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Unification of Germany: Source Question

Using these four passages, assess the view that nationalism had little impact on the creation of the German Empire.

On the 18th January 1871, at the Palace of Versailles, German states were united as one, and the German Reich was created. At its head was King William of Prussia, now the Kaiser of Germany, and the capital city was to be Berlin, unsurprisingly also the capital city of Prussia. Although the existence of a new major superpower was to disrupt the extremely fragile peace in Europe and tip it into a hugely damaging world war by 1914, during the mid 1860s, unification was largely seen as a benefit for Germans, especially the ambitious liberal middle classes. This German nationalism wasn’t the only factor that contributed to the birth of the Reich; Prussian nationalism and French nationalism played their parts in the unification of Germany, but Particularism had very little impact at all.

During the mid 1860s, the power balance in Europe was shifting. France had been the most powerful power in continental Europe, but the potential influence of a united German superstate left middle class Germans desiring the creation of the Reich.

Thus, German national feeling was strong by 1866, and Interpretation A points out that ‘the irritability of German public opinion was due to pride and the consciousness of strength’; the potential power of this German superstate had not yet been realised, the power of their old adversary France had not been challenged, and this had left many in Germany dissatisfied, as it later opines ‘The irritability of German public opinion was due to pride and the consciousness of strength.’ 

The idea of German nationalism spreading to all Germans itself can be disputed; the upper classes of the German states didn’t want unification, as they feared an erosion of their influence and of their culture. The lower classes didn’t see any benefits in unification either, as they were appeased by the paternalistic policies of Manteuffel’s social changes after the failed revolutions of 1848. In fact, it was only the middle class liberals who desired unification, as they believed it would bring them increased economic and political power. These middle classes had been the main beneficiaries of the creation of the Zollverein, and believed that further unity could mean personal profit. Despite Interpretation C making the point that ‘One could compose a reasonably plausible argument that the German Empire of 1871 was the creation of the German people…’ it ignores the fact that not all of Germany was united in the desire for a German Empire. Although Interpretation C speaks of the southern German nationalism, saying ‘Bismarck received gratifying demonstrations of support from southern Germany’, the smaller states had fought alongside Austria during the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, and had been annexed to Prussia after their defeat, and therefore could not be considered among those wishing for German unity; in fact, many among these smaller states were Particularist.

Prussia, the most powerful German state, was not fighting for German nationalism, rather the 

Interpretation A also considers the role of the King of Prussia’s Minister, Bismarck, describing how ‘the completion of German unity was Bismarck’s task.’ This is supported by Interpretation B, which describes how ‘…by a strange chain of reasoning, Bismarck himself was decked out as a national enthusiast.’ Bismarck’s role in the completion of Germany was mainly to provoke disputes with Austria in 1864 and France in 1870, all the while ensuring that Prussia, not Germany as a whole, benefitted from the ensuing victories. Therefore, these descriptions of him being a German nationalist are flawed; Bismarck was a Prussian nationalist who wished to see Prussia expand and become more powerful.

However, despite relations between the German states and being fractious, thanks to differences in religion and class, all Germans were willing to fight against the French after Napoleon III’s declaration of war, and ‘1,830,000 regulars and reservists passed through German barracks within…eight days.’ This was because, as Interpretation C later points out, ‘In the face of what was considered to be a premeditated French assault motivated by arrogance and envy, who could stand idly by?’ This is supported by Interpretation A which says, ‘German nationalism was not prepared to tolerate a French veto on the completion of German unity.’ This can be interpreted as more down to general distrust of the French, rather than a desire for German unity, as not all Germans wanted it.

Prussian nationalism was a hugely important factor in the consolidation of German power because the Prussian Chancellor Bismarck, arguably the most significant politician in its unification, was a Prussian nationalist. Perhaps the most obvious sign of this was his making King William of Prussia the new German Emperor, and the new Reich’s capital city Berlin, also the capital city of Prussia. 

Prussian nationalism was not German nationalism. Although there were the liberal middle classes who sought unification for their own gains, Prussia’s officer corps was made up largely of junkers; the aristocratic classes who saw unification as a potential threat to their militaristic Protestant culture. Interpretation B adds to this, saying ‘National wars were fought by a Prussian officer class for whom national feeling was repugnant.’ That these ‘national wars’ were fought by the Prussian officer class can be used to indicate they were really Prussia’s wars of expansionism, dressed up to look like German national wars. The other indication that national feeling toward this officer class was ‘repugnant’ is indicated in Interpretation C, which references the ‘Prussian conservatives… and opponents of the takeover of Hanover’, as well as the southern fear that ‘To be taken over by Prussia meant “pay taxes, become a soldier and keep your mouth shut.”’ This disdain for Prussia’s militarism further separates German and Prussian nationalism, as well as the idea that these sentiments weren’t shared by everyone in Germany. The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine after the defeat of France can be seen as evidence of Prussian, rather than German nationalism. Although Interpretation C attests to this plan ‘being widely discussed in the country, especially in southern Germany…’, one could also interpret it as a Prussian desire for security; the takeover of these provinces would create a buffer zone between France and the Hohenzollern territory of West Prussia. Interpretation C also indicates this later, ‘Bismarck could not ignore this popular clamour, but it did not determine his policy, which had been for annexation from the first.’  

