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Uyghur Mass Migration, Diaspora, and Activism.

The response below is a critical examination of the nature and status of the Uyghur diaspora, the concepts examined in this critique will consider the history of mass migration in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and the developments of activism work in both, Uyghur diaspora communities, and in the Uyghur homeland, the focus of this analysis will be thoroughly involved with methods and theories, pertaining to diaspora and transnational studies. In doing so, this response will closely follow resistance movements such as the movement for an independent East Turkestan, and diaspora activist groups such as the World Uyghur Congress.

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The Uyghur Diaspora: Patterns of Migration in a Chronological Framework

It is important to understand that Uyghur mass migration did not occur all at once or at the same point in time, but instead it occurred in waves that have spanned over almost seven decades, in contemporary times (Sulaiman and Lipes, Radio Free Asia - Uyghur Service). These waves of migration can be best explained by the socio-political context of Xinjiang and else where in China at the time (Howell and Fan). For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to observe the conditions of the first waves of contemporary Uyghur mass migration, in the 1950s, and whilst some did manage to migrate as early as 1933, the bigger waves of migration from Xinjiang, were “officiated” in the 1950s. The year 1949, marks the Communist Takeover of Xinjiang, also known as, “The Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang” in official histories, this point in the history of the PRC is particularly telling, for the patterns in Uyghur mass migration. The 1950s see many demographic changes in Xinjiang. Not only, was the Uyghur population fleeing, to near by states, namely, Turkey, Afghanistan, and the modern day Kyrgyz Republic — but, interprovincial migration also played a significant part in these demographic changes. On one hand, the Uyghur ethnic community was leaving Xinjiang in remarkable numbers, and on the other, there was an influx of Han migrants in to the Xinjiang region, this migration however, was state orchestrated, and up until the late 1950s, Xinjiang was under military rule (Horowitz and Yu, 462). This period of state sponsored Han migration in to Xinjiang, was due for a variety of reasons, one commonly cited is, that of a possible military threat from the former Soviet Union, hence, Han populations were relocated to the frontier provinces (Howell and Fan, 120). However, this alone was not the sole reason for the strategic placement of the Han population, in Muslim dominated regions. In the 1970s, Han movement to frontier provinces, particularly Xinjiang was due to China’s economic reforms, that pushed for job creation and development in the province (121). This however, also led to self-initiated Han migration (119), creating further economic disparity between Uyghur and Han populations, this inequality persists in the province to date, migrants in Xinjiang are still preferentially treated over Uyghur minorities for skill-based urban, industrial work (121). The 1950-70s also saw significant changes in religious/cultural regulation in the PRC, state policies regarding religious affairs were drastically radicalized, the Cultural Revolution lasting from 1966-1976 “saw the fiercest persecution of religion in modern Xinjiang (as well as Chinese) history” (The Uyghur Community: Diaspora, Identity, and Geopolitics, 61); in this period in time “mosques were shut down, ethnic dresses were prohibited, and, traditional holidays were cancelled” (Horowitz and Yu, 462). This perhaps explains why the period from 1950-70s saw a major trend of Muslim migration to neighbouring states and elsewhere. The 1980s however, were comparatively a different time, in Xinjiang. In the 80s, large scale state sponsored Han migration had a significant slow down (Howell and Fan, 122), as did the presence of the PLA, this being due to reduced tensions with the USSR, however, in the 1990s the presence of the PLA was increased in Xinjiang, due to “Uyghur unrest” (Horowitz and Yu, 465). In the year 1999, the PRC’s initiative, “The Great Leap West”, encouraged further “hanification” of the Xinjiang region, and worsened Uyghur-Han relations (Liu, 267). In the 1990s the trends of Uyghur migration, changed. Many, leaving China, were involved in activism work within China, and many “state dissidents” such as Sediq Rouzi, and his wife Rebiya Kadeer, who was later imprisoned for Rouzi’s “separationist” work, left China for countries like the United States (World Uyghur Congress). Today, the Uyghur diaspora continues to grow, and diaspora around the world encourage “transnational activism” (Kuscu, 145).

