j-dominguez

[j-dominguez]

A Brief Look at the Council Member Selection Process in Cuba

A PhD graduate of the political science program at Harvard University, Jorge I. Dominguez retired in 2018 after serving his alma mater as a professor for more than 45 years. An experienced writer and publisher, Jorge Dominguez focuses on Latin America and Cuba.

In Cuba, the government does not disclose the Council of State member selection process. The formal process begins behind closed doors by seeking out nominees and vetting prospective candidates. Then, the National Assembly receives recommendations to fill vacant seats, where the number of candidates equals exactly the number of seats. Since the Communist Party of Cuba leads this process, rather than a popular election, a monopoly of power exists.

Jorge Dominguez authored "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders." According to the article's, the former Cuban President Fidel and his successor Raul Castro informally approved all Council of State nominees in the first place. That further constrained the process of selection.

[j-dominguez]

Cuba Emphasizes Democracy and Inclusiveness Despite Closed Society

Originally from Havana, Cuba, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is a scholar of international relations who taught for decades at Harvard University. Having authored and edited numerous books and articles on Latin American geopolitics, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez wrote the 2021 piece “The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba’s Council of State in a Comparative Context,” which was published in Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

The paper explores a pattern by which communist authoritarian governments, “born of revolution,” make claims of democratic rule. Even though the elections they hold are typically noncompetitive, they may boost claims of legitimate leadership, so long as those who earned the most votes are rewarded with prominent posts, and those who receive fewer votes kept from power.

An example of this phenomenon was at stake in 2018, when the new president of Cuba, Miguel Diaz-Canel, asserted that that year’s election had created a democratic foundation for the Council of State and National Assembly. With Diaz-Canel trumpeting electoral support for the winners, he also highlighted increasing inclusiveness when it comes to race, gender, and age.

The inclusiveness trend has actually been gathering momentum over the past decade, spanning elections in 2003, 2013, and 2018. It puts Cuba on par (or better) than fellow communist regimes in East Asia. However, as in Vietnam, shares of election votes in reality had little impact on Council membership, with the most-voted “not rewarded” and the lower-voted “not sidelined,” thereby severely undermining that claim to democratic legitimacy.

[j-dominguez]

Skills Required for Academic Leadership

Jorge I. Dominguez served as the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs director at Harvard. Among his responsibilities, Jorge I. Dominguez oversaw the IT modernization of the center's capacities, faculty expansion, and academic leadership.

Some consider higher education institutions engine rooms for prosperous nations as they propel innovations and advancements. They also prepare the next generation of thinkers. However, academic leaders are the cornerstones of these institutions, which keep the institution functional while propelling growth.

To excel, higher education academic leaders must possess specific skills. For example, leaders must effectively communicate when explaining plans and assuage member concerns. Effective communication develops trust, transparency, and a sense of shared purpose with stakeholders, such as parents, staff, and students. Thus, communication helps create an inclusive environment.

Furthermore, excellent academic leaders often cultivate new talent through mentorship programs and on-the-job learning opportunities. These initiatives prepare e next generation for future leadership roles in the sector.

[j-dominguez]

Mexican President Appeals for Venezuela-United States Accord

An alumnus of Harvard and Yale University, Jorge I. Dominguez is a writer and publisher. As a former professor, he taught courses on the introduction to comparative politics at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Some of the books that Jorge Dominguez has written focus on Mexico and Latin America.

On October 21, 2022, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador publicly urged the United States government to allow the immigration of more Venezuelans who currently encounter Mexico-United States border crossing restrictions.

Venezuelans resorted to the United States, searching for job opportunities. In the fiscal year, the United States Border Patrol recorded well over 100,000 Venezuelan encounters along the Mexico-United States border.

On October 12, the U.S. government enacted a policy that allows it to expel illegal immigrants via the border, including Venezuelan immigrants. As of October 21, United States officials reported a significant decrease in the Venezuelan migration rate at the border since implementing the policy.

The policy impacts Mexico since the United States relocates these Venezuelans in Mexico. Mexican officials hope to solve the issue that affects the two neighboring countries.

