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From Kabul to Baghdad, A Bird’s-Eye View

by Thomas Friedman

I just spent eight days traveling with the Air Force to all of its key forward bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. So President Trump’s speech on Monday night was very timely for me. It was also unnerving.

It was so full of bombast and clichés, so larded with phrases like “we will break their will,” so lacking in details and, most of all, so lacking in humility in confronting a problem and a region that has vexed better men for ages that I still don’t know where he’s going — only that he is going there very definitively.

I totally agreed with the president’s remarks that our men and women serving in the Middle East “deserve to return to a country that is not at war with itself at home.” But the rank hypocrisy of this man — who has done so much to divide us in recent months to satisfy only his “base” — using our troops as a prop to extol the virtues of national unity made me sick to my stomach.

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The Hermit Hypocrisy

The bomb slinging by both President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has not yet given way to the real thing. Despite Trump’s “fiery” statements, he is not wrong on the Hermit Kingdom. The North Korean problem has plagued administration after administration without any favorable results.

Rebukes and rebuffed invitations have lead us to this catastrophic certainty: North Korea will almost certainly achieve their nuclear ambitions.  With this in mind, our leaders should push for new approaches to this daunting prospect. A combined approach of diplomacy and containment would provide the much needed security support to our allies while giving North Korea an on-ramp to rejoin the global community.

How should the United States face this looming challenge? First, contrary to conventional wisdom, North Korea’s nuclear inevitability could prove to be an international triumph. It’s possible that, over time and with nukes in hand, the North would lower their drawbridge to the world. The North’s nuclear arsenal will likely protect it from external threats, which might allow the regime to focus on the domestic issues of its citizens.

There’s no significant evidence that the North would be any more likely to use nuclear weapons than their nuclear-powered counterparts. As Thomas Friedman writes, “North Korea’s ruling Kim family is homicidal, but it has not survived for three generations by being suicidal. And firing a nuclear missile at us would be suicide.”

Incidents aside, countries with nuclear arms — China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, India, Pakistan, and Israel — have conducted themselves in a manner befitting such destructive power.

More importantly, few options remain for those who oppose this foregone conclusion. War would leave hundreds of thousands dead without removing the North’s nuclear crosshairs from the continental United States and victory would be far from certain.  

Less apocalyptic options aren’t very appealing either. Sanctions are mere half measures for a regime so close to the nuclear promised land and China is unlikely to apply the pressure needed to shift North Korea’s calculus. China would rather have an unpredictable nuclear capable neighbor than a US ally on its border. China continues to walk the tightrope between their interests in North Korea and their relations with the world.

Of late, China has relaxed its support of North Korea in certain areas. They, along with Russia, supported UN sanctions against the regime. Potentially more important are reports that the Chinese have decided they would not defend the North if they provoked an international conflict.

Those less apocalyptic options require a more complex approach. If a nuclear powered North is inevitable, then the country must come to terms with it. Rather than worry about when the North Korea will get “the bomb” we should be looking for diplomatic solutions to bring this menace into the global community.

Overtures in the past have done little to quell the North’s aggressive rhetoric and nuclear tenacity. As with the Soviets, we won’t be able to sit back and take North Korea at their word. Diplomat George Kennan once said of the Soviets that, “the accords were fig leaves of democratic procedure to hide the nakedness of Stalinist dictatorship.” Similar logic often applies to diplomatic accords with North Korea.

Diplomatic delay tactics and broken promises often accompany North Korean agreements. Protected by China, the North has acted like a child raised without rules. Only time will tell if the Hermit Kingdom’s baby blanket of nuclear arms will lead them on a path toward global reconciliation.

North Korea’s economy has grown significantly since the king took his throne. This growth could signal Kim’s broader ambitions and that shift toward reconciliation once he has secured his spot atop the throne. He’s investing heavily in infrastructure not known for going boom. Beyond bombs and bullets, Kim has invested in orphanages, factories, amusement parks and other similar ventures since taking power in 2011.  