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Propaganda piece, critiquing Uyghur separationist movements.

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Diaspora Activism and the Development of an Uyghur “National” Identity

The first signs of a development in the Uyghur “national” identity, find their roots in the 1920s. It is here that, Uyghur liberal thinkers and intellectuals, that returned from completing their education, in Islamic intellectual centres of the world, namely in, Turkey, India and, Egypt, that brought back liberal and reformist ideals to Xinjiang (Tursin, 28-31). By the 1930s, more developments were made in the name of an Uyghur national identity, and many intellectuals had begun, to coin, the term “Uyghuristan”, this ideology eventually became highly symbolic to the Uyghur nationalistic movement (38), leading to the eventual establishment of the two short-lived states, of East Turkestan (41). This period, in Uyghur nationalism has left its remnants, even today. Diasporas have been particularly influential in the progression of such nationalistic movements. 

In Turkey during the 1950s, the first wave of Uyghur immigrants was lead by well known figures in the Uyghur nationalist project, both Mehmet Emin Buğra and İsa Yusuf Alptekin, were significant figures in the cause for an Uyghur homeland; their work involved the engagement of the diaspora through traditional means (Kuscu, 146), they were both instrumental to the diaspora activism effort then, and have shaped what it is now (Kuscu Bonnenfant, 93). Apart from the 1950s, the Uyghur diaspora saw much activism come together in the 1990s, in this second wave, many had established organizations in their host countries — there was however a lack of cohesion between Uyghur organizations in the world, and perhaps more unity in the Diaspora communities, may have helped for a stronger cause (147-8). The internet as a transnational space, has also helped the Uyghur cause in many ways, since the age of the internet the Uyghur cause has been highlighted among other significant and related issues such as, human rights (152).

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Proposed flag for the imagined nation-state of Turkestan.

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East Turkestan: An Imagined Homeland

East Turkestan, interestingly is both official and unofficial. In China, East Turkestan is denied of it’s very existence. However, diaspora activist works, do not consider “Xinjiang” anything but “East Turkestan”, and almost every Uyghur affiliated organization on the internet has referred to the region, as East Turkestan. For the Chinese State, the East Turkestan movement is not only a separatist resistance movement, but also a “terror alliance” (The Guantanamo 22). In the Post 9/11 atmosphere, the US was particularly interested in finding individuals associated with terror organizations, and it was around this time, that China, asked the US to keep the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, on their terror watchlist. In 2002, 22 Uyghurs seeking refuge in Pakistan and Afghanistan were sold to the US for USD 5000, each, in being affiliated with “terror” organizations, these men were sold as terrorists, by the Pakistani government, and were shipped to Guantanamo Bay, where they were kept for many years without any judicial processing, these men were eventually released on the grounds of innonence (The Guantanamo 22).

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Works Cited

Al Jazeera. “The Guantanamo 22.” China | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 9 Dec. 2015, www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/12/uighur-guantanamo-22-151206112137598.html.

“East Turkestan.” World Uyghur Congress, 29 Sept. 2016, www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?page_id=29681.

Horowitz, Shale, and Peng Yu. “Holding China’s West: Explaining CCP Strategies of Rule in Tibet and Xinjiang.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 20, no. 4, 2014, pp. 451–475., doi:10.1007/s11366-014-9323-1.

Howell, Anthony, and C. Cindy Fan. “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi.” Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 52, no. 1, 2011, pp. 119–139., doi:10.2747/1539-7216.52.1.119.

Kuşçu, Işık. “The Uyghur Diaspora in Cyberspace: Identity and Homeland Cause.” Bilig, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World, no. 69, 2014, pp. 143–160., doi:10.12995/bilig.2014.6907.

Liu, Amy H., and Kevin Peters. “The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 17, no. 2, 2017, pp. 265–280., doi:10.1111/sena.12233.

