#faqih

[suraudotco]

Majelis Masyayikh Sebut Standarisasi Mutu Tinggi Pesantren Tidak Boleh Dirancang Sembarangan

SURAU.CO. Majelis Masyayikh menekankan pentingnya penerapan standarisasi mutu tinggi dalam penyusunan jenjang lanjutan pendidikan tinggi pesantren Ma’had Aly. Jenjang yang mendapatkan perhatian khusus itu adalah jenjang Pascasarjana (Marhalah Tsaniyah) dan Doktoral (Marhalah Tsalitsah). Ketua Majelis Masyayikh (MM) Abdul Ghaffar Rozin meminta rancangan standar mutu pascasarjana dan doktoral tidak…

[rasiooid]

PCNU Kabupaten Bogor Gelar Konfercab XII, Bahas Kemandirian Jam'iyyah dan Kaderisasi

  RASIOO.id – Pengurus Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama (PCNU) Kabupaten Bogor menggelar Konferensi Cabang (Konfercab) XII di Hotel Bigland Sentul, Sabtu, 26 April 2025. Acara ini mengangkat tema “Meningkatkan Kemandirian Jam’iyyah Menuju Kabupaten Bogor Istimewa dan Maslahat.” Konfercab XII dibuka oleh Ketua Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU), KH Miftah Faqih. Dalam sambutannya, ia mengingatkan…

[tscnews]

Bellator 299 Post Fight: Asael Adjoudj on Beating Ibrahim Al-Faqih Hassan

Asael Adjoudj on beating Ibrahim Al-Faqih Hassan via unanimous decision on the Bellator 299 prelims!

[shakir2]

How is one chosen as an Ayatollah? 

Through decades of outstanding scholarly work, which inspires the devotion of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of followers.  A typical ayatollah’s career takes him to one of the Shiites’ holy cities, like Najaf in Iraq or Qom in Iran. There, he studies at one of the pre-eminent Shiite seminaries, where he becomes an expert in theology, jurisprudence, science, and philosophy. After years…

[tamamita]

you're gonna be the first cyber-faqih i can feel it. you have a bright future issuing twelve fatawa at once with like 300 cables coming out of your temple.

Me entering the Shi'a hivemind to declare a fatwa on the legality of white women yuri being Halal

[unsolicited-opinions]

2025-06-15

Rabbi Isaac Choua

This was never really about Palestine. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini knew it. So did the Islamists who seized power in 1979. The target wasn’t Israel. It was the Sunni order. Palestine was the banner they raised to transform Shiʿa grievance into pan-Islamic legitimacy. They borrowed Marxist language, oppressed versus oppressor, anti-imperialism, national liberation and fused it with religious eschatology. The Iranian left marched beside them. The Tudeh Party, the Fedaiyan, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, they all believed they were building a just and pluralistic future. What they got was Velayat-e Faqih. In December 1978, six to nine million Iranians flooded the streets of Tehran. They marched under banners demanding democratic self-rule. “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his own country.” That wasn’t Islamism. That was democracy at its largest scale. The revolution was broad: liberals, Marxists, clerics, women, students. It was never meant to become a theocracy. But by March 1979, the first act of the new regime was a referendum on an undefined “Islamic Republic.” 99 percent voted yes. By December, a second referendum passed a constitution that made Khomeini the unelected Guardian of the State. He used the slogans, then crushed the people who wrote them. Between 1981 and 1988, thousands were executed, especially those who still believed in democracy. The 1988 prison massacres alone took up to 5,000 lives. The Islamic Republic rose on the back of a democratic revolution, and delivered a clerical police state wrapped in moral language. It turned anti-colonial struggle into theological absolutism. And now, we are watching that same playbook unfold in the West. A moral cause is elevated and flattened. Student energy is weaponized. Puffed up with catchy Slogans. Power consolidates quietly behind the curtain. The only difference is, this time, we’ve already seen how the story ends. We just pretend we haven’t.

That exactly.

