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Regional Geopolitics by India’s Involvement in SCO

by Col (Dr) Shantonu Roy Introduction

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or Shanghai Pact, an Eurasian political, economic, international security and defence organization established by China and Russia in 2001. The SCO currently comprises eight Member States (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). It is the world's largest regional organization in terms of geographic scope and population, covering approximately 60% of the area of Eurasia, 40% of the world population. As of 2021, its combined GDP was around 20% of global GDP.

The SCO is the successor to the Shanghai Five, formed in 1996 between the People's Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. In June 2001, the leaders of these nations and Uzbekistan met in Shanghai to announce a new organization with deeper political and economic cooperation. In June 2017, it expanded to eight states, with India and Pakistan. Iran joined the group in July 2023. Several countries are engaged as observers or dialogue partners. The SCO is governed by the Heads of State Council (HSC), its supreme decision-making body, which meets once a year. The organization also contains the so-called Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).

In 2001, the annual summit returned to Shanghai and the group was institutionalized.  The five member nations first admitted Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Five mechanism. On 15 June 2001, all six heads of state signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, praising the role played thus far by the Shanghai Five mechanism and aiming to transform it to a higher level of cooperation. From 2001 to 2008, the SCO developed rapidly, establishing a number of permanent bodies and adhoc initiatives dealing with economic and security matters. In July 2015, in Ufa, Russia, the SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan as full members. In June 2016 in Tashkent, both signed the memorandum of obligations, thereby starting the process of joining the SCO. In June 2017, at a summit in Kazakhstan, India and Pakistan officially joined SCO as full members.

In 2004 the SCO established relations with the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2005, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2005, the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2007, the Economic Cooperation Organization in 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2011, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in 2014, and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in 2015. in 2018, SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has established relations with the African Union's African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The United States applied for observer status in the SCO, but was rejected in 2005.

Regional Dynamics

Basically, it was felt that China created the SCO for curbing Russia’s dominance in the area. But, the heads of the member states point out that, against the backdrop of a contradictory process of globalisation, multilateral cooperation, which is based on the principles of equal right and mutual respect, non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states, non-confrontational way of thinking and consecutive movement towards democratisation of international relations, contributes to overall peace and security, and they collectively call upon the international community, irrespective of its differences in ideology and social structure, to form a new concept of security based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and interaction.  It is trying to provide an unique opportunity to take part in the process of forming a fundamentally new model of geopolitical integration. The SCO was not a platform for resolving bilateral issues, and its members were also reluctant to mediate disputes multilaterally. Due to the widely divergent agendas among member states, Indian commentators even called it the "Shanghai Contradiction Organisation".

The SCO's main achievement this far is to have offered its members a cooperative forum to balance their conflicting interests and to ease bilateral tensions. It has built up joint capabilities and has agreed on common approaches in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. However, major shortcomings, such as institutional weaknesses, a lack of common financial funds for the implementation of joint projects and conflicting national interests have prevented the SCO from achieving a higher level of regional cooperation in other areas.

India’s Involvement

             India has steadfastly used its diplomatic capital to campaign for strengthening cooperation and used the SCO platform to collaborate with regional counterparts. In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Qingdao, China, coined the acronym SECURE to highlight the pressing regional challenges facing the SCO, where S stands for security of citizens, E – economic development for all, C – connecting the region, U – uniting the people, R – respect for sovereignty and integrity, and E for environmental protection.

India has been sensitising the influential members of SCO on Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism. The dreaded global and regional terror outfits, such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to secure the SCO and greater Eurasian region from these radical extremist forces. The issue resonates with China, Russia and Central Asian Republics (CARs), which are facing increasing threats. Another common challenge to the SCO region is the illicit drug trade emanating from the Af-Pak region. In 2021, more than 80 per cent of opium and heroin supplies originated from Afghanistan via different routes to the global opium market. The greater involvement of terror outfits in the narcotic trade has sprung new geo-political challenges to the SCO. It has become a significant funding source for anti-state activities by the region’s dreaded terror groups and radical Islamists. India has been trying to garner support for putting an end to all these.

This year the summit which was held virtually at Delhi had the highlights

The New Delhi Declaration was signed by the member nations, which states that the international community must come together to "counter the activities of terrorist, separatist and extremist groups, paying special attention to preventing the spread of religious intolerance, aggressive nationalism, ethnic and racial discrimination, xenophobia, ideas of fascism and chauvinism."

     Joint Statements:

The leaders adopted two thematic joint statements - one on   cooperation in countering the radicalisation leading to separatism, extremism, and terrorism and the second one cooperation in the field of digital transformation.

New Pillars of Cooperation:

 India has created five new pillars and focus area for cooperation in the SCO, which include,

Startups and Innovation

Traditional Medicine

Youth Empowerment

Digital Inclusion

Shared Buddhist Heritage

India's Reservations on BRI:

India refused to be part of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) of the  SCO members’ economic strategy statement, mentioning “interested member states’.India's opposition to the BRI stems from its inclusion of projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), which India considers a violation of its sovereignty.

Conclusion

Last but not least, there continues to be a perception in the West that SCO is an anti-West forum. However, India’s growing economic and political stature at the global level in the era of multi-vector foreign policy has made New Delhi a potential player in turning SCO into a development oriented organisation in Eurasia rather than an anti-west alliance. That is why New Delhi has been stressing maintaining peace and security based on UN Charter provisions to ensure the collective prosperity of the region.

India has advocated win-win cooperation within the SCO for regional or trans-regional connectivity, regional security and defence collaboration, combating state-sponsored terrorism, and a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan with an inclusive government and peaceful global order without rival blocks. The challenge for New Delhi, going forward, will remain one of using its substantial diplomatic capital toward making the Eurasian region a driver of economic growth and prosperity within the ambit of SCO.

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The Necessity of Semiconductors for India

By Col (Dr) Shantonu Roy

Prologue

The focus on the semiconductor industry can be attributed to a recent global shortage which has impacted several industries, including automotive, consumer electronics, and telecommunications. But there are several other factors to explain its significance beyond this demand-supply binary. Let’s look at what makes it critical for India.

What are Semiconductors?

A semiconductor is a substance that has specific electrical properties that enable it to serve as a foundation for computers and other electronic devices. It is typically a solid chemical element or compound that conducts electricity under certain conditions but not others. This makes it an ideal medium to control electrical current and everyday electrical appliances. 

A substance that can conduct electricity is called the conductor and a substance that cannot conduct electricity is known as the insulator. Semiconductors have properties that sit between the conductor and insulator. A diode, Integrated Circuit (IC) and transistor are all made from semiconductors. The conductance can vary depending on the current or voltage applied to a control electrode or on the intensity of irradiation by infrared (IR), visible light, ultraviolet or X-rays. The specific properties of a semiconductor depend on the impurities -- known as dopants -- added to it. 

How do Semiconductors work?

