was registered with the SEC. The Certificate of Registration, together with the letter of transmittal, was received by the accused who brought and hand-carried the same to Davao Oriental.

Upon learning that BCASSI got registered amidst the failed proposed merger, Baltazar Pagaduan filed a complaint against BMA, including herein petitioner, for falsifying the SALN of BCASSI and forging his signature.

The petitioner contended that he cannot be made liable for the said charges for he was not the one who submitted the documents and forged the signature of Pagaduan. Petitioner insists that it was “Pete”, the fixer employed by Luis Granados - from whom he asked for assistance, who forged Pagaduan’s signature.

ISSUE/S

Whether the petitioner, acting as an authorized representative but further delegated the authority to another person, can be held liable for the latter’s submission of falsified documents necessary for company registration to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. Well-settled is the rule of the presumption of law that a person who is found in possession of a forged document and who used the same is the forger thereof. (Presumption of Material Author discussed under Art. 169)

The Court finds that the accused-petitioner has consistently made use of the fixer as a necessary character to block the possibility of his having gone to the SEC. The petitioner not only had to use the person of Luis Granados but also a third person whose shadowy character and shady occupation do not help at all to convince us of the veracity of the defense theory.

Even assuming that the defense story was true and such that the accused-petitioner could not have been the one who personally received the letter of transmittal and the certificate of incorporation the circumstances point to the vital fact that being the real authorized representative, any representations made at his own instance by another before the SEC and for the newly-formed corporation, were absolutely made on behalf of the petitioner.

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Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 29 April 2009

Doctrine: Art. 142 Inciting to Sedition

Different acts of inciting to sedition:

Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations.

Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb public peace.

Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb public peace.

[Note: The crime that the petitioner was prosecuted for in this case was not inciting to sedition. This case was probably included by Atty. Lexie, similar to what she did in including People v. Mamantak under Arbitrary Detention, to give an example of the gravity of scurrilous remarks - low, vulgar, mean, or foul utterance -  that is punishable under Article 142.]

FACTS

Eliseo Soriano, host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” 1 x x x”

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program.

Prompted by the unfavorable judgment of the MTRCB against him, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief alleging that:

the order of preventive suspension promulgated by respondent [MTRCB] dated 16 august 2004 against the television program ang Dating Daan is null and void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

Section 3(c) of PD1986, is patently unconstitutional and enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It unduly infringes on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, speech, and expression as it partakes of the nature of a subsequent punishment curtailing the same. 

ISSUE/S

Whether MTRCB has the power to issue a preventive suspension order against the petitioner and his television program.  

If yes, whether the said suspension was an infringement of the petitioner's right to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection of the law guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution.

Whether the remarks of the petitioner in his television program were scurrilous which tends to disturb public peace.

RULING

Note to the reader: Please only read the underlined phrases if called to recite. The explanations of the rulings are a bit long. Not only you might experience a dry mouth after this, shortness of breath is expected. I find the other phrases essential to fully understand the case, hence did not omit them. Thwinx. 

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. The preventive suspension was done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation.

However, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for.

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

On alleged curtailment of freedom of religion:

There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. The Court cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors but opted for the low road.

On alleged curtailment of freedom of speech:

The petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension cannot be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB, sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the petitioner’s use of the words “putang babae” which means “a female prostitute,” and “ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ, were obscene utterances, therefore not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech. Their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security

On alleged denial of equal protection under the law:

Petitioner has not been denied the equal protection of the law as the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) ministers he criticized are not facing any administrative charges. The petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee.

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. 

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Nazareno vs. Station Commander, G.R. No. 86332, 3 October 1991

Doctrine:

Under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of arbitrary detention are: 1) the offender is a public employee; 2) that he detains a person; and 3) the detention is without legal grounds. In the case at bar, the warrantless arrest of Nazareno, being valid as held by the Supreme Court in its resolution  promulgated on 9 July 1990, follows that herein respondents did not commit the crime of arbitrary detention against the petitioner. There was a legal ground to detain Nazareno based on the probable cause supported by the testimony of Regala. 

If the arrests were made in accordance with law, it would follow that the detention resulting from such arrest is also in accordance with law. Hence, no arbitrary detention.

FACTS

Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa in the morning of 14 December 1988, Metro Manila. At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed the petitioner as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II. At 7:20 of the same morning, the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.

On 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the warrantless arrest of Nazareno was valid? and;

If the answer in no. 1 is in the negative, whether the respondents committed arbitrary detention against the Petitioner.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

The Court reiterated that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with the conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

The warrantless arrest of Nazareno, being valid as there was probable cause, follows that herein respondents did not commit the crime of arbitrary detention against the petitioner. 