[guerillas-of-history]

🔴 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine:

The Popular Front and Its Military Wing, Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Visit and Receive Freed Prisoners in Gaza

As part of its commitment to its freed prisoners who spent the prime of their lives in "israeli" occupation prisons, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its military wing, the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, organized a series of visits to the released prisoners who were freed as part of the first phase of the Toufan deal. This initiative reaffirms their dedication to their fighters, who remained steadfast in resisting the occupation despite years of suffering behind bars.

In Khan Younis, the Front and its military wing held a grand reception for the freed and exiled prisoner, Comrade Leader Jalal Al-Faqih, a native of Iraq Burin village, south of Nablus. Al-Faqih was released as part of the deal after spending 23 years in the enemy’s prisons, where he was sentenced to two life terms plus 90 years due to his leading role in the resistance.

The reception was an expression of pride in his steadfastness and sacrifices, emphasizing that the issue of prisoners will remain a top priority for the resistance until the last prisoner is freed from "israeli" prisons.

In the central governorate, the Front and its military wing also organized visits to several freed prisoners under the deal. Among those visited were Comrades Ahmed Mohammed Abu Jalal and Munir Shahada Abu Rabie, who emerged from "israeli" prisons more determined and steadfast in their pursuit of freedom, liberation, and return.

During these visits, the PFLP and its military wing reaffirmed that the liberation of prisoners remains a core priority for the resistance and that the enemy will not enjoy security as long as Palestinian prisoners remain incarcerated.

They also stressed that this deal is only a step in a long path toward the full liberation of all prisoners. The freed detainees will continue to be an integral part of the struggle, whether on the battlefield or in supporting the resistance in various forms.

It is noteworthy that the Popular Front and its military brigades place special importance on the prisoner issue, considering it an inseparable part of the national liberation struggle. They affirmed that the release of prisoners was achieved through the sacrifices of the resistance and the steadfastness of both the Palestinian people and the detainees inside the occupation’s prisons. This issue will remain a key factor in any equation imposed by the resistance on the occupation.

February 4, 2025

[city-of-ladies]

“Women were included in the ranks of this fully mobilized society. Prokopios, aware, of course, of the legends of the Amazons whose origins he traces to the region of the Sabirs, reports that in the aftermath of "Hunnic" (i.e. Sabir) raids into Byzantine territory, the bodies of women warriors were found among the enemy dead. East Roman or Byzantine sources also knew of women rulers among the nomads. Malalas, among others, mentions the Sabir Queen Boa/Boarez/Boareks who ruled some 100,000 people and could field an army of 20,000. In 576 a Byzantine embassy to the Turks went through the territory of 'Akkayai; "which is the name of the woman who rules the Scythians there, having been appointed at that time by Anagai, chief of the tribe of the Utigurs." The involvement of women in governance (and hence in military affairs) was quite old in the steppe and was remarked on by the Classical Greek accounts of the Iranian Sarmatians. It was also much in evidence in the Cinggisid empire. 

These traditions undoubtedly stemmed from the necessities of nomadic life in which the whole of society was mobilized. Ibn al-Faqih, embellishing on tales that probably went back to the Amazons of Herodotos, says of one of the Turkic towns that their "women fight well together with them," adding that the women were very dissolute and even raped the men. Less fanciful evidence is found in the Jiu Tangshu which, s.a. 835, reports that the Uygur Qagan presented the Tang emperor with "seven women archers skillful on horseback.” Anna Komnena tells of a Byzantine soldier who was unhorsed with an iron grapple and captured by one of the women defenders as he charged the circled wagons of the Pecenegs. Women warriors were known among the already Islamized Turkmen tribes of fifteenth century Anatolia and quite possibly among the Ottoman gazfs (cf. the Bacryan-z Rum "sisters of Rum")”.

