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[iamsiddharthanilnair]

The Sixth Year of the Second Civil War in Libya.

The current scenario in Libya is characterised by a volatile civil war and regional power politics; the issues of refugee migration, ineffective governance, growing unemployment, civil violence are only exacerbated by the looming threat of the Covid-19 pandemic. The death of dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and subsequent conclusion of the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector has seen Libya ravaged by a dynamic internal political struggle; barring smaller tribal militias who control large swathes in the south, the two major halves of Libya are the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), operating out of Tripoli in the west, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) based in Tobruk in the east. An additional complication is brought forth by a growing number of extra-regional actors who are using Libyan interests to further their own.

Current Situation

With the global pandemic leaving nations around the world incapacitated by unprecedented economic and health crises, the question is what will the situation in Libya look like in the near future?

Up until the end of April 2020, the GNA was seen as weak, unable to successfully rein in its divergent militias, stave off Daesh attacks, expand beyond Tripoli and finally, provide for those it governs. Even as the opposing sides met in Berlin for peace-talks in January, the GNA was losing ground to encroaching LNA forces, who continue to siege the capital city.

However, the situation on the ground has seen a massive shift as GNA and allied forces have begun to gain ground, beating back both, the  tribal militias and LNA forces. In late April, after GNA forces retook territory in the surrounding areas around Tripoli, General Haftar declared the 2015 UN-brokered Shikrat Agreement void. He claimed that along with the House of Representatives, the LNA had a “popular mandate” to govern Libya. 

Recent GNA victories have now been topped off by a campaign to take back parts of Al-Watiya airbase, a key airfield that had been captured in 2014 by LNA forces. It is also important to note, that this shift has been primarily sustained by Turkish support, and the same has caused the LNA to declare a tentative ceasefire – hidden under the guise of maintaining peace during the holy month of Ramadan. However, the LNA spokesperson has added that this does not mean a total cessation of the on-going Tripoli offensive. 

Background: Extra-Regional Powers

After successfully toppling the Gaddafi regime in 2014, NATO forces pulled out of Libya, leaving local groups to tend to the post-war situation – the hope being that they would generate consensus and establish a stable government. The European Union (EU), United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt were among the first to enter the political game, choosing sides that would not only play to their larger geopolitical interests, but in some cases religious interests too. Germany, Italy and France – active in supporting the rebellion, found themselves on opposite sides of the post-war conflict, with Germany supporting the GNA under the mandate of the EU, and France and Italy throwing their weight behind the LNA. The latter providing the side with military intelligence and equipment. It is important to note that both France and Italy show diplomatic support to the GNA as well, given their membership to the EU. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE support General Haftar as they believe the LNA would quash "fundamentalist groups in Tripoli” – the origins of this support lies in the Arab Spring – and in that vein they have been providing LNA forces with fuel, food, finances and firearms. 

Regardless, real international power lies in Turkish and Russian ambitions. A complicated history with Libya – given Gaddafi’s support to the Kurdish movement – led the former to support rebel groups in 2011 along with its NATO allies. In 2012, following its disbandment Turkey began to direct its support away from the Transitional National Council (TNC) to the newly-formed GNA. More recently, Turkish troops and allied Syrian groups have found their way to Tripoli, bolstering GNA engagements against hostile forces – via artillery, special forces, UCAVs and more; a few Turkish soldiers have also been known to have perished in LNA-directed rocket assaults and firefights in the west, causing a bit of a political churn back at home. 

Russia on the other hand is extending its involvement in the Middle-East following its intervention in Syria. Nonetheless, some reports suggest that Russian involvement in Syria have more to do with the 2016 US Presidential Elections; Saif Al-Islam (Gaddafi’s son), claimed to have sensitive, compromising information on democratic candidates, information to be used in the Russian disinformation campaign. Support to Haftar was a natural consequence of his growing power and control of oil infrastructure in the east. Russian contributions to the LNA come in the form of diplomatic, military and intelligence support; more controversial is the involvement of the infamous Wagner Group – Russian mercenaries known to be operating on the behest of the Kremlin across a variety of conflict zones. 

What Are the Levels At Play?

There are three levels at play in Libya – the first (and most important) are the two warring factions in the country. The outcome on the battlefield, will influence the political make up of a nation that has suffered for decades, first under a brutal regime and then in its absence. The significance of the local has disappeared in the global eye, as NATO pulled out and Gaddafi was found dead in a ditch outside Tripoli. The second level is the North Africa-Middle East dimension – involving Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Syria. It is in this level that Daesh, the Arab Spring, the Shia-Sunni conflict and more operate. The final level is that which involves the UN, the EU and Russia; global actions determined by global posturing – some looking to increase their own standing and influence through a “great power” competition. At times, these levels melt into one another, priorities, principles and prerogatives get muddled, causing great violence to the people of Libya. 

Conclusion

The strategic effect of this shift in the battlefield is yet to be seen – as GNA forces advance through southwest Libya, and LNA troops fall back to Benghazi and Tobruk, the space for greater volatility begins to open up as those silent tribal militias band together to protect the lands under their control. A possible positive effect could be the fact that Haftar and his House of Representatives may be more willing to come to the negotiating table , and this time remain far more sincere. However, the GNA’s refusal to accept the Ramadan ceasefire, may make matters more politically complicated. Furthermore, the spectre of the Covid-19 pandemic adds a new dimension to the conflict, affecting battles, governance and ceasefires. 

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Covid-19 and Surveillance: Tracing and Monitoring the Pandemic

Given the vast dimension of the Covid-19 pandemic, states around the world have now begun to use a large number of surveillance tools to trace, monitor and regulate the movements of their local populations. Most responses to the pandemic have been a combination of tracing, lockdowns and testing. Tracing allows concerned authorities to narrow down potential infection areas, and simultaneously warn the public of the same. Lockdowns, whether staggered, regional or national are to cut-down the novel coronavirus’ infamously high reproduction number (R0). Finally, testing – now the main focus of countries around the world – helps identify positive and negative cases, allowing for more coordinated and knowledgeable efforts to prepare the state’s healthcare system. However, the issue of tracing has become increasingly controversial.  

Concept & Counters

The main focus of Covid-19 mitigation efforts has been “social-distancing”; the maintenance of appropriate distance between two individuals or more, ensures that the virus does not spread innocuously throughout the population. However, in order to know when, where and from who social-distance should be maintained, states have started to – contact tracing aside – use existing mobile surveillance technologies to geo-locate individuals in a population and track their movements. 

However, the issue here is data privacy and the extent of the current surveillance. While understandable in the case of a health crisis such as Covid-19, citizens and rights-groups are concerned with how this data is stored and employed, and when the surveillance apparatus will be dismantled. Others are also concerned with the organisations involved in this effort – will they be public, or private? Will the data be anonymised and protected? And finally, who will monitor those monitoring? The list of questions go on.  The debate, as it were, is how do authorities balance the concerns of public healthcare, and private liberties?

Examples Around the Globe

It is also interesting to note that there is a difference in how concerned the public is in different parts of the world – with vigorous debate taking place predominantly in the US and Europe versus a more muted discussion in the Eastern hemisphere.

There are a variety of different surveillance methods being employed across the globe – Singapore’s use of the TraceTogether mobile app has made the concept quite popular (even though South Korea did the same much before); users download the app, consent to the state’s surveillance, and using bluetooth link-up, the app identifies other users in the vicinity, where and for how long the encounter was, and finally stores that data for a defined period for the Health Ministry’s use. Many EU states such as Germany and France are looking to adopt this model, but will devise a system – now called the Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project – based on EU privacy and data monitoring standards. 

Another system is based on tapping into existing location monitoring programs courtesy of telecommunications companies or technology firms like Google or Apple. Initial tracing efforts in the EU were dependent on private mobile operators; these were similar to and based on Chinese precedent – Alibaba Group and Tencent Holdings were roped into supporting government tracing and monitoring efforts in the mainland. 

Finally, there are municipal-level efforts to ensure that citizens are adhering to lockdown laws while simultaneously supporting tracking efforts. Different provinces in Russia have employed various levels of surveillance ranging from tracking bracelets to permission slips. In Moscow, facial-recognition systems have been put into overdrive to actively track potential positive-cases, and “digital-passes” now have to be requested for even the slightest step out (whether throwing the trash or buying groceries); Nizhny Novgorod has developed a QR-code system that allows authorities to note down the user’s movements across public areas; finally, in Murmansk the authorities have instituted an electronic bracelet system that allows authorities to maintain real-time tracking of all cases, and violations of lockdown laws. 

The last system has possibly been derived from Hong-Kong’s geo-fencing bracelet system that allows authorities to do the same, however, while still maintaining user privacy – the system only lights up when the user violates a fixed boundary, data is anonymised and never stored. 

Conclusion 

There appear to be a variety of ways that states can monitor and limit the movements of its population; the pandemic also helps citizens and groups see the extent of the existing surveillance apparatus. From geolocation monitoring to simple QR-code systems, and from bluetooth handshakes to real-time permission slips, the range of surveillance tools is large and to many alarming – and rightfully so. India on its part has been incredibly successful at making use of traditional contact-tracing measures to mitigate the spread of the virus; even so authorities have recently developed the Aarogya Setu app to help trace potential cases in its +1 billion population. 

However, while states around the world exercise their right to protect their citizens, it is also important to keep in mind that data today, is a double-edged sword – especially dangerous in the wrong hands.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

The Latest in Air Defence: MSHORAD

As the world’s military powers disengage from decades of low-intensity conflict, military experts around the world are looking to fill in the gaps that allow their forces to parse a war scenario against near-peer opponents. Some of these gaps fall into the unconventional sphere, such as electronic or information warfare (EW/IW), while others have to do with conventional shortfalls, of which short-range air defence is one. 

The current air defence doctrine revolves around a layered and networked system – sufficient enough to conduct ballistic missile defence (BMD) and suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) missions while simultaneously dealing with smaller targets such as UAVs and UCAVs.

