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Article 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. (164a)

Spouses Docena vs. Lapesura     

G.R. No. 140153     

 Mar 28, 2001    

Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

Facts:

     The case involves petitioners Antonio and Alfreda Docena against Hon. Ricardo P. Lapesura, Rufino M. Garado, and Casiano Hombria. The events leading to this case, when private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, the Docena spouses. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on their long-standing occupation. A third party, Guillermo Abuda, intervened in the case, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and Abuda. However, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the petitioners to vacate the land, except for a portion they had reclaimed from the sea, and to pay Hombria a nominal rental of P1.00 per year from the date of the complaint until they vacated the premises. Hombria filed a motion for execution of the appellate court's decision, which had become final and executory. The public respondent judge granted this motion. The sheriff later requested clarification regarding the specific portion of land to be excluded from the execution due to defects in the Commissioner’s Report. The judge ruled that the execution should proceed without altering the appellate court's decision. Consequently, an alias Writ of Demolition was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to set aside or defer the implementation of the Writ of Demolition, which was denied. They then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial court and the sheriff. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on June 18, 1999, citing that it was filed beyond the 60-day period and that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was denied on September 9, 1999, prompting the petitioners to seek relief from the Supreme Court.

Issue:

      Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the grounds that it was filed beyond the 60-day period and that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners?

Ruling:

     The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its computation of the 60-day period for filing the petition. The Court clarified that the period should be counted from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, which was on May 4, 1999. Thus, the petition filed on June 14, 1999, was within the allowable timeframe. The Court also addressed the issue of the certification of non-forum shopping, stating that the signing by only one of the petitioners constituted substantial compliance with the rules. Given that the petitioners were spouses with a joint interest in the property, the husband’s signature was deemed sufficient. The Court emphasized that procedural rules should not be applied rigidly to the detriment of justice, especially in cases involving conjugal property where the husband is the statutory administrator.

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Article 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)

Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals                

G.R. No. 89667              

Oct 20, 1993        

Vitug, J.

Facts:

     The case revolves around the ownership of a parcel of land acquired by Alayo D. Bosing while he was living with his common-law wife, Josefa Rivera, after having deserted his lawful wife, Juliana Oday, and their three children. Alayo and Juliana were married on July 27, 1927. In 1946, Alayo left Juliana and began cohabiting with Josefa, with whom he had a daughter named Josephine Bosing, now known as Josephine Belcodero. Alayo purchased a piece of land on an installment basis from Magdalena Estate, Inc., indicating his civil status as "married to Josefa R. Bosing." In a letter, Alayo authorized the transfer of the lot to Josefa's name. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in Josefa's name. Alayo married Josefa on June 6, 1958, while his marriage to Juliana was still valid. Alayo passed away on March 11, 1967. On September 17, 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed an extrajudicial partition and sale of the property, describing it as "conjugal property" of Josefa and the deceased Alayo. This deed conveyed Josefa's supposed one-half interest and her one-fourth interest as an heir to Josephine for P10,000. The notice of partition was published, and a new title was issued in Josephine's name on June 6, 1974. On October 30, 1980, Juliana and her children filed an action for reconveyance of the property, leading to a trial court ruling in their favor.

Issue:

     Did the action for reconveyance prescribe and the property in question belong exclusively to the petitioners?

Ruling:

     The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling that the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and Juliana, and that the action for reconveyance had not prescribed. The Court also upheld the finding of an implied trust and denied the petitioners' claims regarding the exclusive ownership of the property. The presumption that all property acquired during marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership was not convincingly rebutted. The Court also noted that the extrajudicial partition executed by Josefa and Josephine recognized Alayo's ownership, as Josefa claimed a share in the "conjugal partnership."Regarding the prescription of the action for reconveyance, the Court clarified that the prescriptive period for real property under the Torrens System begins upon the issuance of a new title. Since the action was filed within the ten-year period, it was timely. The Court further explained that the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence was not meritorious, as the evidence was not truly newly discovered but rather forgotten, and did not alter the outcome of the case.

