echoesoftheeast

[echoesoftheeast]

Why I No Longer Believe in God

I am sure that even seeing the title of this post will be shocking for anyone who has known me within the last 10 years. As someone who grew up within an Evangelical-Mennonite community, embraced Christianity wholeheartedly at the age of 19, converted from the Mennonite faith to Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and even played a role in establishing an Orthodox liturgical community in Winkler, I am sure that the last thing that anyone expected to find out was that I have lost all belief in a God. Before I spell out the reasons why I am no longer a believer, I want to clarify what this loss of belief DOESN’T mean: 1) I don’t hate religion. I still recognize and understand all the good that religious faith (along with the unnumerable shameful things) has contributed to society throughout history. I give credit to where credit is due. I also still have a strong aesthetic attraction to religion, particularly Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam. I keep icons in my home and read writers such as Rumi. I will always be attracted to the artistic beauty of religious architecture, liturgy, hymnography, and art. Even if I no longer subscribe to the faith being expressed by this art, it still moves me deeply. 2) I do not have any antagonism to people of faith. Pretty much all the nearest and dearest people to me back home in Canada are people of faith. I do not think that they are uneducated, illogical, or stuck in the past. People of faith have their own reasons for why they cannot understand the world we live in apart from the existence of a God and I respect people’s beliefs, regardless of what they are or if I agree with them. There is still a part of me that wishes that I could still believe in a God, even if it is an impossibility for me at this point in my life. 3) I am not interested in “de-converting” people. Back when I was a believer, I always found “atheist evangelists” a strange phenomenon. I do not see any value in trying to convince anyone to not believe in anything and would rather live a life of mutual respect and acceptance. 4) I do not have all the answers. Even though my world view has naturally changed completely, I do not claim to have answers to every question about the existence/non-existence of God. Life has been chaotic for me for a while now and I have not had the necessary time to consider every facet of life from a non-theistic perspective to have a definitive position on a variety of fundamental questions regarding life and existence. This means that if someone asks me the sort of question that goes like “If God doesn’t exist, then how do you explain___?” I likely will not have a definitive answer. My life and my perspectives are still a work in progress. 5) I still believe in the necessity of morality. Contrary to the opinion of Dostoevsky who wrote that without God, everything is permissible, I still believe that morality and a consideration on how we treat other people is an inescapable necessity in life. While my definitions of what is right and wrong may be more subjective since they are no longer tied to the idea that morality is rooted within the commandments of a God, I still believe that there is much value in the moral teachings found in religion which help regulate interactions and maintain healthy relationships. If someone would ask me why I would even bother if I do not believe that there is any post-mortem reward of punishment for our behaviour, my answer would simply be that I’d rather live happily now with healthy relationships and if you’re a self-centered, inconsiderate, selfish jerk to everyone, you’re not going to have a happy life. Obviously this doesn’t encapsulate the entirety of my worldview/values at this point in my life (as my fourth note set out to explain) but I believe that these points are important to keep in mind before I move on and explain why I no longer hold onto any theistic beliefs. However, I know that anyone reading this is not primarily interested in the above points and wants to know why I am an atheist now after having been such a dedicated believer for the last 10 years of my life. With that being said, let us move on to the main subject. The foundation of my disbelief is rooted in a few interrelated issues: 1) The problem of evil 2) The traditional attributes of God 3) The issue of human freedom 4) A flawed creation from a perfect God 5) The contradiction between the doctrines of creation and eschatology Nothing here is entirely knew in the history of atheism so I’m not pretending that I’ve discovered some never before heard of reasons to reject belief in a God. However, I do think that I have come to my own conclusions with these issues which may be unique to myself, as I have never seen them articulated elsewhere (though that may simply betray the lack of atheistic literature that I have read). I will begin with the age-old objection: how can there be so much pain, suffering, and evil in a world created by an all good, all powerful, perfect God? For years I was able to disregard this objection with the simple retort that since God is Love, it was necessary for Him to create humans with free choice, since love is a free response and can not be compelled. The side effect of this gift of freedom is the possibility to misuse this freedom and therefore turn away from God, thereby disordering the perfect order of creation and ultimately excusing God from any wrongdoing. Later, I will explain how this answer no longer is adequate. According to traditional Christian theology, God is the existence beyond existence, the supra-existential being beyond all being, the perfect communion of love, and the source of all life, being, and goodness (among innumerable other cataphatic and apophatic affirmations). Since God has always been and has always been the plenitude of perfection of power, knowledge, and goodness, this means that even before the indescribable moment when He began to bring the material universe into existence, every single moment, event, and individual that would come to exist was already known to Him (since if there was anything which was not known to Him, this would imply ignorance in God, which is an impossibility since it is necessary for God to know everything). This means that God knew that His creation would turn away from Him, endure an existence of pain, misery, loss, suffering, injustice, and death. If we also take the traditional position of judgement into consideration, this means that a significant portion of His creation would ultimately be condemned to eternal punishment due to their lack of faith and wrongdoing. This means that every single person who is ultimately condemned to hell was eternally known to God and He still chose to create these people. While not all Christian traditions adhere to the doctrine of predestination, most of them hold to the doctrine of foreknowledge, which confirms that God has known all the actions and decisions of people before they make them (even if these decisions were not predestined to happen but were the result of people’s free choices). What we have here is a picture of a perfect God Who creates an imperfect world. The objection to the assertion that the world created must be perfect rests on the position that only God is perfect, and therefore creation can only be perfect if it was an extension of God Himself, therefore even though God created the world without anything bad or evil, the constant refrain in Genesis is that everything was good, there is still the potential for imperfection and deviation inherent within creation by virtue of the fact that it is creation and not God. The crack in the image appears when we consider the doctrine of the gnomic will as was articulated by one of the most preeminent Church Fathers, St. Maximus the Confessor. He wrote that the first created man was in possession of a pre-lapsarian will (this essentially means that the human will prior to the “Fall” or the first instance of sin was not disordered in any way). Due to the choice made by Adam and Eve to eat the fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, in direct disobedience to God, this has disordered the human will and resulted in all of humanity subsequently living in a state of ignorance, not knowing fully what is good and therefore living in a state of needing to choose, not immediately knowing what is good. According to Maximus, in the Age to Come when Christ will return to raise the dead, carry out the Final Judgement, and usher in the Kingdom of Heaven, the righteous will be filled completely with the Holy Spirit, granting them a perfect illumination and their gnomic wills will be healed. This means that their freedom will be preserved, but since they have their wills re-ordered and with the perfect illumination by the Holy Spirit, they will not exist in this fluctuation of not knowing the good. They will know the good perfectly and will always choose the good perfectly. This begs the question as to why God did not immediately create humanity in this state. Why didn’t He immediately grant the newly created humanity a perfect illumination? If the freedom of will can be maintained in the Kingdom of Heaven where there will not be any sin, suffering, or death, why go through aeons of this cruel existence? Why not simply create the world and humanity in this glorified state to begin with? This brings us to a contradiction in traditional Christian theology. According to the historical doctrine of creation, as can be found in “An Exact Exposition on the Orthodox Faith” by St. John of Damascus (for example), it is stated that the world that God created is the best possible world that could have been created. Since God is perfect, the world He made is the best possible world that could have been created. However, the fundamental Christian theology of the end times (“eschatology”) precisely maintains that the world to come will be better than the world that we live in now. This means that God is going to transform the world we live in and make it into a perfect version. However, this flies directly in the face of the suggestion that the original creation was the best possible option since eschatology flatly contradicts this. Eschatology says that the world to come is better than this world and even better than the world when it was first created. Once again, we are left to beg the question as to why didn’t God simply create the world in this glorified perfect state to begin with? When we tie all these threads together, this is the conclusion that I have come to: 1) God creates an imperfect world where He has known from eternity that His creation will turn away from Him, plunge the world into a state of disorder, and history will be a horrifying parade of injustices. 2) This is apparently the risk that God had to take in order to preserve the freedom of His creation, even though He is also apparently able to fully illuminate His creation in a way that their freedom is preserved and they freely make good choices. 3) This is also presented as the best possible world that God could have created, even though He will recreate this world into a perfect version. Adding all of this together, it seems to me that God was perfectly able to create a world where human freedom is preserved while sin, suffering, and death is prevented. This then brings us to the final point of traditional Christian theology with is intolerable: the doctrine of hell. How can the eternal punishment and suffering of created beings be an expression of the perfect love of God? If God is love, therefore every single act of God is an expression of love. This means that the existence of eternal maintenance of hell is necessarily an expression of the love of God. How is eternal conscious torment an expression of love? So many passages within the Gospels present God as the great Healer, the One Who recognizes the brokenness of the human condition and comes to fix us. How could any doctor be content to preserve someone in an eternal state of misery and anguish if their true desire and intent is to bring the person back to health? If God is truly love, then what sort of love is this? Here I find the words of Friedrich Nietzsche to be straight to the point, “Dante, I think, committed a crude blunder when with terror- inspiring ingenuity, he placed above the gateway of his hell the inscription "I too was created by eternal love"-at any rate, there would be more justification for placing above the gateway to the Christian Paradise and its "eternal bliss" the inscription "I too was created by eternal hate"-provided a truth may be placed above the gateway to a lie!” Perhaps those of a more sensitive disposition might point out the tradition of universalism within the Christian tradition; the belief that at some point, everyone will be saved (even if after spending a prolonged purgatorial period in hell if necessary). At first glance, this seems to solve the problem: hell is not a place of vengeful punishment, it is a place of purification and healing which is a temporary stop on towards the perfection of the whole of humanity and creation. However, even if everyone will eventually be saved, does this really bring restitution to the unspeakable horrors that have happened in this life? Here I am unable to consent to the question posed by Ivan Karamazov, “ Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature...and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on this condition?” When looking at universalism through the lenses of my previous conclusions, I hardly see how the eventual salvation of all humanity is a satisfactory resolution for all the intolerable horrors that have happened throughout history. If God can save everyone, why didn’t He create us in a state which did not need to be saved? Again, I ask, why not start things off at the end where existence is free of tear, pain, sorrow, and death? Why put us through all of this? This is love? When I weighed all these issues together, I realized that I can no longer in good conscience consider myself a believer. The contradictions between the doctrines of creation and eschatology, the unsatisfactory assertion that evil exists because humanity possesses free will when eschatological theology confirms the preservation of the will’s freedom in glorified perfection, that an all good, all powerful, all knowing God of love would willingly create this world as it is when He could have made it according to the pattern affirmed by eschatology, and that He has foreknown the eternal conscious torment of an innumerable amount of people and carried on creating them, knowing that their lives will be episodes of suffering with intervals of happiness, only to end in eternal suffering. I am unable to accept this. I understand that for many people reading this, particularly many of my friends and family back in Canada and people from the Orthodox communities that I was a part of, that this is very painful to read. I want to stress that I do not regret my time spent within the Orthodox Church and that none of my current positions are connected to any of my experiences. I cannot thank everyone enough for being there for me over the years, for all the love, all the care, and for be a living example of Jesus to me. You will all have my love and care no matter where life takes me. I also want to emphasize that there is no way that I will ever believe in God again. Perhaps a day will come where something changes in my head, or my heart, and I find faith once again. I have not closed the door and nailed it shut. However, I also need to be honest about where I am in life and I care about everyone too much to just pretend, you all deserve better than that. I have been struggling with this loss of faith for almost a year now and the fear of hurting anyone has prevented me from opening up. I have been realizing lately that lying to myself and others about how things are has only caused greater damage to my life. I have come to understand that the only way forward in my life is to be honest with myself, confront the things that have been eating me up inside, and to accept where I am in life. While I understand that many people reading this will have many questions and concerns, I kindly ask that if you wish to discuss anything with me, please refrain from messaging me directly over social media. While I will be posting this on my various social media platforms, I have no desire to get into arguments or debates. If anyone simply wants to talk or to listen, you can write me an email at wesleygiesbrecht92@gmail.com. I may not reply right away, but I will in time. Writing this has not been an easy thing and publicly sharing this has been even more difficult. I am sorry for any pain, confusion, or disappointment that I may have caused anyone by making this announcement.