[j-dominguez]

Book Probes the Roots of 19th Century Revolts in Spanish Regions

A retired Harvard University professor, Jorge I. Dominguez served as the Antonio Madero Professor of Mexican and Latin American Politics from 1972 to 2018. An accomplished writer and publisher, Jorge Dominguez has also written a number of books and articles in English and Spanish, one of which is titled: Insurrection or Loyalty.

Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire uses the method of social science to analyze the bouts of insurrection in major Spanish-American countries during the first quarter of the 19th century. In the analytical text, the author referenced historical events in the region and leveraged data to zoom in on the plausible factors for uneven revolt, since war didn't occur in some countries during that period.

The book focuses on four colonies - Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico. The work revisits some of the existing theories on the central question surrounding the insurrections. It also vets and rebuts the plausibility of each theory while introducing the author's point of view, which is then supported by data. In the concluding chapter, the book briefly analyzes similar events in other regions of the Americas.

[j-dominguez]

Harvard University Press Presents The Cuban Economy in a New Era

A doctoral graduate of the political science program at Harvard University, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez spent nearly 50 years at his alma mater as a professor and campus leader. Since retiring in 2018, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez has focused his efforts on writing and publishing.

He has also served as a co-editor of the book The Cuban Economy in a New Era: An Agenda for Change toward Durable Development. The Cuban Economy in a New Era was authored by Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia as part of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Series on Latin American Studies. It was distributed by Harvard University Press.

The text highlights a number of important topics impacting the economy in modern Cuba, including the start of Raúl Castro’s presidency in 2006 and the economic collapse of Venezuela, an important trade partner for Cuba. The book also looks back on a long legacy of deteriorating infrastructure. Agriculture, an industry that perfectly represents the stagnant nature of Cuba’s economy, is another key focus of the book. The nation has been hit especially hard by the fall of the once-thriving sugar industry.

The Cuban Economy in a New Era is the product of more than 10 years of work, which included aid from a number of Harvard scholars and various workshops held in both Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Havana, Cuba.

[j-dominguez]

Debating US-Cuban Relations

A retired Harvard University professor and prolific writer and publisher, Jorge I. Dominguez began studying Latin American political, economic, and social change during the Cold War. In his book Debating US-Cuban Relations: How Should We Now Play Ball? (shortened to Debating US-Cuban Relations), Jorge I. Dominguez explores Cuba’s interactions with the United States and its allies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Debating US-Cuba Relations explores six areas and was written after the Cold War. The book discusses political, social, and economic issues, looking at how both countries can interact fairly. The authors also address possible national security concerns. However, Dr. Dominguez and his co-authors acknowledge ways to normalize US-Cuba relations, primarily through cultural exchange. Their primary examples include scholarly discourse between the two countries and immigration to the US from Cuba. To anchor such diverse subject matter, Dr. Dominguez uses a baseball game as a metaphor. He uses the image of the presidents of Cuba and the US attending a baseball game in 2017 and sharing concessions. With this analogy, he captures the relationship between the two and how relations normalized despite their difficulties after the Cold War.

[j-dominguez]

Cuban Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is an author and former Harvard University professor who specializes in the socio-economic and political dynamics of Latin America. A particular focus for Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is Cuba; his edited works include “The Cuban Economy in a New Era.” One question in early 2022 centered on how Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine would impact its relations with Cuba, a nation with which the country has long had a strong connection. From the time of Fidel Castro onward, Russia (formerly as the Soviet Union) formed a bulwark of support and influence when it came to Cuban resources and ideology. As the Ukraine crisis unfolded, Cuba took a stance of blaming the United States and NATO for Russia’s incursion. The government described itself as supporting Russia’s right to security guarantees and self-defense. This reflected the way Russia has sought to justify its military action as one against an expansionist NATO presence in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Cuba stopped short of advocating a military solution in this volatile region. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advocated diplomacy through the use of “constructive and respectful dialogue" and refrained from endorsing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They emphasized that every attempt should be made to preserve international security and peace. Beyond historical ties, one reason for Cuba’s support of Russia relates to $2.3 billion in loans the country received from Putin’s government from 2006 to 2019. These spanned a variety of infrastructure, power generation, and metals investments. Russia has now indicated it will postpone a portion of debt payments until 2027 and the chairman of the Duma, or Russian assembly, visited Cuba in February, as a way of strengthening ties