Golden Peter B., “War and warfare in the pre-cinggissid steppes of Eurasia” in: Di Cosmo Nicola (ed.), War and warfare in Inner Asian History

[magickgarlick]

article by R' Isaac Choua, summarized underneath - I found it interesting but I am asking for help fact checking!!

ok, here's a 15- point summary

1. 1979 Revolution's Promise: Millions of Iranians took to the streets seeking democracy, justice, and an end to monarchy—not clerical rule.

2. Hijacking the Revolution: Ayatollah Khomeini co-opted the revolution, transforming it from a democratic uprising into a theocratic regime under Velayat-e Faqih—rule by unelected clerics.

3. Palestine as Strategic Symbol: Though not central to the revolution, Khomeini used the Palestinian cause to legitimize Iran’s leadership in the Muslim world and bypass sectarian divides.

4. Reframing Shiʿa Identity: Khomeini recast the Battle of Karbala as a universal struggle between oppressed and oppressor, making every land “Karbala” and every day “ʿAshura.” --> can someone READ THE ARTIFLE and Fact-Check this please? I'm NOT an expert and I don't understand what any of this means

5. From Shiʿism to Pan-Islamism: He universalized Shiʿa martyrdom to claim pan-Islamic leadership, repositioning Iran as the revolutionary voice of the broader Muslim Umma.

6. Collapse of Pan-Arabism: After Arab nationalism failed to liberate Palestine, Iran filled the void by adopting revolutionary Islamic rhetoric centered on resistance and justice.

7. Ideological Fusion: Khomeini blended Qurʾanic themes of oppression with Marxist language, creating an “Islamo-Marxist populism” to appeal broadly across classes and ideologies.

8. Institutionalizing the Shift: He declared Jerusalem Day in 1979 and reframed Palestinian suffering as a reenactment of Karbala, casting Israel as a modern-day Yazid (tyrant).

9. Political Repression: By the early 1980s, secular and leftist revolutionaries were purged, imprisoned, or executed. Their visions of democracy were crushed by authoritarian theocracy.

10. A False Choice: In March 1979, a manipulated referendum replaced monarchy with an “Islamic Republic,” but without clarity, debate, or alternatives—99% voted “yes.”

11. Creation of Parallel Power Structures: The constitution created powerful, unelected institutions (e.g., Guardian Council, Revolutionary Guard) ensuring clerical dominance.

12. Exporting the Revolution: Khomeini saw Iran’s revolution as the start of a global “ideological war,” aiming to awaken Muslims worldwide and confront Western and Sunni powers alike.

13. Performative Resistance Today: The article draws parallels with modern protest culture, arguing that slogans and symbols are again being co-opted and emptied of meaning.

14. Commodification of Outrage: Protest is often professionalized and monetized, with causes serving as tools for performative identity rather than genuine transformation.

15. The Cycle Repeats: The piece warns that student energy, idealism, and revolutionary language are again being manipulated—echoing 1979—and urges critical vigilance before history repeats.

[the-garbanzo-annex-jr]

by Brian Stewart

But since deferring to Washington last October, the Netanyahu government has generally met Hezbollah’s continued aggression with remarkable restraint. As it pounded Hamas in Gaza, Israel pointedly refrained from doing anything remotely comparable to Hezbollah, preferring to absorb its attacks and bide its time until Hamas had been defeated as a military organisation. But this posture was unsustainable indefinitely in the teeth of relentless aggression without inflicting further damage on Israel’s deterrent power—a remote consideration for inveterate critics of Israeli counter-terrorism but an essential one for the stewards of Israeli security.

In recent days, a decision was finally made by Israel’s war cabinet to spurn the Biden administration, which has not displayed much interest in allowing its allies to actually win wars initiated by their enemies. First, Israel detonated Hezbollah’s communication devices, which Israeli intelligence had booby-trapped with explosives, decommissioning thousands of Hezbollah fighters and operatives at a stroke and spreading paranoia through its rank and file. This ingenious attack compelled the militia’s senior officers to meet in person, which provided Israel with the opportunity it needed to waste Hezbollah’s chain of command, including Nasrallah himself.

