#I changed it a little to accommodate a missing/ambiguous subject
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【哪吒之魔童闹海】破亿海报英译:52亿
【Nezha 2】 Box Office Milestone Poster Translation: 5.2 Billion


From top to bottom:
中国影史动画电影票房冠军 -> Chinese Cinematic History's Champion Animated Feature of the Box Office
52亿 -> 5.2 Billion
石矶娘娘:留得青山在 / 不怕没柴烧 -> Lady Stone Spirit:Where there is life, there is hope
可大可小 保持乐观 -> No matter who or what, hold on to your optimism

Suggestions on the translations would be appreciated as I work to improve my Chinese. I would also love to read/discuss other interpretations ☺️
Project Overview | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 》
#哪吒之魔童闹海#nezha 2025#试一试翻译#For some reason “Lady Stone Spirit” pops into my head as her English name but I can not remember if that was her official name#I am using it for now because I think it fits her character but otherwise her name would just be Shiji Niangniang transliterated#Her dialogue also seems to be her catchphrase based on some articles I searched up haha#It is in the artbook as well#Additionally the first half of the set phrases translated directly is “Whether big or small”#I changed it a little to accommodate a missing/ambiguous subject#Is it referring to the size of a person vs the scale of an issue that one should keep their optimisim in the face of?#This movie really has a lot of fun characters that could have been the final boss in its own story#But the fact that they really went above and beyond to incorporate everyone from Nezha's myth and then tell their story is amazing#project fireball#火流星项目
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Distill'd by magic sleights: SNM Shanghai, show no. 5
**(Spoilers for Nurse loop again - and, again, not for 1:1s. Brief spoilers for Taxi and Lady Macduff, but nothing of substance. Details have been obscured or altered, as usual. A very long post here, I’m so sorry.)**
It’s over two weeks since my final Shanghai SNM. For some reason I’ve been reluctant to write this recap of my last show, as if perhaps putting the words onto paper (or screen) would erase the memories from my mind. With any luck, the opposite will be the case; because the last show not only produced some of the most magical moments of my time with Punchdrunk, but also delivered an emotional punch to the gut which caught me utterly by surprise. More on that, later.
My reluctance has also been spurred by the realisation that this will be yet another Miranda-heavy write-up. It’s only on reviewing my recaps (and those of other people) that I realise just how much I monopolised her on my visit, and how shamefully I overlooked Ben, Jude, Daniel and others, with whom I would like to have spent more time (including several of the Chinese cast). Another five visits would perhaps have sufficed for me to get as much appreciation for the show as, say, @whenwillweawake, whose summary I commend to you (it’s more objective and less self-focused than mine).
But I didn’t have five more shows. And, in any case, Miranda was the main reason I came all this way. She rewarded my loyalty handsomely, but I can’t help feeling a little guilty. Not that I begrudge a second I spent with her; nor should anyone consider a second watching this supremely talented artist wasted. If you would prefer to watch her than read about her, I sympathise, but that’s all I have to offer.
It’s Sunday. The weather is hot, but not as roasting and steamy as Shanghai sometimes gets (so I’m informed). My regret at seeing the McKinnon for the last time is immediately exacerbated when, on entry, I get a Deuce. My first Deuce ever. Even in New York I was able to swap it out, but here the rest of my party have Aces and they are all people whose last show it is too, so I don’t really have a case. A bad omen?
Another bad omen - I’ve forgotten to check my phone into the cloakroom; obviously my mind is somewhere else. I have to endure the indignity of carrying my phone around in a little velvet bag strung over my shoulder. Throughout the show my bag slips, and I have to keep hiking it up over my back to get it out of the way. Seriously, folks - check your phone in. It’ll be quite safe and you’ll be spared a lot of annoyance.
My mask is tighter than previous nights and, despite its extra cord, I can’t get it to loosen enough to suit my stupidly big head. My perpetual problem. I briefly wonder if this is how the cast always pick me out - “ah, big head, must be @thefoolsloop.”
My Deuce, worthless in comparison to an Ace, sits in my pocket. My velvet bag is already irritating. My mask pushes my glasses into my eyes, uncomfortably. Is this going to be my first bad show here? Thankfully the magic of Punchdrunk is awaiting me. So - spoiler - no, it’s going to be magnificent.
