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ARTICLE 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon

G.R. No. L-60174

Feb 16, 1983

Facts:

Petitioners: Eduardo Felipe, Hermogena V. Felipe, Vicente V. Felipe.

Respondents: Heirs of Maximo Aldon, including Gimena Almosara, Sofia Aldon, and Salvador Aldon.

In 1936, Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara.

Between 1948 and 1950, the couple acquired several parcels of land, subdivided into lots 1370, 1371, and 1415 in San Jacinto, Masbate.

In 1951, Gimena sold these lots to the Felipes without Maximo's consent.

On April 26, 1976, Maximo's heirs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Masbate (Civil Case No. 2372) claiming ownership and alleging an oral mortgage.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Felipes, declaring them lawful owners and dismissing the complaint.

The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ordering the Felipes to surrender the lots and account for profits.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property was valid.

Ruling:

The sale of the conjugal property by Gimena Almosara was ruled invalid due to the absence of her husband's consent.

The petitioners did not acquire ownership of the lots by acquisitive prescription because of their bad faith.

The Court emphasized that a wife cannot dispose of conjugal property without her husband's consent, as per Article 166 of the Civil Code.

Gimena's sale was deemed voidable due to her lack of capacity to consent without her husband's agreement.

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ARTICLE 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;

(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;

(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;

(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and

(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159)

Flores vs. Flores

G.R. No. 24173

Nov 24, 1925

Facts:

The case "In Re Will of Jose Flores, Deceased" concerns the probate of Jose Flores's will after his death on May 6, 1919, at approximately 89 years old.

Probate proceedings began on October 13, 1919, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, with Rafael Flores, the deceased's brother, as the executor.

Romulo Macalino later became the estate administrator.

Jose Flores had three marriages, producing children from each:

First wife, Angela Payuyu: three children (Catalina, Apolonia, Eleuterio, who predeceased him, leaving three children).

Second wife, Maria Agustin: two surviving children (Sotero and Agueda Flores, the petitioners and appellants).

Third marriage: two children (Gerardo and Alfredo, who predeceased him).

The property in question was acquired during the second marriage, and the conjugal partnership with Maria Agustin had not been formally liquidated.

The appellants contended that the property should be treated as part of the conjugal partnership and liquidated before estate distribution.

The lower court acknowledged this but ruled that the lands under a Torrens certificate of title were exclusively Jose Flores's, a decision the appellants contested.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred on its decision.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the lands covered by the Torrens certificate of title were part of the conjugal partnership between Jose Flores and Maria Agustin, reversing the lower court's ruling.

The Supreme Court emphasized that property acquired during marriage is part of the conjugal partnership, regardless of the title's form.

The surviving husband acts as the administrator of the conjugal estate and has a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries.

Registration under the Torrens system does not change the character of property as conjugal, as per Section 70 of the Land Registration Act, which maintains marital rights and responsibilities.

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ARTICLE 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.

Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a)

Maramba vs. Lozano

G.R. No. L-21533

Jun 29, 1967

Facts:

Hermogenes Maramba (plaintiff-appellant) filed a civil action against Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano (defendants-appellees) for money collection on November 3, 1948, in Dagupan City.

The trial court ruled on June 23, 1959, ordering the defendants to pay P3,500.07 plus legal interest and costs.

The defendants appealed, but their appeal was dismissed on March 30, 1960, for failing to file a brief on time.

A writ of execution was issued, leading to a levy on Nieves de Lozano's property on August 18, 1960, with a public auction set for September 16, 1960.

Nieves made a partial payment of P2,000.00 and requested an adjournment to October 26, 1960.

On October 17, 1960, she filed a motion claiming her property was paraphernal and her liability should be halved due to her husband's death in 1952.

The auction proceeded, and the property was sold to the plaintiff for P4,175.12.

On June 28, 1961, the trial court reduced Nieves' liability to P1,750.04, prompting the plaintiff to appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision was final and executory.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the June 23, 1959, decision was final and executory, thus unchallengeable.

The judgment was determined to be joint, meaning each defendant was liable only for their respective share of the debt.

The Supreme Court stated that a final and executory decision cannot be amended except for clerical errors.

The request for a "nunc pro tunc" order to amend the judgment was denied, as it would require substantial changes to the original decision.

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ARTICLE 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the said period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without complying with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

Republic vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 78391

Oct 21, 1988

Facts:

The case involves the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Manila (respondent).

On January 28, 1985, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue served a Warrant of Distraint on the Maritime Company of the Philippines to collect P17,284,882.45 in deficiency taxes.