MSHORAD

With this doctrine in mind, programs have begun in both Russia and the US to develop mobile short-range air defence (MSHORAD) systems; these mobile units, within a layered network are also supported by EW systems that jam, confuse or blind incoming forces. Such systems move beyond static defence, and help engage in proactive offensive manoeuvres, allowing units to echelon in depth and engage in either opportune or pre-emptive suppression of hostile air targets. The significance of such units are that they can cover chinks in long-range radar coverage caused by terrain obstacles, and do so while providing variance, through movement in the battle-space.

Witnessing the performance of  Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine, the US has begun to dust-off the Cold-War era Avenger SAM system to immediately overcome gaps in SHORAD capacity; however the recent induction of the Stryker A1 system – armed with Hellfire and Stinger missiles – will form the vanguard of US SHORAD. In Russia, the Tor-M1 and Pantsir S-1 systems have gained traction for their similar function – an all-in-one package including AA cannons, missile defence and tracking systems; however, the latter’s recent performance in Norther Syria, against Turkish Predator drones, has left its users wanting. The other system being developed by Russia, is the Gibka-S which – like the Avenger – is a missile defence system loaded onto a high-mobile utility vehicle such as a jeep or pickup truck. The simple differentiator between these new systems and the older mobile air defence systems – say the Patriot PAC-1/2 – are the higher levels of mobility, accuracy, range and reaction-times.

It is important to note, that barring the teeth – platforms that field the AA or SAM systems – such MSHORAD units are also backed up by command-and-control (C2), reconnaissance and EW vehicles.

Changes to Force Structures

Opportune and pre-emptive suppression aside, MSHORAD units provide a decentralised control to air defence, allowing for  360° coverage to manoeuvre forces and engagement zones further up in the battlefield; the latter to harass enemy units engaged in air assault or close air support. Given the heightened mobility afforded by these new platforms, some say that the traditional structure of manoeuvre forces, such as the US’ infantry brigade or Russia’s motorised rifle brigade, will change. Demands for “multi-domain” superiority – a buzzword in modern warfare – require that upper-echelon forces house all forms of offensive and defensive capabilities; so, one may see the number of infantry battalions being reduced to include a new Stryker or Pantsir unit. 

SHORAD and India

India’s big-ticket purchases usually overshadow the intermittent capacity-building initiatives taking place in the forces. Of these initiatives, short-range air defence has been a desperate need of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force; still fielding Soviet-era man-portable air defence (MANPAD) systems, a large portion of the forces’ air defence systems are considered obsolete. However, following trials and competitive bidding, the Indian Army settled on the Russian Igla-S MANPAD, considered a direct replacement of extant systems such as the Igla-M. The Igla-S system is a 25kg, fire-and-forget system that can engage targets 6km away, in both night and day scenarios. Plans have also been made to integrate a portion of the 5157 missile to be purchased onto light vehicles, with dedicated C2 and reconnaissance units. An interesting point to note is that the latest variant of the Igla is the same mounted on the Gibka-S platform, providing India the opportunity to develop fast-moving and lethal air defences in addition to its exiting requirements.

Given the growing use of drones and UAVs by non-state actors – best highlighted by the September 2019, Houthi attack on the ARAMCO oil facility – MSHORAD systems are not a long shot in India’s capacity-building initiative. They represent a pressing, immediate need while simultaneously building a strategic advantage to the Indian Armed Forces. While there may be a backlash due to the changes to force and command structures, MSHORAD is the latest near-peer threat perceived by the US, Russia and even China; and India must keep its eye on the ball. 

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Book Review | “Fire in the East: the Rise of Asian Military Power & the Second Nuclear Age”, Paul Bracken.

Paul Bracken’s book, “Fire in the East” is a brief, yet incredibly insightful examination of the changing dynamics of war in the modern age; specifically new technologies that change strategic paradigms and the influence of those technologies on the countries of the non-west.  Paul Bracken is not only tenured at Yale University as a professor of political science and business, but has also performed as a consultant for the US’ Department of Defence and even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

The book is focused on the relationship between military confrontation, geopolitical instability, nationalism, and the diffusion of missile and nuclear technologies around the world. More importantly, Bracken examines these influences to international security from the American lens, and frames his argument using geography as the yardstick to measure stability and relative military power. 

Content

The book begins with a foray into the Cold War dynamic between the US and the USSR; not the battle for political influence, but the theatre of military technology. From here Bracken exposes the domino effect spurred by decolonisation, the end of the Cold War, globalisation and a rising nationalism. The author then examines how these socio-political influences effected tangible security in the modern world – multipolarity, changing economic loci and international law. 

The text is essentially short, and incisive sections dedicated to certain phenomena or a historical context to analyse the former. The book extends from the end of the Second World War to the Gulf War – peeking into America’s wars in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan – and includes non-western wars as well, such as those fought between China and Vietnam in 1978 and India and Pakistan in 1965. Bracken’s emphasis on geography as the determining factor in America’s “chess board” is backed up by the maps provided in the very beginning of the work, and he also includes the literature that had inspired this text at the end of the work. 

Argument

The work’s main argument is that the global chess board, dominated by the West and its partners has shrunk. The multipolar world of the 21st century has not only seen global power shift away from Europe to Asia, but economics and military outcomes have substantially changed the way the world and America approaches the concerns of national and international security. Along with this overcrowding of the board and shifting loci, Bracken highlights the geographical enormity of Asia, and how that poses a threat to American dominance in the region. Simultaneously, he points to the compactness of Asia, which when combined with the most dangerous of military technologies – chemical, biological and nuclear capable missiles – generates a high level of geopolitical instability. 

One of Bracken’s arguments, “Asia stretches military forces” essentially revolves around the fact that the logistical burden of maintaining a military presence in such wide and hostile a space – peppered with multiple, powerful actors – makes any extra regional player’s position shaky. This argument hinges on Bracken’s contextualisation of what he calls “disruptive technologies” in the post-Cold War era. These technologies bring into question America’s conventional and unconventional superiority. Biological, chemical and nuclear technologies, now abundant in the non-west, coupled with fervent nationalism and an “unreliable” political culture makes the Cold War approach – practicality and logic – to modern security dilemmas irrelevant, almost impotent. 

Bracken’s second argument has to do with the “second nuclear age” – the rise of Asian military power in the context of Asian rivalries and conflicts, which he uses to highlight key differences between the West and East’s interactions with nuclear power, and modern military technology – missiles, surveillance technology, computing powers etc.

Premises

Bracken’s first point has to do with the influence of geography on security imperatives – during the Cold War, the existence of only two superpower, the US and USSR allowed for enough space on the table, i.e. competition and not direct conflict, determined security approaches. In the modern world, Asia’s compactness alone with its economic and military development has broken down geographical buffer zones, increasing territorial anxieties. That military development – characterised by disruptive technologies such as satellite surveillance, missile and nuclear technology – brings into question the efficacy of America’s overseas deployments, specifically its forward bases from Saudi Arabia to South Korea. The post-Cold War draw down of conventional military strength has seen America adopt, what Bracken calls a “superpower-lite” posture. Unfortunately, as countries in the Middle East and South Asia begin to develop their own military power, America as the sole global policemen is relegated to reacting to Asia, no longer shaping it; which is why it attempts to engage in arms control and mutual security treaties. 

On that note, the text dives into its second argument – the rise of Asian military power. Having experienced a post-colonial period dominated by powerful militaries dictatorships and juntas, modern Asia and its economic/military progress is increasingly determined by civil society actors – he points to Iran, India and North Korea (all different in nature and context, but strikingly similar in this regard). More important to Bracken, is the coupling of new-age technologies with outdated organisational structures; most countries having adopted governance and military structures from their colonial past, have now begun to intermittently modernise. This is important to the text’s argument given the uniqueness of civil-military relations in the non-west, their unique histories and the internal socio-political dynamics that influence the outcome of that modernisation drive. Lastly, and most important to the rise of Asian military power, is the idea of nationalism. Nationalism, what Bracken terms the “hot-side” of Asian military development works in tandem with the civil government to determine security approach, both at home and abroad. Using the India-Pakistan and India-China dynamic as an example, Bracken traces how and why, nuclear technology along with other military implements were pursued, highlighting the incredibly important role that nationalism plays in Asia’s stability; a far cry from the ideological and rational conflict of the Cold War. 

Asia’s stability is then an outcome of an international (or US-led) attempt to bring in collective security and principled debates about the use of these disruptive technologies. Using arms control, non-proliferation as touchstones to devise a principled, moral international security paradigm, the US hopes to negate the influence of nationalism, shaky command-and-control structures, militarism, religious fanaticism in Asia. To this point, Bracken definitively states that the level of instability in Asia, makes routine encounters incredibly volatile, leading to cataclysmic confrontations – full-scale war. One very interesting point that the author makes, is that there has come a reversal of sorts in the Western and Eastern “ways of war”. The Western way was characterised by the sword-wielding knight who rode headlong into battle, while the Eastern way was distinguished by the archer, who would use distance to his advantage; today, that reversal is showcased by the West’s use of cruise missiles and the East’s habit of moving troops to conflict areas without hesitation. 

Analysis And Conclusion

Bracken’s book is a highly informative text that leaves the reader wondering how he/she could miss out on such obvious changes to the global order. Each section is carefully designed not only to present the author’s argument, but also to shock the reader into reflecting deeply into the subject at hand – whether it is the Cold War dynamic, the geographical quirks that affect security approaches, the use of missiles, the similarities among such disparate countries and more. 

One very important aspect of Bracken’s book is that it is patently an American perspective on changes to the global order; the author’s tone and construction is reflective of this. Even so, the general point made by Bracken is a lesson to all actors – the increasing multipolarity of the world, coupled with the dispersion of advanced military technology and feverous nationalism has not only increased global instability, but has also begun to cast doubt on the US’ military power. And as Bracken concludes, Asia is now its own chessboard, the US will have to learn how to adapt to this new phase in international politics. 