Since Sam was Duncan last night I figure (correctly) that he’s going to be Taxi tonight. Upon exiting the lift, I search for him, then realise he must be in the new scene which I eulogised about in a previous write-up. Sure enough, I catch him there - he is barely recognisable, but he’s participating with more gusto than I’ve seen Sam display before, and his pairing with Olly again awakens TDM memories. But suddenly he disappears (I later learn how), and I’m left in front of an excellent scene which I enjoy very much, but don’t want to watch just now.
I hurry to his shop - yes, there he is. He’s removing a sock from his head (it’s not a sock, but if I tell you what it is it’ll destroy the impact of the scene). We’re alone in the room, and I wonder if he recognises me. He fiddles with a few items, then extends his hand. This is my first 1:1 with Sam since he thrust an orange into my face, but my hopes for something as violently compelling are dashed. Instead, Sam’s 1:1 is whimsical, lugubrious - at times he pauses with such melancholy that I almost corpse. This Taxi is not the ambiguous agent of evil found in the McKittrick, but a weary man accepting that he is controlled by fate and inevitability. When I’m confronted with a choice, I find the McKittrick’s rather delightful option has been replaced by a strictly Chinese alternative which isn’t nearly as palatable. Oh, well.
Sam concludes the 1:1 by guiding me out into the rep bar through a passage I don’t recognise, and this is where things start to go wrong. The rave is gearing up: the thumping has started. I literally cannot stay in this room. As I emerge, I bolt for the door. Sam, the spirit of Stanford alive in him still, seizes me by the shoulders and forces me into the room, further away from the door (it’s a great spot to watch proceedings - if only I could). Just as I was complicit in Frankie’s initiation in Temple Studios, so I am to be complicit in the witches’ sabbath in the McKinnon.
Except I can’t. I wonder how Sam will deal with a seizure? Maybe he’ll make notes, so as to incorporate it into his Duncan loop? But I can’t indulge him - my only thought is, I have to get out of here NOW. Sam will pick up that something is wrong, surely?
Starting to panic, I bang on the hand gripping my shoulder. I shake my head furiously. I’m about to break both character and the rules by shouting at him, “Sam, I can’t stay here!” when he twigs. He releases me, and I shoot for the door, just in time before Macbeth arrives and the strobes start.
(I don’t know how Punchdrunk can accommodate people with photosensitive epilepsy without spoiling the experience for everyone else; it’s something I want to discuss with them.)
Recovering from my near-miss, I brush myself down in the corridor and take some deep breaths. I’d like to continue with Taxi’s loop, but Sam isn’t in the shop. At this point, I remember I need to be somewhere else.
Flashback to the previous evening. As I recounted in my last recap, I spent a wonderful few hours with the cast post-show, in which I discussed all kinds of things with all kinds of people. Miranda and I enjoyed a lengthy chat covering performance, politics, film, injuries, vegetarianism, the Chinese concept of personal space, and I don’t remember what else. In the course of talking to her I mentioned something that had always bothered me about 1:1s - performers, unknowingly, have always spoken their script into my deaf ear. As a result I’m lucky if I catch the text, let alone remember it.
I also remarked that I believed I now had a full house of interactions with her characters - all the Sexy Witch and Nurse 1:1s, dances, bed-making, kisses, whatever. She grinned, blew cigarette smoke out sideways, and said, “no, you’ve missed one.” Disbelieving, I asked her for details; all she revealed was that as the Nurse she’d been waiting to give me another 1:1, only to see me run off and follow another character. I put two and two together and realised the moment she must have meant.
The trouble is I’m now at the point where I know I can catch Miranda’s Nurse alone, if I hurry upstairs; and I can’t remember how long it is until the moment in question. Sorry, Sam, but there’s only one thing I can do now. I head for the fifth floor.
Sure enough, right when I expect, she emerges from a side room. Once again, just as she did on a previous night, she fixes me with the sarcastic stare and hands me the folded sheets she’s carrying. I follow her to the hospital ward, anticipating that the missed 1:1 will come presently.

(I found this image online, when googling ‘stage blood’ - it seems to unite many of the themes in the Nurse’s loop.)