Note to the reader: The original decision of this case could not be found. Nevertheless, in so far as the question whether the respondents committed arbitrary detention is concerned, the facts of the case and the ruling show that the respondents DID NOT COMMIT arbitrary detention. The concern now is whether the respondents are instead liable under Article 125.  

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PINGOL v. CA G.R. No. 102909 September 6, 1993

DOCTRINE

A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Moreover, in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. 

FACTS

Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public, in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY (P20,530.00) PESOS to be paid in several equal installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning January 1970. 

Private Respondent Francisco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972.

When Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on the contract price.  Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession of Donasco's heirs. Not long after, the heirs filed an action for Specific Performance against spouses Pingol, and prayed that the defendants be ordered to accept the payment of the balance for the agreed price on the lot. 

In their answer, Spouses Pingol argued that the deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale as the consideration is to be paid on installment basis and considering the breach by Francisco of his contractual obligation, the sale was deemed to have been cancelled.  

The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Pingol and held that the contract agreed upon by the parties was a “Contract to Sell” not a “Contract of Sale”, since Vicente Pingol had no intention to part with the ownership of the loan unless the full amount of the agreed price had been paid. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision, hence this petition for Certiorari. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the parties entered into a contract to sell. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. 

In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 16 we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit "A" contains neither stipulation. What is merely stated therein is that "the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees."

Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended, by the parties and not a contract to sell:

P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and constructive possession of the property to the vendee, who occupied and took such possession, constructed a building thereon, had the property surveyed and subdivided and a plan of the property was prepared and submitted to the Land Registration Commission which approved it preparatory to segregating the same and obtaining the corresponding TCT in his name. Since the sale, appellee continuously possessed and occupied the property as owner up to his death on July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death, continued the occupancy and possession of the property up to the present. Those contemporaneous and subsequent events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale recognized the vendee as the absolute owner of the property sold. All those attributes of ownership are admitted by defendants in their answer, specifically in paragraphs 7 and 9 of their special and affirmative defenses.

The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made upon the execution of the deed of sale while the actual delivery was effected when the private respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A.

The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code which provides that:

In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or judicial rescission of the contract had been made. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his demand for rescission was made either judicially or by a notarial act.

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Resuena, et al v. CA G.R. NO. 128338: March 28, 2005

Doctrine

Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification, or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument. [to affect third parties]

FACTS

Private respondent, Juanito Borromeo, Sr., is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja (Spouses Bascon) own two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not determined a quo.

Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners, Resuena et. al to vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.

Petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.

The MTC held that Borromeo et. al had no right to evict petitioners therefrom. Consequently, respondent's Complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC; hence, this petition. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the verbal contract between Borromeo and Spouses Bascon as to the portions each would occupy gave the latter capacity to assign their portion to the petitioners.

Whether the tolerance of one of the co-owners suffice to establish the petitioners right to occupancy? 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. 

It is of no moment whether indeed, as petitioners claim, there was a verbal contract between Basilisa Maneja and Borromeo when the latter indicated the portions, they each were to occupy in Lot No. 2587. Such verbal contract, assuming there was one, does not detract from the fact that the common ownership over Lot No. 2587 remained inchoate and undivided, thus casting doubt, and rendering purely speculative any claim that the Spouses Bascon somehow had the capacity to assign or transmit determinate portions of the property to petitioners.

Thus, in order that the petition may acquire any whiff of merit, petitioners are obliged to establish a legal basis for their continued occupancy of the properties. 

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. 

The mere tolerance of one of the co-owners, assuming that there was such, does not suffice to establish such right. Tolerance does not bear any legal fruit, and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden change of heart on the part of the owner. Petitioners have not adduced any convincing evidence that they have somehow become successors-in-interest of the Spouses Bascon, or any of the owners of Lot No. 2587.

Indeed, there is no writing presented to evidence any claim of ownership or right to occupancy to the subject properties. There is no lease contract that would vest on petitioners the right to stay on the property. 

As discussed by the Court of Appeals, Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification, or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument. Assuming that there was any verbal agreement between petitioners and any of the owners of the subject lots, Article 1358 grants a coercive power to the parties by which they can reciprocally compel the documentation of the agreement. 

Thus, the appellate court correctly appreciated the absence of any document or any occupancy right of petitioners as a negation of their claim that they were allowed by the Spouses Bascon to construct their houses thereon and to stay thereon until further notice. 