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

UCAV Programs Around the World & their Development in India.

Drones - both, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) – have become part-and-parcel of 21st century warfare. They provide the user with an incredible amount of firepower and battlefield information without endangering human lives. Over the years, most military powers have created a space for drones in offensive airstrike, ground support and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) roles. However, the novelty of the Predator and Global Hawk programmes have in many ways worn off, and the next level of drone-human interoperability comes in active function, i.e. developing units made up of both piloted and unmanned platforms. These new prototypes are attempting to incorporate 4th Gen. fighter aircraft technology with existing network-information systems in order to minimise the risks posed to human pilots, while simultaneously enhancing overall air superiority. 

Current Developments

There are a variety of programs taking place around the world that are dedicated to developing such interoperable air units – the Boeing X-45 in the US and the Dassault nEUROn in Europe (developed by a consortium of France, Italy, Switzerland etc.)  being the most famous. Russia too is in the running, with its Sukhoi Okhtonik-B (or, Su-70) program which had its maiden flight last year; many speculate its design is derived from ongoing western prototypes pioneered by Boeing, General Dynamics and the like. Even China is reported to have developed a similar concept – the Gongji-11 (or, “Sharp Sword”). 

Many of these programs date back to the early 2000s when the aviation industry was developing testbeds for low-observable platforms, whose technology and design would then be incorporated into the 5th Gen. fighter aircraft we know today – the F-35 and the Su-57 for example.

Uses of Interoperable UCAVs

In fact many of the specifications displayed by these UCAV prototypes – particularly their stealth qualities are directly appropriated from these fighter aircraft programs. The main aim of these projects is to develop a tighter informational loop that affords greater tactical advantages to the piloted vehicle, which is why along with the technical development of the UCAV, the industry is doing its best to improve the system interoperability between the drone and its designated partner aircraft; in the case of the nEUROn, it is the Rafale M, and as for the Su-70 it is reportedly Russia’s latest 5th Gen. aircraft, the Su-57 PAKFA. Along with a heightened level of interoperability for tactical advantages in the battlefield, the testbeds are also used to inform Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programs. However, the development of stealth UCAVs are also regarded as the future of aerial combat, resulting in the complete removal of piloted aircraft.

India’s Use of UAVs

India does operate a small number of UAVs, particularly in surveillance and reconnaissance roles; these are the Searcher Mark I and II, and the Heron purchased from the Israel Aerospace Industries’ Malat Division. Recent purchases of the Harop allow for a wider array of missions in electronic warfare and hunter-killer roles. Absent in this procurement is the development of high-tech, multirole UCAVs such as those outlined above. This is mainly because a vast majority of military missions in India are directed towards border security and counter-insurgency operations in the North and Northeast. However, India’s recent capacity building initiative in terms of air superiority and air defence, shows a rekindling of the type of conventional superiority required of a military power of its stature. 

In that vein, India’s multiple defence public sector undertakings (DPSU), specifically the Defence Research and Development Organisations (DRDO), Defence Electronic Applications Laboratory (DEAL), Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), Defence Avionics and Research Establishment (DARE) and Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) have been on course to develop indigenous UAVs and UCAVs; most notably the Nishant, Rustom and the mini-UAV, Suchan. The indigenous line of UAVs are to be used in ISR, targeting, weapon guidance, battle damage assessment, artillery fire correction, weather data collection, search-and-rescue missions and more. 

The DRDO Ghatak

More recently, India’s UAV development program has grown beyond mini-UAVs to High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) vehicles, and even projects similar to those such as the FCAS programs undertaken in the West. Of these, is the DRDO Ghatak, or in its departmental parlance the Autonomous Unmanned Research Aircraft (AURA). 

Still in the testing phase, the stealth wing flying testbed (SWiFT), is the design definition being conducted at the aeronautical department of IIT Kanpur. With a fruition date set for 2032, the flying prototype is said to have the ability to maintain a low-radar cross section, drop laser-guided munitions, conduct electronic and signal intelligence missions etc. The program is also apparently based on the erstwhile Kaveri jet-engine program, and now runs parallel to India’s development of the Advanced Multirole Combat Aircraft (AMCA) – the next step after Tejas programme. With work still being defined in terms of design and aeronautics, IIT Kanpur had reportedly run a flight test using a 1:1 prototype fitted with a Russian NOP Saturn 36MT engine in early 2019. 

Conclusion

While India still has ways to go before it operationalises and reaches the level of technological innovation of the West, Russia or even China, it is important to note that it is keeping an eye on global developments as it searches to build its own cutting edge air-superiority technology. Furthermore, recent acquisitions such as the Rafale, additional Su-30MKIs and the MQ-9B Guardian will give India the intermittent leg-up it needs; more interesting is the joint-development MOU signed by DRDO and the US’ Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to design air-launched drones. Hopefully, with complete squadron strength following the induction of the Tejas, the Indian Air Force (IAF) will be able to induct UCAVs that augment the country’s conventional superiority, both tactically and strategically. These developments will in many ways actualise the IAF’s change in posture from denial, to punishment.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair. 

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

What is the Islamic State of Khorasan Province?

As the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) losses ground in Syria and Iraq, its fighters have had to move to new arenas in the Middle East and North Africa. The disintegration of ISIL in Raqqa and Mosul, has also led to a dispersion of fighters to parts of South Asia and South East Asia. Indigenous groups that such as the Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines or Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh having initially claimed some form of affiliation to ISIL missions are now offering sanctuary to these fighters; in this way they have access to ISIL tactics, manpower and theological legitimacy. The other effect of this dispersion is the establishment of Asian ISIL “wilayats”, or provinces. One such province was established in Kashmir in 2018 as the Wilayat-e-Hind; and it was quickly engaged by the Indian Armed Forces, and the newly instituted Army Special Forces Operations Division (ASFOD) at the end of 2019. The other provincial ISIL outfit – that of Khorasan Province –  has morphed into its own individual entity, known as Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). 

ISK operates mainly in north eastern Afghanistan, and has logistical bases along the Durand Line, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s namesake, Khorasan, is a historical region that spans eastern Iran, northern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, and is a cultural anchor for much of Persian history. According to some sources, the modern Persian language – Dari - finds its origins in its use by the people of Khorasan. 

ISK

Even though ISK did not have much of a promising start – the loss of 4 emirs, and a number of mid-high level lieutenants – owing to its hostilities towards all regional groups, Taliban and Al Qaeda included, its recent attack on a gurudwara in Kabul has brought it back into the spotlight. In the early days, ISK was highly dependent on ISIL, but the loss of Raqqa in 2017 and then Al-Baghdadi in 2019 left it isolated; free to operate on its own terms. These events similarly affected other ISIL wilayats in Central, South and South East Asia, but unlike the others, ISK is still a coherent, operational group and fields an estimated 2500-4500 fighters, recruited from local villages and groups such as Tareek-e-Taliban (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Janghvi Al-Aalami (LeJ-A). 

While the historical influence of Khorasan as a geopolitical entity is dominant in ISK’s thinking, the main reasons for its continued existence is the perceived occupation of Kashmir by India, and it’s recruitment cadre – educated youth and scholars from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh – is reflective of this perception. The other key perceived enemy is Russia, following its 2015 intervention in Syria. Even in the March, 2020 US-Russian Joint Statement  on Afghanistan ISK is regarded mutually, as an enemy to the future of Afghanistan. The defeat of the Wilayat-e-Hind in 2019, and the coordinated efforts of the US-led Coalition and the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Afghanistan signalled to the world that ISK would be soon, dead in the water. 

However, sustained terror attacks on checkpoints and outpost in Afghanistan – 6 in 2016, 18 in 2017, 24 in 2018 and at least 12 last year – and the disintegration of the ISIL caliphate in Syria and Iraq, has given more power to the legitimacy of the ISK, as more and more foreign fighters join its ranks. Other important events that solidified ISIL in Asia, were the 2017 battle for Marawi, in the Philippines and the 2019 Easter bomb-attack on a Sri Lankan church that killed 290. In 2017 a 5-month battle raged over the island of Mindanao, and was a result of ISIL affiliates, particularly the Abu Sayeef Group and Insilon Hapilon taking over the city. The terrorist attack on the Colombo church was carried out by National Tawheed Jama’at (NTJ) another well-known ISIL-affiliate. 

India and Pakistan

It would seem that ISK is not only a threat to India, but to Pakistan as well. While India was already involved in the fight against ISK in 2019, Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) had issued a warning that ISIL had begun planning attacks on political gatherings and party head-quarters in Pakistan’s major cities. But the establishment of the Wilayat-e-Pakistan in that same year, did not really garner a response from Pakistani authorities (in fact, the Wilayat was considered an afterthought, a face saving measure, to not seem only “anti-Indian”). 

More recently, the ongoing protests and riots over the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) policy in India seems to have spurred further recruitment into ISK. The theological bent is so severe that the newsletter of the Kashmir-wing of the ISK –  “Sawt-ul-Hind” –has claimed that Indian Muslims are only different from their fellow Hindu or Christian citizens in name and nothing more.

Conclusion

South Asia is seeing a resurgence of insurgent/terror groups owing to the shifting tide in the Middle East. As ISIL loses ground in Syria-Iraq, its fighters have to move once more, just as they did from post-civil war Libya and Egypt in 2011. This time, these fighters are finding themselves in most South Asian countries and those in South East Asia, particularly Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. ISK may become the new stronghold, and it is imperative that American-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan begin coordinated strikes against ISK before they become a burden to the Asian community. 

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair. 

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

North Korea’s Experience with the Covid-19 Outbreak.

North Korea claims to be unaffected by the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to  the outbreak in Wuhan, the North Korean government issued a statement in February that border surveillance would be been tightened, and mass health inspections would being carried out. The statement also claimed that manufacturing of testing kits had already begun. The main concern was the large, porous western border shared with China. This border accounts for over 90% of the North Korea’s trade with China. There was considerable cross-border movement in December, much before the outbreak was announced and a large number of North Korean workers continued to be employed in central China. The movement and people-to-people contact should have already given a foothold to the virus in North Korea. Stuck between two of some of the most affected countries – China and South Korea – it is virtually impossible that North Korea lacks corona-virus patients. Even so, the virus hasn't damped dictator Kim Jong Un’s supervision of a number of military exercises and missile launches that began in the same month. 