**(SPOILERS FOR NURSE’S LOOP - NOT 1:1s, BUT CERTAIN INTERACTIONS)**
It doesn’t. I’ve misremembered the sequence of events in the loop. The result is that I go through almost an entire loop with her, just as I did on Thursday - making beds, opening bags, hanging up gowns. Only this time two things are different. First, I don’t mess anything up. Second, the tone of the interactions has changed. Now I’m no longer her unpaid slave (hold on, all slaves are unpaid, no?). Now we’re collaborators, co-conspirators. I have more of her trust than I had before. In the first 1:1, where before I was meekly committing my service, I now do so with confidence; in the second, I feel less like a subject and more like a... I want to say lover because of the nature of the 1:1, but that's not quite it... sadly, I can’t really explain without gross spoilers.
In the open, too, we’re more like partners in crime. I carry out instructions before she gives them to me. She directs me more with her eyes now, less with her hands. I feel that we are walking together, rather than me following her. This time - is it my imagination? - there’s a conspiratorial smile just lingering behind that severe look. At one point we’re in the hospital, where on Thursday she dipped her finger in a spread of blood and tasted it. This time, she takes my hand and dips my finger in the blood; then she does the same with her own. We look into each other’s eyes and, in perfect time with one another, taste it.
I’ve followed her for almost a full loop now, and nothing new has happened (in terms of scenes); I’ve got the timing completely wrong. However we finally find ourselves at the very moving scene I described in my second recap and, this time, I don’t get distracted. I wait for her, she appears - again, there’s that tiniest hint of a smile, as if to say, “shall we, then?” I take her hand and she leads me off.
Of what follows, I cannot give the merest hint. It is comfortably the most complete Punchdrunk experience of my life. By turns scary, intriguing and beautiful it wraps me in darkness, brings me out into the light of a new world, turns the theatrical into the cinematic, dazzles me with its virtuosity and the sheer imagination and execution it displays. Even if I wanted to describe it, words would be inadequate. I almost can’t believe it happened, as if it was a snatch of a half-remembered dream. What it took TDM three hours to achieve on a cool October night in 2013, this 1:1 achieves in minutes. To have seen it is a privilege; to have had Miranda share it with me is doubly so.
At the end, when she’s returning my mask, she leans over to whisper a parting shot. She breathes in - then pauses. I wonder what’s gone wrong. She moves her head to the other side of my head, then delivers the text into my good ear. She remembered.
How many performers would have recalled that tiny piece of information, relayed almost in passing the night before? How many performers would have cared enough to make a change to their usual delivery? How many performers would have remembered which ear it was?
When I first saw Miranda as Romola, all those years ago, sitting in the Seamstress’s office with the makeup smeared on her face, I thought: I don’t know what it is yet, but there is something very special about this artist. If you wonder why I devote so many words to her, well, this should exemplify it.
**(SPOILERS END)**
She bundles me out, and doesn’t reappear. I have one more moment with her to tick off - the walk-out - but still a bit of time to kill before the time comes for that. So I hurry down to the ballroom to catch what I know will be my last ever ballroom party scene.
It’s getting started as I arrive, and I position myself in the McKinnon’s equivalent of the mezzanine, right in the centre, the best view of all the action. The guests assemble, chat, pair off, dance, interact. And something comes over me. Perhaps it’s just the lingering effect of the 1:1, but suddenly I feel an emotional surge, much stronger than I felt the previous night. This scene is so beautiful, I love it so much. Every time I see it, I grow in admiration and love for it. What started out two years ago in New York as a useful point to decide who to follow, has turned into one of my touchstones of the entire production.
The emotion heaves, a wave coming straight from my heart. Standing in the midst of a crowd of strangers, watching this wonderful, magical scene, I can bear it no longer. The dam breaks. Tears form in my eyes, as they did the night before, but now the emotion punches through my defences. I start to sob, my body shakes. I’m in love with this scene. I’m in love with this whole show. What was an entertaining and marvellous experience in New York, has been transformed in Shanghai into a moving, overwhelming, glorious world of feeling. The McKittrick delighted my mind; the McKinnon has captured my heart.