Netanyahu ordered the strike in the Dahiyah before he left Israel to address the UN General Assembly, underscoring his nation’s independence from a global consensus that has preferred to denounce Israel while giving succour to its terrorist enemies. The alternative would have been to permit Iran’s revolutionary network, laboriously built around Nasrallah since he was elevated to lead Hezbollah in 1992, to remain intact. It was pure folly and naivety, in Washington as much as in Jerusalem, to think that such a malign and expansionist force could be safely accommodated, let alone absorbed into a durable regional order.

Hezbollah’s malice toward Israel has been unambiguous since its inception. An early Hezbollah manifesto—its 1985 open letter addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World”—promised to evict outside powers from Lebanon and terminate “the influence of any imperialist power” (besides Syria or Iran). The main enemy of the “Islamic resistance,” it declared, was the United States, which deployed Israel as the “spearhead” to inflict suffering on the Muslims of Lebanon and beyond. The clerics directing Hezbollah’s foot-soldiers have been committed in word and deed to perpetual war against Israel ever since.

Contrary to the popular myth that Hezbollah emerged as an organic “resistance” organisation during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the group was already a stalking horse for Iranian interests in the Levant by then, created and trained by the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guards Corps. The ill-conceived and ill-fated Israeli invasion undoubtedly aided the group’s proliferation —it “let the genie out of the bottle,” Yitzhak Rabin later conceded—but it was Iran, intoxicated by the euphoria of its 1979 revolution, that nurtured its lethal proxy on the shores of the Mediterranean. And it was Iran that provided the materiel and military backing to its fellow Shi’ites in south Lebanon who, until then, had been a disdained underclass in Lebanon’s polyglot ethnic makeup. Its operatives and fighters, newly urbanised and in search of religious purpose, came to think of themselves as warriors in Ayatollah Khomenei’s wilayat al-faqih, a Shi’ite notion of ordained supremacy. In time, Hezbollah became not only the most powerful force in Lebanon but also the most dynamic and feared militia in the Middle East.

The group’s poisonous ideology—a grim trinity of anti-modernism, anti-Americanism, and antisemitism—combined with its revolutionary passion has wrecked Lebanon. Hezbollah began by driving suicide truck-bombs into US targets and kidnapping prominent Americans, evolved into an anti-Zionist guerrilla army, and then effectively took over the Lebanese state from within. In the process, it emerged as a uniquely malevolent force in the Arab world. As Thanassis Cambanis observes in A Privilege to Die, Hezbollah is “not quite a state, but much more than a political party; not quite an army, but much more than a terrorist network; not yet a full-fledged transnational movement, but much more than a Lebanese faction.”

[girlactionfigure]

Hezbollah confirms the deaths of two operatives who were killed by IDF troops while attempting to carry out a bombing attack on the Israeli border earlier this week. They are named by the terror group as Hussein Faqih and Ali Mansour. Their bodies are reportedly being held by Israel. Since October, Hezbollah has named 482 members killed by Israel amid the ongoing fighting.

[etaali]

İmam Bakır (a.s.) şöyle buyurmuştur:

"Şüphesiz Allah yanan ciğerleri serinletmeyi sever. Ciğerleri yanan bir kimseye veya hayvana su vereni Allah'ın gölgesinden başka gölgenin olmayacağı bir günde Allah Arş'ının gölgesinde gölgelendirir!"

Şeyh Saduk (r.a.); Man la yahzuruhul-Faqih; 2. cilt; s. 64; hadis 1723

[loverandservantoftheahlulbayt]

🍂🥀🍂 The burial ground of Hussain (as) (Karbala), from the day he was buried in it has always been a land, from the lands of Paradise.

🍂🥀🍂 Imam al-Sadiq (as) 🍂🥀🍂

🥀 Man La Yahdarahu al-Faqih 🥀

🍂 (page. 600) 🍂

.

[tamamita]

do you think the houthis are a proxy of Iran?