Most semiconductors are composed of crystals made of several materials. To better understand how semiconductors work, users must understand atoms and how electrons organize themselves within the atom. Electrons arrange themselves in layers called shells inside an atom. The outermost shell in the atom is known as a valence shell. The electrons in this valence shell are the ones that form bonds with neighboring atoms. Such bonds are called covalent bonds. Most conductors have just one electron in the valence shell. Semiconductors, on the other hand, typically have four electrons in their valence shell. However, if atoms nearby are made of the same valence, electrons may bind with the valence electrons of other atoms. Whenever that happens, atoms organize themselves into crystal structures. We make most semiconductors with such crystals, mainly with silicon crystals.

What is the difference between N-type and P-type semiconductors?

An N-type semiconductor carries current mainly in the form of negatively charged electrons similar to the conduction of current in a wire. A P-type semiconductor carries current predominantly as electron deficiencies called holes. A hole has a positive electric charge, equal and opposite to the charge on an electron. In a semiconductor material, the flow of holes occurs in a direction opposite to the flow of electrons. Elemental semiconductors include antimony, arsenic, boron, carbon, germanium, selenium, silicon, sulfur and tellurium. Silicon is the best known of these, forming the basis of most ICs. Common semiconductor compounds include gallium arsenide, indium antimonide and the oxides of most metals. We also widely use gallium arsenide (GaAs) in low-noise, high-gain, weak-signal amplifying devices. A semiconductor device can perform the function of the original vacuum tube, but with hundreds of times its volume. Like a microprocessor chip, a single IC can do the work of a set of vacuum tubes that would fill a large building and require its own electricity generating plant.

What is a Semiconductor Chip?

A semiconductor substance lies between the conductor and insulator. It controls and manages the flow of electric current in electronic equipment and devices. As a result, it is a popular component of electronic chips made for computing components and a variety of electronic devices, including solid-state storage.

Relevance of Semiconductors for India

Firstly, the country’s economic growth. India currently imports about 80 percent of its required semiconductors, and the failure to develop a domestic semiconductor industry could add $95 billion to the country’s import bill and widen its current account deficit. Creating a robust semiconductor industry in India would offer significant job creation opportunities.  The Indian IT industry today contributes $150 billion to the $1 trillion global IT market, and provides around 5.8 million high-quality jobs in the country – around one fifth of the world’s semiconductor design engineers are from India. The global semiconductor market is projected to reach over $1 trillion by 2030, up from a market size of $590 billion in 2021, according to a McKinsey report. India’s semiconductor market, meanwhile, is forecast to grow from $15 billion in 2020 to $110 billion in 2030, putting it among the world’s fastest-growing semiconductor markets. To put these numbers in perspective, the Indian government’s estimated budget for the sector in 2023 is $550 billion.

Additionally, semiconductors have a key role in the emerging security state, particularly in military equipment, communication systems, and satellites. In contemporary warfare, the availability and sophistication of equipment often play a more crucial role than the sheer number or skill of military personnel.

For example, in an air battle, aircraft radar is used to track targets that are hundreds of kilometres away. In a melee between the two aircrafts, the one whose radar can efficiently track more targets is likely to win – a strategic advantage made possible by semiconductors. The emerging technologies in the field of artificial intelligence and quantum computing also heavily use semiconductors. While AI systems rely on semiconductor-based components such as central processing units and graphics processing units to perform complex calculations, building functional quantum computers requires precise control over quantum states, which is only possible using semiconductor-based devices.

If India fails to develop advanced semiconductor design and manufacturing capability, the country may have to depend on semiconductor leaders to harness such technologies to their full potential.

How is Indian Chip manufacturing positioned?

The electronics industry in India has seen remarkable growth in recent years, fueled by the government's focus on digitalisation, the Make in India initiative, and the rising demand for electronic equipment. The country is now the world's second-largest producer of mobile phones, positioned closely behind China, and a leading manufacturer of other electronic devices like LED televisions, laptops, and tablets.

But when it comes to semiconductor manufacturing, India lacks a robust manufacturing ecosystem and its semiconductor industry primarily focuses on the design and development of products, rather than their production.

Semiconductor design involves creating the blueprint or layout of a semiconductor chip, which includes specifying its functions and characteristics. Design engineers use specialised software tools and simulation techniques to develop the design and verify its performance. The primary goal of semiconductor design is to create a chip that meets the desired specifications and performs its intended functions efficiently. On the other hand, semiconductor manufacturing involves the physical creation of the semiconductor chip based on the design specifications. This process typically involves several steps, including wafer fabrication, photolithography, etching, deposition, and packaging. Manufacturing engineers use specialised equipment and techniques to transform the design into a physical product. The primary goal of semiconductor manufacturing is to produce a high-quality product that meets the design specifications and is cost-effective for production in large volumes.

The process of packaging the semiconductor ICs is a complex and specialised task in the manufacturing chain, often handled by companies responsible for testing as well. These companies are commonly referred to as OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) or ATMP (Assembly, Testing, Marking, and Packaging) houses.  ICs are manufactured by specialised companies known as semiconductor foundries, using a process called semiconductor fabrication. These foundries enable firms to focus on the design of their products while crafting chips to match their performance needs. OSAT companies typically take wafers or bare dies (untested semiconductor chips) and package them into final products that can be used in electronic devices.

Designing semiconductors is equally challenging and important as manufacturing them. In fact, due to the complex nature of semiconductor manufacturing, a vast majority – approximately 95 percent – of semiconductor companies operate under the fables model. This means that they focus exclusively on design, while outsourcing the manufacturing process to specialised fabs. The rise of new players in the industry remains restricted as a result of the extremely capital-intensive nature of semiconductor manufacturing – which is closely tied to a specific process node – with each node needing additional capital expenditure. The rapid rollout of new semiconductor technologies every two years, by established players, makes it even more difficult for new entrants to break into the industry. This is evidenced by the fact that TSMC, the top-ranked semiconductor manufacturer, generates more revenue than the combined revenue of the next 10 largest fabs. The other leading players in the foundry business include Samsung, GlobalFoundries, and UMC.

Further, as the global semiconductor industry becomes increasingly critical, countries are not only focusing on refining their own technologies but also restricting access to perceived adversaries. The US, for instance, had previously used the Foreign Direct Product Rule to ban Huawei’s exports to the country and cut off chip supply to Russia. 

The CHIPS Act (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors), a $52 billion semiconductor manufacturing incentive plan proposed by the US government, is another example. It seeks to provide significant financial incentives to chipmakers to encourage domestic production of semiconductors. It aims to reduce American dependence on semiconductor imports, particularly from China, and to ensure a stable and secure supply of semiconductors for national security purposes.

It includes a provision that restricts the export of chips (or any product in the semiconductor supply chain made using American technology) from being exported to China, reportedly, as part of efforts to protect the US intellectual property and national security. This provision has been a source of contention, with India and China asserting that it unfairly restricts access to critical technologies.

How are indigenous semiconductors faring?

India's semiconductor industry journey began in the 1970s with the establishment of Semiconductor Complex Ltd (SCL) in Mohali, Punjab. The state research institute produced silicon wafers, the building blocks of microchips, for strategic purposes. However, with technological advancements, SCL's current 180nm process node is not competitive for commercial applications, though it still caters to the needs of the defence and satellite industries.