Response to the Outbreak

North Korea shut its border with China and South Korea, amassed a cadre of 30,000 workers to fight the virus, and prevented the movement of foreigners in and out of Pyongyang. Diplomatic and humanitarian missions were cut short due to the quarantine, and only recently were a few European embassies evacuated.  The government claimed that it had adequately prepared for foreign carriers of the virus, and were tracking down active, suspected cases. There were questions as to how North Korea, with its limited resources and capacity would handle the outbreak. However, the immediate quarantine was seen as possibly being an effective measure, given the state’s existing control of movement in North Korea.  The government had also announced that manufacturing and research of testing kits and personal protection equipments (PPE) would be increased; requests for additional supplies were made to both China and Russia (who supplied 1500 diagnostic tools at the end of February). However, in February controversial news broke out of “deaths in Pyongyang due to coronavirus”. While some government officials did acknowledge the existence of symptomatic cases, the official line was, there were there were no actual coronavirus cases in North Korea, and the 141 suspected cases were tested and found to be negative.

Missile Launches

As Kim Jong Un sent messages of comfort and condolences to South Korean President Moon Jae-In, he supervised missile launches over the Sea of Japan. North Korean forces also conducted various military exercises to test the effectiveness of frontline troops; one of the exercises was a simulated attack on an island target. The US-led talks regarding nuclear disarmament tapered off last year as parties could not agree on sanction waivers and disarmament timelines. The Republic of Korea (ROK) had decided to unilaterally engage with North Korea, and there has been a slow melt in tensions between the two nations since 2018. But the ROK still remains concerned given the ever increasing number of missile launches. The impact of North Korea’s KN-25 short-range missile tests are also worrisome to others in the neighbourhood; most notably, Japan. The tests are considered to signal to the international community, that not only has North Korea protected itself from the COVID-19 outbreak, but it also continues to improve its offensive military capabilities. In fact, Kim Jong Un has claimed that by the end of the year, North Korea would have developed a new “strategic weapon”

Foreign Aid & Trade

The North Korean market heavily depends on Chinese and Russian imports. The current restrictions on trade and movement have dealt a heavy blow to the economy, but we do not know exactly to what degree. According to some, this is a major reason why North Korea is cautiously engaging with the ROK. Food and medical supplies and commodities would be the worst hit, and remittances from North Korean workers employed abroad may have also shrunk. 

In the North Korean view, aid is considered either a sign of recognition from the international community, or in some cases a sign of humiliation. Kim Jong Un, tends to play both cards simultaneously. In February the United Nations (UN) Sanctions Committee announced that it would consider revoking sanctions as a humanitarian gesture in view of the corona-virus outbreak. The US seems to have also made similar concessions, and even issued the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to step up efforts in North Korea to contain the virus. In response, the North Korean government issued a statement claiming no need for international aid. 

The missile tests and military drills seem to aid North Korean ambitions in securing foreign aid. By only marginally limiting missile testing, Kim Jong Un signals to the international community and his people, that even with the COVID-19 pandemic grabbing the world’s attention, North Korea is relevant. The tests help not only with North Korea’s position in the nuclear disarmament negotiations, but also in aid and sanction relief.  The Chinese Ambassador to the UN claimed that North Korea was  being “negatively” effected by the virus outbreak, and that there should be a serious reconsideration of sanctions against the country.

Considerations 

While it is possible quarantine and blockade measure have been effective, the chances of having absolutely zero COVID-19 cases seems implausible, now that it has spread to most of the world. China has only recently announced the absence of new cases in Wuhan, where the pandemic began. The other issue is that most epidemics that have begun in China, have found their way to North Korea; and the track record of poor health and healthcare in the country makes North Korea even more vulnerable. 

The most obvious concern regarding COVID-19 has been information. The same was said of China, when it failed to report the outbreak in time. North Korea’s record of information sharing negates any possibility of knowing the true impact of the virus on the North Korean people. Even during the SARS epidemic of 2003, North Korean numbers were underreported. 

Conclusion

We may not know what the real impact of COVID-19 is in North Korea for some time. But what is evident is that the North Korean government had taken stringent measures to curtail movement (a key mission in stopping the virus) and had put in place contingencies to increase healthcare capacity. What is also clear is that the North Korean economy has taken a great hit and may make Kim susceptible to reach out to neighbours for trade. Finally, it would seem that missile tests will continue unhindered as it operates as a strategic tool in maintaining legitimacy; it helps to prop up the image of strength and resilience to both the local population and the international community. 

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Artillery Against Insurgencies: Lessons from Russia & the US

Artillery finds its origin in the large battle spaces of conventional war, in clearing, attacking or holding space. In the modern era of sub-conventional warfare – characterised by insurgencies, civil war and terrorism – its use is relatively limited. Urban warfare and the needs of political legitimacy dictate a restraint on the use of force. India is a perfect example of this case;  the Maoist concept of “political insurgency” is at the heart of the Indian counterinsurgency doctrine. The Indian Army has refrained from using offensive airpower and artillery given the kind of damage they cause to infrastructure and the political psyche. 

Significance

Even so, both Russian and the US’ ground forces, have employed artillery in arenas of sub-conventional or “low-intensity” conflict (LIC). Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq are some examples of such conflicts.

Considered a “God of War”, artillery is a mainstay of the Russian Ground Forces. In its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-89, Russia found a fast-moving, dispersed target in Mujahideen fighters. In the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009, the separatists posed a similar threat. Russian Artillery was used to protect advancing troops with a wall of fire, to prepare the space before a manoeuvre or to directly target the enemy to prevent escape or reinforcement. (Grau, 1997) In Syria, the fight against Daesh and the Syrian Democratic Forces (since 2015) has seen the latest Russian airpower and artillery in action; however, a better example of the current Russian doctrine is the conflict in Eastern Ukraine that began in 2011. 

In the American doctrine, artillery is considered a more artful and specialised tool. Experiences in Vietnam changed the American approach to artillery, making it more precise and light. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, led the Coalition forces to the Taliban who like the Mujahideen of the past, used guerrilla, hit-and-run and terror tactics. In Iraq since 2003, US forces have battled both conventional troops such as the Iraqi army, and non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, Daesh, Kata’ib Hezbollah etc. But what is unique to the American approach, is the effectiveness of Indirect fires. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the adaptability of American weapon-systems and units, led to artillery playing a multi-role function in support roles, against enemy infrastructure, manoeuvre forces and in harassment and interdiction fires. (Major R.B. Johnson, 2011)

As with any other weapon before it, artillery produces both successes and failures; but these outcomes are of two types – operational and political. The distinct use of artillery by the US and Russia in varying battlefields, can provide South Asian militaries with the key advantages and disadvantages in using such a powerful force, in such a highly politicised space. 

Operational Advantages & Disadvantages

One operational issue with artillery in LICs is that artillery units require considerable infantry cover. The Russian experience in Afghanistan proved that large artillery units were susceptible to attacks from the rear and sides, when not provided with opaque security. Insurgents would use guerrilla tactics and make use of mortars/RPGs at close range, or in the Chechen case, hug artillery positions resulting in Russian fratricide. (Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2016) Breaking larger artillery units into smaller tactical ones, such as those employed by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan improve the multi-role function that artillery units play, while reducing the costly security cover that could be employed elsewhere. 

The other complications lies in target selection and accuracy. By using modern targeting/positioning technology both American and Russian artillery have fine tuned the ability to provide incredible firepower with reasonable accuracy, and yet be light and manoeuvrable. 

The final issue with artillery against insurgencies, is the geographic and topographic qualities of the battlefield. Jungle warfare such as those in Vietnam or even in Chattisgarh or Nagaland, reduce the efficacy of artillery. The open spaces of North Africa and the Middle East allow for easier movement and targeting. Finally, there is the adage that no matter how accurately a team or technology can target an enemy, the guerrilla tactics used by insurgents, will undercut any attempt to effectively deter them. 

Political Advantages & Disadvantages

The political outcomes of using artillery in LICs has remained the same, no matter the changes to accuracy and manoeuvrability. The sheer destructive power of artillery goes against the political ambitions of discursiveness and reconciliation. In the case of LICs, artillery and airpower both, are viewed as pushing the bounds of appropriate action. The destruction of infrastructure and the fear of collateral damage is very harmful to the political interests of the state actor. As such, the use of artillery can only take place when certain battlefield conditions are met; higher density of enemy forces, clear targets and minimum firepower.

The Russian use of indirect fires resulted in a political backlash in Afghanistan and it continues to do so. In its recent intervention in Syria, Russian use of artillery was reportedly indiscriminate – with ground troops firing upon civilian populated village and towns. The American experience in Afghanistan was similar (but not to the extent that Russian doctrine allows). Over time, the US realised it had to reduce the ratio of artillery to infantry to truly reap long-term political gains; US artillery today is used to influence tactical outcomes, and is not a major component of American counter-insurgency strategy.

Conclusion

The improvements in targeting and portability allow artillery systems to be employed in LICs. They not only enhance the operational effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations, but also chip away at the hurdle of political considerations. Along with these improvements, modern forces will also have to integrate cyber and information systems into the overall counterinsurgency strategy. Recent Russian development in these two fields has brought about a shift in the “annihilation” strategies of the past to the more accurate, tactical fires of today. 

However, it is incredibly important that states involved in LICs keep a mind on the minimum or appropriate use of force. (Scales,1990)  The unbridled use of artillery can uproot years of political gain, multiply local resistance and destroy any hope for future reconciliation. 

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair. 

References:

Lester W. Grau, “Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan”, Field Artillery Journal, May 1997.

