kelseycoppinger

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #27: What would a New Realm of Ethics do?

Kelsey Coppinger

December 6, 2018

Class #27: What would a New Realm of Ethics do?

Hans Jonas begins his chapter The Altered Nature of Human Action from his book The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age by talking about how modern technology has created the need for an entirely new ethic. He says that this is due to the fact that technology has changed the nature of action itself. Since ethics is all about actions, a new kind of action means we need a new kind of ethics. He moves on to describe  “old” or traditional actions and technology. He explains that old action was limited to the present, and did not have cumulative character.This means whatever happened through actions didn’t have an impact on future generations. Lastly in “old” actions we were able to predict the consequences. Jonas then talks about old technology. He says old technology did not change nature as a whole and its consequences were confined to a city bubble. Additionally though humans had powers, it was small compared to the powers of the universe. Lastly old technology was simply a means to an end.

Jonas then explains how traditional ethics works. He says that in traditional ethics nature is not an object of human responsibility. They solely deal with ethics inside the individual and social sphere. It is also confined to the immediate setting of the action. This means there are no long term effects of the action. Thirdly the agent of the action and the one who is affected share a common present. Fourthly Jonas says ethical knowledge was readily available to all. In other words you did not need to be an expert to understand it. Lastly Jonas claims that traditional ethics is anthropocentric.

Now, says Jonas, all of this has changed. He declares that we need a future oriented ethic that deals with future responsibilities. Humans have become objects of technology so we need an ethic that will match our “new” actions and our “new” power. Jonas believes that there is an entirely new realm of ethics that will affect not only nature but the future of mankind. Jonas also goes over the question of should there even be mankind in the future? He answers this by claiming that there should be. However, this new ethic will not be anthropocentric, and it will need a massive change in politics.

I agree with a lot of what Jonas had to say. It’s apparent that there has been a HUGE shift in the past 100 to 200 years that has completely changed our way of life and our way of communicating with the natural world. It’s no doubt that with these changes a change in ethics and politics is necessary. My question is though to what extent can we restrict individual action when we implement a change in policy? Can we keep individuals from using plastic straws or plastic bags? Can we go even further and restrict time spent driving a car? Our constitution is based on individual rights so if we bend or break the rules the whole system could fall apart. Can we amend our constitution? Can we create a new basis for our government? What’s more important, saving future generations or protecting our constitution. Lastly if we were to modify the constitution then what would that do to the rest of the world?

Word count:554

Jonas, Hans (1984). The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. University of Chicago Press.

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Class #25 and #26: A (confusing) Chain Towards the Essence of Technology

Kelsey Coppinger

December 3, 2018

Class #25 and #26: A (confusing) Chain Towards the Essence of Technology

Martin Heidegger starts The Question Concerning Technology by searching for the essence of technology so that we can “prepare a free relation to it” (311).  He states that if we don’t think about our relationship to the essence of technology then we will remain “unfree and chaired” to it (311). He explains that the essence doesn’t equal anything technological; just like the essence of a tree isn’t any one specific tree. By essence Heidegger means what the thing is. He determines that any problems that we have cannot be solved by making out technology better. So, the answer to our environmental problems will not be creating more advanced technology. Heidegger states that since the essence isn’t anything technological you don’t have to be an expert to know it. Thus, we’re not just talking about modern technology here.

Part of Heidegger’s strategy is to open our eyes to blind spots by analyzing and bringing to light the assumptions of technology. He will do this by looking at what we think technology is. According to Heidegger people see technology in two ways. The first is it being an instrument or a means to an end, and the second is it being human activity. This view of technology is called an anthropological definition, but as Heidegger will point out, this is only part of the truth. Heidegger moves on to talk about the concept of Instrumentality. He determines since instrumentality is just something having an effect on something else, then it really is just causality. So, he then looks at what causality is by looking to Aristotle. Aristotle saw four types of causality: material cause, efficient cause, form, and purpose. Heidegger decides to look closer at the word cause. For the Greeks, he notes, it meant not effect but instead a kind of owing or responsibility. Giving the example of the chalice from Aristotle, he notices the silversmith is responsible for the chalice. In other words this means he brings the chalice into existence. Heidegger coins this term bringing-forth. He says this when something that was once concealed is brought into the open or is unconcealed.

Suddenly Heidegger seems to remember the purpose of the paper as he states, “but where have we strayed to?” (pp. 318). He claims that this idea of revealing has everything to do with the essence of technology. Technology is in fact not just instrumentality but it’s a way of revealing. If a dam on a river is examined it can be seen that the dam reveals that the river is an energy source. Heidegger then looks at the ancient word techne when was used for arts of mind or fine arts. This word meant some sort of expertise who reveals something. This was a type of poiesis which is a poetic revealing by artists. So, essence of technology is a mode of revealing. But Heidegger isn’t completely satisfied as he asks the question is this the case for modern technology? Yes it is he answers; however, he names this not poiesis, but instead a challenging revealing. Modern technology differs because it transforms our world. In the example of the dam, we notice that the only way of seeing the river is as a resource. Technology turns nature into “standing reserve” (pp. 322). This is when objects no longer appear to us as what they are in their being, but instead only as a resource to be used.