A Receipt for Goods and Things Seized was executed on April 16, 1985, acknowledging the seizure of several barges, vehicles, and spare parts.

A Notice of Seizure was issued on October 4, 1985, received by a Maritime Company representative, including six barges (MCP-1 to MCP-6).

On June 11, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Enriquez levied on Barge MCP-1 and Barge MCP-4 following a writ of execution from the Regional Trial Court in favor of Genstar Container Corporation.

A public auction for the barges was scheduled for June 23, 1986.

On June 18, 1986, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue informed the respondent that the barges were no longer owned by the Maritime Company due to prior distraint.

Despite this, the respondent sold the barges at auction on June 23, 1986, and issued a sheriff's certificate of sale.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on July 24, 1986, arguing the respondent acted beyond his authority.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 30, 1987, leading to the current appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the BIR Warrant of Distraint prevails over the writ of execution issued by an RTC.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the Court of Appeals' decision, annulled the notice of levy and execution sale of Barges MCP-1 and MCP-4, and enjoined the respondent from further sale proceedings.

In the case, the Distraint was made by the Commissioner long before the writ of execution was issued by the RTC. There is no question that at the time of the writ of execution, the 2 barges were no longer properties of Maritime. The power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionable belonging to the judgment debtor. Execution sale affect the rights of the judgment debtor only, and the purchaser in an auction sale acquires only such right as the judgment debtor had at the time of sale.

There is no further need for petitioner to establish his rights over the 2 barges as evidence clearly proves that the barges are under distraint and in fact seized by the Commissioner.

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ARTICLE 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)

Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106169

Feb 14, 1994

Facts:

Samson T. Sabalones (petitioner) and Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones (respondent) are a married couple.

Samson served in the Philippine diplomatic service for fifteen years, entrusting the management of their conjugal properties to Remedios.

After retiring in 1985, he returned to the Philippines but did not reunite with his family.

In 1989, Samson filed a petition to sell a conjugal property in Greenhills, citing financial difficulties due to health issues.

Remedios opposed the petition and counterclaimed for legal separation, stating she and their six children relied on rental income from another property.

She accused Samson of living with another woman and entering a bigamous marriage in 1981.

The lower court ruled in favor of Remedios, granting legal separation and forfeiting Samson's share in the properties.

Remedios sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Samson from interfering with property administration, which the Court of Appeals granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of Sabalones was meritorious.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied Samson's petition for lack of merit, upholding the Court of Appeals' decision to grant the preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court justified the preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo of the conjugal properties and protect Remedios' rights during the appeal.

Article 61 of the Family Code requires the court to appoint an administrator for conjugal properties upon filing for legal separation, in the absence of a written agreement.

Samson was disqualified from being an administrator due to the forfeiture of his share in the properties.

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ARTICLE 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

Francisco vs. Tayao

G.R. No. 26435

Mar 4, 1927

Facts:

Juanaria Francisco filed a divorce petition against her husband, Lope Tayao.

The couple married in 1912 in Manila and separated in 1917.

After their separation, Tayao moved to Zamboanga and was prosecuted for adultery with Bernardina Medrano, the wife of Ambrosio Torres.

Ambrosio Torres initiated the prosecution, resulting in Tayao's conviction and a sentence of three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment.

Juanaria sought a divorce in the Court of First Instance of Manila based on her husband's adultery conviction.

Judge Revilla denied her petition, stating Juanaria was not the "innocent spouse" as defined by the Philippine Divorce Law.

Juanaria appealed the ruling, leading to the current case.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal action filed upon Tayao's could be ground for divorce.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, ruling that Juanaria Francisco was not entitled to a divorce based on her husband's adultery conviction.

The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Philippine Divorce Law, specifically Act No. 2710, which allows divorce petitions only for adultery by the wife or concubinage by the husband.

The use of the word "only" in the statute indicates that no additional grounds for divorce are permitted beyond those explicitly stated.

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ARTICLE 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage. (87a)

Buccat vs. De Buccat

G.R. No. 47101

Apr 25, 1941

Facts:

Godofredo Buccat (petitioner) sought annulment of his marriage to Luida Mangonon de Buccat (respondent).

The case was elevated to the Supreme Court from the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

The marriage occurred on November 26, 1938, in the Catholic Cathedral of Baguio City.

The petitioner claimed he married under the belief that the respondent was a virgin, which he later contested as fraudulent.

The respondent did not appear in court despite being summoned, allowing the petitioner to present his evidence.