I’m not a crier. Things rarely push me over the edge. I can count on the fingers of two hands things which make me cry in private, and on the fingers of one things which have made me cry in public. What is it that has happened here, in this dark basement, with jaunty trad jazz music playing, that is so compelling, so touching, that it bypassed my everyday reticence and evoked a response that would mortify me elsewhere? I don’t know. All I know is, this is what Punchdrunk try to do. They've done it to me now.
I have to look away from the scene, as the tears have blurred my vision. That seems to break the spell. I gradually recover my composure. What shall I do with the rest of my limited time here? I recall that Lady Macduff was one of my favourite moments in the McKinnon. Perhaps it would be a good idea to see if I can recapture some of the feeling I developed for her. In New York I had a touching 1:1 with Annie Rigney. I wonder if Ingrid can pull off the character with the same vulnerability and innocence displayed by Annie.
I follow her to her chamber, one of my favourite scenes in the McKittrick, where her battle with her addiction is played out against the nightmarish, repetitive soundtrack of her music box, a light, trite tune (’Wedding of the Painted Doll’) turned sinister, the tiny walls of her suite hemming her in. But here, in the McKinnon, the space is more open and her torment seems somehow dissipated. Also, the soundtrack has changed - still a music box, but a different tune, less threatening somehow. This is one of the areas where the new show has fallen short of its predecessor.
It’s not Ingrid’s fault; she puts the same passion, desperation and guilelessness into her performance that Annie had (and my glimpses of Xu Huiting on other nights suggest she is also superb in the role). I find myself accidentally (honest!) standing in the right spot for the 1:1, and when it comes Ingrid is tender and eloquent, just as Annie was.
I don’t like ‘Goodnight Children Everywhere’, even though the scene it accompanies is genuinely moving, so I pass through the cemetery where Fred is awakening, spend a little time watching Daniel make a boat, then drift until it’s time to pick up Miranda again. I follow her and Tang Tingting as they once again, like evil twins, pass in lockstep through the rooms and corridors until they find themselves in the master bedroom, where it’s their job to set everything up for the next round of this perpetual tragedy.
Except something is wrong. There’s a man lying on the bed. He’s got a white mask on. The Nurse-Matron duo pause for a split second to absorb this, and give him time to move. He doesn’t. He may actually be asleep. They seem to shrug with their eyes, and carry on making the bed as if he wasn’t there. They tuck him in nicely, as he twigs what’s going on and collapses into giggles. I can’t see if he’s Chinese or Western, or if he’s one of the cast conducting a prank. I never do find out who he is.
Business concluded, Miranda turns and offers me her hand. We walk down together, our complicity renewed. When I trip on the stairs she reaches out to catch me, but we’re so synchronised now that a slight gesture is enough to assure her that I’m OK. She and Tang, again in perfect step with each other, lead me and another white mask out to the Manderley. Unsmiling, she unmasks and kisses me. I respond with nothing but a wink. Not breaking character, she stares at me for a beat, then walks off. I have not seen her since.
This has been my longest recap, and I must thank anyone who’s made it this far for indulging me. The McKinnon got such a grip on my emotions that I cannot simply recount a few observations about the show and pass an objective critical comment or two. Like a clumsy teenage poet, I must splurge.
Just as TDM did - though to a lesser degree, inevitably - SNM Shanghai worked its way under my skin, and woke emotions long dormant. And, just as at Temple Studios, at the centre of this awakening was a performer of breathtaking commitment and raw talent. I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again. Thank you, Miranda. Thank you, Punchdrunk.
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Cyber-Bullying & Law Reform: Rights versus Harms on Trial
One of the great struggles faced by legal systems world-wide is keeping pace with technological change. Inevitably, with each advancement, people find new ways to misbehave, and the law must evolve to accommodate these developments. Sometimes, in attempting to do so, legislatures miss the mark. Such was the case with Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act,1 which attempted to target cyber-bullying. The Act was struck down by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Crouch v Snell,2 after it was found to unjustifiably violate the defendant’s rights under ss. 2(b) and s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3
Nova Scotia is now on the verge of bringing into force new legislation to replace the stricken Cyber-Safety Act. Bill 27, The Intimate images and Cyber-protection Act,4 is intended to provide victims of cyber-bullying with non-criminal remedies, while avoiding the pitfalls that led to the striking of its predecessor. One expert has suggested that the alternative definition of cyber-bullying adopted in Bill 27 may raise the bar too high for complainants. This blog attempts to analyse the new definition in light of this suggestion, and offers its own view on the result of the changes made to the definition of cyber-bullying in Bill 27.
