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Proof that not only am I a sword lesbian, I’m a dual wielding disaster femme
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The problem with moderation is two fold.
The problem with moderation is two fold. You can to some degree crowd source it, by relying on reports. This can be gamed of course, mass reporting fraud, etc. Because reports are anonymous (and there are good reasons for that), its hard for individuals to know when the system is gamed.
you could require reports to be public, and have an audit trail. But how do you prevent bots and sockpuppet accounts? You create a cost to create an account. To prevent the direct abuse via "buying moderation" , the cost has to not "fungible" i.e. directly convertible to money.
Ranked voting systems can be used to reduce the risk of mass reporting, but having audit trails can revel system abuse. So by tying it all to digital identities, and peer to peer verification, you can create a system, that is resistant to abuse and gaming,
So if you move to a new platform, this is what you want. It doesn't have to rely on email address, phone numbers, apps. But it does rely to secure digital account management. This is what I envision for Psuednonymous Identity. In a distributed computing environments this is similar to protocols like bittorrent and bitcoin, with the idea that it's not directly money. Relying on proof of work protocols we know is subject to many failure modes and waste of electricity. But creating small networks can work.
This is observability networks. Community networks that are mathematically resistant and self determining
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Proof of Observability
Abstract: Managing identity and account recovery, beyond the bounds of MFA.. Proof of Observability. Pseudonymous identity. Ability to recover from catastrophic loss of secret keys, hardware tokens, computers, and mobile devices. Examining the question of human based secret recovery,. Revisiting the web of trust in the age of social media. Understanding that the most at risk users are the one most in need of high security. Understand the potential role of proof of observability ledgers, with a focus on observability networks, undeniably signatures and hard anonymity. The use of secret sharing methods to create identity control blocks. Understanding the difference between statutory identity and persistent global Pseudonymous identity.Understanding why this is important in modern social context. Mitigating the risks of global identities. Bootstrapping the protocol using peer to peer methods over existing protocols. Avoiding federated protocols to avoid monopolistic oligarchies. Avoiding the pitfalls of failure to scale. Understanding human factors and cryptography engineering in a combined system.
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Identity, authentication, anonymity; Pseudonymous identity and recovery in an uncaring world. Revision 2.1a
Identity, authentication, anonymity; Pseudonymous identity and recovery in an uncaring world. Revision 2.1a This paper explores managing identity and account recovery, going beyond multi-factor authentication (MFA) and examining the potential role of using proof of observability ledgers. The focus is on observability networks, undeniably signatures, and hard anonymity. The goal is to allow users to recover from catastrophic losses of secret keys, hardware tokens, computers, and mobile devices while still maintaining a pseudonymous identity. The paper also discusses the question of human-based secret recovery and revisits the web of trust in the age of social media. It emphasizes that the users most at risk are the ones who need the highest level of security. To achieve this, the paper proposes using secret sharing methods to create identity control blocks, understanding the difference between statutory identity and persistent global pseudonymous identity, and recognizing why this is important in the modern social context. Mitigating the risks of global identities is also discussed, and the paper proposes bootstrapping the protocol using peer-to-peer methods over existing protocols. The pitfalls of failure to scale are highlighted, and the importance of considering human factors and cryptography engineering in a combined system is emphasized. The paper suggests avoiding federated protocols to prevent monopolistic oligarchies from emerging. Since these identities are not tied to a central service they are not entrapped to a walled garden and can freely move from service to service. With operational conformance to OpenID Oauth2 and Fido U2F they can quickly be deployed to many existing services. To ensure secure key recovery, players use Shamir's secret sharing to publish a specific number of recovery key bits to a subset of peers. The reconvocation key of the primary key is also published this way. Although not all members will sign everyone's key, all group members watch the log, and groups can be of arbitrary sizes based on performance and connectedness. Players should be in multiple groups, and auto-summaries of group hashes are published to prevent rollbacks. In case a player loses their primary hardware key, they can convince N out of M of their key partners to publish their revocation token. All actions in the game use N of M fail/stop multi-party computation, and the game doesn't require a central authority or policy-setting organization since it relies on hardware tokens and published revocation and recovery keys. In practical operation the game will be designed to cause tokens to fail to simulate key loss, as well as designate some players as attackers. Each token will initially be loaded with a “Alias” and “True Name”. Attackers will have “Agent Smith” in the true name field. A play variant may be created where cheating detection by the group can force the reveal of the “True Name”.
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