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Dauden-Hernaez v. Hon. De Los Angeles G.R. No. L-27010, April 30, 1969

Doctrine

The contracts covered by Art. 1358 are binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of any writing because said article nowhere provides that the absence of written form will make the agreement invalid or unenforceable.

FACTS

Petitioner Marlene Dauden-Hernaez, a motion picture actress, had filed a complaint against private respondents, Hollywood Far East Productions, Inc., and its President and General Manager, Ramon Valenzuela, to recover P14,700.00 representing a balance allegedly due said petitioner for her services as leading actress in two motion pictures produced by the company, and to recover damages. 

Upon motion of defendants, the respondent court (Judge Walfrido de los Angeles) ordered the complaint dismissed, mainly because the "claim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document, either public or private", and the complaint "was defective on its face" for violating Article 1358 of the Civil Code, since the contract price exceeded P500, the same should have been evidenced by a written instrument. 

ISSUE/S

Whether a contract for personal services involving more than P500.00, under Art. 1358 of the Civil Code, should be in writing to be valid and enforceable. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Generally, under Art. 1356 all contracts are valid, regardless of form. There are only two exceptions — first, when the contractual form is needed for VALIDITY as in the case of a donation of real property which needs a public instrument; secondly, when form is needed for ENFORCEABILITY under the Statute of Frauds. The contract for her services falls under neither exception. 

The contracts covered by Art. 1358 (such as her contract) are binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of any writing because said article nowhere provides that the absence of written form will make the agreement invalid or unenforceable. In the matter of form, the contractual system of our Civil Code still follows that of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and of the “Ordenamiento de Alcala” of upholding the spirit and intent of the parties over formalities; hence, generally, oral contracts are valid and enforceable.

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Cruz & Sabon v. Atty. Gruspe G.R. No. 191431. March 13, 2013

Doctrine

Contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. In determining whether a document is an affidavit or a contract, the Court looks beyond the title of the document, since the denomination or title given by the parties in their document is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. In the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued.  If the terms of the document are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.  If the words appear to be contrary to the parties’ evident intention, the latter shall prevail over the former.

FACTS

On October 24, 1999, the minibus owned and operated by Cruz and driven by one Arturo Davin collided with the Toyota Corolla car of Gruspe; Gruspe’s car was a total wreck.  The next day, on October 25, 1999, Cruz, along with Leonardo Q. Ibias – a barangay official, went to Gruspe’s office, apologized for the incident, and executed a Joint Affidavit of Undertaking promising jointly and severally to replace the Gruspe’s damaged car in 20 days, or until November 15, 1999, of the same model and of at least the same quality; or, alternatively, they would pay the cost of Gruspe’s car amounting to  P350,000.00, with interest at 12% per month for any delayed payment after November 15, 1999, until fully paid. When Cruz and Leonardo failed to comply with their undertaking, Gruspe filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against them on November 19, 1999 before the RTC.

The RTC ruled in favor of Gruspe ordering Cruz and Sabon to pay the amount at 15% interest. CA affirmed the decision with reduction of interest rate at 12% per annum. 

Contention of the petitioners:  

The Joint Affidavit of Undertaking is not a contract that can be the basis of an obligation to pay a sum of money in favor of Gruspe. 

Even if the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking was considered as a contract, it is invalid because Cruz and Leonardo’s consent thereto was vitiated; the contract was prepared by Gruspe who is a lawyer, and its contents were never explained to them.  Moreover, they were simply forced to affix their signatures, otherwise, the minibus would not be released.

ISSUE/S

Whether the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking executed by the petitioners is a contract.

Whether the affidavit, assuming that it is a contract, is void due to vitiated consent. 

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. 

A simple reading of the terms of the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking readily discloses that it contains stipulations characteristic of a contract.  As quoted in the CA decision,[10] the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking contained a stipulation where Cruz and Leonardo promised to replace the damaged car of Gruspe, 20 days from October 25, 1999, or up to November 15, 1999, of the same model and of at least the same quality.  If they cannot replace the car within the same period, they would pay the cost of Gruspe’s car in the total amount of P350,000.00, with interest at 12% per month for any delayed payment after November 15, 1999, until fully paid.  These, as read by the CA, are very simple terms that both Cruz and Leonardo could easily understand.

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence; Cruz and Leonardo failed to support their allegation.  Although the undertaking in the affidavit appears to be onerous and lopsided, this does not necessarily prove the alleged vitiation of consent. They, in fact, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Joint Affidavit and Undertaking when they said that they signed the same to secure possession of their vehicle.  If they truly believed that the vehicle had been illegally impounded, they could have refused to sign the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking and filed a complaint, but they did not.  That the release of their minibus was conditioned on their signing the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking does not, by itself, indicate that their consent was forced – they may have given it grudgingly, but it is not indicative of a vitiated consent that is a ground for the annulment of a contract.