These investments, if continued, should provide a measure of stability and decrease any future domestic turmoil.

In a sign of supreme confidence in both his nuclear arsenal and his domestic situation, Kim has only increased his rhetoric over the last several months. Kim’s peace through strength approach has won him the short game. Since nuclear-armed nations are rarely attacked, it seems he has protected his regime from outside actors for the time being.

The long game, however, may prove more challenging. Jong-un will need to continue domestic investments, but the more he provides the more will be expected. Given the state of the North Korean economy, providing sustained benefits to the North Korean people will be challenging. Most improvements to date have been superficial measures like theme parks and ski resorts. If Kim wants stave off a Venezuelan-style disaster he will need to generate substantial economic growth over time. In refocusing efforts inward and away from bombastic military adventurism Kim could make other world powers more willing to do business with his regime. That’s especially true of nations unaligned with western interests. Increased economic aid, trade, and investments should spurn the growth required to ensure stability.  

The North has the weapons, that game is over and we’ve lost. Now we must find ways to contain and converse with the Hermit Kingdom to ensure regional stability and our own security. Given Kim’s actions, that may not prove as impossible as some would believe. If we can live with a nuclear armed Pakistan and the threat of armed terrorists seizing their arsenal, North Korea should be a walk in a Pyongyang park.

[dustinwmooney]

Admiral William H. McRaven’s Commencement Address to the University of Texas at Austin in 2014

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Asia's Dilemma: China's Butter, or America's Guns?

by Rodger Baker

Flying into Singapore's Changi Airport, one is struck by the fleet of ships lined up off shore, the tendrils of a global trade network squeezing through the narrow Malacca Strait. Singapore is the hub, the connector between the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific. Since the late 1970s, with little exception, trade has amounted to some 300 percent of Singapore's total gross domestic product, with exports making up between 150 and 230 percent of GDP. Singapore is the product of global trade, and the thriving multiethnic city-state can trace its trade role back centuries.

Having arrived in Singapore from Auckland, the contrast was stunning. It's not that New Zealand isn't heavily integrated into global trade networks — some 50 percent of its GDP is based on trade, and since its early days as a British colony it has been heavily dependent on distant trade partners. But whereas Singapore sits at the center of trade flows, New Zealand is at the far fringes, a remote outpost that has come to represent the leading edge of free trade agreements and calls for globally agreed-upon trade rules.

Given the significance of trade to the two, it is perhaps no wonder that New Zealand and Singapore were both part of the P3 countries (alongside Chile) that initiated Pacific trade talks in 2002, which emerged three years later as the first iteration of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), adding Brunei as the fourth founding signatory. Only a decade earlier, in the 1990s, trans-Pacific trade had exceeded trans-Atlantic trade, marking a shift in global patterns established for several centuries. Trade is the lifeblood of the Asia-Pacific, and even with rising examples of nationalism, the globalized world is still seen here as a greater benefit than risk. Whereas colonialism was exploitative, globalism is seen as the provision of opportunity for growth and national strength.

It is interesting that the theme of the "easternization" of the global system — the assertion that China is set to usurp the leadership role of an inward-turning United States — is not nearly as pronounced in the region as it is in the West. With regard to Singapore and New Zealand, one could argue that British heritage and history may play some role, but discussions with businessmen and policymakers from countries around the region seem less focused on the so-called Asian Century than on ensuring that global multilateral trade pacts remain the norm. Asia may trade primarily within Asia, but that doesn't mean it has any interest in being isolated from the rest of the world. And aside from assertions in some sectors in China (perhaps reminiscent of similar ideas espoused in Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s), there is little expectation that Asia is ready to take the lead, except perhaps in the promotion of open trade.