The lower court ruled in favor of the respondent, leading to the appeal.

The couple met in March 1938, became engaged on September 19, and married shortly thereafter.

They cohabited for 89 days before the respondent gave birth on February 23, 1939.

The petitioner claimed the birth resulted from the respondent's alleged deception regarding her virginity.

After the birth, the petitioner abandoned the respondent and ceased marital relations.

The lower court found the petitioner's claims unconvincing, particularly noting his awareness of the respondent's pregnancy.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners claim was meritorious.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the petitioner's claims did not justify annulment.

The court found insufficient evidence to support petitioners claim.

The Supreme Court emphasized the sanctity of marriage, requiring clear and convincing evidence for annulment.

The court deemed the petitioner's assertion of ignorance regarding the respondents condition was unmeritorious.

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ARTICLE 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Terre vs. Terre

A.C. No. 2349

Jul 3, 1992

Facts:

Complainant: Dorothy B. Terre filed a sworn complaint against Atty. Jordan Terre for "grossly immoral conduct."

Respondent contracted a second marriage while his first marriage to the complainant was still valid.

The respondent evaded service of the complaint for over three years, leading to a court suspension.

On April 24, 1985, the court suspended the respondent for his evasion.

Respondent's defense Claimed his marriage to Dorothy was null and void ab initio due to her prior marriage, which he alleged was incestuous.

Complainant's rebuttal Asserted that their child, Jason Terre, was the respondent's son.

Investigation: The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General, where hearings were conducted, but the respondent failed to appear.

Findings: The investigating solicitor reported that the respondent married Helina Malicdem on May 3, 1981, while still married to Dorothy.

Outcome: The court found the respondent's actions constituted grossly immoral conduct, leading to disbarment.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty Terry committed gross immoral conduct.

Ruling:

The court ruled that Atty. Jordan Terre did engage in grossly immoral conduct by marrying Helina Malicdem while his marriage to Dorothy B. Terre was subsisting.

The court held that the respondent's claim of good faith belief regarding the nullity of his previous marriage was inconsistent to the case law.

A valid marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of nullity.

The respondent's argument of believing his first marriage was void ab initio was deemed spurious due to lack of evidence.

The court emphasized that a lawyer must understand the legal requirements for contracting a second marriage, which required absolute nullity of marriage.

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ARTICLE 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)

Republic vs. Tecaq

G.R. No. 229272

Nov 19, 2018

Facts:

The case involves the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and Gina P. Tecag (respondent).

Gina and Marjune B. Manaoat married on August 2, 2006, in La Trinidad, Benguet, after cohabiting for two years.

They initially worked in vegetable farming; Gina later found employment in Macau.

Gina attempted to secure job opportunities for Marjune, but he chose to invest in their farming instead.

Their communication decreased, and Gina discovered Marjune's infidelity.

Upon returning to the Philippines in 2009, Gina confronted Marjune, who insisted she stay abroad.

In 2010, Gina received a call from a woman claiming to live with Marjune and that they had a child together.

Gina alleged physical abuse from Marjune due to her inability to conceive.

On October 9, 2012, Gina filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Marjune's psychological incapacity.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition on January 20, 2014, declaring the marriage null and void ab initio.

The RTC found both parties psychologically incapacitated, supported by Professor Emma Astudillo-Sanchez's findings.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision on June 29, 2016, leading to a petition for review on certiorari by the Republic.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of Court of Appels was proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court.

The Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional and statutory protection of marriage as a fundamental social institution.

Any doubts regarding the validity of marriage should favor its continuance.

The burden of proof for declaring a marriage null lies with the petitioner.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a valid ground for nullity but must involve serious personality disorders that prevent fulfilling essential marital obligations.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

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ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Morisono vs. Morisono

G.R. No. 226013

Jul 2, 2018

Facts:

Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono (petitioner) married Ryoji Morisono (respondent) on December 8, 2009, in Quezon City, Philippines.

They lived together in Japan for one year and three months without children.

Their marriage faced conflicts due to Ryoji's infidelity and their significant age difference.

They opted for a "Divorce by Agreement," approved on January 17, 2012, and recorded on July 1, 2012, in Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan.

Luzviminda sought recognition of the foreign divorce decree in the Philippines to remove her ex-husband's surname from her passport and to remarry.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 105, scheduled a hearing for her petition, with the government opposing it.

Luzviminda presented her evidence ex-parte, which the RTC admitted without objection.

On July 18, 2016, the RTC denied her petition, stating that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse could not be recognized if the Filipino spouse initiated it.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce decree could be recognized in the Philippines.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition is partly meritorious.