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Article 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a)

Laperal vs. Katigbak         

G.R. No. L-16951            

Feb 28, 1962              

Labrador, J.

Facts:

     The case involves Roberto and Purificacion Laperal as plaintiffs and Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak as the defendant and appellant. The events leading to the case began with a previous action, filed in the CFI of Manila. This case was initiated by the Laperals against Ramon and Evelina Katigbak to recover amounts of P14,000 and P97,500, which were borrowed and received by Ramon Katigbak.  The promissory notes for the P14,000 were signed solely by Ramon, and he also signed a receipt for the jewelry valued at P97,500 without Evelina's concurrence. The lower court dismissed the action against Evelina, ruling that she was not liable since she did not sign the documents. On February 10, 1955, the Laperals filed another action, against the same spouses, alleging that the previous case's judgment was not a bar to the current action. They claimed that the obligations incurred by Ramon redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, as they were married without an ante-nuptial contract. The plaintiffs argued that the judicial separation of property filed by Evelina was made to defraud creditors and was therefore void. They sought to hold the conjugal properties liable for the debts incurred by Ramon. Evelina denied the allegations and claimed that the previous dismissal absolved her from liability. The trial court ruled against Evelina, ordering her to pay half of the amounts owed to the Laperals, leading to the current appeal.

Issues:

Does the previous ruling bar the present action against Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak?

Can the conjugal properties of the spouses be held liable for the obligations incurred by Ramon L. Katigbak?

Ruling:

     The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, stating that the previous judgment indeed barred the present action against her. The Court held that the obligations incurred by Ramon did not redound to the benefit of the family and that the conjugal properties could not be held liable for his personal debts. Consequently, Evelina was absolved from the action.The Court's decision was grounded in the principle of res judicata, which prevents the same parties from relitigating the same cause of action. The Court emphasized that the previous case had already determined Evelina's non-liability for the obligations incurred by her husband, as she did not sign any of the relevant documents.

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Article 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitime’s of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n)

Johnson and Johnson, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals           

G.R. No. 102692           

Sep 23, 1996              

Panganiban, J.

Facts:

     The case at hand involves Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. as the petitioner and Alejo M. Vinluan, along with his wife Delilah A. Vinluan, as the respondents. The events leading to this case began in 1982 when Delilah Vinluan, operating under the name "Vinluan Enterprises," purchased products from Johnson & Johnson for her retail business. Over time, she incurred a debt amounting to P235,880.89, which she attempted to settle through several checks that ultimately bounced due to insufficient funds. Despite multiple demands for payment and extensions granted by Johnson & Johnson, the debt remained unpaid, prompting the corporation to file a complaint for collection on June 8, 1983, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4186.

     On February 5, 1985, the trial court ruled that Delilah Vinluan was solely liable for the debt, as there was no evidence of her husband’s consent to the obligations incurred by her, nor was there any benefit to the conjugal partnership from her business activities. The court dismissed the counterclaim of the Vinluan spouses for lack of merit. Following this decision, a writ of execution was issued on February 3, 1989, to enforce the judgment against Delilah's properties. However, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued notices of levy that included not only Delilah's paraphernal properties but also the conjugal properties owned by both spouses. Alejo Vinluan filed a third-party claim to contest the levy on the conjugal properties, asserting that the trial court's earlier decision had absolved him of any liability for his wife's debts. The trial court denied his motion to quash the levy, leading to an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which ultimately ruled in favor of Alejo Vinluan, declaring the levies on the conjugal properties null and void.

Issues:

Can a husband be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership?

Is a judgment declaring a wife solely liable for her debt’s executable against conjugal property over the objection of the husband?

Ruling:

     The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Alejo M. Vinluan, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the trial court's orders to levy on the conjugal properties were null and void, as the husband could not be held liable for his wife's debts that were incurred without his consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership.The Court reiterated that the obligations incurred by Delilah Vinluan were solely her responsibility, as the trial court had previously established that there was no privity of contract between Johnson & Johnson and Alejo Vinluan. The Court further noted that the trial court's decision had become final and executory, and any subsequent orders attempting to levy on the conjugal properties were improper as they contradicted the final judgment. The ruling underscored the principle that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable, and the execution of such a judgment must strictly adhere to its terms. The Court concluded that since the obligations did not benefit the conjugal partnership and Alejo Vinluan did not consent to his wife's business dealings, the conjugal properties could not be subjected to execution for her debts.