Major R.B. Johnson, United States Military Academy, 2011.

Asymmetric Warfare Group, “Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook”, December 2016. 

Robert H. Scales, “Firepower in Limited War”, 1990.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Why Don't We See Technicals in South & South East Asia?

Technicals are light-weight, improvised vehicles that are combinations of a civilian 4x4 with a mounted heavy machine-gun, automatic cannon or an anti-aircraft gun. Commonly understood to be the descendent of the Tachanka of the Russian Civil War (1917-1922), the technical is used in low-density, open-spaced areas as it is a highly manoeuvrable light-weight platform that offers both tactical and normative fires. 

The modern vehicle is a variant of the British Long-Range Desert Group trucks of the Second World War and the American “gun-trucks” of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In contemporary times, the technical has been used by a variety of non-state actors, first by the Sahrawi’s People’s Liberation Army (1975) and then trickling through a variety of other North African and Middle-Eastern conflicts. e.g. the Chad-Libyan Conflict (1987), the Iraq War (2003) and the Syrian Civil War (2014-ongoing). 

Uses

The geographic conditions of North Africa and the Middle-East – large desert plains with small dispersed towns – allowed the technical to be used in both, defensive and offensive roles as it could be used in manning checkpoints, providing convoy protection, anti-air defence or in hit-and-run missions. The other alternative was using tracked vehicles such as BMPs and tanks. While these platforms do provide certain tactical advantages, the use of wheeled vehicles in the desert-terrain proved to be more effective, and the cost of production and repair was also low. 

On the Use of Technicals

Given that the technicals is particularly effective in asymmetric warfare, one will find them in areas of low-intensity conflict predominantly used by rebel or insurgent groups. The historical trend of using technicals in North Africa and the Middle-East persists due to the post-2001 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and the post-Arab Spring conflicts in Libya and Syria-Iraq. 

In Libya, the technical was particularly useful in evading both air and ground targeting, while simultaneously providing effective cover or offensive fire. In fact, the French Rafale gained prominence world-over because of its hunt-kill functionality which allowed it to effectively destroy technicals employed by pro-Qaddafi forces. However, technicals aren't, by definition, part of any conventional force. Powerful militaries such as the United States, China and Russia do not include them as part of their regular armies; those light-weight platforms that are used, e.g. Humvees, are usually heavily armoured and reinforced with additional electronics such as Active Protection Systems (APS) and more. 

Over the years however, its successful use by non-state actors such as Daesh and Al Qaeda in the Middle-East, has led the concept to be adopted by these otherwise conventionally superior armies. The United States Special Forces make use of the buggy-type Desert Patrol Vehicle and the Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (LTATV). But the primary function is not offensive, but transport. Most other armed vehicles are based on the Humvee chassis, or belong to the Armoured Personnel Vehicle (APV) class.

The 30th Independent Motorised Rifle Brigade instated by Russia in the Central Military District is an adoption that goes even further. The brigade is equipped with the UAZ-3163 “Patriot”, and is trained for wars in the mountain-desert terrain; a result of Russia’s experiences from the ongoing Syrian Civil War. Outside the country, the Russian Army is known to have used the Patriot against Daesh in the early days of the Syrian intervention. 

The aim of having a force with the technical at the heart of its doctrine, is a light, fast moving unit that can cover hundreds of kilometres in a single day, slip through enemy lines and perform quick strikes to supply-lines and defensive positions. 

South and South East Asia

The geographic conditions of South and South East Asia – thick jungle terrain, high population density and distant islands – makes employing the technical less practical. While insurgent/terrorist groups and countries in Asia do make use of technicals, specifically those equipped with heavy machine-guns and  auto-cannons, they are not as prevalent as their Middle-Eastern and North African counterparts. 

Most insurgent groups in South Asia use either terror or guerrilla tactics. Those in South East Asia, for example the Abu Sayyaf Group, make use of boats given the conditions. They are used in both kinetic and non-kinetic roles, e.g. smuggling, piracy and human trafficking. Even so, there is a healthy employment of technicals and armoured vehicles by quasi-states such as the United Wa State Army and the Al Qaeda.

Given the conflicting geographic conditions and the functions of a technical, it would seem that their employment in South East Asia is limited. However, by taking on the Russian model and normalising Special Forces tactics among conventional units, there are certain specific applications of the technical in South Asia that could be exploited by countries such as India and Pakistan, especially when engaged in low-intensity conflicts. Indian Paramilitary Forces and Special Forces could be equipped with technicals to be used in Kashmir and Chattisgarh. In fact, the Russian model could be applied in designing a vanguard force that cuts through enemy lines and disrupts their defences ahead of the larger deployments.  

Conclusion

The geographic differences between North Africa/Middle-East and South East Asia, make it obvious that the technical may find fewer takers in the latter. However, the technical has some potential use in South Asia given the geographic and security conditions. As a a fast-moving, armed vehicle, the technical can be used in both low-intensity and conventional conflicts in Western and Northern India. 

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Book Review | “Mutual Security: The Case of India-Nepal”, Sangeeta Thapliyal.

Sangeetha Thapliyal’s book, “Mutual Security”, examines the history of the India-Nepal relationship with an emphasis on the unique geopolitical qualities that Nepal, as a landlocked, small-state embodies. This history is explored through the issues of economic and security cooperation,  and placed in the foreground of the internal and external political concerns of each nation. The book argues that Nepal, as a landlocked, small-state, situated between two of the world’s most populated countries – India and China – has made all the potential manoeuvres to raise its survivability; and that those manoeuvres belong in either the accommodation and alternative transit models typical of small-states.

The work begins with Nepal’s relationship with British India -  the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814, the Treaty of Segouli in 1816, the Treaty of Peace & Friendship of 1923. Thapliyal notes that these events laid the foundation of Independent India’s disposition towards Nepal.  The author argues that India’s approach to Nepal, as a “buffer state” or as a “state on its threshold”, was heavily influenced by British perceptions of territorial integrity in the era of Tsarist Russia and Imperial China. From here on, the work examines the ways in which the economic, cultural and military relations between India and Nepal have been tested, around and in between two critical junctures - 1962 and 1971.

Content

The text, a result of the author’s doctoral thesis, is also organised as one. The work contains maps, economic data and the treaties undertaken in the time period of interest. The chapters are short, with premises being offered and analysis running parallel to one another. Each chapter is limited to a certain time period, chronologically examining the geopolitical changes between the 1800-1980s, e.g. the democratic tussle inside Nepal, the issue of Gurkha recruitment for the Indian and British Armies, the changes in Chinese attitudes towards South Asia etc.

The key debate revolves around the politcal conflict between the monarchic, communist and democratic elements of Nepal’s domestic politics. These elements determined Nepal's sentiments towards India, China and the extra-regional states involved (the USSR, US, the UK); but they do not deviate far from the models set by the condition of ‘small-statehood’. The security concerns of a small-state, such as Nepal emanate from both, military and non-military threats, that require the state to adopt a fluid attitude. To quell threats, internal and external, political and militaristic, small-states at times engage in formal security arrangements with larger, regional powers. It is in this situation, that Nepal finds itself; anxious about its survivability given its economic and security dependence on India.

The debate on Gurkha recruitment is an incredibly strong lead to the Nepal-India-Britain relationship; a unique aspect of the text,  it explains how after the war of 1814, the East India Company (and the Crown) realised that the Gurkhas, as a veritable fighting force, would serve best under the Company/Crown, in case they were employed by India or neighbouring powers against them. The recruitment of Gurkhas in Independent India, displays the consanguinity of the colonial British Raj.

Argument

The key determinants of the nature of India-Nepal relations, have been the internal political considerations of either country, and their external relationships with third-party countries, particularly China. Internal issues stem from the tussle between the Nepalese monarchy, the Communist Party and the National Congress; while the monarchy identities its own security as that of the state’s, the last two have unique ideological ties to China and India respectively. A combination of internal-external considerations then determine which of the aforementioned models - accommodation (working with multiple neighbours in a neutral manner) or transit (using multiple neighbours against one another in a neutral manner) – Nepal would employ to ensure its survival.

Contentious themes that coul be categorised as internal, deal with the domestic perceptions on the issue of Gurkha recruitment, the influence of Nepali nationalism, power conflict between the democratic, communist and monarchic political groups. External issues revolve around Nepal’s desire to initiate relations with extra-regional powers, disputes between India, China and Pakistan, trade, foreign aid and military-to-military relations.

Most important however, is that Thapliyal notes the significance of Nepal’s geographic location, and the international politics that follow from it. No matter the changes to internal or external axes, the geopolitical dimensions of the India-Nepal-China triangle remains constant, almost structural.

Premises

The issue of Gurkha recruitment finds its origins in the Anglo-Nepal war of 1814, when Sir David Ochterlony formed four irregular corps of Gurkha soldiers to serve in the British-Indian army. The practice continues even today as part of the Tripartite Agreement between Britain, India and Nepal; and as Thapliyal notes, it became a hammering board for nationalist sentiments in Nepal. The combination of Nepali nationalism and small-statehood found the Indian altitude towards Nepal, to be “big brotherly”. Indian security policies were viewed in Nepal with suspicion given the geopolitical differences between the two. The economic dependence also furthered Nepal’s desire to diversify its international relations. The nature of that diversification, Thapliyal argues, was dependent on the political balance in India and in Nepal. The communists, obviously, leaned towards China, while the National Congress had a relatively balanced approach to foreign policy (It is in the monarchy, that we see a greater use of structurally-determined models of foreign policy).

The author also uses the events of 1962, 1965 and 1971 as a test of Nepal’s foreign policy as a small state. In the 1950s under King Mahendra, Nepal began to court Chinese influence, particularly through development projects and arms purchases. The 1962 Sino-Indian war, also put a dent in India’s image as a regional power, leading to further intimacy with China. India’s victory in the 1971 war was critical in bringing back Nepali confidence, but India’s relationship with its own northeastern states also created certain misgivings in the same. Economic aid was a benchmark to measure Nepal’s attitude towards its neighbours; India’s competition in infrastructure and connectivity projects included China, USSR, the US and Japan.