Interpretation B, however, opines that ‘Germans sought freedom in the conquest of others.’ Whilst this is true in the case of the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the generalisation of the Germans wanting conquest can be disputed. The Prussians sought the conquest of others; the opinions of the populations of other German states distrusted its military ambitions.

Therefore, the expansionist aspirations of the powerful Prussian nationalists like Bismarck can be considered the main factor in the unification of Germany, since although the notion of ‘Prussian nationalism’ presents similar issues as German nationalism, it was ultimately the desires of a few Prussian nationalists that consolidated the power of the German Reich.

French nationalism can be interpreted as the deciding factor in the unification of Germany, since it can be argued that without the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the German Reich could not have come into existence. The French were well aware of the potential power of a united Germany, and unwilling to relinquish their place in continental Europe as the major power to their traditional enemy. As Interpretation A describes it, ‘The extreme irritability of French public opinion was caused by anger, humiliation and fear… The supremacy in Europe was at last passing into German hands.’  As well as the growing fear of Prussia’s power, the French had been insulted by them; their lack of territorial gains after the defeat of Austria and the Luxembourg crisis had been deemed disrespectful, and the issue of the Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne had served to put them further on edge. Furthermore, the friction between France and the Germans had been worsened by the German belief that the French declaration of war was a ‘premeditated…assault’.

The ‘premeditated’ attack referred to by Interpretation C, had actually been manipulated by Bismarck, through his stirring up of French nationalism by releasing an initially inoffensive telegram detailing the visit of the French ambassador to the King of Prussia carefully altered to seem like an affront. Not only was this telegram insulting, but it was released on July 14th; the great day of French nationalist celebration. Thus, the ‘anger, humiliation and fear’ reached boiling point, and resulting nationalist calls for war forced the hand of Napoleon III into declaring a war his country wasn’t prepared for, and consequently lost, paving the way for Bismarck to take the final steps of unification.

Particularism, or the desire of the four southern German states to remain independent from Germany, caused few problems for Bismarck. Although they had been annexed to Prussia in 1867 after the disastrous Austro-Prussian war, as Interpretation D points out ‘The elections to the Zollparliament in 1868 became a demonstration of the surviving strength of particularism…In Bavaria and Württemberg, particularism triumphed.’ This is countered by Interpretation C, which argues ‘Bismarck received gratifying demonstrations of support for the national cause from Southern Germany. Particularism and distrust of Prussia were swept aside… in July 1870.’ One can hardly say that the states which voted in Particularist politicians would suddenly change allegiances to side with Bismarck’s Prussia a mere two years later. Religious differences also played a part in the general lack of nationalism in the south. As Interpretation D describes it, ‘There was the Catholic suspicion of the Protestant North.’ Although these Catholic fears would be realised in the years immediately following unification with the mass persecution of papists during the Kulturkampf, the extent of it was largely unforeseen in the years immediately preceding unification. Interpretation C also alludes to the ‘threat of French invasion’ and ‘French aggression since the days of Louis XIV,’ but during these supposed days of aggression, the War of the Spanish Succession, Bavaria had been France’s ally, so one could argue against the idea of French aggression being feared in the South. But after the defeat of their formerly powerful ally Austria, the particularist states had no military or economic power to enforce their desires of staying independent, and this is attested to particularly strongly by the fact that the King of Bavaria was the one to offer the Prussian King William I the Imperial crown.

Therefore, Prussian ambition was the most important factor in the unification of Germany, because Bismarck had seen unification as a potential way of ensuring Prussia was at the head of this German superstate. German nationalism itself was almost unimportant, since the German nationalists were only a relatively small demographic of the middle class liberals. The role of French nationalism was pivotal; as Bismarck’s provocation of French public opinion and the subsequent war enabled him to finally unify the German states as one new superstate. Particularism on the other hand, was unimportant. Although the determination of the particularists led them to vote in particularist politicians, they were fundamentally to weak to uphold their wishes against the military might of Prussia; a weakness attested to by the King of Bavaria’s giving the Imperial Crown to William I.