The Court highlighted the principles of divorce in the Philippines, particularly Article 26(2) of the Family Code, which permits a Filipino spouse to remarry if a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

It clarified that the nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code does not bar recognition of a foreign divorce decree when the Filipino spouse initiates the divorce.

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ARTICLE 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)

Republic vs. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577

Sep 21, 2005

Facts:

The case involves the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent).

Crasus filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against his wife, Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, on March 25, 1997, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22.

Crasus and Fely were married on December 16, 1961, and had five children.

Crasus described Fely as "hot-tempered, a nagger, and extravagant."

Fely left for the United States in 1984, abandoning their children, the youngest being six years old.

Crasus received a letter from Fely asking him to sign divorce papers, which he ignored.

By 1985, Crasus learned that Fely had remarried an American and had a child with him.

Fely returned to the Philippines several times, using her new husband's surname and presenting herself as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus."

Crasus claimed Fely's actions indicated psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations, constituting grounds for nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Fely countered the Complaint on June 5, 1997, asserting her American citizenship since 1988 and her legal marriage to Stephen Micklus.

Fely denied Crasus's allegations, claiming her departure was due to financial necessity and that she supported their children.

The RTC ruled in favor of Crasus on October 30, 1998, declaring the marriage null and void.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC's ruling on July 30, 2001.

The Republic then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was applicable to the case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of Fely's psychological incapacity, reversing the RTC's and Court of Appeals' decisions.

The Court held that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code was not applicable since Fely was still a Filipino citizen when she obtained her divorce.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the party seeking the declaration of nullity, and any doubt should favor the validity of the marriage.

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ARTICLE 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.

If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality.

The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (60a)

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116

Jun 30, 1989

Facts:

Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (petitioner) and Erich Ekkchard Geiling (private respondent) were married on September 7, 1979, in Germany.

Imelda is a Filipino citizen; Erich is a German national.

They lived in Malate, Manila, where their daughter, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.

Their marriage deteriorated, leading to a de facto separation.

In January 1983, Erich filed for divorce in Germany, citing the failure of their marriage.

Imelda filed for legal separation, support, and separation of property in the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983 (Civil Case No. 83-15866).

On January 15, 1986, the German court granted a divorce decree, awarding custody of their child to Imelda.

On June 27, 1986, Erich filed two complaints for adultery against Imelda, alleging infidelity with William Chia and Jesus Chua.

The City Fiscal initially recommended dismissal due to insufficient evidence but later issued a resolution to file the complaints.

The cases were assigned to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Imelda sought to dismiss the cases through a petition to the Secretary of Justice, resulting in a temporary restraining order against one case's arraignment.

The respondent judge denied her motion to quash in the other case, prompting her to file a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal action was proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil.

The order denying her motion to quash was set aside.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, adultery can only be prosecuted upon a sworn written complaint from the offended spouse.

This requirement is jurisdictional; without it, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case.

The offended spouse must be legally married to the accused at the time of filing the complaint.

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ARTICLE 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119190

Jan 16, 1997

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi (petitioner) and Gina Lao-Tsoi (respondent) were married on May 22, 1988, at the Manila Cathedral.

They spent their first night at Gina's mother's home, where no sexual intercourse occurred.

This pattern continued for several nights, and a honeymoon in Baguio City also lacked sexual contact.

The couple lived together until their separation on March 15, 1989, without engaging in sexual relations.

Gina claimed Chi was impotent and possibly a closet homosexual, alleging he married her for residency status.

Chi contended that Gina was avoiding intimacy and expressed his love for her, opposing the annulment.

Gina filed for annulment in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) based on psychological incapacity.

The trial court ruled in favor of Gina, declaring the marriage void due to the absence of sexual intercourse.

Chi appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling on November 29, 1994, and denied Chi's motion for reconsideration on February 14, 1995.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has Psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, stating that the trial court's findings were supported by evidence.

The absence of sexual intercourse over a significant period was deemed indicative of psychological incapacity

The ruling was based on the interpretation of psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court highlighted that the lack of sexual relations over ten months of cohabitation indicated a serious personality disorder, constituting psychological incapacity.

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ARTICLE 49. Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are governed by special laws. (n)

Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Election

G.R. No. 221697

Mar 8, 2016

Facts:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was abandoned as a newborn on September 3, 1968, in Jaro, Iloilo.

Edgardo Militar found and registered her as a foundling on September 6, 1968, under the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."