RFE/RL. “Interview: 'I Can't Say The Struggle Will Always Be Peaceful,' Says Uyghur Advocate Kadeer.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 27 Feb. 2011, www.rferl.org/a/interview_rebiya_kadeer_uyghurs_china/2322376.html

Sulaiman, Eset, and Joshua Lipes. “Between Identity and Integration: The Uyghur Diaspora in the West.” World Uyghur Congress, 27 May 2016, www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=28586.

“The Uyghur Community Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics.” The Uyghur Community Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics, by Guljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun and Konuralp Ercilasun, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2018.

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Islam and a Labrang Monastery: A Muslim Community in a Tibetan Buddhist Estate

The Paul Nietupski piece titled, “Islam and a Labrang Monastery: A Muslim Community in a Tibetan Buddhist Estate”, explores Muslim presence in Amdo, particularly in the Labrong estate. Here, Nietupski explores Muslim assimilation in Labrang, multidimensionally, considering religion, politics, military and social groups. Nietupski also sees that the assimilation of Muslims can also be attributed to the eventual Manchu and modern Chinese rule in Amdo. Nietupski talks particularly about what it meant to be Muslim in Labrang, and if the Muslim identity was largely definitive of Islamic presence in Labrang. Or, if there were other factors motivating the settlement of Muslim groups in Labrang, these factors were often situated in trade, business, and politics.

In the first subsection of his piece, Nietupski considers the religion of Islam at Labrang, here we are introduced to the diversities within Islamic communities settled in Labrang, and Amdo. Sufi tariqas, or orders, most popular in the region were those from Hezhou, these groups were largely followers of the Qadriyya and Nakshbandiyya. Practices from within these traditions included, both silent and oral study of the Quran, as well as repeated recitations of the name of God, and lastly, ritual practice, and prayer at Sufi affiliated tombs and shrines; and, despite differences in the Sufi orders, at Labrang, these groups were well integrated, with each other and with the world outside of them. Nietupski even cites, occasions of an integration between Tibetan and Muslim communities through marriage in the region. He also cites incidents of sharing religious space and religious figures in both communities. It is mentioned that, post-1854, Muslim presence grew exponentially in Labrang, by 1884, the 4 families that were settled in Labrang in 1854, turned in to 60 households. By the late 1800’s a mosque accommodating about a 100 people, was built in Labrang, up until this point in time however, Muslims only relied on Labrang as a source for economic stability and a “safe haven”. It was not until 1913, that a power struggle was eminent in the region, and by 1918 hostilities between the Xining Muslims and Labrang Tibetans grew. Through the demands Muslim groups made of the Tibetans, it is made clear that, Xining Muslims were wanting to disarm the Tibetans in the region, and keep them from secular affairs, it was after these demands that the Tibetan authorities at Labrang fled and remained in exile until 1927. In the period after this, many Christian missions were also settled in Labrang, their accounts of Tibetan-Muslim interaction were also very telling of the political condition, many accounts from the missions, were in fact sympathetic in their support towards the Xining Muslims. By the 1930’s Muslim communities in Labrang had a stronghold in the area, they were both, socially and economically advantaged in the region. In the 1940’s, things in Labrang, changed however, Tibetan-Muslim relation normalized in region, but by 1949, both Tibetans and Muslims, had a larger challenge to face, and that was of the Communist takeover.

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Interethnic Conflict in the PRC: Xinjiang and Tibet as Exceptions?

In an official sense, China, sees itself as a “harmonious, multiethnic state”, in which all of China’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups, are of an equal status. However, constant ethnic conflict, particularly in Lhasa, Urumqi, and Kunming, tell a different story. In the official stories of China, as prescribed by the CCP, these are works of “separatists, terrorists and anti-China allies”, Liebold’s piece looks at the particularities of how certain events have led to the deterioration of interethnic relations in the past decade, and the consequential possibilities these crises may have on the CCP and the social stability of the PRC, however it is also important to note that he wishes to argue that, the current situation in Xinjiang and Tibet, are an exception to the norm.