[j-dominguez]

Between Change and Rigidity, Reform and Repression 

Can Cuba’s ruling Communist Party undertake reforms? A reform agenda may start with a  slogan made popular elsewhere in Latin America (¡Que se vayan todos!) – out with everyone in  national leadership posts. In fact, the April 2021 Party Congress approximated that goal. All  members of the Party’s national Secretariat were replaced, as were half of the members of the  Political Bureau and half of the key provincial officials (the First Party Secretaries). Eleven of  the thirteen active-duty Generals serving on the Central Committee also departed, as did three  out of five of all Central Committee members. 

Leaving the Party’s Political Bureau were President Raúl Castro, former Interior Minister  Ramiro Valdés, and long-time Party Organization Secretary José Ramón Machado, among other  notables who had ruled for decades. More typical had been the outcome of the 2016 Party  Congress, when none such notables left, only one in ten of the “political” Generals was new to  the Central Committee, and the majority of the Secretariat held on. 

A reform agenda would also require greater leadership pluralism to prevent a small clique  from undertaking all decisions. This, too, has been happening. In 2016, about a quarter of the  ministers had also served on the Council of State, hence approving their own proposals. The  2019 Constitution brought to zero the overlap between the Council of Ministers and the Council  of State. The 2021 Party Congress also reduced the overlap between the two Councils, on the one  hand, and, on the other, the Party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee. 

In this century, greater demographic inclusion has been the rule as well, doubling the  proportion of Afrodescendants in Council of State posts and bringing their share and that of 

1 

women on this Council closer to their respective shares of the population. The median age in  elite institutions has fallen; new Central Committee members must be below age sixty. So, why the unprecedented nationwide protests in July 2021 – thousands of people  protesting on the streets of three dozen cities across the provinces – and what was new in 2021? Cuba’s economic stagnation, in effect near zero growth for a decade, does not explain the July  protests. Nor do U.S. economic sanctions in place for decades, notwithstanding Trump  administration enhancements. Nor does the equally long authoritarian regime. Nor do the effects  of the Covid-19 pandemic. If so, the protests would have occurred well before. In 2021, much changed. The economy stopped stagnating: It nosedived. Access to food  became a severe problem. In January, the top leadership adopted a dramatic monetary and  exchange rate reform. Inadequate planning unleashed a remarkably high inflation rate, followed  by frequent policy “fixes” for specific problems, which contributed to renewed and ongoing  policy uncertainties. A frightening Covid-19 spike in June vaulted Cuba from one of the more  successful pandemic managers to one of the world’s worst-afflicted countries. As the very hot  Caribbean summer approached, in late June the electric power system broke down, propelling  people out of their homes. Too much time following the April 2021 Party Congress focused on  building new relationships and bonds of authority between the top leaders – career veterans but  new to being at the top – and intermediate Party and government ranks. Decision making  processes, never speedy, slowed. 

How did the nation’s leaders respond? The top leaders were surprised by, and  unprepared for, the July protests. Their initial response was confused and contradictory. Early  steps of conciliation and police restraint were followed by Special Troops and police repression  (beatings, arrests, summary trials) across the nation. Following explanations of practical

2 

problems, especially by the prime minister, the official blame for the protests soon fell on  “outside agitators,” such as U.S. agencies and Cuban diaspora members. 

Following the July protests, which made significant use of social media, the government  also enacted new rules to criminalize actions through the Internet that may have an adverse  “impact on Cuba’s prestige,” criticize the content of the authoritarian Constitution, seek to  “compel public authorities to act or to fail to act” while performing their duties, or “damage the  reputation” of government officials. The 2019 Constitution promised improvements in its charter  of rights, but their implementation has been deferred, as these responses to the July protests  make clear.  