One of the reasons for the striking of the Cyber-safety Act was that its definition of cyber-bullying was found to be overbroad, encompassing conduct far beyond that which the legislation intended to prevent.5 The definition of cyber-bullying in the Cyber-safety Act read as follows:
“cyber-bullying” means any electronic communication through the use of technology including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably [to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any way…6
Contrast this with the new definition in Bill 27:
“cyber-bullying” means an electronic communication, direct or indirect, that causes or is likely to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being where the person responsible for the communication maliciously intended to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being or was reckless with regard to the risk of harm to another individual’s health or well-being…(emphasis added)7
There are two significant differences which separate the latter definition from the former. The first is that Bill 27 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate malice or recklessness on the part of the defendant. The new standards import a minimum intent requirement that was previously lacking, addressing one of the concerns with the original definition which led McDougall J. to declare the Act unconstitutional in Crouch v Snell.8 The second is that the Bill 27 definition only captures conduct which rises to the level of causing, or being likely to cause, harm to the plaintiff. This narrows the range of conduct considerably when compared to the former definition, in which the conduct need only have caused a feeling of distress in the plaintiff in order to be considered “cyber-bullying”.
In a blog post relating to Bill 27, David Fraser, who represented the defendant in Crouch v Snell, suggested that the importation of a malice requirement may have raised the bar too high for prospective applicants.9 While Fraser gives little attention to this issue in his blog beyond raising it, it is deserving of consideration, especially considering the proliferation of cyber-bullying in our society.
The new definition of “cyber-bullying” requires that the applicant prove malice or recklessness. In order to understand the impact of this change, it is necessary to examine what these two terms, in a legal sense, really mean. There are two types of malice: legal and factual. Legal malice, used for example in the law of defamation, can be implied merely from a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. Factual malice requires evidence of actual spite, ill will or improper motives on the part of the defendant.10 Thus, depending on which type of malice the court intends to rely upon when Bill 27 goes into effect and a judge has the first application before her/him, the requirement of malice may not be much more difficult to make out than the original “intent” stipulated in the Cyber-safety Act.
It is also open to an applicant to show that the defendant was reckless as to whether harm was caused or likely to be caused. Recklessness represents a lower standard than malicious intent, providing an alternative to proving malice. Recklessness requires a degree of subjectivity but also imports conceptions embarking on a risky course of action with unreasonable disregard as to the potential consequences.11 Recklessness represents the lowest level of subjectivity above an objective standard. Thus, an applicant could avoid demonstrating malicious intent on the part of the defendant if they could prove instead that the defendant acted recklessly as to whether their conduct harmed, or was likely to harm, the applicant. As the lowest subjective standard, this would be, theoretically, a much easier burden to meet than would be required under malice.
Thus, at present it is difficult to determine how the new definition of cyber-bullying will impact the ability of applicants under the Bill 27 framework to make out their cases. Practically speaking, the new malice and recklessness requirements may not have much of an impact, but this depends on how the court chooses to apply them. Until an application comes before a judge, or these ambiguities are addressed in the regulations supporting what will become the Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, a determination cannot be made either way. It should also be kept in mind that some standard of intention is necessary.
One of the downfalls of the Cyber-safety Act was that it captured conduct far beyond what was intended.12 Situations can be imagined where an individual, with entirely good intentions, might author an electronic communication that causes harm to another. Therefore, as sympathetic as the situation of cyber-bullying victims may be, the bar still needs to be set sufficiently high. Given that Bill 27 can still result indirectly in penal consequences for a respondent (should they fail to comply with an order), imposing the lowest level of subjective intent as the minimum burden which applicants will need to meet seems appropriate. Until more information is available, answers to the question raised by David Fraser remain speculative. It should not be taken as a matter of course, however, that the new cyber-bullying definition contained in Bill 27 has significantly disadvantaged prospective applicants.
Endnotes
1 Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c. 2 [Cyber-safety Act].