Meanwhile, India’s Shakti microprocessor program, which began as an academic initiative in 2014, achieved a significant milestone by delivering the country’s first indigenous microprocessor in 2018. With manufacturing options in 180nm and 22nm, the processor is well-suited for industrial and internet of things applications, and marks an important step towards building a robust processor infrastructure in India.

Is the chip industry getting adequate policy push?

Electronics systems have been identified as one of the 25 key economic sectors for job creation and skill enhancement under the Make in India initiative. 

The National Policy on Electronics 2019 aims to promote domestic manufacturing of electronics products, replacing NPE 2012. While the NPE 2019 covers the entire electronics value chain, from manufacturing to design and innovation, the NPE 2012 was limited to electronics manufacturing. The NPE 2019 emphasises the need for research and development (R&D) in electronics and aims to promote innovation and intellectual property creation in the sector.

The latest Semicon India Policy Framework – a policy document first released by the centre in 2007 – provides fiscal support of $10 billion to bolster the semiconductor supply chain. The framework also emphasises the modernisation and commercialisation of the SCL and has tasked the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology with exploring the possibility of a joint venture with a commercial fab partner to upgrade the brownfield fab facility.

In February 2021, the India Semiconductor Mission was launched by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Department of Science and Technology. It is implementing schemes to set up semiconductor and display fabs, offering higher incentives for more advanced process nodes. For process nodes at 28nm or lower, up to 50 percent of the project cost is covered by incentives. For process nodes between 28nm and 45nm, up to 40 percent of the amount is covered, and for nodes between 45nm and 65nm, up to 30 percent of the cost is covered.

Under this mission, compound semiconductors, silicon photonics, sensor (including MEMS) fabs, discrete semiconductor fabs, and semiconductor ATMP/OSAT units are eligible to receive 50 percent of the capital expenditure. Then there is the design-linked incentive (DLI) scheme, which provides up to 50 percent of eligible expenditure as incentive to 100 domestic semiconductor design companies for Integrated Circuits. The scheme aims to boost the local design capabilities of ICs, the building blocks of all electronic devices, and to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in the domestic sector.

Epilogue

Despite the Indian government’s impetus to the domestic chip industry, a large reservoir of resources, both human and material, remains untapped in the segment. While India has made leaps in design and development of chips, the industry needs the government’s concentrated efforts to boost the domestic production ecosystem. US memory chip maker Micron’s recent announcement of setting up a semiconductor assembly, testing, marking, and packaging (ATMP) facility in India has given the country a long-awaited breakthrough in the business of chips that power almost every device in the modern world. In view of the growing relevance of semiconductors in technology and its foreseeable compelling role in geopolitics, India’s continued dependency on imports for chips isn’t likely to bear well, and its journey of bridging this gap will be closely watched.

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The Necessity of Uniform Civil Code

Introduction

Diversity in India has multiple ethnicities, multiple religions. In India we can find people from all the cultural backgrounds who follow different practices. This diversity is also reflected in our laws. We have a legal system based on personal laws that are made keeping religion into consideration. The article 25 of the Indian Constitution define India as a secular nation and the values of secularism are enshrined in that article and it states that everyone shall be allowed to follow their religion and no one shall be discriminated on any grounds.

The article 44 of the Directive principle state that, it is the duty of the state to secure a Uniform Civil Code for the citizens throughout the country. One country, one rule is another name for it. The main objective behind implementation of a uniform Civil code in India is that it sets a law to govern the personal matters of all the citizens irrespective of religion. Personal laws are different from public laws as they cover marriage, inheritance, adoption, divorce and maintenance and that India practices a model of secularism in which it has made special provisions for people of different religions and the main idea behind Uniform Civil Code is to treat everyone equally irrespective of religion.

Now the problem exists in the fact that there are differences and discrepancies within the personal laws. There is no uniformity. Also, there has been instances where the personal laws denied the rights of women or did not even give them rights. To counter these shortcomings, the Uniform Civil Code should be enacted.

The Uniform Civil Code means a uniform personal law for all citizens of the country. This code will replace the existing religious personal laws in India and have a uniform law that will cater to all the citizens, irrespective of their religion. This has been envisaged by the makers of our Constitution under Article 44. But, it has been strongly opposed because it is considered violative of Article 25 of the Constitution since it does not let people enjoy the personal laws which are domain of the Dharam Gurus.

The Code

The Uniform Civil Code (Hindi: समान नागरिक संहिता, romanized: Samāna Nāgarika Saṃhitā) is a proposal in India to formulate and implement personal laws of citizens which apply on all citizens equally regardless of their religion, gender and sexual orientation. Currently, personal laws of various communities are governed by their religious scriptures. Implementation of a uniform civil code across the nation is one of the contentious promises pursued by India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. It is an important issue regarding secularism in Indian politics and continues to remain disputed by India's political left wing, Muslim groups and other conservative religious groups and sects in defence of sharia and religious customs. Personal laws are distinguished from public law and cover marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption and maintenance. Meanwhile, article 25-28 of the Indian constitution guarantees religious freedom to Indian citizens and allows religious groups to maintain their own affairs, article 44 of the constitution expects the Indian state to apply directive principles and common law for all Indian citizens while formulating national policies.

Personal laws were first framed during the British Raj, mainly for Hindu and Muslim citizens. The British feared opposition from community leaders and refrained from further interfering within this domestic sphere. Indian state of Goa was separated from India due to colonial rule in the erstwhile Portuguese Goa and Daman, retained a common family law known as the Goa civil code and thus being only state in India with a uniform civil code till date. Following India's independence, Hindu code bills  were introduced which largely codified and reformed personal laws in various sects among  Indian religions  like  Buddhists,  Hindus,  Jains  and  Sikhs but it exempted Christians, Jews, Muslims and Parsis, being identified as distinct communities from Hindus.

UCC emerged as a crucial topic of interest in Indian politics following the Shah Bano case in 1985. The debate arose when the question of making certain laws applicable to all citizens without abridging the fundamental right of right to practice religious functions. The debate then focused on the Muslim Personal Law, which is partially based on the Sharia law, permitting unilateral divorce, polygamy and putting it among the legally applying the Sharia law. UCC was proposed twice, in November 2019 and March 2020 but was withdrawn soon both of the times without introduction in parliament. The bill is reported to be being contemplated due to differences between BJP and RSS.

Evolution

The debate for a uniform civil code dates back to the colonial period in India. Prior to the British rule, under the East India Company (1757–1858), they tried to reform local social and religious customs by imposing Western ideologies on India. The Lex Loci Report of October 1840 emphasised the importance and necessity of uniformity in codification of Indian law, relating to crimes, evidences and contract but it recommended that personal laws of Hindus and Muslims should be kept outside such codification. This separation of Hindus and Muslims before law was part of the Divide and Rule policy of the British Empire that allowed them break the unity among different communities and rule over India. According to their understanding of religious divisions in India, the British separated this sphere which would be governed by religious scriptures and customs of the various communities (Hindus, Muslims, Christians and later Parsis). These laws were applied by the local courts or panchayats when dealing with regular cases involving civil disputes between people of the same religion; the State would only intervene in exceptional cases.