The military-to-military relations between India and Nepal, through the Indian Military Training and Advisory Group (IMTAG) and Indian Military Liaison Group (IMLG) which helped in bringing about the modernisation of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), were also a key factor in the India-Nepal relationship. Even though India’s dominance in the region waxed and waned through the years, convergent security perceptions ensured some level of conjugality between the neighbours. However, the author notes how Nepal uses its ability to maintain its neutrality towards its neighbours, either playing them off one another, or accommodating their individual ambitions.

Analysis & Conclusion

“Mutual Security” contends that Nepal’s failure to successfully develop its economic, political and cultural dimension had led to a certain state of flux, forcing it to feel insecure about its sovereignty and independence. The author claims that the Nepal’s perception of India is based on its [India’s] bureaucratic “carrot and stick” foreign policy; and this isn’t completely wrong given India’s security dominated approach to the small state. Nepal’s attempts at neutrality and diversification lead it to reach out to extra-regional powers, declare itself a “zone of peace”,  adopt a non-alignment philosophy or Panchsheel, trade with China, enter into a security agreement with India and so on. These events not only fall into the models set out in the beginning of the work, but the  nuances of Nepal’s strategic outlook are also clarified as the author engages in the political history.

Thapliyal has built a chronological work that is not only informative, but also theoretically sound. The theory that the unique geopolitical situation that Nepal and India find themselves in, coupled with Nepal’s characteristics as a small-state determine the relationship between the two, even with (and because of) the domestic political divergences, hold true in Thapliyal’s work.

The postscript is also welcome as it ties up the theory, where India and Nepal have begun to engage in greater cooperation - in trade, connectivity and security - particularly along the lines of the Treaty of “Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal” signed in 1950.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Book Review | “Toppling Qaddafi: Libya & the Limits of Liberal Intervention”, Christopher S. Chivvis.

The heightened multi-polarity of the modern world especially in the international realm, hinges on the slowly waning [read: withdrawing] supremacy of the American hierarchy. That hierarchy is determined in small part by the United States’ foreign and extractive economic policies, but largely reflected in its indiscriminate and constant use of coercive power.

However, Chivvis, the Associate Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center (RAND Corporation), through his book - “Toppling Qaddafi”, hopes to present a new vision of that coercive power - one that is inclusive and decisively unassertive. Written as a response to his contemporaries’ skepticism about interventions, particularly American-led ones, “Toppling Qaddafi”, is a narrative text that outlines the geopolitical scenarios during the Libyan Intervention of 2011. The book is holistic in its approach to grand themes, detailed in its use of personal anecdotes and news reports and, simple in its telling. Chivvis’ framework interpolates the Obama presidency between the Bush 43 and Clinton eras in order to tease out deviations and similarities in foreign policy (particularly in the arena of military intervention), to divine the new form of American global policing.

Content

The book explores the diplomatic history surrounding the decision to intervene in Libya following the initial outcry from Europe (France and then Britain), the United States and interestingly, the Arab League; it also offers a glimpse of how other actors - Russia, Germany, Italy entered the fray. It also includes a short study on the colonial history of Libya which allows the reader to grasp the complexities of the modern intervention. Following the chronology of the Libyan Intervention - from the early calls for Qaddafi’s ouster, the passing of Resolution 1973 and the battles from Benghazi to Tripoli - Chivvis explores a wide range of issues that plague coalition-based interventions. Issues such as poor intervention goals, mismanagement of sanctions and embargoes, differences in military capabilities between NATO members (and non-members), operational slumps, vulnerable munition supplies, poor communication between forces of the ground (the rebels) and NATO operatives, changing technologies (the prevalence of ISR and the need for a “low-footprint”), varying magnitudes of political will between participants -  France, the US and other member states - and finally, the problem of the impending refugee crisis.

Given that the Libyan issue has taken a backseat in the late 2010s - particularly between the Arab Spring and the rise of Daesh in 2014 - the book’s importance is in its display of how the new approaches in employing military strategies (a combination of air strikes, naval blockades and ISR) have become increasingly more effective against rogue states and tyrannical governments in the 21st century.

Argument

The book’s main argument: post the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the looming shadow of Bosnia, American strategists and administrations have been forced to redefine the ambitions, prerequisites and structure of military interventions; a result of the failures of American leadership, changes in national agendas, European exasperation and increasing independence, and the battered equation between the Arab world and America. The book is not theoretical or conceptual, rather an essentialist study of historical facts.

The author’s juxtaposition of the Obama administration to the neoconservative and liberal agendas of the past calls up a variety of aspects, most importantly, how the Libyan intervention, coupled with the Obama administration’s foreign policy birthed the idea of the United States playing a “support-role” or “leading from behind” (tangibly seen as America’s role as a supplier of armaments, ISR and political weight). Chivvis also adds that the decision to finally make use of military power comes as a result of not only the administration’s “dedication” to R2P and the humanitarian element, but also Europe’s pressing need for political/military support in the intervention. (One criticism of American involvement was that it was delayed given that American strategic interest remained flat and time was running out). The assault on Benghazi by Qaddafi’s forces in March 2011, comes across as the turning point that pushed the coalition towards full-scale readiness.

Premises

Chivvis’ argument for this shift in the typical “American-style” of interventions - such as those in Afghanistan/Iraq and Bosnia, where American troops make up most of the boots on the ground and American leaders dictate battle strategies - to one more broad-based and comprehensive, revolves around four issues - (1) the staggering financial and economic costs of previous military interventions left the American public poorly disposed to a new one; an argument previously heard, and credible. (2) a mix and match of political agendas at the executive level (a fight between Bush and Clinton remnants), (3) limited strategic goals on the part of the US military given that Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq were still ongoing operations, (4) the diverse functions and existing capabilities of international organizations (NATO, Berlin Plus, the UN etc.) and (5) the constant ire of Russian and Chinese interest groups.

Finally, in order to re-legitimize itself in the eyes of the Arab world, while still holding onto American ideals, the administration designed itself as a care-taker partner (providing other members of the coalition with intelligence and superior firepower), rather than coming across as the sole “imperial” invader.

Another important aspect of the book is that it explicitly claims that the format of intervention - naval blockade, airstrikes and rebel support - has sharpened and bettered itself over the years, and in many ways gives credibility to the Afghanistan intervention. Toppling a dictator in 7 months is no easy task, and to do it effectively without boots on the ground is a Herculean one. It is undeniable, that according to the mission set out by Resolution 1973, NATO forces have carried out a successful intervention.

Analysis & Conclusion

While a well researched account  of the Libyan Intervention, in hindsight there are a few criticisms that can be made of “Toppling Qaddafi”; the American stance vis-à-vis the Russians and the Chinese (whose positions in the issue should’ve been probed further) could have been made clearer. Additionally, domestic issues in both Europe and the US - the Greek Financial Crisis, the Wall Street Crash, Medicaid and Medicare, Elections - would have presented a unique backdrop for the political issues of the day.

Furthermore, given the recent turmoil in Libya, the book seems to lack research related to the diversity among the thuwwar (rebels). While the author explore their distinct agendas and reasons to take up arms, in-depth analysis of tribal militias and other groups such as Daesh, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan National Army lead by General Haftar are absent. This could be solved with a contemporary revision of the regional consequences of the intervention - the divisions within Libya and the NTC, the increased martial activity in Yemen, Syria and Mali and finally Russian presence in Syria.

More importantly, even though, Chivvis argues that Operation Unified Protector showcased a new format for American-backed coalitions, and cements NATO as a real enforcement organization, the concept of “American-backed” interventions results in fractured mandates and independent decisions, and like interventions before it, Unified Protector had a steep learning curve in the 7 months it was active.

All in all, Toppling Qaddafi (and so the Libyan Intervention) is a significant example of how American military strategies and western-led coalitions have come to fruition; not as imperial, illegal acts, but as true, comprehensive and broad humanitarian acts - additionally, it is a well referenced work that would benefit its readers, foreign-affairs buffs or those with general interest in the subject.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.*

*As part of my midterm assignment for a course with Prof. Arjun Subramanium (AVSM), "IR-305 Impact & Consequences of Military Interventions" March 2019.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Asymmetric: Russia I

Russia has remained a major player in global politics even after the Cold War; of which as a result, its immediate neighbourhood was split into two parts - the satellites (in Eastern Europe) and the proxies (the Balkans and Central Asia). Each parts' significance in global politics determines the scope of the Russian state's involvement. Russia's current investments in Eastern Ukraine, Syria and Libya signify that the state will remain a key player in ensuring international stability in the near future; particularly in security and energy issues. The general question the, is how has Russia maintained notions of its “great power” status, its influence in the world and developed the tools employed in this endeavour?

Hostile Measures

In each region, Russian involvement is determined by two denominators - capabilities and goals. In Eastern Ukraine the goal of halting EU/NATO expansion necessitates the use of proxy militias, cyber and electronic warfare. In Syria, the goal is to suppress security threats to a key ally and establish a foothold in Middle Eastern affairs. This has been executed through the use of conventional warfare - massive troop deployments to incapacitate Daesh and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and expansion of naval and air projection in the region. Goals come from Russia’s notions of itself and its history in regional affairs, and these goals are measured up against an array of tools. Tools which fall under the umbrella of “hostile measures”.

The term “hostile measures” encompasses a wide range of political, economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military activities that could be perceived as harmful or hostile. (Radin 2019) These military and non-military strategies have, at the heart of their agenda the “art of subversion”: Asymmetric Strategies. These strategies are employed by the Russian state, in three key areas - electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare (CW) and, conventional warfare.