Moreover, the government has failed to make effective use of its own noncompetitive  national elections. For example, at the last national single-party election in 2018, three quarters  of the members of the Council of State would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the  electoral law had required having been the top vote getter in a municipality; more than half  would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the electoral law had mandated having  finished in the top half of vote receivers in their respective provinces. The government has not  made effective use of its own authoritarian-regime electoral law to promote its more popular  politicians into key national posts. 

Thus, can Cuba’s Communist Party undertake reforms beyond renewing and widening its  top leadership circles? Its most positive response following the July 2021 protests has been the  formal and final approval of reforms to permit the freer growth of small- and medium-sized  private sector businesses and cooperatives. Such reforms had been under consideration since the  Fall 2010! The leadership may need a “win” before it adopts wider reforms and does so more  quickly. The government chose to develop Cuba’s own vaccines against Covid-19. It claims to 

3 

have succeeded with two, not yet approved by the World Health Organization and pending  independent peer review. Success with these vaccines could permit the reactivation of  international tourism, announced for mid-November 2021, even if not from the United States yet,  reactivating the economy while also addressing the public health crisis. With such new breathing  room, the pace of economic reform may accelerate. The near-term challenge is simpler. Do government and Party leaders believe their own  propaganda that the causes of the protests all lie outside the nation’s boundaries? Shakespeare’s  Cassius, in Julius Caesar (I:2, 145) provides good advice: “The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our  stars, but in ourselves…” The fault, dear President Miguel Díaz-Canel, lies not in the U.S.  government or in southern Florida but in a leadership and policy regime in Cuba, both in  desperate need of bold and swifter change.

[j-dominguez]

Jorge I. Dominguez is an alumnus and longtime professor at Harvard University, where he most recently served as chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. A successful writer and publisher, Jorge I. Dominguez is best known for his work in the areas of Latin America and Cuba that include “Social Policies and Decentralization in Cuba” and “The Cuban Economy in a New Era.”

Over 182 pages, The Cuban Economy in a New Era analyzes challenges and potential solutions as they relate to Cuba’s stagnant economy. The book, which includes commentary from professors Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia, was published in 2018 by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and distributed by Harvard University Press.

The Cuban Economy in a New Era pinpoints a number of ills burdening the Cuban economy, ranging from a decaying infrastructure to stagnant agriculture and a bankrupt sugar industry. Moreover, the book explores policy changes that could lead to improvements in seven economic areas. These are new macroeconomic policy, private enterprise, non-agricultural cooperatives, central planning, private sector financing, state enterprise management, and relations with international financial institutions.

For additional information on The Cuban Economy in a New Era, visit https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674980358.

[j-dominguez]

A New Hampshire resident, Jorge I. Dominguez graduated from Harvard University and holds a Ph.D. in political science. Jorge Dominguez served in the past as a professor and chair of international and area studies at Harvard. Jorge I. Dominguez is also an author and published The Cuban Economy in a New Era.

Cuba is undergoing huge economic changes in 2021 due to the pandemic and coronavirus. The state seems to have hit a new low with people being discontent about the rising of prices and the decrease of wages once adjusted for high inflation increases. After shrinking the economy by 11 percent in 2020, the crisis has extended to 2021. Cuba has a command economy, which means the government mainly decides and determines the prices of goods, as well as the production and availability of goods.

Cuba lacks private ownership of large-scale industries, properties, and resources due to the command economy. Command economy is a feature of communism, which has been present in Cuba since 1959. Recent command economy policies and the economy in general have frustrated citizens, as the fact that the production of goods is controlled by the government can lead to shortages of goods and high prices.

[j-dominguez]

I published “Mexico’s Economy Continues to Slump” on @Medium https://ift.tt/34mpfE0

[j-dominguez]

I published “Cuba Effectively Contains Coronavirus, at a Price” on @Medium https://ift.tt/3ll4EHO

[j-dominguez]

I published “Defying Expectations, Remittances to Mexico Increase” on @Medium https://ift.tt/3iKOtkS

[j-dominguez]

I published “Cuba Moves to Expand Use of US Dollar to Shore Up Economy” on @Medium https://ift.tt/2D6C7nu

[j-dominguez]

I published “Cuba Faces a Significant Drop in Imports in the First Half of 2020” on @Medium https://ift.tt/3gvFKC0