Post Independence, the Indian Parliament discussed the report of the Hindu law committee during the 1948–1951 and 1951–1954 sessions. The first Prime Minister of the Indian republic, Jawaharlal Nehru, his supporters and women members wanted a uniform civil code to be implemented. As Law Minister, B. R. Ambedkar was in charge of presenting the details of this bill. It was found that the orthodox Hindu laws were supportive of women's rights since monogamy, divorce and the widow's right to inherit property were present in the Shashtras.  Ambedkar recommended the adoption of a uniform civil code. But Ambedkar faced severe criticism in the parliament over which he resigned. Nehru administration then moved to pass Hindu code bills which would ensure modern reformation of Indian society. The Hindu bill itself received much criticism and the main provisions opposed were those concerning monogamy, divorce, abolition of coparcenaries (women inheriting a shared title) and inheritance to daughters. The women members of the parliament, who previously supported this, in a significant political move reversed their position and backed the Hindu law reform; as they feared allying with the fundamentalists would cause a further setback to their rights.

Significance of the Shah Bano Case

The frequent conflict between secular and religious authorities over the issue of uniform civil code eventually decreased, until the 1985 Shah Bano case. Bano was a 73-year-old woman who sought maintenance from her husband, Muhammad Ahmad Khan. He had divorced her after 40 years of marriage by triple Talaaq (saying "I divorce thee" three times) and denied her regular maintenance; this sort of unilateral divorce which discriminates against women is permitted under the Muslim Personal Law. She was initially granted maintenance by the verdict of a local court in 1980. Khan, a lawyer himself, challenged this decision, taking it to the Supreme court, saying that he had fulfilled all his obligations under Islamic law. The Supreme court ruled in favour of Shah Bano in 1985 under the "maintenance of wives, children and parents" provision (Section 125) of the All India Criminal Code, which applied to all citizens irrespective of religion. It further recommended that a uniform civil code be set up. Besides her case, two other Muslim women had previously received maintenance under the Criminal code in 1979 and 1980.

The Shah Bano case soon became a nationwide political issue and a widely debated controversy. While the Liberal and Progressive Indians as well as progressive Muslim women supported the Supreme Court judgement as being supportive of women. The All India Muslim Board defended the application of Muslim Personal Law which was based on Sharia Law and denied divorced Muslim women the right to alimony. The judgement of the Supreme Court, which sought to offer protection to Muslim women was argued to be an attack Muslim Personal Law by conservative Muslims. The orthodox Muslims felt that their communal identity was at stake if their personal laws were governed by the judiciary. Rajiv Gandhi's Congress government, which previously had the support of Muslim minorities, lost the local elections in December 1985 because of its endorsement of the Supreme Court's decision.

Legal status and prospects

UCC had been included in BJP's manifesto for the 1998 and 2019 elections and was even proposed for introduction in the Parliament for the first time in November 2019 by Narayan Lal Panchariya. Amid protests by opposition MPs, the bill although soon was withdrawn for making certain amendments. The bill was brought for a second time by Kirodi Lal Meena in March 2020 but was not introduced again. As per reports which emerged in 2020, the bill is being contemplated in BJP due to differences with RSS.

A plea was filed in the Delhi High Court which sought establishment of a judicial commission or a high level expert committee to direct central government to prepare a draft of UCC in three months. In April 2021, a request was filed to transfer plea to the Supreme Court so that filing of more such pleas throughout various high courts doesn't bring inconsistency throughout India. The draft was further published on the website for 60 days to facilitate extensive public debate and feedback. The constitutionality of the Uniform Civil Code has been challenged by various religious groups who argue that it violates their fundamental rights to practice their religion and follow their personal laws. However, the Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld the constitutional validity of the UCC and has held that it is the duty of the State to move towards a Uniform Civil Code.

Uniform Civil Code is followed in many countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, America, Ireland, etc. All these countries have uniform laws for all religions and there are no separate laws for any particular religion or community

Conclusion

The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has been a topic of debate in India for several decades. It refers to the idea of having a common set of laws governing personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption for all citizens, irrespective of their religion. While many argue that it is the need of the hour to implement UCC in India, others believe that it is not the right time to do so. In this response, I will present my views on whether or not it is the right time to implement UCC in India.

Firstly, it is important to understand that the implementation of UCC is a highly sensitive issue in a country as diverse as India, with a plethora of religious and cultural identities. It is imperative to ensure that the implementation of UCC does not infringe upon the rights and beliefs of any community. In this regard, the government must engage in a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders, including religious leaders and community representatives, to address their concerns and arrive at a consensus.

Secondly, the implementation of UCC requires a thorough review of the existing personal laws of different religious communities. It is essential to ensure that the UCC is in line with the principles of justice, equality, and non-discrimination, which are enshrined in the Indian Constitution. This review process can be time-consuming, and it may take several years to arrive at a comprehensive and acceptable UCC.

Thirdly, the implementation of UCC requires a strong political will and a conducive environment. The political climate in India is highly polarized, with political parties often using religion and identity politics to further their agendas. The government must ensure that the implementation of UCC is not used as a tool for political gains and that it is undertaken in a non-partisan and inclusive manner.

Fourthly, the implementation of UCC requires a significant investment in terms of resources, including manpower, finances, and infrastructure. The government must ensure that it has the necessary resources to undertake this massive task without compromising the quality of implementation.

Fifthly, the implementation of UCC must be accompanied by a robust public awareness campaign. The common citizen must understand the rationale behind UCC and the benefits it offers in terms of gender justice, social equality, and national integration. This will require a concerted effort on the part of the government, civil society, and the media to educate and sensitize the public on this issue and also woman empowerment.

Though, the implementation of UCC is a desirable goal, it is not the right time to do so in India. The government must engage in a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders, review the existing personal laws, ensure a conducive political climate, invest in resources, and undertake a robust public awareness campaign. The implementation of UCC must be a well-thought-out, inclusive, and consensus-driven process that upholds the principles of justice, equality, and non-discrimination

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Impact of Modi’s Visit to USA on our Geo-Politics

Prologue

 Narendra Modi arrived in the US on his first official maiden state visit with India’s geopolitical clout higher than at any point since he took power in 2014. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to hold bilateral talks with his US counterpart and finalise deals spanning jets engine production, semiconductor chip manufacturing, and drone deals. Earlier Micron Technology, Applied Materials had announced investment in India for semiconductor manufacturing. The trip (21-24 June 23) is a high-profile affair, complete with a banquet at the White House to be hosted by President Joe Biden and First Lady Jill Biden and an address to the US Congress, making Modi the first Indian Prime Minister to speak in front of the legislature twice.

After 76 years of Independence, India has come across to be one the world's largest economies and the fastest growing one as well. Such achievements would not have been possible without foreign aid. In order to get that, our previous leaders and politicians have taken farsighted steps that have helped the country shape its future. From Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Narendra Modi, the Prime Ministers of India have always been eager to place India prominently on the world map by negotiating terms with other countries. The leaders of India have paid several visits to the foreign shores and many of those visits have yielded historical results.