Typology 

One would note that this is a marked shift in Soviet/Russian military strategies, and is a result of its modernization campaign post-1999. The typology derived from the Russian military is one that is conventionally, i.e. numerically superior, is top-heavy and operates with a rigid fundamental, but tactical system. This template dictates that the state also has "land warfare" as its core doctrine and, have a rapidly depleting and deteriorating inventory. This typology can be loosely applied to other states as well, e.g. Iran, India, Egypt etc. While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would have made an appearance in this list earlier, its modernization, and foray into unconventional warfare has deemed it a peer competitor by the US; today it is in a league beyond Iran and India, even Russia.

The adversary to a state employing such strategies is one that is not only conventionally superior, but unconventionally as well, e.g. net-centric warfare, nuclear warfare, long-range missile systems etc. The differences in this typology would be the experiences with protracted conflict, sanctions, national priorities and internaational relations. Other more technical ones would have to do with force structures, capabilities and histories.

The typology provided by the Russian state is of significance given the rise of China, and a shift in the world’s competitive disposition to one of conflict. It would be safe to say that excluding the nuances of culture and history, the Chinese standard for military and international superiority is pegged to the American standard. And rightfully so, the US as a diplomatic, economic and military power has been unquestioned since the end of the Cold War - until now that is. The PLA’s successful campaign to modernize, indigenize and professionalize its war-fighting capabilities has made American strategists worried, who, in many ways have begun to judge China as a peer-competitor, a super-power.

The wars in Iraq, Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-91, showcased American military superiority to the world and established the American military as the world’s unrivalled power. The use of information systems and air defence/superiorityby the US, provided the world with a new bench-mark in conventional warfare. The Gulf Wars were, consequently, the reason for subsequent increases in Russian and Chinese military budgets, as both had now realized the real gap in their combat capabilities. There are large differences between Putin's Russia and Xi's China, both countries have a unique relationship with the US, but there are a few convergences such as hypersonic missile technologies, 5th Gen fighter aircraft development and air-defence.

Russia Asymmetric

Today Russia is a key player in the politics of Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Its invasion and annexation of Georgia in 2008, was followed by a diplomatic and clandestine attempt to dissuade the colour revolutions of Eastern Europe. In 2013-14 Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and began to support separatists forces in the Donetsk Republic, Ukraine. In 2015, Russia officially intervened in the Syrian Civil War on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad, against Daesh and SDF forces. In 2019-20 Russia has become an influential party to the resurgence of the crisis in Libya.

In this series, “Russia Asymmetric” I hope to explore the Russian state’s use of asymmetric strategies and hostile measures against its percieved and potential adversaries in 2000-2020. I also wish to see what can be gained from such strategies when applied in the South Asian context. Military Warfare, Intelligence and Diplomatic Influence will be the three main axes. 

  один

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Book Review | “Indian Arms Bazar”, Maj. Gen. Pratap Narain (Retd.).

The Indian Defence Establishment has been at once, efficient and incompetent. India’s stature as the world’s number one importer of defence equipment has not been reflective of its economic progress, rather, it is emblematic of the failures of the Indian Military Industrial Complex (MIC). The establishment today, is concerned with the issues of expensive, sup-par and indigenously manufactured weapons, the burdens of limited capital expenditure, the inefficiencies of state-owned enterprises and political corruption; all of which affect the Indian Armed Forces’ operational capabilities.

The concerns of today find their history in Maj. Gen. Pratap Narain’s book “The Indian Arms Bazar”. Published in 1996, the text is an informative and rather frank examination of the Indian Defence establishment’s performance since the country’s Independence in 1947. The author’s insights come from the highest places, as he was India’s first Controller General of Defence Production (CGDP). The author argues that the structural failures of the Indian defence procurement-production chain are a result of a cumulation of errors on the part of the bureaucratic and political agents involved in the Indian MIC.

Content

The work is chronologically organised (1930-2000), with each chapter examining a period in Indian history, the projects undertaken in those times and the political-bureaucratic events that led to their failures. The book reviews the technological shifts from medieval to industrial warfare and the subcontinent’s experiences in First and Second World Wars. The author is keen to showcase the expanse of the realm, with the Introduction covering multiple innovations in explosives, small arms and vehicles, from various countries. Some of the famous indigenous projects covered in the work are the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme Tejas, and the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) programme; other projects include the development of indigenous jet engines (the Kaveri project), electronics (radars, sensors), small arms such as the self-loading rifle (SLR) and missile technology (such as the anti-tank Nag and the surface-to-surface Agni).

The text is bookended by an exploration of the tools of warfare; the Introduction examines the  weapons of the past, and the final chapters look at the future. The author provides technical and financial details where required, and does the same with political context and history. The work is also comprehensive in highlighting problems, studying their causes and addressing  them with solutions or alternatives.

The text argues that the structure of the Indian Defence Establishment was inherited from the British Colonial Government, and that post-Independence, continued to be influenced by reforms and attitudes in England; but eventually, lost its way. In fact, India’s emphasis on a “scientific approach” to defence production is a direct result of the latter’s reformative measures during the Second World War.

Argument

The author argues that a combination of corruption and incompetency had led to a poorly constituted defence production/procurement chain, and that the personal egos of politicians (such as then Defence Minister Krishna Menon) and self-serving bureaucrats had aided in the same.

The Indian MIC’s ability to function effectively was hampered by political considerations and the corrupting influence of the “License Raj”. He also argues that the slow expulsion of those with military backgrounds in the Indian MIC - done in the name of maintaining civilian control - had robbed the industry of its imperatives and experience. The work focuses on the wars with China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 respectively, and exposes the gaps in Indian operational capabilities that were a direct result of the Ministry’s negligence.

As solutions, the author provides comparatives from France, Britain, the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Brazil, among others. These comparatives are used to call attention to the structural differences in the hierarchies, trade models and logistics that made India the world’s largest importer of conventional arms.

Much emphasis is placed on the fact that defence production in India had become highly inefficient and expensive, due to a nexus of bureaucrats, suppliers and politicians who were solely driven by personal gain. In order to maintain their positions, the ministry pursued a “subtle propaganda” that India could access the latest in defence technology cheaply, through imports.

Premises

The authors main arguments revolve around four key themes - (1) the “scientific approach”, (2) the failures of Indian logistics, (3) the absence of educated and informed  bureaucrats in key decision-making positions, and (4) a host of structure issues - such as appointments, delegations and planning. The author dedicates a chapter that reiterates the suggestion of the 1966 Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) that was constituted after the 1965 war with Pakistan; the ARC’s suggestions to the problems of the time, are still relevant to Indian MIC today.

The first theme contends with the Nehruvian conception of “science” as a conduit to economic prosperity. Due to this, Indian defence enterprises were tasked with projects unrelated to the operational requirements of the Indian military. e.g seeds that grow in harsh conditions, more efficient a/c units etc. Such an expansion of scope meant that scientists, and not engineers were given key roles in the supply chain, and  consequently research and not manufacturing became the objective. The author highlights this issue by the absence of “soldier scientists” and military engineers in the MIC. The second theme of logistics relates to the separation of research and development (R&D) and manufacturing.

This resulted in a decrease in accountability and competency. The author examines the performances of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and its subsidiaries through projects such as the LCA, the Shaktiman Truck and the Arjun MBT. The number of Defence Public Sector Units (DPSU) and their isolation from one another lead to a dispersed effort to improve the state of Indian defence production. Factories and research labs were placed hundreds of kilometres from one another, with poor access to transport and raw-materials. Being state-owned, these DPSUs remained immune to the whims of the free-market and were unreliable and ineffective. Indigenous production in India had relegated itself at the level of import assemblage (where a country develops an indigenous platform using systems and parts from foreign markets), but due to financial and technical constraints, continues to do so.

A crucial point, stressed throughout the book, is the isolation of the civilian industry from defence production; the Indian establishment deemed it necessary to prevent the privatisation of defence research and production, to keep the civil and military separate and maintain state control.

The author laments the absence of well-educated and informed technocrats in key decision-making positions in the Indian MIC. This led to poor planning, unorgianised undertakings, higher corruption and, a rather apathetic view of Indian defence production. Over time, the propaganda of “cheap” import-assemblage combined with a deficient system, has depreciated the public’s faith in the Indian MIC.

The author surveys global arms trade between 1960-90, and provides a context to India’s failures and successes in the world of defence production and procurement. The acquisitions of fighter aircraft (such as the MiG-21 and the Mirage), ships (such as the Kashin-class Destroyers) and artillery (such as the controversial Bofors 155mm Howitzer) are used to explore the economic aspects of defence production, and these stories highlight the reasons why India is a net-importer of arms and ammunition and not an established trader in the same. It is the comparisons to smaller states such as Israel, South Africa and ROK that really drive the point home.

Analysis & Conclusion

The overall performance of the Indian Defence Establishment’s in the production and procurement of arms and ammunition is, simply, dismal. The entire system is hamstrung by the corrupt influence of politicians and unprofessional bureaucrats; the principle of civilian control and the “scientific approach”; the lack of structural diligence and accountability; the absence of technocrats, military engineers and soldier scientists; and the lamentable standards of Indian defence production. The author finds his argument not only in his first-hand accounts, but also in statistics, which he provides on weapons-packages, trade numbers, production capacities and more.

The last two chapters are concerned with the emergence of a new age of warfare and possible corrections to the Indian system. The world’s security imperatives had radically shifted following the display of American technological superiority in the Kuwait War of 1990-91 and the author uses the examples of these innovations (such as the Sidewinder Missile, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank and the Patriot Air Defence system) to explore the potential parameters of conflict in the future.

Maj. Gen. Narain’s work is a brilliant introduction to the world of defence production and procurement in the Indian context. It is both, a historical and forward-looking text that engages the reader not only via its conversational attitude, but its sheer depth of information.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Rawat & Shreya Dhoundial (CNN-NEWS18) Interview Review.

In the foreground of the DefExpo 2020 in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India’s first Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) Gen. Bipin Rawat sat with CNN-News18’s Shreya Dhoundial for his first interview in this new position.