Growing Angst in the Asia-Pacific

Perhaps the most common theme I encountered in discussions in New Zealand and Singapore, and with individuals from around the region, was the future of the global trade environment — specifically, the implications of a potential trade war (or even a minor spat) between the United States and China. Like many countries in the Asia-Pacific, both Singapore and New Zealand have adapted to a basic post-Cold War regional status quo, one where economics center on China and regional security centers on the United States. But with the Brexit underway, the TPP gone, the United States flirting with a more nationalist rather than globalist trade policy, and China expanding its military activity throughout the region, there is growing angst that this unofficial balance will no longer be sustainable.

This is particularly pronounced among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 10 Southeast Asian countries (nearly all post-colonial entities) that have for decades sought to strengthen their hand internationally through cooperation and shared negotiations. Nearly a quarter of ASEAN trade is within the bloc, but better than 19 percent is with China and Hong Kong. Overall, Asia and the West Pacific account for more than 66 percent of ASEAN's total trade. Just 10 percent is with the European Union and 9.4 percent with the United States. While economics is regional, security looks abroad. Two ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines, are formal treaty alliance partners with the United States, and several others have established or developing defense relations. There is little real complaint from the ASEAN states (or from countries including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) of the United States' unofficial role as guarantor of freedom of navigation in the seas in the region. But there are growing challenges with China's expanding military activity and evolving assertion of its own role as the rightful regional security hegemon.

So long as China was largely seen as a beneficial trading partner and a source of investment, but fairly innocuous when it came to involvement in local politics or security, the dualistic approach toward Washington and Beijing was seen as not only acceptable, but preferential. China's economic heft balanced the United States' military heft, and vice versa. A slight sense of competition for regional friends between Beijing and Washington could be exploited to ASEAN's benefit, and even South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — close U.S. partners — saw merit to the system. China would increase its offer of preferential investments or trade access, Washington would counter with offers of more trade but also keep China's broader regional ambitions in check. This semi-equilibrium has been breaking down over the past several years, with two apparent case studies being the Philippines and South Korea.

When Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office last year, he challenged the country's defense relationship with the United States, arguing that close ties with Washington had undermined Philippine relations with Beijing without providing security against China's occupation and construction on disputed islets. Essentially, the Philippines lost economic opportunities with China yet failed to benefit from security guarantees by the United States. It was the worst of both worlds. Duterte has since pursued a policy far different from that of his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who doubled down on the relationship with the United States and took a largely confrontational attitude toward China. This is not to say that Manila has simply accepted the dual economic and security role for China in the region. It continues to assert its own rights, is expanding economic and security ties with Japan, and continues to engage with U.S. military forces in the region — and in the Philippines itself.

South Korea is another case study in the dualistic policy of tying the economy to China and security to the United States, perhaps more overtly than most other countries in the region. South Korea has free trade agreements with both the United States and China. A quarter of South Korean exports go to China, a number that nears 30 percent when adding in Hong Kong. This compared with 14 percent to the United States. Meanwhile, China accounts for 21 percent of South Korean imports, while the United States accounts for just 10 percent. And China's role in the overall Korean supply chain, particularly with electronics, is masked in these baseline numbers. But when it comes to defense, the balance is entirely one-sided. The United States maintains 28,500 troops on the Korean Peninsula and retains operational control of South Korean forces in the Combined Forces Command, should hostilities with the North break out.

South Korea's decision to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system triggered a strong outcry from China. Beijing began complaining even before Seoul and Washington entered formal discussions about the deployment, and since a decision was made it has used unofficial measures to strike at the South Korean economy. Tourism flows to South Korea have slowed, Korean cultural and entertainment exports and tours in China have been curtailed, and Korean businesses are facing boycotts, spools of red tape and bureaucratic sluggishness. Washington, in return, has accelerated the pace of THAAD deployment, hoping to complete the placement of the systems before early South Korean elections, which are likely to bring a progressive candidate to power — one who could revisit the THAAD agreement.