Previous Visits by Prime Ministers

As many as 9 Indian prime ministers, including Modi and his predecessor Singh, have undertaken official visits to the United States. While Singh went there 8 times, Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first PM, made as many as 4 visits, the same number as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who preceded Singh in the office. Others are Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi (3 each), PV Narasimha Rao (2), and Morarji Desai and IK Gujral (1 each). Modi, however, has undertaken 5 visits to US as India's PM and one unofficial visit in 2021 under the US leaderships of Obama, Trump and Biden.

Areas of Cooperation between India and USA

India-US relations have become increasingly multi-faceted, covering cooperation in areas such as trade, defense and security, education, science and technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, environment, and health. Grassroot-level interactions between the people of the two nations provide further vitality and strength to this bilateral relationship. There have been regular contacts at political and official levels with a wide-ranging dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues have taken place. 

On issues where the countries differ, like the nuclear deal, trade, and World Trade Organisation (WTO), they seem to have deferred negotiations, indicating that no progress was made in resolving them. In that context, even the renewal of the strategic partnership, and reference to “joint and concerted efforts” to dismantle terror groups including Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis” do not indicate any particularly new action or formulation. The statements seem most opaque when it comes to spelling out a shared worldview for India and the U.S.: while referring obliquely to China’s aggression in the South China Sea, ‘global crises’ like the situations in Iraq and Syria, and cooperation in Afghanistan, and a confounding, long reference to North Korea (DPRK), they list no action or step that the two countries hoped to take together. And while both sides made it clear ahead of the talks that the U.S. would request, and India would discuss the possibility of joining the anti-Islamic State coalition, there was silence on where those discussions led. On all fronts of the ‘comprehensive dialogue’, that is, eight issues including energy, health, space, women’s empowerment, trade, skills, strategy and security, Mr Modi’s visits successfully brought India-U.S. ties, that were faltering for a few years, back on track.

Regular exchange of high-level political visits has provided sustained momentum to bilateral cooperation, while the wide-ranging and ever-expanding dialogue architecture has established a long-term framework for India-U.S. engagement. Today, the India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectoral, covering trade and investment, defence and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health. Vibrant people-to-people interaction and support across the political spectrum in both countries nurture our bilateral relationship.

The Present State Visit

The visit has big implications for U.S.-India relations as President Biden seeks to shore up an alliance against Russia’s aggression and China’s economic influence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India received a lavish welcome in Washington, where he addressed a joint session of Congress and was feted by President Biden and the first lady in a state dinner at the White House — only the third state leader to be hosted by the current administration.

The pageantry of a momentous visit for U.S.-India relations, seen as an affirmation of India’s rise as an economic and diplomatic power, will raise weighty questions of geopolitical alignments with regard to China’s economic influence and Russia’s military aggression, as well as the erosion of India’s secular democracy under Modi. Like his predecessors, Mr. Biden has leaned into the hope that India, the world’s most populous democracy and the fifth-largest economy, will serve as a counterweight to China’s growing global economic heft.

The urgency for improved relations has intensified with Russia’s war on Ukraine, a geopolitical crisis that has placed India at the center of jostling between the United States and its allies and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. India, while fostering closer ties with the United States, has maintained military and economic relations with Russia, buying up Russian oil at a discount and staying away from backing United Nations resolutions that have condemned Russia’s aggression. The United States wants to help India bolster its domestic defense industry and increase military cooperation between the two countries in an attempt to wean India off its long dependence on Russia for its weaponry. 

In hosting Mr. Modi, Mr. Biden will be standing shoulder to shoulder with a leader who is immensely popular in his country but has sidelined challengers, co-opted judicial systems and consolidated power to a degree that has concerned observers and critics about the democratic erosion in the nation that recently surpassed China to become the world’s most populous.

Deals this Time

This visit symbolizes the unwavering commitment to deepening ties and signifies the immense potential for both countries to collaborate amidst global challenges. For many in India and the U.S., the visit is a testament to the promise and high expectations for the future of U.S.-India collaboration — one of shared prosperity. The U.S. is looking at India as a partner it can rely on, but its partnership will be very different since India is not an ally. High on the agenda will be deepening of defense ties, partnerships in technology and India’s role in the Indo-Pacific. However, because of the war in Ukraine, Russia has not been able to send critical defense weapons it had promised India, pushing the Indian military to look to others — such as the U.S. — for supplies. India has long been interested in buying SeaGuardian drones from the U.S., but the hoped-for deal that could be worth between $2 billion to $3 billion had been long hampered by “bureaucratic stumbling blocks. The deal has been brought back to the table. 

But India wants to “go beyond a buyer-seller relationship,” with the U.S and India is working toward a “co-production and co-development relationship” with the U.S. so it can build its own domestic manufacturing defense base. Private sectors in the U.S. could also start making more significant investments in India, with the two countries set to work together on producing fighter jet engines with GE collaborating with HAL. India will definitely be looking to reduce its dependence on Russia, and that will be quite an extreme move as presently majority of the military hardware is Russian.

This visit has strengthened the two countries’ with a shared commitment to a free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific and resolve to elevate the strategic technology partnership, including in defense, clean energy, and space.”

In seeing, how much China is advancing, the U.S. now understands the importance of really cooperating closely with India and trying to take advantage of the strengths on both sides. There are so many ways that the two sides can benefit from this increased technology cooperation—not to mention the progress that has been made on semiconductors. This has been a real area of focus for India and the United States.

Conclusion

Both the United States and India share the objective of not having an Asia that is dominated by China, or an Indo-Pacific region that is subject to Chinese coercion and assertiveness. India and the U.S. are framing a relationship that can respond to 21st century challenges, and China will be watching very carefully. The two countries have already identified what their strengths are and are articulating a much ambitious agenda for that.

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SINO – INDIA BORDER DISPUTE AND ITS ROAD FOR MANAGEMENT

Genesis of Sino-Indian Border Dispute

Over its seven decades, the Sino-Indian border dispute has become an intractable disagreement, with no resolution in sight. The question of a disputed border emerged in the early 1950s when the PRC effected its occupation of Tibet, a move which created for China and India one of the longest undemarcated borders of the world. The proximity of the Chinese military presence so close to the undemarcated frontier created considerable consternation in New Delhi. Factions of Indian policy elites led by India’s first home minister and also its first deputy prime minister, SardarVallabhbhai Patel, and then-Bombay Governor Girija Shankar Bajpai urged the government of then-Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to enhance the military and administrative presence along India’s north-east region . However, both Nehru and India’s ambassador to China, K.M. Pannikar, were reluctant to annoy their powerful northern neighbour and decided that India would not actively pursue the border question with Beijing, but would explicitly announce their endorsement of the McMahon Line as India’s border. Beijing, on the other hand, was less perturbed by the status of the common border as the new communist regime was more engaged in consolidating its authority at home, supressing rebellions, dealing with poverty, agrarian crises, and fears of invasion by the United States and the exiled nationalist government of the Republic of China, then in exile in Taiwan. Accordingly, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw fit to put the boundary issue on the backburner until they were well-prepared to address it.