The Houthis are not a proxy of Iran, because of two simple reasons: First, Iran state religion is Twelver Shi'a Islam and Ansar Allah belong to the Fiver Shi'a Islamic branch or (Zaidi Shi'a Islam), both of which contradict each other in the theological and political sphere. It makes no sense for Ansar Allah to allow Iran to have a stranglehold on the socio-political sphere of Yemen. However, their anti-imperialist values overlap, which is why they play a significant role in the fight against the US-backed settler state and its allies.

2. The Houthis are concerned with Zaidi revivalism, their ideological purpose is to revive the Imamate, which ceased in the 60s. In Zaidi theology, anyone who is a progeny of the Banu Hashim clan can become an Imam of the Zaidi Shi'as. Some Zaidis claim the wish to establish a democracy. Furthermore, Iran's political and clerical system is not well-received by other Muslim communities, even among Twelvers; if Iran attempted to export the system of Wilayat al-Faqih to Yemen, it would be a recipe for disaster, and would definitely catch the attention of the Gulf states. While the Iranian Twelvers and the Yemenite Zaidis make up the Axis of resistance, they do not always share the same geopolitical goals.

[swiftsnowmane]

"This report, Outsiders: Multifaceted Violence Against Baháʼís in the Islamic Republic of Iran, jointly produced by Abdorahhman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran and Eleos Justice (Faculty of Law, Monash University), examines the persecution of Bahá’ís through two frameworks: Johan Galtung’s theory of violence — direct, structural, and cultural — and international criminal law. Drawing on diverse sources, including over 50 interviews with Baháʼís, the report provides unprecedented insight into the mechanisms of persecution and calls for international awareness and accountability.

The Bahá’í faith, established in 1844, has faced continuous and intense persecution in Iran, marked by violence, discrimination, and a systematic denial of rights. Initially, Bahá’ís experienced mob violence and various forms of state-sanctioned oppression, which worsened after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The new regime viewed the Bahá’í community as a theological and ideological threat, reinforcing exclusionary policies under the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, which left no room for religious diversity.

State violence against Bahá’ís has ranged from executions, enforced disappearances, torture, and physical abuse, to the destruction of property, including homes, businesses, and cemeteries. Hundreds of Bahá’í properties have been confiscated, leaving families without recourse and with lingering trauma.

Apart from physical violence, Bahá’ís in Iran suffer structural and cultural discrimination. The constitution excludes Bahá’ís from recognized religious minorities, denying them basic rights to education, employment, and property. A 1991 memorandum further formalized policies aimed at limiting Bahá’í socioeconomic progress. Recently, Bahá’ís have been denied marriage registration, complicating legal matters around family and inheritance.

Culturally, the State perpetuates anti-Bahá’í sentiment through propaganda and misinformation, portraying Bahá’ís as foreign agents or morally corrupt. This narrative permeates educational materials, fostering discrimination among students and teachers. However, there is growing resistance among Iranians, with some expressing support for the Bahá’í community.

Under international law, these systematic actions against Bahá’ís constitute crimes against humanity, including murder and persecution, though they fall short of the legal definition of genocide. Despite Iran’s non-participation in the Rome Statute, the principle of universal jurisdiction allows for potential prosecution by other nations, marking an ongoing international concern for the Bahá’ís’ plight in Iran.

Read the full report in PDF format."

[ceritasiolaa]

Assalamu'alaikum Aqsha!

Rabu, 17 Juli 2024M | 12 Muharram 1446H

اَلْحَمْدُ للَّهِ رَبِّ الْعالَمِينَ

Telah lahirnya putera pertama kami tepat di pukul 19.39 WIB di Rumah Sakit Hermina Medan.

Bismillah, aku ingin menuliskan kisah persalinan dan proses bagaimana seorang sosok penerus peradaban lahir dari rahimku kemarin.

Berawal dari merasakan kontraksi di tanggal 14 Juli. Malam hari tidurku sudah mulai tidak nyenyak, hampir setiap 10-20 menit sekali aku merasakan kontraksi. Saat aku cek juga sudah mulai ada flek dan cairan bening yang keluar.