[digestsbymarianpurpleink]

Security Bank v. Regional Trial Court Makati, 263 SCRA 453 (1996)

Topic: Remedies for Breach; Rules on Delay, Default, or Mora

Doctrine: Article 1169 par. 2, subpar. 1

Article 1169 

Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or

When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

Relevant provisions

Article 1306

The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (1255a)

Central Bank Circular No. 905 [Note that this circular was issued by the Central Bank’s Monetary Board pursuant to P.D. 1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forbearances]

Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended. 

Sec. 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall continue to be twelve percent (12%) per annum.

FACTS

On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed Promissory Note No. TL/74/178/83 in favor of petitioner Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in the total amount of P100,000.00) payable in six monthly installments with a stipulated interest of 23% per annum up to the fifth installment. On July 28, 1983, respondent Eusebio again executed Promissory Note No. TL/74/1296/83 in favor of petitioner SBTC. Respondent bound himself to pay the sum of P100,000.00 in six (6) monthly installments plus 23% interest per annum. Finally, another Promissory Note No. TL/74/1491/83 was executed on August 31, 1983, in the amount of P65,000.00. Respondent agreed to pay this note in six (6) monthly installments plus interest at the rate of 23% per annum. 

On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila Ventura had signed as co-maker.

Upon maturity which fell on the different dates below, the principal balance remaining on the notes stood at: 

PN No. TL/74/748/83 — P16,665.00 as of September 1983. 

PN No. TL/74/1296/83 — P83,333.00 as of August 1983. 

PN No. TL/74/1491/83 — P65,000.00 as of August 1983. 

Upon the failure and refusal of respondent Eusebio to pay the aforestated balance payable, a collection case was filed in court by petitioner SBTC. On March 30, 1993, the court a quo rendered a judgment in favor of petitioner SBTC ordering the defendant Eusebio pay the sum of: 1) P16,665.00, plus interest of 12% per annum starting 27 September 1983, until fully paid; 2)  pay the sum of P83,333.00, plus interest of 12% per annum starting 28 August 1983, until fully paid; 3) pay the sum of P65,000.00, plus interest of 12% per annum starting 31 August 1983, until fully paid; 4; and 4) pay the sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due and payable to plaintiff as and by way of attorney’s fees. [Note: Only in this part of the details that Article 1169 is related to. Per the judgment of the trial court, the interest for forbearance of money starts from the day the obligation stipulated in the contract – subpar. 1 of the exceptions under the said article. Delay exists even without demand] 

On August 6, 1993, a motion for partial reconsideration was filed by petitioner SBTC contending that: 

the interest rate agreed upon by the parties during the signing of the promissory notes was 23% per annum; 

the interests awarded should be compounded quarterly from due date as provided in the three (3) promissory notes; 

defendant Leila Ventura should likewise be held liable to pay the balance on the promissory notes since she has signed as co-maker and as such, is liable jointly and severally with defendant Eusebio without a need for demand upon her. 

Consequently, an Order was issued by the court a quo denying the motion to grant the rates of interest beyond 12% per annum; and holding defendant Leila Ventura jointly and severally liable with co-defendant Eusebio. 

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S

Whether the Courts have the discretion to arbitrarily override stipulated interest rates of promissory notes and stipulated interest rates of promissory notes and thereby impose a 12% interest on the loans, in the absence of evidence justifying the imposition of a higher rate?

Whether or not the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner bank and respondents is allowable and not against the Usury Law.

RULING

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. It is not for respondent court a quo to change the stipulations in the contract where it is not illegal. Article 1306 of the NCC provides that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.  Since All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already covered by CB Circular No. 905. In a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that stipulated in writing, and in the absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% per annum. Hence, only in the absence of a stipulation can the court impose the 12% rate of interest.

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. 

Contrary to the claim of respondent court, CB Circular 905 did not repeal nor in any way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity. It was issued by the Central Bank’s Monetary Board pursuant to P.D. 1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forbearances. 

The rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent did not question that rate. Therefore, stipulations therein are binding between them. Respondent Eusebio, likewise, did not question any of the stipulations therein. 

[digestsbymarianpurpleink]

Keng Hua Products v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 (1998)

Topic: Rules on Delay, Default, or Mora

Doctrine

Article 1169 par. 1 [General Rule]

Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

Note:

The general rule on delay is that “no demand, no delay”. Under Article 1169 par. 1, the corresponding legal interest of the delay incurred by the debtor shall begin to run from when the obligee/creditor judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. 