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Article 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a)

Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Spouses Revilla     

G.R. No. 190901     

Nov 12, 2014    

Leonen J.

Facts:

      The case involves a 15,000-square-meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite, originally owned by Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses).In 1983, due to financial difficulties, the Revilla spouses borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada) under a verbal agreement.The agreement stipulated that Amada would take possession of the property, cultivate it, and use the earnings to pay off the loan and realty taxes. Upon full payment, the property would be returned to the Revilla spouses.Amada presented a fictitious document, "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," to the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, falsely indicating that the Revilla spouses sold the property to her.This led to the cancellation of the Revilla spouses' tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in Amada's name.Amada subsequently sold the property to the Casorla spouses, who then sold it to the Sun spouses.When Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia in 1994, he discovered the fraudulent transfers.The Revilla spouses filed a complaint in 1995 for the annulment of sales and transfers, and reconveyance of the property.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Revilla spouses, declaring the sales and transfers null and void and ordering the reinstatement and reconveyance of the property.Amada appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal and partially granted the Sun spouses' appeal regarding interest and damages.Amada then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

      Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the reinstatement and reconveyance of the property in favor of the Revilla spouses.

Ruling:     The Supreme Court upheld the reinstatement and reconveyance of the property in favor of the Revilla spouses.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' finding that the signatures of the Revilla spouses in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" were forged. The court also noted that the notary public who allegedly notarized the document was not commissioned. Furthermore, the court held that the good faith argument raised by the Sun spouses, who were buyers of unregistered land, could not be considered as it is a defense personal to them and not applicable to Amada.

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Article 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a)

Uy vs. Court of Appeals    

G.R. No. 102726        

May 27, 1994

Vitug, J.

Facts:

       Natividad Calaunan-Uy and Menilo B. Uy, Sr. were in a common-law relationship for about 36 years and had four children together. After Menilo B. Uy, Sr. passed away, Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate. However, Natividad Calaunan-Uy filed a motion to hold the special proceedings in abeyance and also filed a civil case for partition of properties under co-ownership against the estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr.

     During the trial of the civil case, the parties submitted a compromise agreement, which was later rendered as a judgment. However, Tshiate Uy filed an omnibus motion, claiming that she was the surviving legal spouse of Menilo B. Uy, Sr. by virtue of a Hong Kong marriage. She requested to intervene in the civil case and submitted an answer in intervention, arguing that the judgment based on the compromise agreement was a patent nullity. The trial court allowed the intervention and set aside the compromise judgment. Natividad Calaunan-Uy filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the orders of the trial court.

Issue:

       The main issues raised in the case are: (1) whether the intervention of Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy came too late, and (2) whether the trial court ignored the rule on finality of judgments.

Ruling:

      The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Court held that the intervention of Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy is essential for a proper disposition of the case. The Court cited Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code, which govern the co-ownership of property acquired during a common-law relationship. The Court emphasized that without the presence of indispensable parties, a judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. The Court also noted that the denial of the intervention would lead to injustice and open the door to fraud.

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Article 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a)

Matabuena vs. Cervantes      

G.R. No. L-28771       

Mar 31, 1971     

Fernando, J.

Facts:

      Cornelia Matabuena contested a donation made by her deceased brother Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes.The donation was executed on February 20, 1956, while Felix and Petronila were in a common-law relationship.Felix and Petronila married on March 28, 1962.Felix passed away intestate on September 13, 1962.Cornelia claimed ownership of the property based on an affidavit of self-adjudication executed in 1962.The lower court dismissed Cornelia's complaint, stating the donation was valid since it was made before Felix and Petronila were married.Cornelia appealed, arguing the donation was void under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during marriage.

Issue:

      Does the prohibition on donations between spouses during marriage under Article 133 of the Civil Code apply to common-law relationships?