She was adopted at age five by Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe on May 13, 1974, changing her name to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."

In 2006, her adoptive mother executed an affidavit to correct the adoption record, leading to a new Certificate of Live Birth.

Mary Grace registered as a voter in 1986 and obtained several Philippine passports.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares in 1991 and became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

After her father's death in 2004, she returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, and purchased property in Quezon City.

She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines on July 7, 2006, and reacquired her Philippine citizenship on July 18, 2006.

In 2012, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator, declaring a residence of "6 years and 6 months."

Elected as Senator in 2013, she filed her COC for the presidency on October 15, 2015, claiming a residence of "10 years and 11 months."

Issue:

Whether of not the petitioner was a Natural Filipino Citizen.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

The Supreme Court emphasized that foundlings are presumed to be natural-born citizens under Philippine law, despite the 1935 Constitution's silence on the issue.

The Court referenced international law principles supporting citizenship for foundlings in the country where they are found.

The burden of proof lies with those challenging her citizenship status, and evidence suggested a high probability that she was a Filipino citizen.

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ARTICLE 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Fragante

G.R. No. L-770

Apr 27, 1948

Facts:

Angel T. Limjoco is the petitioner against the intestate estate of Pedro O. Fragante, the respondent.

On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, led by Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibanez, issued a decision in case No. 4572.

Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.

The Commission found that granting the application served public interest, as Fragante was a Filipino citizen and his estate could maintain the service.

The Commission overruled opposition and issued a certificate allowing the estate to operate an ice plant with a daily capacity of 2.5 tons.

Limjoco opposed the decision, raising four assignments of error regarding legality, evidence, opportunity for existing operators, and policy adherence.

Limjoco argued that the substitution of Fragante's estate as the applicant was erroneous and contravened the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in its decision.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Public Service Commission did not err in allowing the intestate estate of Pedro O. Fragante to substitute as the applicant.

The Court held that the estate of Pedro O. Fragante is considered a "person" under the Public Service Act.

The Supreme Court reasoned that Fragante's right to pursue the application did not lapse upon his death, as it was an asset of his estate.

The legal representative of the estate can act on behalf of the deceased in matters that survive their death, including unfinished proceedings.

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ARTICLE 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

People vs. Aragon

G.R. No. L-5930

Feb 17, 1954

Facts:

Abelo Aragon was charged with bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The charge arose from his second marriage to Efigenia C. Palomer on September 21, 1947, while his first marriage to Martina Godinez was still valid.

The information for the bigamy charge was filed on May 22, 1951.

Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil action against Aragon on October 11, 1951, claiming he coerced her into marriage through threats and intimidation, seeking annulment.

On April 30, 1952, Aragon requested a provisional dismissal of the bigamy charge, arguing that the civil annulment case was a prejudicial question.

The trial court denied his motion, stating the validity of the second marriage could be determined in the context of the bigamy charge.

Aragon appealed the trial court's order.

Issue:

whether or not prejudicial question was present in the case.

Ruling:

The court upheld the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge.

It ruled that the civil action for annulment was not a prejudicial question affecting the criminal case.

A prejudicial question must be resolved before addressing the main issue and must be determinative of the case, with jurisdiction lying in another tribunal.

The court found that the civil annulment action did not meet these criteria.

The validity of the second marriage, even if voidable, did not negate the criminal charge of bigamy.

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ARTICLE 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

People vs. Bayotas y Cordova

G.R. No. 102007

Sep 2, 1994

Facts:

The case involves People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. No. 102007.

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. C-3217 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 16.

He was convicted on June 19, 1991, by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.

Bayotas filed an appeal after his conviction.

He died on February 4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to hepatic encephalopathy from gastric malignancy.

The Supreme Court issued a resolution on May 20, 1992, dismissing the criminal aspect of the appeal but requiring the Solicitor General to comment on Bayotas' civil liability.

The Solicitor General argued that Bayotas' death did not extinguish his civil liability, citing People v. Sendaydiego.

Bayotas' counsel contended that his death during the appeal extinguished both criminal and civil liabilities, referencing People v. Castillo and Ocfemia.

Issue:

whether or not the accused pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal liability and civil liability.

The decision was based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that criminal liability is extinguished by the death of the convict, particularly concerning personal penalties.

For pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only if death occurs before final judgment.

"Final judgment" refers to a judgment that is enforceable and beyond recall.

The ruling in People v. Castillo established that civil liability is linked to criminal liability; if the accused dies before a final judgment, there can be no determination of guilt, and thus, no civil liability.