2 Crouch v Snell, 2015 NSSC 340 (CanLII), https://ift.tt/1UiL2AS [Crouch v Snell].
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b) and s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4 Bill 27, Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, 1st Sess, 63rd General Assembly, Nova Scotia, 2017 (assented to 26 October 2017) [Bill 27].
5 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 187.
6 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1 at ss. 3(b).
7 Bill 27, Supra, note 4 at ss. 3(c).
8 Crouch v Snell, supra, note 2 at para 187.
9 See: David Fraser, “My comments on Nova Scotia's Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act” (19 October 2017), Canadian Privacy Law Blog, online: <https://ift.tt/2HgCoRq;.
10 Yogis, John et al, Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (Hauppauge, N.Y. : Barron's Educational Series, 2009) sub verbo “malice”.
11 Ibid sub verbo “reckless”.
12 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 115.
Cyber-Bullying & Law Reform: Rights versus Harms on Trial published first on https://divorcelawyermumbai.tumblr.com/
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Cyber-Bullying & Law Reform: Rights versus Harms on Trial
One of the great struggles faced by legal systems world-wide is keeping pace with technological change. Inevitably, with each advancement, people find new ways to misbehave, and the law must evolve to accommodate these developments. Sometimes, in attempting to do so, legislatures miss the mark. Such was the case with Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act,1 which attempted to target cyber-bullying. The Act was struck down by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Crouch v Snell,2 after it was found to unjustifiably violate the defendant’s rights under ss. 2(b) and s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3
Nova Scotia is now on the verge of bringing into force new legislation to replace the stricken Cyber-Safety Act. Bill 27, The Intimate images and Cyber-protection Act,4 is intended to provide victims of cyber-bullying with non-criminal remedies, while avoiding the pitfalls that led to the striking of its predecessor. One expert has suggested that the alternative definition of cyber-bullying adopted in Bill 27 may raise the bar too high for complainants. This blog attempts to analyse the new definition in light of this suggestion, and offers its own view on the result of the changes made to the definition of cyber-bullying in Bill 27.
One of the reasons for the striking of the Cyber-safety Act was that its definition of cyber-bullying was found to be overbroad, encompassing conduct far beyond that which the legislation intended to prevent.5 The definition of cyber-bullying in the Cyber-safety Act read as follows:
“cyber-bullying” means any electronic communication through the use of technology including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably [to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any way…6
Contrast this with the new definition in Bill 27:
“cyber-bullying” means an electronic communication, direct or indirect, that causes or is likely to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being where the person responsible for the communication maliciously intended to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being or was reckless with regard to the risk of harm to another individual’s health or well-being…(emphasis added)7
There are two significant differences which separate the latter definition from the former. The first is that Bill 27 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate malice or recklessness on the part of the defendant. The new standards import a minimum intent requirement that was previously lacking, addressing one of the concerns with the original definition which led McDougall J. to declare the Act unconstitutional in Crouch v Snell.8 The second is that the Bill 27 definition only captures conduct which rises to the level of causing, or being likely to cause, harm to the plaintiff. This narrows the range of conduct considerably when compared to the former definition, in which the conduct need only have caused a feeling of distress in the plaintiff in order to be considered “cyber-bullying”.
In a blog post relating to Bill 27, David Fraser, who represented the defendant in Crouch v Snell, suggested that the importation of a malice requirement may have raised the bar too high for prospective applicants.9 While Fraser gives little attention to this issue in his blog beyond raising it, it is deserving of consideration, especially considering the proliferation of cyber-bullying in our society.
The new definition of “cyber-bullying” requires that the applicant prove malice or recklessness. In order to understand the impact of this change, it is necessary to examine what these two terms, in a legal sense, really mean. There are two types of malice: legal and factual. Legal malice, used for example in the law of defamation, can be implied merely from a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. Factual malice requires evidence of actual spite, ill will or improper motives on the part of the defendant.10 Thus, depending on which type of malice the court intends to rely upon when Bill 27 goes into effect and a judge has the first application before her/him, the requirement of malice may not be much more difficult to make out than the original “intent” stipulated in the Cyber-safety Act.