Ruling:

     The Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition on donations between spouses during marriage under Article 133 of the Civil Code applies to common-law relationships. The donation made by Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes was declared void. Petronila, as Felix's widow, is entitled to one-half of the inheritance. The other half of the inheritance goes to Cornelia as the surviving sister.

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Article 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local custom. (118)

Intestate Estate of Pareja vs. Pareja      

G.R. No. L-5824    

May 31, 1954     

Barrera J.

Facts:  

       The case of Intestate Estate of Pareja v. Pareja involves the recognition of the petitioner-appellee and her siblings as acknowledged natural children of the deceased Natividad Pareja. Natividad Pareja and Eulogia Fernandez lived together as man and wife without being married, and they had four children together. Soledad Pareja was recognized by the deceased as his natural child, while the other children sought recognition after his death. The trial court declared all the children as acknowledged natural children and heirs of the deceased. However, Soledad Pareja Marcial, who was also recognized as a natural child, appealed the decision.

Issue:

       The main issue in this case is whether the documents presented, such as birth and baptismal certificates, satisfy the requirements of recognition as natural children under the Spanish Civil Code.

Ruling: 

       The court ruled that the birth and baptismal certificates are not considered public documents as defined in the Spanish Civil Code. These certificates, although issued by public officers, are not proof of the relationship or filiation of the child. The court also clarified that the public document mentioned in the law refers to documents executed by private individuals and authenticated by notaries. The documents presented in this case do not meet the requirements of precision and solemnity for recognition as natural children.

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Article 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:

(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;

(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and

(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.

The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)

Maquilan vs. Maquilan        

G.R. No. 155409         

Jun 8, 2007                

Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

       Virgilio Maquilan (petitioner) and Dita Maquilan (respondent) were once happily married and had a son. Their marriage deteriorated when Virgilio discovered Dita's affair, leading to her conviction for adultery along with her paramour. Both were sentenced to imprisonment ranging from one year, eight months to three years, six months, and twenty-one days. Subsequently, on June 15, 2001, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains, and Damages, citing psychological incapacity on Virgilio's part. During pre-trial, the couple entered into a Compromise Agreement detailing the division of their conjugal properties, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley approved. Virgilio later filed an Omnibus Motion to repudiate the agreement, claiming his lawyer had not properly informed him of its effects. The RTC denied his motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Virgilio then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed his petition. Virgilio brought the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Compromise Agreement was void due to Dita's adultery conviction and lack of participation by the Solicitor General or Provincial Prosecutor.

Issues:

Can a spouse convicted of adultery still share in the conjugal partnership?

Is a Compromise Agreement giving a convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property valid and legal?

Ruling:

   The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, with the modification that the Compromise Agreement is valid without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.

    The Supreme Court held that the conviction for adultery does not automatically disqualify Dita from sharing in the conjugal property, as the penalty for adultery (prision correccional) does not include civil interdiction. Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and legal separation, do not apply because the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. The Compromise Agreement was a voluntary separation of property allowed under Article 143 of the Family Code and was validly entered into by both parties.

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Article 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

      In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano        

G.R. No. L-13553       

Feb 23, 1960        

Bengzon, J.

Facts:

 In the case of "De Ocampo v. Florenciano," the petitioner, Jose de Ocampo, sought legal separation from his wife, Serafina Florenciano, on the grounds of adultery. The couple was married on April 5, 1938, in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had several children who resided with the petitioner. The complaint, initially filed on July 5, 1955, and subsequently amended, detailed specific instances of Serafina's infidelity, particularly with Jose Arcalas in March 1951 and Nelson Orzame in June 1955. The respondent did not respond to the complaint, leading the court to declare her in default and instruct the provincial fiscal to investigate potential collusion. The fiscal's investigation revealed no collusion, and the plaintiff presented evidence through witness testimonies. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision, citing confession of judgment, condonation or consent to the adultery, and prescription. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of Articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code.

Issue:  

Can a decree of legal separation be granted based on evidence of adultery independently of the defendant's confession?