The border dispute came to the fore in 1958, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, responding to Nehru’s protests against the Aksai Chin Road – 179 kilometres of which ran through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India – as well as acquisitive Chinese maps, denied for the first time the presence of any formalised border between China and India. Central to the border dispute was two flanks of territories lying at the two extremities of the vast border; the Aksai Chin region in the western sector, and the India-controlled and administered North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh, in the eastern sector. While New Delhi extended its claims on the basis of maps inherited from the British, Beijing claimed that these territories were historically part of Tibet. Over the next few years, the territorial disagreements between the two countries only deepened as the Tibet crisis, Dalai Lama’s refuge in India, and New Delhi’s Forward Policy only intensified the mutual distrust and led to the 1962 war.

The Border Dispute: A Colonial Legacy

Ambiguity about the Indian frontier with China dates back to the colonial era, and can be attributed as one of the foremost causes of the territorial conundrum facing the two countries. The British initiatives to demarcate the Himalayan frontiers were guided primarily by its strategic competition with Russia. Accordingly, the urgency to delineate the boundaries of the British Empire arose only when the Great Game intensified between the two superpowers. British administrators up until then held no clear view of India’s territorial limits along the massive Indo-Tibetan boundary. In the western sector, the first attempt to fix a boundary line was taken in 1865. Then-Surveyor General of India Sir W. H. Johnson, in a bid to impress the Dogra ruler, produced expansive boundary claims stretching the Dogra state border to the Kunlun Mountains and including all of Aksai Chin. Since other British officials were sceptical about Johnson’s claims, the boundary proposition died a natural death, until it was revived in 1897 by the director of the British military intelligence Sir John Ardagh, who believed that implementation of the forward positions in Johnson’s line would secure strategic leverage against Russia in the event of an Anglo-Russian confrontation. This boundary came to be known as the Ardagh-Johnson line, and later formed the basis of India’s claims to Aksai Chin.

It is noteworthy that between 1865 and 1897, colonial administrators depicted different versions of the northern and north-eastern boundary of Kashmir, the line fluctuating according to the degree of perceived threat from Russia. Also, China never acquiesced to any of the boundary propositions made during this period. The 1899 Macartney-MacDonald Line, which was the only formal boundary proposition ever presented to Beijing, was never officially acknowledged by the Manchu dynasty then ruling China.

The urgency to secure British India’s northern boundaries was lost with the removal of threat of invasion due to fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917. Post-1945, a map published by Survey of India did imply claims to the Aksai Chin region, but the British military remained non-committal on that boundary. In effect, the British administration exercised such benign neglect that sometimes the Macartney-MacDonald or the Ardagh-Johnson Line were treated as informal boundaries, depending on the administration’s inclination. Therefore, when the British left in 1947, there was no clear indication of exactly where the northern boundaries were. A similar reticence was displayed by colonial administrators in the eastern sector as well. The British had long been content to occupy the Brahmaputra plains, and did not extend their jurisdiction to the mountains, for these mountains were neither of commercial nor strategic value. However, in order to delineate the limit of British responsibility, the foothills were divided by an Outer Line representing the external territorial frontier of the British Empire, and an Inner line which was forbidden to cross without a permit. In the absence of any perceived threat from Russia or China, the vague demarcation continued.

The British began consolidating India’s eastern boundaries with Tibet in the early 1900s, as the administration became paranoid about Russia’s increasing influence in that country. A military expedition under Francis Younghusband was sent to Lhasa in 1903 to secure British India’s diplomatic and economic rights, which in turn triggered the perception of a threat by China, which responded with an expedition of its own to assert control over Lhasa. The operation’s leader Zhao Erfeng, who had earned the nickname ‘the Butcher of Kham’ for his actions extending Chinese rule into that Tibetan province, reached Lhasa in 1910 with 2,000 troops, securing the city and spurring the 13th Dalai Lama to flee toward India.

Britain, sensing the potential of a threat from China’s counter-moves, for the first time ordered a series of surveys to determine the extent of the tribal areas and to bring the area of Assam Himalaya (later NEFA) under British jurisdiction. Although, the sudden collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 eased some of the pressure, the new republican government appeared equally assertive toward Tibet. At this point, the British government began to contemplate a tripartite conference to settle such issues as the eastern borders of Inner and Outer Tibet, China’s degree of control in Inner Tibet, and alignment of the Indo-Tibetan border.

A tripartite conference which ultimately convened at Simla in October 1913 was fraught with controversy from the very beginning. For instance, the Chinese objected to Tibet’s equal representation, and were adamant about pushing Tibet’s Inner Line as the Outer Boundary. After negotiations dragged on, eventually in March 1914 the Chinese representative reluctantly agreed to a line drawn by McMahon on the map that ran along the highest crest of the Assam Himalayas and included Tawang within British Indian territory.

The Simla Conference ultimately failed to align the Indo-Tibetan border: the Chinese government never ratified the McMahon line, and since the Assam government was never informed about the Simla Conference proceedings, areas of Dirang and Tawang claimed by the McMahon Line remained under Tibetan control. In 1938, the Assam government attempted to occupy Tawang, but it back-pedalled after vehement protests from Lhasa, as well as when the British government during World War II excluded Tawang from its defensive efforts against a Japanese invasion, despite fortifying nearby Walong and Dirang. China too, its hands full fighting both the Second Sino-Japanese War (the Chinese theatre of World War II) as well as the Chinese Civil War against communist revolutionaries, paid scant attention to the Indo-Tibetan border issue. Therefore, the British left the Indian subcontinent without making any definite provisions for either NEFA or Tawang.

The Entrenchment of the Border Dispute

After India’s independence, three major factors contributed to the entrenchment of the border dispute. First was the reluctance of both India and China to broach the subject in the initial phase from 1950 to 1957, when Sino-Indian ties were peaceful and amicable and the two countries had many high-level diplomatic exchanges, which provided the leaders with ample opportunities to settle the ambiguities left over from the colonial period. However, the two countries not only circumvented the boundary issue but also followed unilateral policies. The Indian government failed to consult China before declaring the forward-most posts in the eastern and western sectors; it annexed Tawang in 1951; and it published new maps reflecting India’s unilateral demarcation, interpreted China’s silence as tacit consent. Nehru himself admitted in 1953 that even while India inherited the McMahon Line from the British, he was not willing to raise the subject lest it awaken sleeping dogs. Similarly, Mao Zedong’s instructions, the PRC followed a delaying strategy, with China deciding to refrain from formally protesting against New Delhi’s unilateral moves until they had consolidated their administrative and military position in Tibet, as China had begun building the Xinjiang National Highway in 1951 – a road that would not be completed until 1957. Moreover, during 1954 negotiations on Tibet, China chose not to raise the issue of border alignment despite having the opportunity, and in 1956, when Nehru for the first time referred to the boundary issue, Zhou Enlai suggested that the Chinese government would be willing to recognize the McMahon Line.

Tibet is the second factor which contributed to the entrenchment of the border dispute. From the very beginning, Tibet had become a point of contention between India and China. China’s military occupation of Tibet in 1950 was seen as a security threat in New Delhi and led to massive public outcry against China. Similarly, India’s close ties with the Dalai Lama and Nehru’s attempts to mediate between Lhasa and Beijing was perceived by the Communist regime as interference in China’s internal matters. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement provided only partial relaxation of tensions as China’s coercive practices to Sinicize Tibet, and India’s clandestine aid to the unarmed Tibetan resistance, kept suspicions lingering on both sides. In this context, the spontaneous 1959 Lhasa uprising further aggravated mutual misgivings, which in turn hardened their positions on the border dispute.