A Broken Consensus

With U.S. participation in the TPP off the table, and U.S. defense seen as either insufficient to address regional concerns or, going to the other extreme, exacerbating economic challenges with China, there is a growing sense throughout Asia that the United States is simply not able to be counted on as a counterweight to China, at least not for the next several years. China's expanded military capability and activity is only reinforcing these views. The consensus forming is that the status quo balance between Chinese economy and U.S. security has already broken down. China's expansion was not effectively countered, whether by the so-called U.S. pivot (or re-balance) to Asia or by U.S. engagement with ASEAN and regional trade initiatives. For many in the region, it is not a question of what they prefer, but rather an acknowledgement of the shifting regional realities. When a country the size of China begins to assert its own interests, changes to the existing regional structure are inevitable.

The discussion now is about options. Simply accepting that China will be a regional hegemon is unlikely for most countries in the region. Even the Philippines, which has seen such a dramatic shift in its public policy, is looking for a balancer to China's regional power and influence, possibly in Japan. And South Korea is re-thinking its overreliance on the Chinese economy. Some countries that were in the expanded TPP are looking to maintain momentum even without the United States, hoping that together they can either shape China's economic behavior or perhaps lure the United States back into at least a modified version of the trade agreement down the road. ASEAN is pressing for the long-delayed Code of Conduct with China to try to curtail China's apparent expansionist tendencies. But few individually or together have the overall heft of the United States.

In Singapore and New Zealand, two countries that have successfully navigated their dual relations with Washington and Beijing for some time, there is a fear that they may be forced to choose. If a trade war breaks out between the United States and China, it will not be only about trade; it will be about regional relationships, about interpretations of the rights of passage through the South China Sea, about the options for dealing with North Korea — in short, about the whole of Asia-Pacific stability. China is facing deep structural challenges as it undertakes the painful transition from an export-based economy to a consumption-based one, and it will consider any strong U.S. economic action to be a clear attempt to disrupt the transition and contain China. The United States sees each further step by China to assert its military capability through the South China Sea as a clear challenge to a core interest of freedom of navigation and control of the seas.

Stuck between these two powers lie the Asia-Pacific countries, adapting to the changing balance of power and fearing a dramatic break in the pattern. Their ability to play both sides, to use the bookend powers of the Pacific Ocean as counterweights, may prove untenable if the there is a substantial slide in U.S.-China relations toward the negative. Few in the region are eager to choose sides, all are assessing their limited options, and the pervading hope is that somehow Washington and Beijing will continue their uneasy dance, leaving Asia-Pacific countries space enough to cheer both on.

Asia's Dilemma: China's Butter, or America's Guns is republished with permission of Stratfor.

[dustinwmooney]

Republicans Crash and Burn on Health Care

The seventeen-day standoff between Republicans from different sides of the aisle ended with President Trump stepping away from any health care legislation entirely. The Republican’s failure on health care reform has left many Americans questioning their elected representative's campaign promises. It has also left members of Congress questioning where they politically stand on health care and other divisive issues. Health care is perhaps the most fundamental issue in American politics, and rightly so as according to the World Bank health care costs represent 17.1% of the economy as a percentage of GDP – up from 13.1% in 1995. As we have seen with the Affordable Care Act (also known as ObamaCare), when you pass a massive piece of legislation, without bipartisan support, the political consequences can be dire.

The House bill, the American Health Care Act, which was originally crafted in secret, came under immediate scrutiny from all sides. Congressional officials, on the left and right, dove in front of news cameras like rabid dogs to share their displeasure with the hastily crafted legislation. The Freedom Caucus has said they couldn't support the bill because it left parts of the Affordable Care Act in place and didn't go far enough. The President, for his part, visited Capitol Hill several times to show Republicans some marginal level of support for their reckless push into the abyss. President Trump’s apparent handshakes and arm-twisting had little effect on GOP members though, as the bill was removed from the legislative calendar twice before being abandoned completely.

The newly elected majority on Capitol Hill rightly believe they have a responsibility to fulfill the promises made to their voters during the tumultuous 2016 campaign. However, as in 2010, this could have a disastrous political impact in future elections. As President Trump alluded to in a press conference from January, … “We don’t wanna own it, we don’t wanna own it politically. They own it right now. So the easiest thing would be to let it implode in ’17 and believe me, we’d get pretty much whatever we wanted, but it would take a long time.”