Ruling:  

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a decree of legal separation should be granted if there is evidence of adultery independent of the defendant's confession. The Court emphasized that a confession of judgment typically occurs when the defendant explicitly agrees to the plaintiff's demand in court, which did not happen in this case. The evidence presented by the plaintiff, including testimonies from witnesses, was sufficient to prove the adultery. The Court also clarified that collusion, which would invalidate the legal separation, involves an agreement between the parties to fabricate or suppress evidence of a matrimonial offense. In this case, there was no collusion as the adultery had genuinely occurred, and the defendant's admissions were not made to deceive the court. Regarding the issue of condonation, the Court held that the husband's failure to search for his wife did not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous acts. The obligation was on the wife to return after leaving him, especially since she had already committed infidelity. The Court distinguished this case from others where the husband's abandonment implied consent or condonation, noting that here, it was the wife who left the husband. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and decreed a legal separation between Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano, with costs against the respondent.

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Article 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

Aquino vs. Delizo          

G.R. No. L-15853           

Jul 27, 1960          

Gutierrez David, J

Facts:

       In the case of "Aquino v. Delizo," petitioner Fernando Aquino sought to annul his marriage to respondent Conchita Delizo. The marriage took place on December 27, 1954. Aquino alleged that Delizo concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage, which he discovered when she gave birth to a child in April 1955. Aquino filed a complaint for annulment on September 6, 1955, on the grounds of fraud. Delizo, in her defense, claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and Aquino. During the trial at the Court of First Instance of Rizal, only Aquino testified, and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract. Delizo did not appear or present any evidence, despite her counsel's reservation to do so later. The trial court dismissed Aquino's complaint on June 16, 1956, noting the absence of a birth certificate to prove the child's birth within 180 days after the marriage and holding that the alleged concealment did not constitute fraud sufficient to annul the marriage. Aquino filed a verified petition to reopen the case for the reception of additional evidence, including the birth and delivery certificates of the child, which he claimed he failed to secure earlier due to excusable negligence. The trial court denied this petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals acknowledged Aquino's excusable neglect but still affirmed the dismissal, suggesting that it was not impossible for Aquino and Delizo to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement, thus making the child their own. Aquino's subsequent motion for reconsideration and new trial, supported by affidavits and birth certificates, was also denied by the Court of Appeals, leading Aquino to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

     Did the concealment of pregnancy by Conchita Delizo at the time of marriage constitute fraud sufficient to annul the marriage?

Ruling:

     Yes, the concealment of pregnancy by Conchita Delizo at the time of marriage constituted fraud sufficient to annul the marriage.

    The Supreme Court held that under the New Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that she was pregnant by another man at the time of marriage constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3)). The Court found that the trial court's dismissal of Aquino's complaint was erroneous. The appellate court's reasoning that it was not impossible for Aquino and Delizo to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement was deemed conjectural and unsupported by the record.The Supreme Court emphasized that the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, combined with the existing evidence, would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by Aquino. The failure of Delizo to file an answer to the motion for reconsideration could not be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal was ordered to represent the government to prevent such collusion. The veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes could only be determined after hearing the evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower court for a new trial, ensuring that justice would be better served.

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Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Anaya vs. Palaroan          

G.R. No. L-27930               

 Nov 26, 1970             

Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Facts:

     In the case of "Anaya v. Palaroan," plaintiff-appellant Aurora A. Anaya sought to annul her marriage to defendant-appellee Fernando O. Palaroan. The couple was married on December 4, 1953. Shortly after, on January 7, 1954, Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage, claiming his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed Fernando's complaint, upheld the validity of the marriage, and granted Aurora's counterclaim. During negotiations to settle the judgment, Fernando revealed to Aurora that he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative. Aurora claimed that this non-disclosure constituted fraud under Article 85, No. 4 of the Civil Code, and sought annulment and moral damages.

Fernando denied the allegations, asserting he never had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative and did not commit any fraud. Fernando counterclaimed for damages due to the malicious filing of the suit. Aurora, in her reply, alleged that Fernando courted her without genuine affection, intending to evade marrying his close relative and not to perform marital duties. She also claimed that Fernando cohabited with another woman and had children. The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila attempted to reconcile the parties but failed. Upon reviewing the case, the court found Aurora's fraud allegation legally insufficient to invalidate the marriage.