The first section of Liebold’s piece considers the scope and the implications of interethnic conflict in the PRC, here, Liebold examines the rise of interethnic conflict, particularly looking at the events of 2008/2009, and even as recently as 2013/2014. Whilst these are the more major events that have taken place in the recent past, Liebold, also observes the smaller scale conflicts, namely between the Han-Hui communities, and incidents between Uyghurs and Tibetans. According to Liebold, these ‘small scale’ incidents are only the ones we manage to hear of, in reality, the volumes of these happenings are likely on the daily. One may wonder why there is so little heard of these daily occurrences of interethnic hostilities, Liebold suggests, it is due to the prohibition on the Chinese media, that many incidents of a smaller scale go completely unreported. However, Liebold offers a contrasting view on the situation, he questions whether or not, these incidents are actually unreported, since in the social media age many have the liberty to do their own “journalism”.

He also notes that due to the lack of consistency in reporting and numbers, it is difficult to assess whether interethnic conflict is worse now, or at other times in the history of the PRC. To argue this he presents the case of the Urumqi attacks, here he states that these were not the worst attacks the PRC has seen, however due to media accessibility, “highly graphic and disturbing imagery” was much more easily available — he argues that, it was more likely that the violence was worse off in the Cultural Revolution. The implications of this recent crisis, according to some, particularly scholars, is that the PRC will disintegrate, citing the fate of the USSR, the reality of the situation however is that, the PRC does not have as its minorities in larger numbers, and hosts a “super majority” Han population, making minority population secession from the state an unlikely possibility.

In the Structural Ecology section of his piece, Liebold considers, themes of misunderstanding and mistrust in majority/minority relations in the PRC, while also considering the improvements in livelihood for certain minority communities through some state programs. Here, he considers the economic grown of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, all regional ‘minority hubs’. However, these practices have led to a sort of “minority elitism”, in certain populations, particularly in Southern China. Similarly, the strife of rural peoples has exponentially increased due to the state’s push for, “bilingualism, secularization and integration”. Here, Leibold cites the income disparities between Han and Uyghur populations in Xinjiang, with the latter earning significantly less. Here, he also speaks of cross cultural interactions being, “ethnicized”, with the use of stereotypes to describe rural Uyghur populations as “barbaric”, whereas southern Chinese minority populations were seen as more “docile”. Leibold explains, these “differences” may be the cause for these hostilities, despite state programs to cultivate collective identity.

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Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light

Murata’s Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light, concerns itself with the origins of Chinese Islamic literature. China’s first encounters with Islam, were in the first century of Islam, the 7th century. According to Murata, the very first missions arriving in China are recorded to be in 651 and 655, and during this time Islam in China was primarily transmitted in Arabic and Persian. It wasn’t until the 9th century, that a Chinese speaking Muslim community started to formulate in China, and as per Murata’s work it was rather difficult for the Chinese Ulama to transmit Persian and Arabic Islamic works to Chinese. This is because, Arabic, as the language of Islam has been to many regions, namely India, Persia and South East Asia, and has influenced the vocabulary of languages and local dialects in these regions — however, the Chinese language does not allow for transliteration and even when it has been attempted, it does not do phonetic justice to the word being transliterated. Hence, Chinese Muslim scholars mostly avoided using Arabic words, and to explain concepts native to Islamic practice, the Ulama had to use pre-existing equivalent words in the Chinese vocabulary.

One of the earliest scholars of Islam in China, Wang Tai-yu, supposedly wrote the first book on Islam in Chinese. In his work, The Real Commentary, Wang states, his descendant, an astronomer, came to China from Persia, well over 300 years before Wang’s lifetime, to develop the science of astronomy.  Wang’s depth of knowledge in Turkic, Arabic and Persian languages was apparently far greater than his understanding of Chinese, despite his 300 year old ancestry in China. According to Murata his lacking in the language was a source of great shame, particularly among the more learned population of Chinese Muslims at the time. Despite his eminent struggles with assimilating in the language culture in the earlier part of his life, in his later years it is recorded that he was able to conduct intellectual debates with other Chinese scholars of the time, and at their capabilities and levels. Many students, and admirers of Wang Taiyu eventually wrote their own works inspired by his intellectual trajectory.