At the outbreak of the insurgency, Beijing immediately held India responsible for inciting the violence. Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) quickly crushed the rebellion, the 14th Dalai Lama’s flight to India and his subsequent granting of political asylum by New Delhi infuriated the CCP and strengthened its conviction about Indian malfeasance. An internal intelligence report even suggested that India had been complicit in fomenting rebellion in Tibet to compel China into accepting India’s territorial claims. Accordingly, Beijing directed intense criticism against Nehru, accusing him of continuing imperial policies in Tibet. The polemical attack not only shocked Nehru but also created trepidation in New Delhi that China might now try to push through the disputed areas. Evidently, an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion surrounding events in Tibet strained bilateral political and military ties. At the operational level, the PLA and the Indian army began to clash quickly since both militaries had begun conducting forward patrols, primarily in the eastern sector, and in August 1959, the first exchange of fire took place at Longju, NEFA, which significantly impacted relations. Concurrently, an exchange of letters between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru in September demonstrated significant hostility between the two leaders over the border dispute: China retracted its earlier willingness to accept the McMahon Line and accused the government of India of pressuring China, and Nehru replied by demanding the withdrawal of Chinese forces from posts on the Indian side as a precondition to border talks. Over the next few months, as bilateral ties continued to deteriorate following more clashes, deaths of Indian soldiers, rhetorical statements, and unfriendly correspondence, both China and India increasingly developed unyielding and aggressive attitudes toward the border question. Therefore, even though the original incident sparking the Tibet uprising had subsided, the resultant bitterness persisted to such an extent that in 1960, when representatives from the two countries met for final talks before the fateful war, there was little room left to manoeuvre.

Compounding the impact of the first two factors discussed above, the post-imperial ideology harboured by the two countries contributed to the entrenchment of the border dispute. While the deferral policy and the Tibet crisis both underscore how the border dispute had attained such complexity by 1960, the post-imperial ideology helps understand why the 1960 negotiations failed, ultimately leading to a deadlock.

Due to the intense trauma and violence suffered during colonization, China and India operated under a post-imperial ideology after their independence, which was aimed at gaining recognition of their victimhood and maximizing their prestige due to the humiliations suffered in the past. This tendency was observed at the 1955 Bandung conference, at which the leadership of both newly decolonized countries highlighted their intense suffering and anti-colonial struggle. However, it also resulted in a simmering competition between India and China that intensified in the months following the Tibetan crisis, due to China’s negative publicity and India’s loss of territory and military casualties. Accordingly, establishing their claims of victimhood over the other and resistance to further humiliation in the form of territorial loss heavily informed China and India’s attitude when their delegates met again in 1960 to try to resolve the boundary question.

Both Zhou Enlai and the Indian leaders were insistent on securing acknowledgement of their victimhood and acceptance of the disputed territories as historically significant and integral to their respective countries. For instance, the Chinese premier emphasised in the aforementioned meetings that Tibet – which he averred had been part of China since the Manchu dynasty – was made a protectorate by the British government of India through the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty in 1904 and the Simla Convention, where the McMahon Line was determined. This, Zhou maintained, was essentially a humiliation imposed on China. With regard to Aksai Chin, Zhou asserted that the region was under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang province, and therefore indisputably part of China. It is noteworthy here that one of the major national goals of the CCP was to restore China’s former glory, and therefore regaining control of Xinjiang and Tibet was seen as essential to this restoration. On the Indian side, Nehru and other Indian leaders argued along similar lines, stating that the British Raj merely formalised boundaries that had been in place for centuries. In the case of Ladakh-Tibet, the boundary was historically accepted and recognised, and did not require any formal delimitation, and for the western sector the McMahon Line established a boundary that had been administered by Indian rulers since even before the Christian era. In other words, the government of India proclaimed a civilizational glory on the basis of timeless borders which were only concretised during colonial rule. Following the logic of post-imperial ideology, the 1960 border talks failed on two accounts; first, neither party made any new territorial claims but simply reiterated what was rightfully theirs; and second, both were eager to establish that they had been victimised in the past and were being victimised again.

Divergent Positions on the Border Dispute

The negotiations between Zhou and Nehru continued for five days and ended in complete failure. Nehru rejected the Chinese premier’s package deal that offered Beijing’s acceptance of the Indian position in the eastern sector in return for New Delhi’s acceptance of the Chinese position in the western sector. The Chinese delegation returned to Beijing with the conviction that the Indians were not interested in negotiating. Tensions escalated over the next two years, with the Indian army pushing northward via the controversial Forward Policy, and PLA units responding tit-for-tat, resulting in small skirmishes. War erupted on October 20, 1962, when the PLA launched a massive offensive across the entire disputed border. It was a short and swift campaign that lasted a month and resulted in the complete defeat of the Indian army. However, the war failed to ensure a permanent solution to the border dispute. Instead, the political rift that was created continues to dampen bilateral ties, especially as regards border negotiations. Indeed, the divergent positions adopted by India and China on the border dispute have seen their differences evolve and widen in the post-war years.

India argues that the western sector was demarcated by the 1842 agreement between Tibet and Kashmir and that the eastern sector was finalised by the Simla Agreement in 1913–1914. Therefore, no further demarcation is required. China in turn states that no formal treaty or agreement has ever been signed between the Indian and Chinese governments, for China neither sent any representative to the India-Tibet negotiations nor ratified the McMahon Line. In this context, China views the establishment of the state of Arunachal Pradesh as a unilateral step by India, and that this amounts to an illegal occupation of China’s Tibet .

From a broader perspective, the two countries disagree first on the size of the border and the locations which are disputed. The Indian position is that the Sino-Indian boundary is a total of 3,488 kilometres in length (including 523 km of what India calls the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir-China section), with the western sector being 1,597 kilometres, the middle sector 545 kilometres, and the eastern sector 1,346 kilometres in length. Here, India accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometres of land in the Kashmir region, along with 5,180 square kilometres of land in the Kashmir region which was ceded to it by Pakistan. Also, India claims Aksai Chin to be part of India’s Ladakh region, and India has no dispute as far as the eastern sector is concerned.

The Chinese position is that the Sino-Indian border is not more than 2,000 kilometres, the western sector roughly covers Karakoram Mountain and is about 600 kilometres long, the disputed area in this sector is 33,000 square kilometres and currently lies under Chinese control. The middle sector is roughly 450 kilometres long and has a disputed area of 2,000 square kilometres, and the eastern sector is 650 kilometres and has a disputed area of 90,000 square kilometres occupied by India. Contrary to India’s position, China asserts that the eastern sector of the border is the most contentious part as the McMahon line is illegitimate and China therefore claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. In the western sector, China contends that Ladakh is a disputed region .