It is also open to an applicant to show that the defendant was reckless as to whether harm was caused or likely to be caused. Recklessness represents a lower standard than malicious intent, providing an alternative to proving malice. Recklessness requires a degree of subjectivity but also imports conceptions embarking on a risky course of action with unreasonable disregard as to the potential consequences.11 Recklessness represents the lowest level of subjectivity above an objective standard. Thus, an applicant could avoid demonstrating malicious intent on the part of the defendant if they could prove instead that the defendant acted recklessly as to whether their conduct harmed, or was likely to harm, the applicant. As the lowest subjective standard, this would be, theoretically, a much easier burden to meet than would be required under malice.
Thus, at present it is difficult to determine how the new definition of cyber-bullying will impact the ability of applicants under the Bill 27 framework to make out their cases. Practically speaking, the new malice and recklessness requirements may not have much of an impact, but this depends on how the court chooses to apply them. Until an application comes before a judge, or these ambiguities are addressed in the regulations supporting what will become the Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, a determination cannot be made either way. It should also be kept in mind that some standard of intention is necessary.
One of the downfalls of the Cyber-safety Act was that it captured conduct far beyond what was intended.12 Situations can be imagined where an individual, with entirely good intentions, might author an electronic communication that causes harm to another. Therefore, as sympathetic as the situation of cyber-bullying victims may be, the bar still needs to be set sufficiently high. Given that Bill 27 can still result indirectly in penal consequences for a respondent (should they fail to comply with an order), imposing the lowest level of subjective intent as the minimum burden which applicants will need to meet seems appropriate. Until more information is available, answers to the question raised by David Fraser remain speculative. It should not be taken as a matter of course, however, that the new cyber-bullying definition contained in Bill 27 has significantly disadvantaged prospective applicants.
Endnotes
1 Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c. 2 [Cyber-safety Act].
2 Crouch v Snell, 2015 NSSC 340 (CanLII), https://ift.tt/1UiL2AS [Crouch v Snell].
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b) and s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4 Bill 27, Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, 1st Sess, 63rd General Assembly, Nova Scotia, 2017 (assented to 26 October 2017) [Bill 27].
5 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 187.
6 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1 at ss. 3(b).
7 Bill 27, Supra, note 4 at ss. 3(c).
8 Crouch v Snell, supra, note 2 at para 187.
9 See: David Fraser, “My comments on Nova Scotia's Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act” (19 October 2017), Canadian Privacy Law Blog, online: <https://ift.tt/2HgCoRq;.
10 Yogis, John et al, Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (Hauppauge, N.Y. : Barron's Educational Series, 2009) sub verbo “malice”.
11 Ibid sub verbo “reckless”.
12 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 115.
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Cyber-Bullying & Law Reform: Rights versus Harms on Trial
One of the great struggles faced by legal systems world-wide is keeping pace with technological change. Inevitably, with each advancement, people find new ways to misbehave, and the law must evolve to accommodate these developments. Sometimes, in attempting to do so, legislatures miss the mark. Such was the case with Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act,1 which attempted to target cyber-bullying. The Act was struck down by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Crouch v Snell,2 after it was found to unjustifiably violate the defendant’s rights under ss. 2(b) and s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3
Nova Scotia is now on the verge of bringing into force new legislation to replace the stricken Cyber-Safety Act. Bill 27, The Intimate images and Cyber-protection Act,4 is intended to provide victims of cyber-bullying with non-criminal remedies, while avoiding the pitfalls that led to the striking of its predecessor. One expert has suggested that the alternative definition of cyber-bullying adopted in Bill 27 may raise the bar too high for complainants. This blog attempts to analyse the new definition in light of this suggestion, and offers its own view on the result of the changes made to the definition of cyber-bullying in Bill 27.