Issue:

     Is the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship by a husband a valid ground for annulment of marriage under Philippine law?

Ruling:

     The non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship by a husband is not a valid ground for annulment of marriage under Philippine law. The non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship does not fall within the categories and is explicitly excluded by the provision that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute fraud for annulment purposes. Regarding the new allegations of fraud raised in Aurora's reply, the Court held that these constituted an entirely new and additional cause of action, which is not permissible in a reply. The Court emphasized that a reply cannot be used to amend or change the cause of action set forth in the complaint. Furthermore, any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform marital duties would have been discovered soon after the marriage, and the action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since the marriage occurred in December 1953 and the new allegations were raised in 1966, the action was already barred by prescription. The Court's decision was based on the provisions of the Civil Code and the legal principle that actions involving public interest, such as annulment of marriage, must adhere strictly to the grounds and time limits prescribed by law.

[gabrieloraiz]

Article 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by R.A. No. 8533)

Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen

G.R. No. 189121

Jul 31, 2013

Perez, J.

Facts:

The case of "Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen" revolves around the administration of the estate of Eliseo Quiazon, who passed away intestate on December 12, 1992. The petitioners, Amelia Garcia-Quiazon and her children Jenneth and Maria Jennifer Quiazon, contested the petition for letters of administration filed by Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes). Elise claimed to be the natural child of Eliseo, conceived and born when her parents were both legally capable of marrying each other. Elise challenged the validity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia, arguing it was bigamous due to Amelia's prior marriage to Filipito Sandico. Elise supported her claim with her Certificate of Live Birth, signed by Eliseo, and filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. The petitioners contended that the venue was improper, citing Eliseo's death certificate, which indicated he was a resident of Capas, Tarlac. The RTC ruled in favor of Elise, ordering the issuance of letters of administration. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision, prompting the petitioners to seek a review by the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring that Amelia Garcia-Quiazon was not legally married to Eliseo Quiazon due to a pre-existing marriage?

Ruling:

The Court noted that a void marriage, such as one that is bigamous, can be questioned even after the death of the parties involved. The Court found sufficient evidence of Amelia's prior marriage to Filipito Sandico, rendering her subsequent marriage to Eliseo void ab initio. The Court also held that Elise, as a compulsory heir, had the right to challenge the marriage and seek letters of administration.

[gabrieloraiz]

Article 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)

Carino vs. Carino

G.R. No. 132529

Feb 2, 2001

Ynares – Santiago, J.

Facts:

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, the petitioner, Susan Nicdao Cariño, and the respondent, Susan Yee Cariño, were both married to the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño. Santiago first married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, and they had two children, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño. During the subsistence of this marriage, Santiago married Susan Yee on November 10, 1992, with whom he had no children. Santiago passed away on November 23, 1992, after suffering from diabetes and pulmonary tuberculosis. Following his death, both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits from various government agencies. Susan Nicdao collected a total of PHP 146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig, while Susan Yee received PHP 21,000 from GSIS and SSS. Susan Yee then filed a case for the collection of half the amount received by Susan Nicdao, arguing that the first marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Susan Yee, a decision which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Susan Nicdao then sought recourse from the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Is the marriage between Santiago and Susan Nicdao void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license?

Does the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage affect the validity of the second marriage between Santiago and Susan Yee?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the marriage between Santiago and Susan Nicdao was void ab initio because it was solemnized without the necessary marriage license, as required under the Civil Code in force at the time. For purpose of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage is required under Article 40 of the Family Code. Since no such declaration was obtained, the second marriage between Santiago and Susan Yee is also void ab initio.

[gabrieloraiz]

Article 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n)

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571

Aug 11, 2010

Brion, J.