[echoesoftheeast]

Russians also Collaborated with the Nazis

One of the stated goals of the Russian “special operation” (or to put it more accurately, invasion and war) in Ukraine is the ‘denazification” of the country. For many years already the mainline Russian media (that is, those who follow the Kremlin’s prescription on how to report) has depicted Ukraine as a country full of rampant right-wing nationalists who are either sympathetic to Nazis or are outright Nazis. It’s not uncommon to see reports of funeral services being held for Ukrainians who had previously served under the Nazis during WW2 where those present at the funeral are wearing Nazi military uniforms. Its also very common to see reports about the “Azov Battalion”, a Ukrainian paramilitary group that was eventually incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine. The Azov Battalion indeed uses Nazi imagery and some of its members have neo-Nazi affiliations. While it is true that there are indeed some neo-Nazi Ukrainian nationalists, it’s important to keep in mind that these people are a significant minority of the actual population of Ukraine. One of the points that are made by those who see Ukraine as a country filled with ultra-nationalist Nazis is that there was a Ukrainian division in the Nazi army: the SS Galicia. This division was founded in 1943 and was made up of predominantly Ukrainian military volunteers. The existence of the division is a historical reality, though its also important to remember that the majority of Ukrainians fought within the Red Army against the Germans, so Ukrainian collaboration was minimal. Nevertheless, the historical fact that this division existed is one of the examples used to prove that Ukrainians are Nazis. If collaboration with the Nazis therefore implicates the entire nation of the collaborators, it might be worth mentioning that the was Russian collaboration with the Nazis as well. In 1944, the German Army saw the formation of 10 divisions of the “Russian Liberation Army” (German: Russische Befreiungsarmee, Russian: Русская освободительная армия). This was organized in tandem with the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (Russian: Комитет освобождения народов России). The Russian Liberation army was led by Andrey Vlasov, a defector from the Soviet Army who agreed to collaborate with the Germans. The army was composed of both Soviet prisoners of war who agreed to collaborate as well as Russian emigres who had supported the White Army during the Russian Revolution, including veterans from the White Army itself. One could also mention the 1st Russian National Army, the Russian Protective Corps, and the Kaminski Brigade as other examples of Russian collaboration with the German Army during WW2. While the existence of neo-Nazis in Ukraine is true, Russian propaganda has exploited their existence and misrepresented their size in Ukraine (lets also not forget that there are plenty of skinheads and neo-Nazi organizations operating within Russia as well). In respect to national implication for collaboration with the Nazis during WW2, if the standards being used by the Russian propaganda machine would be applied to Russia as well, then Russians would also be labelled as Nazis (especially those who look back fondly upon the Tsarist times and the White Army, since veterans of the White Army collaborated with the Nazis). This is just one of many examples of the double standards employed by Russian propaganda and their selective presentation of history.