Politically, the President is right on point, the Pottery Barn rule applies … if the Republicans break health care, they will own it in the next elections. That could have explained the President's lackluster public support for the legislation throughout its seventeen-day existence. Moreover, ideas like risk pools are outdated solutions to modern problems, especially given the Republicans promise to protect those with pre-existing conditions similar to ObamaCare. 

The issues facing ObamaCare are undeniable. Currently, they rest solely in the lap of the Democrats on Capitol Hill and, even more so, upon former President Obama himself. The Republican Plan, which appears to have been haphazardly contrived in the dead of night, would have shifted the responsibility for health care in the United States to the Republicans. 

From a political perspective, the ideal solution would have been to pass the legislation in the House, only to later have it die in the Senate. However, that outcome never came to fruition. That scenario would have provided some measure of political cover for House Republicans who have promised to repeal ObamaCare since its inception. This could have been a well-rounded political solution if it had succeeded. But in this case, it seems the ideals of the perfect outweighed the logistics of the good. 

Politics aside, the legislation itself had a lot of issues and unknowns. In that respect, it was not dissimilar from the passing of the Affordable Care Act. As most will recall then-Speaker Pelosi’s statement, "we have to pass the bill so that you can find out what is in it, away from the fog of the controversy." The proposed Republican Plan maintained many of ObamaCare’s foundational principals in an effort ensure passage in the Senate by reconciliation. Since the election of President Trump, there has been a noticeable increase in the approval ratings of the Affordable Care Act. This likely played a large role in the decision-making of moderate Republicans as they came to their final determination. 

With the release of the Republican’s plan, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presented its estimate of the legislation prior to any scheduled votes. The one positive is that the original estimate indicated that the federal deficits would decrease by $337 billion over a ten-year period. However, that estimate was later reduced significantly based upon alterations to the bill, in an effort to sway more conservative votes. According to the CBO, the largest savings would have come from reductions in outlays for Medicaid and from the elimination of ObamaCare subsidies for non-group health insurance plans.  

Despite that positive point, the CBO also estimated that in 2018 alone, an estimated 14 million more people would be uninsured in comparison to those under current law. Furthermore, the CBO’s estimate suggested that the plan would have eliminated the coverage of an additional 10 million within ten years. 

The Republicans’ fetish-like infatuation with health care instruments like Health Savings Accounts, or HSA’s, is exceedingly evident. The assumption in Congress is that individuals would put a portion of their salaries into a savings account, dedicated to health care, in exchange for tax incentives. In practice, this may have been an incentive for higher wage earners, but has been very impractical to expect deposits to savings accounts from those who earn lower salaries. Moreover, HSA’s are not designed like 401(k)’s where there is an employer match which increases the incentive to save. 

So, what are we to think? It seems safe to surmise that our current health care system, created under the Affordable Care Act, will remain unchanged and in place for the foreseeable future. Republicans, and more particularly President Trump, seem unwilling to dedicate any more time or political capital to this political quagmire. 

President Trump has repeatedly stated that his “Plan B” for health care would be to allow ObamaCare to collapse under its own weight. However, it appears unlikely that ObamaCare will collapse as quickly as President Trump and Republicans have suggested. Nonetheless, Republicans and Democrats will eventually need to go back to the drawing board if they want to fix this politically toxic issue. Indeed, suggestions have already been made that a bipartisan deal could be reached at some point later down the road ….and most likely, much later. 

The most problematic aspects of the Affordable Care Act; the rising costs of premiums and deductibles, as well as the increasing lack of market-based insurance solutions for many around the country are not likely to change without government intervention. So, for now, everyone will just have to wait and see. For many, they can rest more comfortably knowing the health care system as they’ve come to know it will remain unchanged.