Facts:

The case involves petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Shortly after the wedding, Gerbert returned to Canada due to work commitments. Upon his return to the Philippines in April 2005, he discovered that Daisylyn was having an affair. Gerbert then returned to Canada and filed for divorce, which was granted by the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada on December 8, 2005. Desiring to remarry in the Philippines, Gerbert registered the Canadian divorce decree at the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. However, an official from the National Statistics Office informed him that the marriage still subsisted under Philippine law and that the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Consequently, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Daisylyn did not oppose the petition and expressed her desire to file a similar case. The RTC denied Gerbert's petition, ruling that only the Filipino spouse could avail of the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Gerbert then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Does the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extend to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court explained that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was enacted to benefit the Filipino spouse, allowing them to remarry if their alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind this provision was to provide a substantive right to the Filipino spouse, not the alien spouse. Therefore, only the Filipino spouse can invoke this provision. However, the Court also noted that the foreign divorce decree itself, once its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law are proven, serves as presumptive evidence of a right under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with Canadian law, as Gerbert had failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce in his petition. The Court also highlighted that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted improperly by annotating the Canadian divorce decree on the marriage certificate without a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment. The Court clarified that a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry, which requires compliance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

[gabrieloraiz]

Article 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a)

Republic vs. Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380

Oct 5, 2005

Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

The case involves Cipriano Orbecido III, who married Lady Myros M. Villanueva on May 24, 1981, at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. They had two children, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States with their son Kristoffer and later became a naturalized American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that Lady Myros had obtained a divorce decree in the U.S. and remarried a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, granted his petition, declaring him capacitated to remarry. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration, which was denied. The OSG then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, raising a pure question of law regarding the applicability of Article 26 to Cipriano's case.

Issue:

Can Cipriano Orbecido III remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code, given that his wife, who was originally a Filipino citizen, became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a divorce decree abroad?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Cipriano Orbecido III is allowed to remarry under Philippine law, provided he submits competent evidence proving his wife's naturalization as an American citizen and the validity of the divorce decree obtained abroad. The Court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases where both parties were Filipino citizens at the time of marriage, but one later became a naturalized foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree. The legislative intent behind this provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to an alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The Court emphasized that the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time the valid divorce is obtained abroad, not at the time of the marriage celebration. The Court also noted that Cipriano must provide competent evidence of his wife's naturalization and the divorce decree to be capacitated to remarry. The decision of the Regional Trial Court was set aside due to the lack of such evidence on record.

[gabrieloraiz]

Article 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

(1) Full name of the contracting party;

(2) Place of birth;

(3) Age and date of birth;

(4) Civil status;

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

(6) Present residence and citizenship;

(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;

(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;

(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and

(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.

The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a)

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116

Jun 30, 1989

Regalado, J.

Facts:

The case of "Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera" involves petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. The two were married on September 7, 1979, in Germany and subsequently lived together in Manila, where their child was born. Marital discord led to their separation, and in January 1983, Geiling initiated divorce proceedings in Germany, which were finalized on January 15, 1986. Meanwhile, Pilapil filed for legal separation and support in the Philippines. After the divorce, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil in Manila, alleging affairs with two different men. The City Fiscal of Manila initially recommended dismissal due to insufficient evidence but later approved the filing of the complaints. Pilapil sought to quash the complaints, arguing that Geiling, having obtained a divorce, lacked the legal capacity to file the adultery charges. The Regional Trial Court of Manila denied her motion, leading to her filing a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Does a foreigner who has obtained a valid divorce in his home country have the legal capacity to file a complaint for adultery against his former spouse in the Philippines?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, setting aside the lower court's order and dismissing the complaint for adultery due to lack of jurisdiction. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, only the offended spouse can file a complaint for adultery, and this is a jurisdictional requirement. The Court emphasized that the status of the complainant as the offended spouse must exist at the time of filing the complaint. Since Geiling had obtained a valid divorce in Germany, he was no longer Pilapil's spouse at the time he filed the adultery complaints. The Court also referenced American jurisprudence, which holds that an innocent spouse loses the right to file for adultery after a divorce is decreed. The Court found this applicable to the Philippine context, given the nationality principle in civil law. The Court concluded that Geiling, having severed the marital bond through divorce, lacked the legal standing to file the adultery complaints, as he was no longer the offended spouse.