[echoesoftheeast]

Russia and NATO Expansion: A Brief Look Into a Complicated History

One of the justifications given by the authorities in Moscow for the current war in Ukraine is that NATO allegedly promised not to expand eastwards following the collapse of the Soviet Union. By admitting former Soviet countries (such as the Baltic republics) or other former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO, this has created a security threat to the Russian Federation. Therefore the only way to maintain Moscow’s security concerns is to prevent any further expansion of NATO into the geographical regions surrounding Russia (with Georgia and Ukraine being the most notable examples). While one can not argue whether or not the inclusion of countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or Hungary into NATO have indeed presented a security threat to Russia (evidently the authorities in Moscow seem to think so), one can make the argument that: 1) NATO never promised not to expand. 2) Russia signed an act with NATO that specifically allows for any country to join NATO and for that decision to be respected. 3) Russia actually helped Latvia and Estonia join NATO by cooperating on border conflict resolutions with them. Regarding the first point, its a common argument made by Moscow and Moscow policy supporters that NATO promised not to expand. I’ve covered this argument in a previous post where I critiqued the standard justifications for the annexation of Crimea, so I won’t spend too much time covering this point. As I mentioned in the previous post, the only official agreement that was made was over the deployment of non-German NATO forces and nuclear weapons in the former territory of the German Democratic Republic. Gorbachev himself admitted that NATO expansion was never discussed at that time. It’s also worth noting that Boris Yeltsin indeed spoke with US President Bill Clinton privately about making a gentlemen’s agreement that no former Soviet Republic would be allowed into NATO, but Clinton refused to make such an agreement, noting that he can’t make commitments on behalf of NATO since NATO operates by consensus. It’s also interesting to take into consideration that Yeltsin wrote a letter to NATO raising the question about Russia’s inclusion in the alliance. This means that if NATO would have agreed to prohibit any former Soviet countries from joining NATO, then this would have necessarily excluded Russia as well. Moving on to the second point, while Russia was obviously never made a member of NATO, they have had cooperation with NATO since 1991. One of the important moments in the history of this relationship was the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997. Within this act, Russia and NATO committed to “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act; [and] respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents.” By signing this founding act with NATO, Russia agreed to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of other countries and the right of countries to choose their own means of security. This document negates any right of Russia to decide who does or does not join NATO. Finally, Russia worked alongside both Latvia and Estonia to resolve border disputes that they had with both countries, which in turn helped both countries on their path towards NATO membership. As a 1995 NATO document studying the enlargement of NATO, it stipulated that prospective members have to have “ demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.” This means that will be more difficult for countries with territorial disputes to be considered for NATO membership. Both Latvia and Estonia had border disputes with Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The border treaty between Latvia and Russia was initiated in 1997 and the treaty between Estonia and Russia was initiated in 1999. Both Latvia and Estonia were accepted into NATO in 2004 (alongside Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania). If Russia had been intent on preventing the eastern expansion of NATO, they could have indefinitely stalled any border settlements with Latvia and Estonia and could have tried to stoke ethnic conflict in both countries via the large Russian minorities present in both countries. On the contrary, the diplomat Ron Asmus (who played a major role in the NATO enlargement discussions) noted in an interview with Latvian journalists that in 2001 the Kremlin had already accepted the fact that the Baltic countries were going to join NATO and were mainly concerned about what Russia was going to get in return for their acceptance. With these three points, we can see quite clearly that no promise was every made to Russia that the former Soviet Republics would be prohibited from joining NATO, that Russia even signed cooperative acts with NATO that confirms the eligibility of any country to seek NATO membership and for these decisions to be respected (as well as the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of said countries), and that Russia actively helped former Soviet countries in the process of joining NATO by cooperating on border dispute resolutions. All of this goes to show that the current arguments made by Moscow in regard to Ukraine have no weight to them whatsoever. The decision to join NATO is for Ukraine to make, not Russia. The sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine must also be respected by Russia in fulfillment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, a document which also stipulates that any country (which includes Ukraine) has the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.  (Relevant sources below) https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_nato_whitehouse.html#:~:text=On%20May%2014%2C%20NATO%20Secretary,between%20the%20Alliance%20and%20Russia. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-ru20060615_07/d-ru20060615_07en.pdf https://www.rferl.org/a/1075521.html https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/the-breakaways-a-retrospective-on-the-baltic-road-to-nato/ https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-history-behind-russias-claim-that-nato-promised-not-to-expand-to-the-east-177085 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm#Myths

[echoesoftheeast]

Why Moldova isn’t a part of Romania

From all of the countries in Eastern Europe, the Republic of Moldova is arguably the least well known. The tiny republic was, however, the subject of much speculation and interest in the early years following its secession from the Soviet Union as many wondered whether it would reunite with its western neighbor, Romania. Yet, over 20 years have passed and Moldova still remains an independent country with no signs of reuniting with Romania. How come? The primary reasons Moldova remains independent fall under three points: Soviet-era propaganda of “Moldovenism”, the mixed ethnic population, and the Transnistrian War of 1992.

Soviet propaganda constantly asserted that the Moldovans were a separate people from Romanians who spoke a different language (Moldovan, rather than Romanian), in order to maintain their territorial claims over the Moldovan lands, over-and-against Romania. As Dr. Argentina Grinbincea notes, “After WW II the Moldovenism was used by the Soviet authorities to justify the occupation of Bessarabia by the USSR on 28 June 1940 in accordance with the provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.”[i] Moldovenism was the state ideology of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, forming the national consciousness of Moldovans. This sense of Moldovan identity continues on to the present, as a 2018 Moldovan Demographics Profile revealed that of the 80.2% that identified as Moldovan/Romanian, 56.7% reported their native language as Moldovan, while only 23.5% reported their native language as Romanian.[ii]

Alongside the ethnic Moldovans, there are large numbers of non-Moldovan/Romanian minorities in the country; most notably Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz (a Turkic people), Bulgarians, and Roma (Gypsies). When individuals within the Popular Front, a Moldovan political party formed near the end of the Soviet Union, began calling for reunion with Romania, minority populations (particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria) became polarized and increasingly autonomously minded, as Dr. Charles King notes, “in the eyes of the Transnistrian and Gagauz leadership, the republican government had taken up a position against the national minorities.”[iii] Just as the Moldovans were divided among themselves regarding national identity, so now were the Transnistrians and Gagauz divided from the larger Moldovan population. These separatist regions, being comprised predominantly of non-Moldovans, played (and continue to play) a large role in Moldovan politics and have been an obstacle to Pan-Romanian aspirations.

The inter-ethnic conflict came to a climax in the Moldovan-Transnistrian War of 1992. The Transnistrians declared independence in the wake of the Pan-Romanian ideology of Moldova, but Moldova rejected the Transnistrian autonomous aspirations, wishing to maintain territorial integrity. The Transnistrians received military aid from Russia and an armed conflict lasted from March until July 1992. If Moldova decides to reunite with Romania, Transnistria would have the right to secede from Moldova, which would have serious economic consequences for Moldova, as Henry Srebrnik writes, “Transnistria had been heavily industrialized and though it accounted for only 17 per cent of the old Soviet republic’s population, it was responsible for 40 per cent of its GDP.”[iv]

Despite the shared history, language, and culture between Moldovans and Romanians, there’s little chance that reunification will happen. With Moldovans divided among themselves over who they are as a people group, the political influence of minorities, and the fall out of the Transnistrian War, Moldova is set to continue down the path of independence.

[i] Gribincea, A. (2006, December 6) Moldovenism: the State Ideology of the Republic of Moldova. Retrieved from https://www.moldova.org/en/moldovenism-the-state-ideology-of-the-republic-of-moldova-21091-eng/

[ii] Moldova Demographics Profile 2018. (2018, January 20) Retrieved from https://www.indexmundi.com/moldova/demographics_profile.html

[iii] King, Charles. (1999, December) The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.