The interview threw up three specific themes - monetary concerns facing the Defense Establishment, the policies following India’s defence procurement for the next three years and the development of Integrated Theatre Commands. There were cursory topics as well - the underutilisation of military assets (land and infrastructure), a ballooning pension fund, retirement ages in the military, the General’s recent media exposure following the anti-CAA/NRC protests taking place across the country, and his statements regarding radicalisation in Jammu/Kashmir.

Interoperability in the Armed Forces

The very basis for the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs, the issue of interoperability and jointness among the three armed forces was brought up as a crucial arena for the CDS. The operational and logistical insulation of the three forces is seen as a comparative weakness in maintaining a credible deterrence to potential adversaries and in conducting sub-conventional/conventional campaigns. The CDS hopes that through the establishment of the Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC) and additional institutional bodies like it, the military establishment will be able to optimise training, logistics and war-fighting capabilities.

According to the CDS, such integration has always been possible in the Indian Military - based on existing integrated formations in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. However, the ambitions of the current CDS is visible in the initiation of the Integrated Battle Group programme, the development of Theatre Commands and the envelopment of the National Air Defence under the Indian Airforce’s (IAF) command.

A Meagre Budget & Staggered Purchases

The CDS has phased his tenure into four parts - 100 days, 1st year, 2nd and so on. The initial 100 days are to be dedicated to appraisals and project explorations; the CDS has also initiated procurement and production deals to accelerate the Armed Forces’ modernisation campaign. A perennial hurdle, the defence budget for 2020-21 has experienced a meagre increase - only 5.8%. This will remain a hurdle in the mission to resupply, optimise and modernise a rapidly deteriorating force structure.

The CDS was quick to defer the criticisms of a small budget, and explained that the way forward was focusing on adequate budgeting and management practices - imminent changes to effect critical areas and a staggered procurement model to even out downtime periods across weapons platforms and combat-ready units.

The argument for staggered purchases made by the CDS, while simplistic, is emblematic of the inventory issues plaguing the Indian Armed Forces. The combined problems of a small budget and a diverse inventory (in era and type) has resulted in a dearth of combat-ready units, i.e. units without ammunition reserves and weapon-specific logistics in place. A major thorn in the Forces’ ability to maintain a dependable OPTEMPO, the CDS claims to have understood the gravity of the situation and has initiated a few exploratory committees to delve into how best the Indian Army, Navy and Airforce can plug the aforementioned gap in inventory.

The changes in the geo-political environment has furthered the need to expand ammunition and armour supplies; the rocket and missile inventory has been deemed unfit and is now been plugged to maintain combat capabilities for a 40-day, 10(I) conflict scenario.

By giving the example of the Russian T-90 Main Battle Tank (MBT), the CDS highlighted how the wholesale purchase of weapon systems/platforms can result in increased downtime for maintenance and life-cycle servicing. The key concern is maintaining a 10-15% downtime across all verticals - units, platforms and systems - which, according to the CDS is possible only with staggered purchases. This concern runs parallel to the issue of a diverse inventory, a recent hot topic in the media after the decommission of the Indian Airforce’s (IAF) last MiG-27 “Bahadur” squadron - Scorpion 29 - in Rajasthan.

The Budget & Critical Areas

The defence budget for 2020-21 is capped at $73.65 billion, of which only 25% is earmarked for weapons purchases and 75% is demarcated for infrastructure, maintenance, recurring payments and pensions (29%). There is also the concern of existing liabilities and division of the budget (between the 3 Armed Forces); $6.76 billion to the Airforce (down from $7.01 billion in 2019-20), $4.56 billion to the Navy and $5.06 billion to the Army. All monies would be directed towards current purchases such as the S-400 system, the M-777 ULH and lease of stealth frigates from Russia.

Some time was spent on discussing the issue of pension payments and retirement ages in the military. The CDS reiterated the calls for higher retirement ages (he suggests 58 years) and  the need to maintain the Indian Armed Force's knowledge heirarchies e.g. in the logistics, ordinance, administrative and medical corps. This would aid in reducing the budgetary portion dedicated to pensions and simultaneoulsy maintain the force's expertise and professionalism over the coming years.

In the same vein, the CDS identified the critical areas that would see immediate changes - a national air-defence (AD) network under the IAF and modernisation of artillery divisions in the North and Western Commands. These areas have received reasonable publicity lately; the former has been mentioned as part of a multi-layer approach to AD across the nation’s capital cities, acquisitions from Israel (Spyder) and Russia (S-400), the possible entry of the US’ NASAMS-II into the Indian AD system and the development of indigenous missile systems such as Akash and Prithvi. The latter, key to India’s defensive posture vis-a-vis China and Pakistan has been showcased in the development of the indigenously-built K9 Vajra Mobile Artillery Gun and the Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launch (MBRL) system. The induction of the US M-777 Ultra-Light Howitzers (ULH) and self-propelled Excalibur rounds, has also grabbed headlines; a response to the outdated Bofors system whose life-cycle services were a considerable burden on a conservative budget.

Conclusion

The DefExpo 2020 did well to shine a light on the domestic defence establishment, and helped secure a linkage between foreign and domestic firms, e.g. the MoU between Lockheed Martin and BEL or Airbus-Adani Aerospace and Defence. Unfortunately or otherwise, such displays are usually political in nature and the more technical aspects of procurement are left unearthed.

While the CDS has managed to set certain reforms in motion, the larger effects of this change in state capacity is yet to be seen. Positives are there where they are to be found, but the outlook, remains as challenging. The sheer scope of the tasks under the CDS’s belt is immense - develop jointness between the three forces; modernise and resupply deteriorating inventory; initiate capabilities in unconventional arenas such as cyber, information and space.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.

*Look forward to my more specific piece on the use of staggered purchases on the IPCS Website.

[iamsiddharthanilnair]

Political Insurgencies & India’s Use of Force.

The issue of “low-intensity conflict” (LIC) or counter-insurgency (COIN), revolves around the political and the kinetic. Unfortunately, balancing both is not an easy task; overwhelming force while a brilliant salve to tactical deficiencies, might in the long run, keep the political animosity boiling. Sub-conventional warfare still relies on the ability of forces to degrade the enemy’s war-making capabilities, the same as conventional war. However it restrains itself in dealing absolute damage to political will. This is evident, not only in the ISAF’s experience in Afghanistan, where post-Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the Coalition took up a nation-building exercise, but also in India’s experiences in Nagaland/Mizoram, Chhattisgarh and Kashmir. The modern dynamic of LIC is lightyears beyond the Colonial practice of insurgency suppression, e.g the British in Malaysia or the French in Algeria. And with the spread of technology, globalisation and emphasis on accountability, COIN has become more of a political game.

The Indian experience is of great interest to the strategic community worldwide, as it is one of the few nations in the world that runs COIN operations with restraint, and ‘limitations on the use of force’ forms the core of its anti-insurgency doctrine. The lack of tactical or indirect fires by air or artillery power is key in highlighting this restraint; and it ensures that the political angles of the insurgency are not irrevocably damaged. The overt use of force, through indirect and indiscriminate fires artillery or otherwise can bludgeon the enemy to surrender, and that is what normative understanding of LIC dictates. By destroying launch-pads, hideouts, training camps and even directly pounding enemy positions, one is able to deter further harassment. However, once enemy infrastructure has been degraded, the larger worry is that the insurgency can disperse itself not only in ideology, but kinetically as well — into a terrorist outfit. This is the case with Daesh, or the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria; the destruction of the Caliphate has led to the diffusion of fighters and so, the spread of the network.

Counter-terrorism (CT) relies heavily on limiting movement, supply and intelligence gathering. In fact, in some circles, India's sub-conventional doctrine considers CT much more than COIN. Kashmir is a particularly good example of the overlaps between CT and COIN, and is a great example of why limitations on the use of force is key in the Indian COIN context. By ensuring the safety of state and private infrastructure, the shutdown of communications and the increases in troops on the ground, India is able to maintain a positive tail to tooth ratio in dealing appropriate psychological damage to the enemy. However, one would be wrong to suggest that only the enemy is affected, the consequences of such overt conventional tactics have clearly upset relations between the state and centre, while destroying citizens’ livelihoods in the state. However, there are certain positives of the move, i.e. the demarcation of socio-political boundaries, limitations on the supply/movement capabilities of the enemy, impress upon the local friendly population the gravity of the situation and bring them within the centre’s fold.

In Nagaland, the issue was primarily kinetic given the Naga-separatists’ war-making capabilities and immediate access to weaponry post WW2. The deployment of troops en masse gave the Armed Forces a fighting chance. Training, courtesy of India’s Jungle Warfare/Desert Warfare schools, also put the forces to the test. However, with incremental — political — successes over the last 70 years, with defined autonomy, statehood and more, the issue in the North East became vastly different in task and form. The political (still significant) became incidental to the fight. Troop counts were reduced, the local police force was given control and the state government was empowered. Focused kinetic operations were expanded, but not under the larger banner of “Army”, but with specialist groups made up of Special Forces (SF), such as Garud, MARCOS, RR, NSG etc. and paramilitary organizations such as the CISF, BSF and CRPF. By creating multi-specialist groups, the strategy was to have concentrated confrontations with enemy groupings in the deep jungle, without having to disproportionately mobilize resources to fight a dwindling enemy.

Political and Kinetic are not exclusive constructions of CT/COIN. They will overlap as an when history dictates, but it is the prerogative of the state to ensure some form of disjointedness between the two. The fight is not for "ultimate" victory, but legitimacy and control. As such conventional strategies such as those used in the Second Chechen War  or in Operation Inherent Resolve while kinetically effective, were and continue to be politically crippled.

That India fights insurgencies with “one hand tied behind its back” is well-known, but to see it in action is still left unclear. Even so, it would be prudent to suggest and assume that the Indian model of LIC/CT/CI, with its deficiencies and inabilities is still operating as a political game, rather than a solely kinetic war. And because of that, the Central Government in India retains its democratic legitimacy and can bank on its history of being a conduit to socio-political betterment.

Written by Siddharth Anil Nair.