[dustinwmooney]

The Issue of Homegrown Extremism

The tragic events in Orlando have certainly shaken the current political and media landscape, a not-uncommon phenomenon with these types of devastating events. The shooter, Omar Mir Seddique Mateen, killed 49 and wounded 53 others; many of whom remain in critical condition.

At present, the media has done an adequate job of presenting information to the public as it has become available. That information included the shooter’s 911 call proclaiming his allegiance to ISIS. Information that is certainly in the realm of the publics right to know.  

In the wake of the current political circus, during a speech addressing the massacre President Obama launched a full throated defense for not using the term “Islam” when talking about terrorism. In his speech he cited various disenfranchising factors of using such terminology and heartfelt proposition that we should rather build bridges with Muslim-Americans and Islamic communities.

Declaring that this lunatic was inspired, much less apart of ISIS is much like arguing Peyton Manning and Arnold Palmer are long-time teammates because they’ve both won championships while completely ignoring the fact that they were professional athletes for two completely different sports. While the facts surrounding a case such as this should not be ignored, there is a national fervor for ISIS related “news", and media outlets are fiercely obliging the wishes of their viewers.

By doing that we’re elevating the importance and impact of the self-proclaimed Islamic State when much of the evidence suggest that they have been put on the defensive. While online radicalization is certainly an important factor to consider in this case, a deeper dive into the psychological state of the shooter shows that he had a lot of deeper issues. It appears more likely that he choose to use ISIS’s extremist ideology as a crutch for his actions.  

Going beyond parenthetically mentioning the shooters 911 call joining his beliefs and ideologies with those of ISIS is ludicrous. Mateen, prior to proclaiming allegiance to ISIS had apparently claimed or showed admiration for both Jabat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s Syrian wing) and Hezbollah (the Lebanese based terrorist and political organization). The views of these respective terrorists groups are as diverse as the shooters alleged sexual preferences.

The threat from both domestic and international extremism is real and pervasive, it’s for that exact reason that the threat shouldn’t be amplified except in cases where the overwhelming preponderance of evidence warrants it. If we allowed every act of lunacy to be considered an act of “terror” then when actual terrorist attacks occur (e.g. Nidal Hassan, Bataclan, etc.) that are acts of terrorism of the magnitude that warrant such a response are less likely to mean as much and less likely to be responded to appropriately.

Much debate has been made in the post-9/11 era of whether to treat terrorism as a law enforcement or military matter. As with most debates the answer typically resides somewhere in the middle. But in this specific case, it is clearly a law enforcement issue and since we do not currently live in the age of “pre-crime” we’re going to have to accept two very simple concepts:

The first is that law enforcement agencies are inherently designed to be reactive rather than proactive. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the keyword is “investigation” and that clearly indicates their function; to investigate crimes once they’ve been committed. While local and federal law enforcement agencies have made strides in their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks nationwide, this system is fundamentally flawed because of the constitutional and judicial constraints that these agencies must adhere to.

The second concept is that this scourge of violence in the name of Islam will never cease until we defeat the ideology itself, something that will be no easy task. As long as these groups continue to promote their agenda, have any measure of success on the battlefield and can continue their massive propaganda campaigns then they will continue to find impressionable young men who will carry out violent acts on their behalf.

This age of bootstrapped terrorism is nothing new, but has in many ways been perfected by the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The leaders of these groups understand, in a way that al-Qaeda has only just grasped, that they do not need to expend the time a resources to plan large scale attacks beyond the areas of their control. Attacks of such magnitude require massive efforts, at least some financial resources, communication networks and well trained attackers in order to be successful. Even if those components are in place law enforcement and intelligence agencies the world over have become extremely adept and foiling these plots.

Organizations like the Islamic State have concluded that it’s much more efficient and effective to convince indigenous impressionable young men to carry out these attacks on their behalf, no matter the scale. The likelihood of such lone-wolf attacks is directly correlated to the strength of these organizations in the places where they operate. As we see their relative strength wane, the probability of such attacks on the homeland should do so in kind.