[iv] Srebrnik, H. (2013, December 17) The frozen conflict between Moldova and Transnistria. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.pe.ca/opinion/letter-to-the-editor/the-frozen-conflict-between-moldova-and-transnistria-111461/

[echoesoftheeast]

In relation to my previous post, here is a map at the Mennonite Heritage Museum in Steinbach, MB, Canada that shows the former Russian Empire as Ukraine :p

[echoesoftheeast]

Russian Irredentism’s House of Cards

In a recent documentary called “Russia. New History”, Vladimir Putin spoke about the breakup of historical Russia with the collapse of the Soviet Union, “it was the disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.” This attitude that the now independent republics of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are actually historical Russia lands and the loss of them constitute one of the greatest geo-political disasters is not uncommon among certain chauvinistic Russian politicians. Speaking specifically about Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov (a former personal adviser to the Russian president) remarked in an interview that, “there is no Ukraine. There is Ukrainian-ness. That is, a specific disorder of the mind. An astonishing enthusiasm for ethnography, driven to the extreme.” In the same interview, Surkov stated that Ukraine is, “a muddle instead of a state..There is no nation. There is only a brochure, ‘The Self-Styled Ukraine’, but there is no Ukraine.” This extreme opinion (which by no means is adhered to by all Russians) which views all lands that formerly belonged to the Russian Empire or Soviet Union as imaginary states whose true existence belongs with Russia isn’t only a defective reading of history but has real world geo-political implications which can move beyond the realm of theory into the very real world of conflict. The most immediate case is the recent build up of Russian military personnel and equipment around the eastern borders of Ukraine. This has already led many political commentators to fear that a far more devastating repeat of the Crimean annexation of 2014 is in store, with certain maps proposing that Russia intends to partition Ukraine so far that all of Eastern, Central and Southern Ukraine would come under Russian control (leaving only the Western region). Whether or not a new phase of the current conflict in the Donbass is going to occur, what can be said in certainty is that Russian irredentism is more than just dangerous geo-political theory, it has the power and sometimes momentum to shape the lives of millions in the former-Soviet sphere. While irredentism has served as a foundation for modern Russian geo-political aspirations, irredentism is always a double-edged sword. If Russia can make claims for modern day territories beyond their internationally recognized borders due to historical association, what’s to prevent different irredentist aspirations from laying claim to current Russian territory? This is where we see that Russian imperial irredentism is nothing more than a house of cards which can easily be knocked down. While we could beat this horse until it’s dead, let’s take a look at just three examples which show how irredentist claims could disintegrate Russia or completely remove it from the map all together: the concept of a renewed Mongol Empire, a resurrected Kyivan-Rus, and the reestablishment of the historical Khanates conquered by Russia from the time of Ivan Grozny. The Russian Empire isn’t the only historical empire to have graced the maps of history. Anyone with even a cursory knowledge of history knows that even thought contemporary Russia is the largest country according to land mass, the Russian Empire (or its successor the USSR) were never the largest empires. The Mongol Empire can make the claim to being one of the largest (if not the largest) empires to have ever have existed. Not only did it conquer practically all of East Asia, Central Asia, and Eurasia, but much of Eastern Europe itself fell to the marauding Mongols, including most (if not all) of what is now Russia. The Mongol conquest of the Rus principalities began in the 13th century and they held power over most Russian lands (though not all the lands that are now Belarus and Ukraine) until the end of the 15th century. If Russian politicians and geo-political strategists want to make claim over non-Russian lands (even those inhabited by non-Slavs) then what is stopping Mongolia from making claims over all of Russia since they had historical control of the area for nearly three centuries? Next, we can consider the historical state of Kyivan-Rus which is considered the foundation for the three east Slavic countries: Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. While modern debates between who can genuinely consider themselves as the true successor to Kyivan-Rus is a hot topic, there’s no debate on where the political center was: the fact that the state is known as “Kyivan”-Rus is a clear indication that the central power was consolidated in Kyiv. Since Kyiv is now the capital of Ukraine, in theory the Kyivans could make claim to those regions of Belarus and Western Russia which where originally included within the historic Rus’ian principality. Here we could even imagine a sort of Greater Ukraine if we would push irredentist theory to the same extent as certain Russian claims. Finally, we can look at the disintegration of Russia with the reestablishment of independent territories that were historically held by the Muslim populations of the Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimean, and Sibir Khanates. With the expansion of Muscovite territory advancing under the rule of Tsar Ivan Grozny (more popularly known as “the Terrible”), the Muscovite Slavs began to conquer territory inhabited by non-Slavs and non-Orthodox Christians. With the Kazan Khanate falling first, next came the Astrakhan Khanate, and then with the Siberian expansion saw the incorporation of the Sibir Khanate and then finally the incorporation of the Crimean Khanate under the rule of Catherine II. If anyone has claim to territory due to historical association, it’s the various Muslim populations within Russia (not even taking the North Caucasus, and especially Chechnya) into consideration). This would effectively see Russia lose practically everything east and south of the Volga River if there was to be a drive for the establishment of independent states based upon the territories of the Khanates (then one could also mention Chinese and Japanese claims on Russian territories in the Far East, but we’ll leave that aside for now). This is the inherent weakness in any state attempting to shape contemporary borders based on historical maps and land claims. The control of land has fluctuated tremendously throughout history and very often there are multiple modern entities who could make a legitimate historical argument for control over certain territories. This is why any attempt to build geo-political policy on irredentist claims is nothing more that building a house of cards that can be swept away by alternative irredentist aspirations. Russia would be safer to focus on improving the quality of the lives of the inhabitants within their own borders rather than to seek to expand those borders based own faulty historical claims.

[echoesoftheeast]

Why I No Longer Support the Russian Annexation of Crimea

A few years ago, when I first began learning the Russian language and the histories of Eastern Europe, I was unabashedly pro-Russian in my geopolitical convictions. I still remember watching a documentary about the Maiden Revolution in Kyiv and how it was presented as being orchestrated by the West, how it resulted in the safety of Russian speakers in Ukraine being compromised, and how it ushered in the rise of a fascist government with Nazi sympathies that espoused a type of ultra-Ukrainian nationalism that left no place for anything Russian in Ukraine anymore. Due to this analysis of the Maidan and post-Maidan currents in Ukraine, I came to the conclusion that the annexation of the Crimea was a truly democratic action and that the war in Donetsk and Luhansk represented almost a motherly care from Moscow for the Russian speakers of Eastern Ukraine. For years this served as the basis of my understanding of the post-Maidan conflicts, particularly the annexation of the Crimea. I continued to read a multitude of pro-Russian articles that justified the annexation. According to the standard positions given, the initial transfer of the Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR by Khrushchev was nothing more than a whimsical decision from the former party head of the Ukrainian SSR. Since the Crimea had been thoroughly under Russian administration prior, this means that the actual transfer was an historical injustice in the first place; Crimea is thoroughly Russian land and is deeply connected with Russian history. Secondly, the annexation can be justified since NATO had allegedly promised the newly formed Russian Federation following the collapse of the USSR that they would not expand into either former Eastern Block or Soviet territory. Since a multitude of former Eastern Bloc and Soviet countries have in fact been integrated into NATO, the West broke their promise so then what sort of moral high ground do they have to declare the annexation of the Crimea as illegal? Thirdly, considering that the majority of the population considered themselves ethnically Russian, since there was a referendum that resulted in an overwhelming majority of voters supporting being received into the Russian Federation, how should this act of democracy be considered any differently than say the will of the Albanian Kosovars to cede from Serbia. If an autonomous province of one country can have the legal right to cede, why can’t another? Finally (not to say that there are only four justifications for the annexation of Crimea, rather these were the biggest reasons for my previous support behind it), there was the strategic considerations of the naval base at Sevastopol. Considering that following the collapse of the Soviet Union that more and more former Soviet republics and Eastern Bloc countries have been joining the European Union and NATO (or lining up to do so), this presents a threat to Russia. Considering that the geopolitical relations between Russia and the West are at an all time low since the Cold War, it would be a strategic blunder for Russia if Ukraine was allowed to achieve its goals of EU and NATO integration. Considering the close proximity of Sevastopol to Russian territory, if Ukraine would become a part of NATO and allow for NATO to establish itself in Sevastopol, this would poise a huge military threat to Russia. Therefore, in a sort of pre-emptive move, the annexation of the Crimea was necessary to prevent any further potential NATO bases being so close to Russian territory. However, over the years as I have opened myself to more and more information from across the geopolitical spectrums, the justifications for the annexation began to slowly dismantle themselves until I came to the conclusion that the annexation of the Crimea was not only an illegal action taken by Russia but a geopolitical blunder of the highest level. I will leave why I think this was the biggest mistake they could make until the end and I will address why I no longer consider the justifications that I mentioned as valid. Before we proceed, I would like to just mention an event that was fundamental in helping me reconsider my convictions and to abandon what I can only call the Russian-Chauvinistic mentality that I previously held. A few years ago when I was on one of my trips to Chisinau, my wife and I decided to visit the Museum of Soviet Occupation (also known as the Museum of Victims of Communism). Now, I was definitely not pro-Soviet (being an Orthodox Christian, I know enough history about the persecutions against the religious in the Soviet Union and the overall atheistic ideology to keep me at arms length from having any real sense of Soviet sympathy) so I was very eager to check this museum out. Having read various books and articles that talk about some of the horrors that happened (especially during the Stalinist era), I wasn’t completely unfamiliar with the tragedies that befell different people within the Soviet Union. However, it was a completely different experience to walk through the museum and see real letters from prisoners, confiscated passports, and photos of the real people who experienced the repressions; simply because they were land owners, priests, or suspected of being pro-Romanians. What struck me most was the collection of propaganda posters in one of the exhibits. Whether they were attacking religion or bolstering the benefits of the Soviet system, the propaganda seemed to address everything. It was this moment of looking at the seemingly endless collection of Soviet propaganda posters where something struck me, “If there was this much propaganda going on back then, who’s to say that there’s not just as much now but through contemporary mediums?” So, what got me to reconsider my positions wasn’t an article, or a book, or a conversation; it was the feeling of being overwhelmed by an endless supply of propaganda. After this moment, I began to be more critical of what I would read and try to expand my reading to include sources that present both sides of a situation, as well as material from non-partisan sources. One of the most important examples was with the annexation of Crimea. I began to look a little deeper at the arguments put forward to justify the annexation. Over time, as I read more sources or would occasionally stumble upon some information, each point began to have less weight to me that they used to have, until the point where I came to the conclusion that I no longer can buy into the arguments: Crimea is Ukraine.