One of the reasons for the striking of the Cyber-safety Act was that its definition of cyber-bullying was found to be overbroad, encompassing conduct far beyond that which the legislation intended to prevent.5 The definition of cyber-bullying in the Cyber-safety Act read as follows:
“cyber-bullying” means any electronic communication through the use of technology including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably [to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any way…6
Contrast this with the new definition in Bill 27:
“cyber-bullying” means an electronic communication, direct or indirect, that causes or is likely to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being where the person responsible for the communication maliciously intended to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being or was reckless with regard to the risk of harm to another individual’s health or well-being…(emphasis added)7
There are two significant differences which separate the latter definition from the former. The first is that Bill 27 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate malice or recklessness on the part of the defendant. The new standards import a minimum intent requirement that was previously lacking, addressing one of the concerns with the original definition which led McDougall J. to declare the Act unconstitutional in Crouch v Snell.8 The second is that the Bill 27 definition only captures conduct which rises to the level of causing, or being likely to cause, harm to the plaintiff. This narrows the range of conduct considerably when compared to the former definition, in which the conduct need only have caused a feeling of distress in the plaintiff in order to be considered “cyber-bullying”.
In a blog post relating to Bill 27, David Fraser, who represented the defendant in Crouch v Snell, suggested that the importation of a malice requirement may have raised the bar too high for prospective applicants.9 While Fraser gives little attention to this issue in his blog beyond raising it, it is deserving of consideration, especially considering the proliferation of cyber-bullying in our society.
The new definition of “cyber-bullying” requires that the applicant prove malice or recklessness. In order to understand the impact of this change, it is necessary to examine what these two terms, in a legal sense, really mean. There are two types of malice: legal and factual. Legal malice, used for example in the law of defamation, can be implied merely from a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. Factual malice requires evidence of actual spite, ill will or improper motives on the part of the defendant.10 Thus, depending on which type of malice the court intends to rely upon when Bill 27 goes into effect and a judge has the first application before her/him, the requirement of malice may not be much more difficult to make out than the original “intent” stipulated in the Cyber-safety Act.
It is also open to an applicant to show that the defendant was reckless as to whether harm was caused or likely to be caused. Recklessness represents a lower standard than malicious intent, providing an alternative to proving malice. Recklessness requires a degree of subjectivity but also imports conceptions embarking on a risky course of action with unreasonable disregard as to the potential consequences.11 Recklessness represents the lowest level of subjectivity above an objective standard. Thus, an applicant could avoid demonstrating malicious intent on the part of the defendant if they could prove instead that the defendant acted recklessly as to whether their conduct harmed, or was likely to harm, the applicant. As the lowest subjective standard, this would be, theoretically, a much easier burden to meet than would be required under malice.
Thus, at present it is difficult to determine how the new definition of cyber-bullying will impact the ability of applicants under the Bill 27 framework to make out their cases. Practically speaking, the new malice and recklessness requirements may not have much of an impact, but this depends on how the court chooses to apply them. Until an application comes before a judge, or these ambiguities are addressed in the regulations supporting what will become the Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, a determination cannot be made either way. It should also be kept in mind that some standard of intention is necessary.
One of the downfalls of the Cyber-safety Act was that it captured conduct far beyond what was intended.12 Situations can be imagined where an individual, with entirely good intentions, might author an electronic communication that causes harm to another. Therefore, as sympathetic as the situation of cyber-bullying victims may be, the bar still needs to be set sufficiently high. Given that Bill 27 can still result indirectly in penal consequences for a respondent (should they fail to comply with an order), imposing the lowest level of subjective intent as the minimum burden which applicants will need to meet seems appropriate. Until more information is available, answers to the question raised by David Fraser remain speculative. It should not be taken as a matter of course, however, that the new cyber-bullying definition contained in Bill 27 has significantly disadvantaged prospective applicants.
Endnotes
1 Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c. 2 [Cyber-safety Act].
2 Crouch v Snell, 2015 NSSC 340 (CanLII), https://ift.tt/1UiL2AS [Crouch v Snell].
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b) and s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4 Bill 27, Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, 1st Sess, 63rd General Assembly, Nova Scotia, 2017 (assented to 26 October 2017) [Bill 27].
5 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 187.
6 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1 at ss. 3(b).
7 Bill 27, Supra, note 4 at ss. 3(c).
8 Crouch v Snell, supra, note 2 at para 187.
9 See: David Fraser, “My comments on Nova Scotia's Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act” (19 October 2017), Canadian Privacy Law Blog, online: <https://ift.tt/2HgCoRq;.
10 Yogis, John et al, Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (Hauppauge, N.Y. : Barron's Educational Series, 2009) sub verbo “malice”.
11 Ibid sub verbo “reckless”.
12 Crouch v Snell, supra note 2 at para 115.
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