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The Multiple Meanings of Pilgrimage in Sino-Islamic Thought

The symbolism of the Islamic pilgrimage, of Hajj, takes several journeys in the Chinese Muslim context. It is often seen as the “umma’s centre”, where all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity, join one another. It is also a religious obligation and a duty for those who are able to perform, and it can also be seen as a transformative journey. Hajj has been explored in a variety of scholarly circles within the context of Islam in China, particularly in the Han Kitab. This blog post will particularly evaluate the views of Wang Daiyu, Liu Zhi and Ma Dexin, with regard to the practice of Hajj in Chinese Islamic practice. As aforementioned, there are a multitude of opinions on the position of Hajj as a focal tenet of Islam. The sacred geography is one particularly important aspect to Muslims in China, as going for the pilgrimage would allow Muslims in the far corners of the world, such as in China to be one with other Muslims, strengthening the umma, in what is one of the holiest Islamic sites, in the birthplace of the religion. However, many Sino Muslim scholars did not have access to perform the hajj, such as Wang Daiyu, and Liu Zhi. Wang Daiyu’s work is especially intriguing as he conjoins the Five Pillars of Islam with the Five Constant Virtues of Confucianism. Interestingly, much of Wang’s works focus is on the Ka’aba and the importance of its sacred geography, and, despite not having the opportunity to perform a hajj, Wang Daiyu consistently highlights the obligation of performing this pilgrimage in Islam. Similarly, Ma Dexin was also rather definitive in his view of the hajj as an obligation, much more so than Wang Daiyu. For Ma Dexin, the hajj was viewed parallel to other procedures in Islamic practice such as, wedding ceremonies, burials and divorces, it was explained to be as unchangeable as other Islamic ritualistic practice. He was in fact, China’s first pilgrim to record his journey to the hajj. Liu Zhi tells of the hajj as a transformative experience, from when one leaves their “mundane setting” to arriving at the sacred centre as a calling for “internal change”, and whilst the transformative properties of hajj are explored, Liu Zhi never himself experienced this transformation, nonetheless, he was a strong advocate for the hajj in the Sino Muslim tradition.

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History of the Development of the Sino Muslim Community

The first Chapter of Peterson’s, Interpreting Islam in China, situates Islam in the Chinese context. It primarily observes the origins of Islam in China, and how Islam came to China from the West — and how despite it being a well established tradition in localities within China much after its arrival, it was still seen as “foreign”. Whilst this was the view predominant view held by the larger Chinese community, there was also the other Sino-Muslim view. The Sino Muslim community, interestingly held the Arab Muslims as the true holders of Islam, although vernacular forms of Islam are just as authentic and hold just as much legitimacy. Peterson also looks at the term “Islamicization” with regard to China. Here however, Islamicization is not merely the conversion of an individual or groups to Islam — it is the universalizing of a Muslim identity through “revivalist urges” to transform vernacular Islam to “true Islam”. Here, it is eminent that, even in Sino Muslim scholarship, the orthodoxy of Arab Islam prevailed.

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Biodata Collection on the Uyghur Population of China

The Uyghurs of China are making the rounds in many news stories due to the harsh ethnically discriminatory polices China employs against them. They are often subject to severe policing, through the new ID system, which according to the cited article, tracks their movement in and out of cities and towns in Southern Xinjiang. In addition to this, the Uyghur population’s are subject to biodata collection — through which the government of China is able to record their fingerprints, their voice patterns, facial recognition and blood type. Although this is standard of biometric collection process, it is rather troubling to know that, the government also collects DNA samples from the Uyghur population through the farce of a public health initiative. According to the article, the health initiative seems to be a farce as the participation from the Uyghur population in this initiative is unusually high, and the article also cites Uyghur populations often get coerced in to these public health initiatives to avoid detention, on the basis of extremism.

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/uyghur-biodata-collection-in-china/