The first point that is often brought up is that Khrushchev simply gave Crimea to Ukraine either because he had a soft spot for the country, or that it was a gift to celebrate the 1654 Pereyaslav Treaty, or because he wanted to reward Ukraine for their loyalty to the whole Soviet system (among other reasons that are given). Now, it is definitely true that the Crimea was previously an autonomous oblast within the Russian SFSR and that Nikita Khrushchev played a major role it the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. However, no matter what the reason (or most likely, reasons) behind the transfer, ultimately it was transferred and became an administrative unit of the Ukrainian SSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of the new entities of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the Crimea was legally recognized as part of Ukraine. Most importantly, in 1994 both the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine (along with the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom) signed the Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances. Along with this document came the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In return for Ukraine agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory within a specified period of time, they were given certain national security assurances. Some of the assurances are worth quoting in full, “1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine;

2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nation.” The first two points that were noted on the memorandum, signed by the Russian President, concerned respecting the territorial integrity of the existing borders of Ukraine at the time, which included Crimea, and the affirmation that they would not use force against Ukraine and threaten their sovereignty. I came across this memorandum while reading an excellent book written by the Ukrainian-Canadian historian Serhy Yekelchyk, “The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know”. This information completing undermines any king of argument that posits the initial transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR as being some sort of geopolitical injustice, and thereby justifying the annexation of it to the Russian Federation. Russia signed a memorandum to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, to abstain from using force against Ukraine, and to refrain from threatening the current borders of Ukraine. This leads nicely into the next point that the Western powers allegedly promised Russia that they had no intentions of expanding NATO into former Eastern Bloc and Soviet territories. As time went by, history has shown us that a number of former Eastern Bloc and Soviet republics have in fact been accepted in NATO. From the standard Russian narrative, since the West went back on their promise, then how can they oppose the annexation of Crimea? The logic seems to go that since the West reneged on their side of the deal, Russia is therefore free to disregard whatever security guarantees they provided to ensure the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, we need to ask the question: did the Western powers ever promise this? This answer was given by Mikhail Gorbachev himself: no. The agreement that did happen was in regards to non-German NATO forces being employed in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic). When Gorbachev was interviewed and asked about the supposed promises made to Russia that NATO wouldn’t expand eastwards, he had this to say,

“The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. … Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement was made in that context… Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled.”

It becomes evidently clear that no such promise regarding the refraining of NATO from expanding eastwards was every actually given, so Russia has no ground to try to justify their breaking of an international memorandum on the alleged failure of the West from refraining to expand NATO. Another point is that Crimea is historically Russian land with great historical significance for Russia. While its true that some very significant historical events in Russian history have taken place in the Crimea (including the baptism of St. Volodymyr in Kherson, the Crimean War, and the siege of Sevastopol) and that from 1783-1917 it was part of the Russian Empire and then from 1921-1954 it was part of the Russian SFSR, if we want to talk about the earlier inhabitants of the Crimea, it’s impossible to overlook the Crimean Tatars. Turkic peoples had been inhabiting the Crimean Peninsula since the 6th century and the Crimean Khanate was established in the 15th century. The Tatars were there prior to the movement of Slavs into the peninsula and were the majority until a number of historical factors began to decrease the Tatar population in the Crimea (such as Tatars fleeing or being deported to the Ottoman Empire after the initial conquest by the Russian Empire, more Tatars fleeing or being deported after the Russian loss of the Crimean War, and when practically the entire Crimean Tatar population was deported to Central Asia following World War 2 by Joseph Stalin). Only since 1989 has the Tatar population been growing again when the Supreme Soviet condemned the removal of the Tatars from their lands as unlawful, and thereby allowing larger numbers of them to return. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Crimean Tatars have largely been in favor of the Ukrainian government and have a more complicated relationship with Russian rule. When the annexation was in process, the Tatar population in Crimea boycotted the referendum and have been vocal in their desire to remain within Ukraine. While the history of Crimea is a part of Slavic history (not simply Russian), the Crimea has more historical rights with the Crimean Tatars, and the voice of the Crimean Tatars has spoken and sides with Ukraine. Now, to address the so-called democratic process of the referendum held in the Crimea that led to the request to be accepted into the Russian Federation. This was probably the strongest argument in favor of the annexation since it appeared the represent the concept of democracy and self-determination. It seemed to me that when the Soviet Union was collapsing and the various republics were declaring their own independence, then why should Ukraine’s desire to cede from the Soviet Union be respected while the Crimea’s desire should be treated as separatism? Is not Kyiv becoming to Crimea what Moscow was to Ukraine? On top of that, why is it that the referendum in the Crimea is treated as illegal while the referendum in Kosovo was accepted by the West? Let’s first look at the legitimacy of the referendum first. The whole tension between the political concepts of territorial integrity and self-determination is difficult to say the least. However, in the situation following the Maidan Revolution, it’s abundantly clear that the situation in Crimea was escalated following the arrival of the little green men. Even in my most pro-Russian days I had no doubts that these were “unofficial” Russian soldiers coming to the Crimea. What this presents itself as is nothing other than a military invasion and occupation. Since the referendum took place within a context of military occupation, it fundamentally cannot be accepted as valid on an international level. While it may be true that a large percentage of the population living in Crimea may in fact have supported a move towards Russia (I have friends and acquaintances with family members in Crimea and I have been told from them that the general opinion was indeed to become a part of Russia), the context and procedures were far from happening within what is accepted on a legal basis and can be legitimized on an international level. In regard to the comparison with Kosovo, we have to recognize that their situations are completely different. While both Kosovo and the Crimea were autonomous regions within their respective countries, the Russian population in the Crimea never underwent the same atrocities that the Kosovar Albanians underwent during the Kosovo War. The context for the independence of Kosovo was largely based on the genocidal afflictions they experienced during the war from Serbia, thus giving a moral precedence to pursue a path of independence. The only population within Crimea that can claim to have any kind of similar experience are the Crimean Tatars, who have been the victims of repression and deportation numerous times throughout history. So, we can see that neither the fact that a referendum was held or the comparison with Kosovo can have any legitimacy in regards to the annexation of Crimea. Now I’d like to look at the claim that it was necessary to annex the Crimea as a pre-emptive strike to protect Russian borders from the expansion of NATO. Since there’s a significant naval port in Sevastopol, it would be a geopolitical disaster for Russia if the ports of Sevastopol became NATO bases. This argument is completely dismantled once one considers the point that Sevastopol isn’t the only port in Ukraine. This point was driven home to me during a discussion with a Ukrainian acquaintance of mine about the whole situation in Crimea. We were discussing the various justifications given by Russia and I brought up this point about self-defence against NATO. My acquaintance simply replied, “So what if Sevastopol doesn’t become a NATO base? If Ukraine would be accepted into NATO, there are ports in Odessa which could easily be used as well. Is the distance from Sevastopol to Odessa really going to be that big of a difference?” The weakness of this argument became immediately apparent to me. If we even put aside the question of naval bases, there’s still the reality of regular military bases that could be set up in Ukraine. NATO could simply set up bases in cities like Kharkiv, Chernihiv, or even Kyiv and these would all be very close to the Russian border. To pursue this line of argument would necessitate that Russia simply annex all of Ukraine to prevent NATO from establishing any closer bases to their borders. As each argument began to collapse for me, I came to the ultimate conclusion that the annexation of Crimea was nothing more than an illegal military occupation, taking advantage of the unfavorable situation that arose for Russia in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution. In an attempt to keep Ukraine divided to at least prevent her from moving closer to the West, the annexation and the war in Donbass is nothing more than a destabilizing effort by Moscow to try and force Ukraine to stay within their sphere of influence and to prevent the West from getting to close to Ukraine. However, the actions taken by Moscow were the biggest geopolitical blunder that they could have made. If Moscow genuinely wants to keep Ukraine within their sphere of influence, the worst thing that they could have done was to annex territory and become involved in a separatist war. By trying to force Ukraine to stay, they have only pushed her farther away. While it’s unlikely that Russia will ever accept that the annexation of the Crimea was unlawful and actually return it to the control of the Ukrainian government, it’s also just as unlikely the Ukraine will return to a place where closer ties with Russia is a popular opinion. While there are small measures of truth in the propaganda employed by Moscow in regards to the situation in Ukraine (there are definitely ultra-Ukrainian nationalists as well as those who have sympathies for the Galician division of the SS who fought against the Soviets with the Germans in World War 2), it is grossly inaccurate to portray the situation as if every Ukrainian is a fascist, ultra-nationalist, who’s looking to persecute Russian speakers. While the Russian language may have less acceptance in certain parts of Ukraine, it’s still spoken across the country. At the end of the day, I realized that my thoughts in the museum in Chisinau were right: Moscow is simply continuing the propaganda tradition through new mediums. To sum everything up simply, we can say this much: not all Ukrainians are fascists, not all Ukrainian are Nazi sympathizers, not all Ukrainians are out for Russian blood. Russia signed a memorandum to respective the territorial integrity of Ukraine and to abstain from threatening it with force. There was never any promise from NATO that they wouldn’t expand eastwards. While Crimea plays a role in Slavic history, the Crimean Tatars have a greater claim through history than the Russians do. The referendum took place in an atmosphere of military occupation and therefore has no chance of legitimacy. The situations of Kosovo and Crimea are completely different and therefore are not a viable comparison. And finally, if Ukraine was to join NATO, bases could still be set up close to the Russian border even without the naval bases in Sevastopol. Crimea is Ukraine.