Paginya aku dan suami langsung bergegas ke rumah sakit untuk mengecek, karena sebenernya kami punya agenda untuk mengikuti event sudut pandang dan ittiba' dari komunitas Yuk Ngaji Medan, kebetulan juga aku salah satu panitianya dan suami sudah membeli tiket kedua event tersebut.

Setelah cek di Rumah Sakit, hasilnya belum ada bukaan. Dokter langsung menyarankan aku untuk pulang, beraktivitas seperti biasa, dan lebih banyak lagi bergerak untuk jalan lahir si bayi.

Dengan memantapkan hati, aku dan suami memilih untuk pergi ke event yuk ngaji. Sembari mengikuti event, menjadi panitia, aku merasakan gelombang cinta per 10-20 menit sekali. MasyaAllah.

Tetapi pelan-pelan kontraksi itu berkurang, saat malam hari bisa 30 menit sekali mungkin kontraksi itu muncul dan hanya sebentar saja. Setelah event tersebut, malam itu aku bisa tertidur lelap. Mungkin karena kelelahan juga ya pikirku saat itu.

Besoknya tanggal 15 Juli, kontraksi juga sering muncul per 30 menit. Flek juga semakin banyak.

Malam harinya, aku tidak bisa tidur lagi. Kontraksi semakin kencang, bisa 5-10 menit sekali. Semakin sakit dan nyeri rasanya.

Suami sudah membujuk aku untuk pergi ke Rumah Sakit sejak jam 2 pagi, tapi aku masih mengurungkan niat dan menunggu, berharap kontraksi semakin cepat lagi.

Namun ternyata, pukul 4 lewat aku sudah tidak tahan. Dicoba untuk tidur pun tak bisa, kontraksi nya sangat membuatku tidak nyaman.

Aku dan suami pun langsung bergegas ke Rumah Sakit sebelum shubuh (aku tidak ingat waktu pastinya).

Tanggal 16 Juli, kembali lagi ke Rumah Sakit. Setelah di cek oleh bidan disana, aku sudah bukaan 1. Alhamdulillah pikirku. Si dedek bayi sudah ingin keluar.

Sembari menunggu bertambahnya bukaan, aku berusaha untuk jalan di sekitar rumah sakit ditemani suami, melakukan pergerakan agar si dede bayi semakin semangat untuk keluar juga.

Qadarullah, bukaannya tidak bertambah banyak. Sejak siang hari sampai besok paginya tanggal 17 Juli, bukaannya tetap di 3-4. Belum bertambah.

Kekhawatiran itu muncul dari dalam hati. Kenapa? Apakah aku masih kurang gerak? Batinku.

Karena tidak bertambahnya bukaan, dokter pun menyarankan agar aku di induksi. Aku diberikan perangsang kontraksi agar bukaan bertambah.

Alhamdulillah atas izin Allah:

- Pukul 12 siang aku sudah bukaan 5-6

- Pukul 2 siang bukaan bertambah menjadi 7-8

- Pukul 4 sore menjadi bukaan 9

- Pukul setengah 6, sudah bukaan 10.

Saat bukaan 10, aku memperhatikan sekitar ruangan bersalin, semua bidan sudah bergerak mempersiapkan persalinanku.

Tidak ada lagi jeda kontraksi. Perut, vagina, bokong, semua terasa nyeri dan aku seperti ingin mengeluarkan sesuatu sesegera mungkin.

Alhamdulillah Allah bantu, Allah mampukan. Pukul 19.39, buah hati kami lahir ke dunia ini.

Semuanya atas izin Allah.

Alhamdulillah bini'matihi tatimmush sholihaat.

Mohon do'a nya untuk teman-teman yang membaca.

Semoga anak kami menjadi anak yang shalih, qurrota a'yun, faqih fiddin. Aamiin allahumma aamiin

Yang berbahagia,

Ola & Farhan ( @farauzanotes )

| Medan, 29 Juli 2024