Another major area of contention between the two countries is the determination of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India rejects the Chinese version of the LAC, describing it as a series of disconnected points on the map. New Delhi also claims that the LAC should be based on military positions before China’s 1962 attack, discounting any gains made during that war. China on the other hand insists that the LAC should be the status quo attained after the 1962 war; which is incidentally the territorial arrangement suggested by Zhou Enlai during the 1960 negotiations. On the eastern side, it coincides mostly with the McMahon Line, while in the western and middle sectors, the LAC follows the traditional customary line pointed out by China. The demarcation and implementation of the LAC is intrinsically associated with the larger process of negotiations on border alignment. The Chinese leadership and officials hold the determination of the LAC to be a critical matter, and have usually followed an extremely reserved approachIndian experts observe that the Chinese lack of interest in providing clarification on the LAC is related to Beijing’s shift in policy on the border dispute. In the post-war period, China has withdrawn the package deal originally proposed by Zhou Enlai and now claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Although initially, Chinese interests in Arunachal Pradesh were limited only to Tawang, in recent years their claims have expanded to include the entire state. For instance, in 2006, before the visit to India by China’s then-President Hu Jintao, the PRC ambassador to India Sun Yuxi declared all of Arunachal Pradesh to be Chinese territory, and that Tawang was merely a small portion of it. Chinese commentators lament that it was a great political mistake on China’s part to give up NEFA or modern day Arunachal Pradesh. In 2007, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that mere presence in populated areas would not affect China’s claims: a stance that is problematic because it is a clear reversal of Beijing’s earlier agreement to abide by the principle to safeguard the interests of the settled populations in the border areas. It also suggests that, in the future, China might unilaterally reject any principle that is inconvenient to its national interests . In response to Indian allegations, China argues that there are two reasons why China is reluctant to demarcate the LAC; first because such a process will take both countries back to the historical disputes and once again entrap bilateral ties within the historical and legal approach, which in turn will inhibit the overall development of Sino-Indian relations. Second, China is charging New Delhi with taking advantage of the clarification process to increase the disputed area into places where no dispute existed before, although Beijing is unable to provide any concrete evidence to support this claim.

Managing the Border Dispute

After 1962 war it took India and China ten years to restore diplomatic ties, and post-normalisation, the two countries were faced with the dual challenge of resolving the border dispute while simultaneously maintaining peace along the undemarcated border. The Indian foreign minister, AtalBihari Vajpayee, visited China in 1979, helping to ease tensions in bilateral ties, and Sino-Indian talks on the border dispute started in the 1980s. However, confidence-building measures were initiated only in the 1990s when border patrols of the two countries had begun to clash again .

In 1981, border talks commenced at the vice-ministerial level, and were followed by seven more separate rounds of meetings. Although bilateral ties deteriorated due to the military standoff during the Sumdorong Chu crisis, however, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit turned out to be a definitive moment. The two countries agreed to set up the Joint Working Group for settlement of the boundary question with a twin mandate of ensuring peace and tranquillity along the LAC and working toward a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question A major breakthrough was achieved in 1993, during P.V. NarasimhaRao’s visit to Beijing. The two leaders penned the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, which called for a renunciation of the use of force, recognition of and respect for the LAC, and the resolution of the border issue through negotiations.  Another high point of border dispute management was reached with 1996 signing of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas. The agreement laid down pledges on non-aggression, prior notification of large troop movements, and exchange of maps to resolve disagreements over the LAC. The two documents remain significant in the context of Sino-Indian border negotiations, because both countries finally acknowledged that certain problems exist in their border regions and that there is need for institutional mechanisms to manage these problems.Following the successful conclusion of these two agreements, China and India in June 2003 adopted the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation between India and China, whereby each side agreed to appoint special representatives to explore ways for settlement of the boundary dispute keeping in view the political perspectives of both countries A more concrete framework for settlement of the territorial dispute was instituted in 2005 with the signing of The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Questions. According to this protocol, the two countries recognised the need to initiate the process of early clarification and confirmation of the alignment of the LAC along with undertaking meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question. The most recent document inked between the two countries, the Border Defence Co-operation Agreement (2013), was signed following the Depsang Valley incident .

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

The border dispute undeniably remains one of the major issues impinging on Sino-Indian bilateral ties. Experts contend that there are multiple factors today which sustain the border dispute. The first is the geographical constitution of the disputed areas: The rugged, featureless terrain and extreme weather conditions make determination of the precise alignment challenging. Subsequently, implementation of border agreements on the ground also remains elusive. Second, there is asymmetry in the level of urgency for the settlement of the border dispute. In contrast to New Delhi’s endeavours seeking a quick settlement, Beijing has staunchly resisted any fast-tracking of the resolution process, arguing that the border dispute is a complicated question and should be negotiated only when conditions are favourable. The primary reason for this difference in approaches is that the disputed border does not pose a security threat to China, and therefore Beijing is willing to wait for a more beneficial resolution. In contrast, New Delhi sees the border dispute as source of instability and worries and that China would use the unresolved border to bully India. The third factor inhibiting the resolution of the border dispute is intense nationalism in both countries. For China, the border dispute is intrinsically linked to Tibet and the Dalai Lama, and since the CCP has always projected the Tibetan government-in-exile in a negative light, territorial concessions involving Tawang will not only endanger China’s own rule in Tibet but will also be seen domestically as sign of weakness; a terrifying prospect for the Chinese leadership. As for India, no political party would be able to propose a territorial exchange with China without seriously jeopardising its electoral prospects, as the memories of 1962 war continue to haunt the Indian national psyche. Lastly, along with the boundary dispute, new issues have begun to stir trouble in Sino-Indian bilateral ties. India’s concerns regarding China’s diversion of the Yarlung-Tsangpo/Brahmaputra river water, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and China’s growing influence in South Asia have emerged as new irritants for Indian policy makers. Similarly, Beijing too is annoyed by India’s increasing proximity with Southeast Asian countries and its diplomatic-military exchanges with the United States, Japan, and Australia. These issues further erode political will in both countries and in this context territorial exchange by swap or political settlement appears a daunting task.

As evinced by the recent Galwan Valley clashes, managing the border dispute is both a political and an economic exigency for India and China because any major confrontation between the two countries will not only hurt the long-term prospects for development of both, but will also have significant repercussions on Asian stability and prosperity. Therefore, the policy-making elites of both countries need to frame innovative solutions like creating soft borders through civilian, cultural, and economic exchanges, and involving local communities in managing the border. Such an approach can help reduce the number of military encounters between the two countries and create an enduring peace in the border region. The two countries should also aim toward building strategic trust through open dialogue, exchange of information, and verification mechanisms along the disputed border. Enhancing military-to-military communication, technological collaboration and engagement on multilateral platforms remain indispensible toward building trust. Public perception is another key area that needs to be urgently addressed through civilian exchanges. This would go a long way toward dispelling stereotypes and negative perceptions. Track-II dialogue involving strategic-affairs experts and academics from the two countries could also be organized to identify new areas for cooperation. For the foreseeable future, the border dispute will remain a pressing challenge in Sino-Indian ties, however, it is in the national interest of both countries to prioritise their larger bilateral relationship, while at the same time erecting confidence-building measures and dialogue mechanisms to better preserve the benefits accruing from the relationship.

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