[echoesoftheeast]

Review of “The Origins of the Slavic Nations” by Serhii Plokhy

“The Origins of the Slavic Nations” from Serhii Plokhy is an absolute must read for anyone trying to wade through the ethno-political language of contemporary Russia and Ukraine.

While the subtitle of the book suggests that it will cover the premodern identities of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the reality is that the book largely focuses on the premodern identities (and their evolutionary developments) of Russians and Ukrainians. Belarusians are occasionally mentioned but even when Plokhy is dealing with the Ruthenians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth he largely focuses on the southern Rus’ lands which would eventually be included within the Ukrainian state. My only criticism of the book is that I would have liked to see more about the region that would become Belarus and its inhabitants.

The starting point for Plokhy is the competing narratives that are typical for both Russian historiography and Ukrainian historiography when it comes to identifying the Rus’ian people from the times of Kyivan-Rus up until the 18th century when the concepts of nationalism, statehood, motherland, and ethnic communities became more developed and pronounced among the Eastern Slavs. The standard Russian narrative is that there was a single “All-Rus” nationality shared by the inhabitants of the various principalities of Kyian-Rus, which implies that the subsequent history of the East Slavs is the history of the Russian people (whether they were a part of the regions of Kyivan-Rus that came under Mongol control following the collapse of Kyvian-Rus or if they were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). The standard Ukrainian position emphasizes the distinctions between the various inhabitants of Kyivan-Rus and that the different political-social developments of the various Rus’ian people led to even more distinctions between them.

So which narrative is the right one? While Plokhy seems to be more sympathetic to the Ukrainian narrative, he rejects both since neither accurately reflects the history of the development of the different Rus identities both in Kyivan-Rus and following its collapse. His goal throughout the book is to work with the primary sources to understand how the Rus’ian peoples (as well as their neighbors) thought of themselves. Rather than trying to retroactively project contemporary national identities onto the ancestors of the East Slavs, he lets them speak for themselves and tries as best he can to present their voices.

When it comes to Kyivan-Rus itself, he recognizes that there was a strong localism in regards to identity (Kyivan, Novgorodian, Volhynian, etc..) and that the original Rus’ Land (strictly speaking) was limited to Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav. These three cities, and the surrounding areas, where the Rus’ Land in the strict sense, while the rest of the regions projected local identities, though they still understood themselves to be a part of the Rus’ realm. Despite the prevalence of local identities, over and against the theory of an “All-Rus” identity, there were still elements that united the people within a larger identity; one of shared historical memory, linguistics, religion, and law. Taking both of these identifying elements into account, it appears that there was at the same time both a shared and distinct identity among the people of within Kyivan-Rus.

The rest of the book follows the history of the Rus’ian people as they are politically fragmented and ultimately separated with the south-western Rus’ian lands coming under Lithuanian rule (and subsequently Polish by virtue of the union of Lithuania with Poland) while the north-eastern lands come under the Mongol rule. Plokhy convincingly demonstrates, by analyzing the chronicles and other primary sources of the time, that the different socio-political experiences of the Rus’ian people, either under the Mongols or the Poles and Lithuanians, led to different understandings of what it meant to be a part of the Rus’ian people. The experience of the Rus’ians under Mongol rule inherited certain socio-political practices from the Mongols which shaped their understanding of state and rule which was drastically different from the understanding possessed by the Rus’ians within the Polish-Lithuanian state. The consolidation of Muscovy and the progressive understanding that all the inhabitants under the rule of Moscow were de-facto Rus’ians can be contrasted to the Rus’ian identity that was exclusive within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; a Rus’ian identity that necessarily needed to be contrasted against the Poles and the Lithuanians. Whereas events such as the Times of Trouble, the Old Believer Schism, and Victory at Poltava had significant identity shaping impact of the people within the Tsardom, and subsequently Empire, of Moscow, the Union of Lublin, the Council of Brest, and the Khelmnitsky uprising played a more fundamental role shaping the identity of the Rus’ians within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even when the Zaporizhian Cossacks accept the rule of Moscow and their elites begin to adopt terminology such as “Little Russian” it’s still visible that they view themselves as distinct from the inhabitants of “Greater Russia”. The Muscovites themselves likewise looked at the inhabitants of the “Little Russian” lands as being different than themselves and, interestingly enough, it was actually the work of Kyivan intellectuals and clergy who were major figures in articulating a larger Rus’ian identity that comprised both the Greater and Little Russians (though by no means at the expense of the unique identity of either).