Furthermore, the Court declared in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals the rules in applying Article 1169:

Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially. 

When such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be the amount finally adjudged.

Relevant provisions

Article 2209. 

If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)

FACTS

Plaintiff (Sea-land Service, Inc.), a shipping company, is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. On June 29, 1982, plaintiff received at its Hong Kong terminal a sealed container, Container No. SEAU 67523, containing seventy-six bales of “unsorted wastepaper” for shipment to defendant (herein petitioner), Keng Hua Paper Products, Co. in Manila. A bill of lading (Exh. A) to cover the shipment was issued by the plaintiff.

On July 9, 1982, the shipment was discharged at the Manila International Container Port. Notices of arrival were transmitted to the defendant, but the latter failed to discharge the shipment from the container during the “free time” period or grace period. The shipment remained inside the plaintiff’s container from the moment the free time period expired on July 29, 1982, until November 22, 1983, or a total of four hundred eighty-one (481) days. During the 481-day period, demurrage charges accrued. Within the same period, letters demanding payment were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant who, however, refused to settle its obligation which eventually amounted to P67,340.00. Numerous demands were made on the defendant, but the obligation remained unpaid. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this civil action. 

The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of the Plaintiff ordering the Defendant to pay the sum of P67,340.00 as demurrage charges, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the extrajudicial demand until fully paid and a sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due as Attorney’s fees and litigation expenses dated September 28, 1990. 

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal but to no avail, hence this petition.

Main contention of the Plaintiff – alleged that it:

Only purchased fifty (50) tons of waste paper from the shipper in Hong Kong, Ho Kee Waste Paper, and that under the letter of credit, the remaining balance of the shipment was only ten (10) metric tons hence it did not accept the other 10 metric tons the plaintiff is asking the petitioner to accept lest that if they were to accept the shipment, it would be violating Central Bank rules and regulations and custom and tariff laws; 

The cause of action should be against the shipper which contracted the plaintiff’s services and not against defendant. The petitioner is not bound by the Bill of Lading because it never gave its consent, proof of which is the Notice of Refused or On Hand Freight it received on November 2, 1982 from private respondent. 

ISSUE/S

Whether the petitioner is liable under the bill of lading?

Whether the petitioner should be charged for demurrage (allowance or compensation for the delay or detention of a vessel). If yes, what is the proper interest to charge?

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. In a letter of credit, there are three distinct and independent contracts: (1) the contract of sale between the buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the issuing bank, and (3) the letter of credit proper in which the bank promises to pay the seller pursuant to the terms and conditions stated therein. In some cases, there are additional contracts created. In this case, it is the contract of carriage, evidenced by the bill of lading which both lower courts held was valid and perfected contract between the shipper (Ho Kee), the consignee (Petitioner Keng Hua), and the carrier (Private Respondent Sea-Land).

The Petitioner’s reliance on the Notice of Refused or On Hand Freight, as proof of its nonacceptance of the bill of lading, is of no consequence. Said notice was not written by petitioner it was sent by private respondent to petitioner in November 1982, or four months after petitioner received the bill of lading. If the notice has any legal significance at all, it is to highlight petitioner’s prolonged failure to object to the bill of lading. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the notice and the letter support—not belie—the findings of the two lower courts that the bill of lading was impliedly accepted by petitioner. Moreover, the non-action of the petitioner 6 months after accepting the bill of lading receiving notices of arrival of the shipment, failing to object thereto, (herein petitioner) cannot now deny that it is bound by the terms in the bill of lading. If it did not intend to be bound, (herein petitioner) would not have waited for six months to lapse before finally bringing the matter to (herein private respondent’s) attention.

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. The prolonged failure of petitioner to receive and discharge the cargo from the private respondent’s vessel constitutes a violation of the terms of the bill of lading. It should thus be liable for demurrage to the former. 

Since the petitioner “first knew” of the demurrage claim of P67,340 only when it received, by summons, private respondent’s complaint, and that the bill of lading did not specify the amount of demurrage; and the sum claimed by private respondent increased as the days went by, the total amount demanded cannot be deemed to have been established with reasonable certainty until the trial court rendered its judgment. Thus, as held by the Court in the Easter Shipping case (interpretation of Art. 1169), the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained), which was September 28, 1990. 

Moreover, since the case at bar involves an obligation not arising from a loan or forbearance of money; thus, pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the applicable interest rate is six percent per annum.