The historical narrative ends in the 18th century and Plokhy summarizes his presentation. In addressing the modern identities of the East Slavs in relation to their histories he says, “the modern Russian nation grew out of the Russian imperial project and preserved many of its characteristics, including the blurred boundary between the Great Russians per se and the non-Russian subjects of the empire. The modern Ukrainian identity developed out of the Ukrainian/Little Russian project of the Hetmanate, excluding Russians and Belarusians and taking over not only the former Polish-ruled Right-Bank Ukraine but also Austrian Galacia, Bukovyna, and eventually Transcarpathia, providing legitimacy for one nation out of historically, culturally, and religiously diverse regions. The Belarusian national project was based on Ruthenian identity that had previously developed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but failed to produce a distinct identity in early modern times, given the lack of proto-Belarusian polity comparable to the Cossack Hetmanate in the Left-Bank Ukraine.” The conclusion seems to be that none of the Eastern Slavs can retroactively claim Kyvian-Rus exclusively for themselves. While Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians have a shared heritage going back to Kvyian-Rus, each has had their historical development which resulted in different Rus’ian people with their own identity shaping history. The Tsardom of Muscovy had elements of continuity as well as discontinuity with Kvyian-Rus just as the Cossack Hetmanate had their own continuities and discontinuities. Neither was an exact replica of Kyivan-Rus yet both were able to still trace their heritage back to Kyivan-Rus.

My conclusion is that neither the Russians, nor the Ukrainians, nor the Belarusians have an exclusive claim to Kyivan-Rus yet all of them have legitimate ties to it. All of them have their own unique historical stories yet there are many points of commonality, and intersections, between them. The East Slavs have much in common yet each retains their own uniqueness about them. “The Origins of the Slavic Nations” is one of the most important books when it comes to the complicated subject of Eastern Slavic identity and, in my opinion, it will be impossible to have a constructive conversation on this topic without having read this book.

[echoesoftheeast]

Bulgars, Bulgarians, and the Macedonian Question

There’re good reasons that the Balkans are considered the “powder keg of Europe”. As the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was imminent and the various people of the Balkans were establishing their own national consciousness the struggle for modern Balkan self-identity was just beginning. The 19th century saw the formation of new autonomous Balkan territories as the people who faced Ottoman subjection for nearly 500 years finally found themselves in the position to free themselves from the rule of Istanbul. The Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians particularly had territorial aspirations that hearkened to their medieval kingdoms and empires. Caught in the middle of this, literally, was the region we now know as “North Macedonia”. Following the Balkan Wars, the territory of Macedonia was divided between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria with the region that is now North Macedonia being ceded to Serbia. It wasn’t until 1946 when the region was officially declared the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” as one of the six federal states of Yugoslavia. It was renamed the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” in 1963 and remained so until the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, whereupon they declared themselves the “Republic of Macedonia”. The newly formed Republic of Macedonia immediately sparked controversy as their Greek neighbors to the south declared that this newly formed republic has no right to the name Macedonia since, in Greece’s opinion, the ancient kingdom of Macedonia was Greek and the inhabitants of the Republic of Macedonia are Slavs. This argument between Greece and, since 2019, North Macedonia has been ongoing to the present over who has the right to use the name “Macedonia” as well as who can claim the ancient Macedonians as their own; the Greeks claiming that the ancient kingdom of Macedon was Greek while the Macedonians claim that the inhabitants of Macedon weren’t Greek. While the Greek-Macedonian naming controversy largely takes center stage there are also disputes between North Macedonia and Bulgaria regarding the identity of the Macedonians. While the Macedonians generally consider themselves a distinct Slavic people amongst the various Balkan Slavs, the Bulgarians generally consider the Macedonians to be Bulgarians. Historical arguments between the two nations typically focus on whether the First Bulgarian Empire was truly Bulgarian or Macedonian (as was claimed by the famed Russian-born Yugoslav historian George Ostrogorsky). Just as both North Macedonia and Greece argue over their right to the name Macedonia so too North Macedonia and Bulgaria argue over whether Tsar Samuil was Bulgarian or Macedonian. While I’ll make no comment regarding whether or not North Macedonia has been misappropriating either Greek or Bulgarian heritage. What I want to look at is how North Macedonia finds itself in a similar situation as Bulgaria when it comes to their national identity. Both modern Macedonians and Bulgarians are Slavic people while the original Macedonians and Bulgars were not. Both territorial regions now called “Macedonia” and “Bulgaria” were not the original territorial regions. Both the ancient Macedonians and Bulgars were assimilated into the larger Slavic population that migrated into the Balkans. While the historical specifics are obviously far more complex at the very least, we can see a degree of similarity between Macedonians and Bulgarians. The main difference is that while these historical circumstances are brought up against Macedonians to discredit their usage of the name Macedonia no arguments are made against modern Bulgarians using the name Bulgaria. My contribution therefore to the “Macedonian Question” is if Bulgarians aren’t challenged in their national identity as Bulgarians then why are the Macedonians? While the debates concerning the identity of the ancient Macedonians still rages on alongside the debates of the relationship between the Macedonians and the Bulgarians perhaps we can set these important issues to the side for a moment and take a look of the similar historical development of Bulgarian and Macedonian national identity and ask ourselves whether or not this can be taken into consideration when asking the “Macedonian Question”.

The Bulgars were originally a Turkic-nomadic warrior people who are generally believed to have lived around the Pontic-Caspian Steppe. In the 7th century, they formed what is known as “Great Bulgaria” which was located between the Dniester and lower Volga rivers (territorially located in modern southern Ukraine and southwest Russia). The 7th century also witnessed the migration of Bulgars into the Balkan region, led by Bulgarian Khan Asparuh, where they established themselves in the region after defeating an army of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine IV. These successes led to the formation of the First Bulgarian Empire which, at its height, encompassed most of the Balkan peninsula. The ethnic demographics of the First Bulgarian Empire was largely Slavic since large numbers of Slavs had already begun settling in the Balkans during the late 6th century. As the local Slavic population was more numerous than the Turkic Bulgars the process of assimilation witnessed the Slavification of the Bulgars. Through this assimilation, the Turkic Bulgars became a new South Slavic people who nevertheless retained the name of Bulgars.

Just as the Bulgars, the ancient Macedonians were not Slavs. The scholarly debate is still ongoing regarding the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians but it is largely accepted that while they weren’t entirely Greeks they nonetheless adopted Hellenistic policies (aside from some major divergences from the ancient Greek society; for example, the ancient Greeks were organized according to city-states while the Macedonians were ruled by a monarch). The region of ancient Macedon is largely found within the modern Greek region of Macedonia, though the later Roman province of Macedonia also encompassed much of the modern region of North Macedonia. As mentioned earlier, various Slavic tribes migrated into the Balkan peninsula during the 6th-7th centuries and assimilated the local inhabitants of the Macedonian region of the Byzantine Empire. Slavic Macedonians were now the local inhabitants of the region, though they didn’t begin to self-identify as Macedonians until the 19th century.

The similarities between the ethnic developments of the Macedonians and the Bulgars are interesting. Both have been Slavs since the 6th-7th centuries while their name-sake ancestors were not. Both the ancient Macedonians and the early Bulgars lived in territorial regions which don’t correspond to their modern borders (though Northern Macedonia is much closer to ancient Macedon than modern Bulgaria and Old Great Bulgaria). Despite residing in territories that don’t correspond to their original predecessors (or claimed-predecessors) and despite being of Slavic ethnicity while again the original Macedonians and Bulgars were not, both modern Bulgarians and Macedonians self-consciously identify with their predecessors. Since there’s no controversy surrounding the Bulgarians stylizing themselves as Bulgarians, despite these historical discrepancies with the original Bulgars, perhaps there shouldn’t be so much controversy over the Macedonians using the name Macedonian despite being a Slavic people. That doesn’t mean, however, that the Macedonians can misappropriate either Greek of Bulgarian history while renaming it Macedonian. The debates whether it’s appropriate for North Macedonia to build statues of Alexander the Great or to claim the First Bulgarian Empire as a “Macedonian” Empire are both important and necessary. The only case that I wish to make is that if the title of Macedonian is to be denied to the Macedonians since they’re Slavs while the ancient Macedonians were not then we should be just as quick to criticize the Bulgarians usage of Bulgarian since they too are Slavs using the name of an older non-Slavic people. Even though North Macedonia is moving forward diplomatically in making concessions to both their Greek and Bulgarian neighbors it seems that North Macedonia still finds itself in the powder keg of Europe and sparks can still fly, potentially setting off the Balkans once again.

[echoesoftheeast]

Sulieman the New Justinian

One of the great historical phenomena we find is when major historical figures seek to identify themselves with other great historical figures from the past through various ways, such as through titles, symbolic gestures, and even through paintings. A fascinating example of this is found in the life of one of the Ottoman Empire's greatest sultans, Suleiman the Magnificent. When considering the most memorable points of Suleiman's reign as sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1520-1566 we find four examples of actions and events which hearken back to the days of the Byzantine Empire and their, arguably, greatest emperor, Justinian the Great. Whether or not Suleiman deliberately sought to identify himself and his reign with Justinian's is a matter of speculation but the correlations are nonetheless intriguing.

The first point of interest lies in the marriages of both men. Both Justinian and Suleiman choose a bride for themselves that came from "less-than-royal" backgrounds. In 525 Justinian married a certain Theodora, who is described by historian John Julius Norwich as not being, "an ideal match. Her father had been a bear-keeper at the Hippodrome, her mother an acrobat - antecedents more than enough to debar her from polite society." Not only was Theodora's lineage considered vulgar but her own youth was considered "less-than-reputable", "while still a child Theodora had joined her elder sister on the stage, playing in farce and burlesque. Before long she had graduated to being Constantinople's most notorious courtesan." Due to her sensational past, Justinian was unable to marry her until his own mother, Empress Lupicina, had died since she considered Theodora origins and past too base. Suleiman's choice was likewise a controversial choice, not because of morally questionable past, such as in the case of Theodora, but due to her status of being a slave. In 1534 Suleiman married the Ruthenian slave-girl Hurrem Sultan (more popularly known as "Roxelana" in the West). This marriage was unprecedented, as in the evaluation of Caroline Finkel, "[Suleiman's] marriage to a freed slave was...a break with convention...[his] marriage to a concubine was shocking enough; his disregard for the one-mother-one-son norm still more so." Despite the popular evaluations of their wives both Justinian and Suleiman were deeply devoted husbands and both Theodora and Roxelana are known to have had considerable influence over their husbands, even in political affairs; Theodora is famous for her rousing speech to Justinian encouraging him not to flee Constantinople during the NIKA protests of January 13th 532 while Roxelana is notorious for her suspected involvement in convincing Suleiman that his oldest son Mustafa, born from another one of his concubines, was plotting against him; leading eventually to Mustafa's execution in 1553.

The next connection between Suleiman and Justinian lies in the scope of the Empires they ruled. Both men are associated with being the rulers of their respective empires at their geographical height. Both men are likewise associated with the expansion of their empires to their geographical height. Justinian's reign is marked by his program of "reconquest" in attempts made by him to retake former territories of the Roman Empire. During his reign, Justinian waged campaigns in Northern Africa, Italy, and Hispania (among others) which brought Justinian's empire beyond being an expression of an "eastern" Roman empire. Suleiman, following the precedence of his forefathers - such as Mehmet II and his father Selim I, likewise expanded his empire through a number of military campaigns. Some of Suleiman's greatest conquests included the taking of Belgrade from the Kingdom of Hungary, the conquest of Baghdad against the Muslim Safavids, as well as the annexation of huge Muslim territories in North Africa.

Another fascinating echo of Justinian in the life of Suleiman is his Ottoman title "the Lawgiver" (rather than his Western title "the Magnificent"). Suleiman is known especially for his work in updating the law-code of the Ottoman Empire as well as formulating new law-codes for the newly acquired territories of his empire. Suleiman's grand legislative work, carried out by Sheikhulislam Ebussuud, was, "a revision and amplification of those [law-codes] of Mehmed II and Bayezid II, containing legislative principles for the empire as a whole on matters such as the regulation of the provincial cavalry forces, taxation...and the affairs of the minority population." This work of updating Ottoman law-codes was not only a revision of laws previously promulgated by the sultans of the past but was also a harmonization between the secular laws and the Islamic religious laws. This dual work of updating imperial law and its harmonization of religious law was also a staple of Justinian's reign. Just as Suleiman carried out his project through Ebussuud so too had Justinian carried out his juridical project through a jurist named Tribonian. In Tribonian, "Justinian found the one man capable of bringing a long-cherished dream to fruition. This was a complete recodification of the Roman law, removing all repetitions and contradictions, ensuring that there was nothing incompatible with Christian teaching."

A final similarity between the two men is found in their ambitious building projects. Justinian is arguably most known for the construction of the church of Hagia Sophia when considering his architectural achievements. During the NIKA revolts, the original church was burned down and Justinian took it upon himself to rebuild the church in greater grandeur than the predecessor. Upon its completion, the cathedral of Hagia Sophia was considered to be the largest building of its time and a marvel of engineering with its enormous central dome, 107 feet across and 160 above the pavement. Tradition has it that when Justinian entered the church for the first time, "[he] stood for a long time in silence before being heard to murmur: 'Solomon, I have surpassed thee.'" Alongside Justinian Suleiman too is known for his construction of religious buildings. While Justinian, as a Christian, was known for his magnificent churches Suleiman, as a Muslim, became known for his mosques. Perhaps the most well known of Suleiman's mosques is the one that bears his name, the Suleymaniye in Constantinople. Just as Hagia Sophia was the most ambitious building project of Justinian's architects so too was the Suleymaniye the largest design of Suleiman's chief architect. The design and size of the Suleymaniye are likewise similar and reminiscent of Hagia Sophia; in fact, it's considered to be the second-largest Mosque in Istanbul right behind Hagia Sophia (which had been converted into a Mosque after Mehmet II's conquering of Constantinople in 1453). Upon its completion, there are whispers that Suleiman uttered the very same words that Justinian had said, marveling and the glory of Hagia Sophia when he entered the mosque for the very first time.

Between these historical circumstances, we can see hints of Suleiman being presented by history as a new Justinian. This would be in fact be quite fitting since the Ottomans considered themselves the inheritors of the Byzantine Empire since their conquest of Constantinople. If an Ottoman sultan wanted to portray himself as being the greatest sultan of the empire it's perfectly reasonable that he may want to draw upon the legacy and image of Justinian to give his own reign an image of greatness. While the lives of Justinian and Suleiman aren't completely identical nonetheless the similarities in marriage, conquest, law, and architecture are intriguing and from these correlations, we can see Suleiman as a new, Islamic, Justinian in a sense. While one's preference for Justinian or Suleiman will largely depend on one's religious convictions (as an Orthodox Christian I make no denial that my own religious convictions place my own personal bias towards Justinian or St. Justinian, as he is remembered in the Orthodox Church) at the very least these similarities can be recognized between them. In calling Suleiman a new Justinian we need not insinuate that Suleiman was greater than Justinian, though no doubt those who hold the Muslim faith would believe so, but rather that since Suleiman's reign bears a certain resemblance to Justinian's, and since Suleiman's reign comes later historically - 1000 years later, in fact, he can be stylized as a new Justinian.

(All quotations regarding Justinian taken from John Julius Norwich's "A Short History of Byzantium" while all quotations regarding Suleiman are taken from Caroline Finkel's "Osman's Dream")