Heidegger connects humanity and raw materials, but argues that we can never completely become raw materials. In other words there’s a potential problem that in the process of turning everything into a standing reserve humans too will be turned into standing reserve but because we are in the driver's seat this won’t happen. Just like nature’s mode of revealing is never completely controlled by humans. Despite the fact that we have the capacity to completely destroy nature, nature still reveals itself on its own terms. With that being said Heidegger then brings up a term called enframing. Heidegger attempts to explain this term by bringing up a German word Gestell. He comes up with a new application of this term to describe the relationship between humans and the natural world. Heidegger explains that humans want to put everything into boxes, or categories, like mathematical equations. This is what characterizes the essence of modern technology. He thinks that enframing comes from humans needing scientific knowledge of the world. He moves forward to suggest that modern technology came before modern physics, which for Heidegger makes sense since the essence of technology is oriented around enframing. And enframing is our drive for a precise knowledge of the natural world. (Think how this drive leads to our physics).

Next, Heidegger claims that enframing, a mode of revealing, has both danger and saving power. It has with it the possibility of a different orientation of the world. Once we are able to see we’re in enframing we can have this different orientation. If we are able to reflect on enframing then we can have a choice. We can either continue (our sense of power will grow) or we can reorient in a way that’s not destructive. Here Heidegger brings up Holderlin who said where there is danger there is the saving power. He take the notion of essence has what endures and what grants. Enframing is a granting. The world is granted to us through enframing. It is an opportunity to see ourselves, and we must keep danger with in our eyes. So, what is this saving power? Heidegger answers that maybe the answer is art in the sense of what art meant for the Greeks.

My issue with Heidegger's argument was found in the beginning of this essay. His whole claim was based on instrumentality being the same as causality. However, these two words are not synonyms. I can see how they’re related but if one changes the definition of causality to mean some new Greek version of the word then one can’t say that they’re the same. Just like how sad and somber are synonyms, and somber and serious are synonyms, that doesn’t mean sad and serious are also synonyms. This is a logical fallacy. I think that since his whole argument was based on this it discredits the essay a little bit. However, I can see how someone would say but does this really matter, or think about the bigger point. Additionally Heidegger’s argument leads to very little application and not many people would understand or take the time to read this paper. I think the language is too confusing and it won’t reach a wide audience.

Word count: 1105

Heidegger, Martin. The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. Print.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #24: What is Nature if not Pristine?

Kelsey Coppinger

November 26, 2019

Class #24: What is nature if not pristine?

Steven Vogel begins his article On Environmental Philosophy and Continental Thought by stating that the goal of the essay is to examine how continental philosophy, specifically post-structuralism, can be used in environmental issues. He identifies four accounts of nature in contemporary continental thought. The first account is nature as origin. Nature as origin examines what it means to be alienated from nature. It looks at how the bible and romanticism portrayed nature as this separate thing prior to humans that was always in the background. In this account the space of nature is separate from the social space. Vogel points out that the problem with this is humans forget that they emerged from nature, and that nature is more powerful than humans no the other way around. In other words alienation occurs when we think we’re above it, and when we forget we’re apart of it. The issue with this account, argues Vogel, is that it suggests humans are nature, but also says our activities aren’t natural. For example strip-mall, or nuclear waste. This forces human beings to be split into the bodily (natural) and the intellectual (unnatural).

The next account according to Vogel is the critique of nature. This account states that nature is a social construct. Vogel brings up Bill McKibben who admired tree in the Adirondacks and preached about an end of nature. However, this account argues “there is no nature” (pp. 260). It claims that in reality there is no such thing as pristine nature or wilderness. Whatever idea of nature we have is socially or historically contingent. On the other hand Vogel presents an issue with this account: if there is no nature of origin then what are we trying to defend? The third account that Vogel presents is nature as difference. This explains nature the otherness that escapes us. It’s based on the fact that there is always something that exceeds our grasp. There is always a difference or a thing that we cannot foresee. Any unexpected consequences is a form of natures resistance. For instance we can think about ethics in real life (like the Happiness principle) but whenever we try to implement them they don’t always work out how we imagined. Again Vogel  takes issue with this account. He says that if we can’t talk about it since it’s not a thing, then this will lead to a kind of quietism.

This leads to Vogel’s last account of nature. This account is called Nature and Practice. This claims that the concept of nature is constructed. He brings up Marxist notion of the human being being a laboring animal. It claims that through labor we transform our environment, and when we understand our environment there is no difference between, for example, Yellowstone and Manhattan. They’re both built by humans- perhaps to varying degrees but built by us nonetheless. Nature and Practice denies the distinction between the physical world and the social world. Lastly it states that practices are always occurring and shaping our natural world. This account of nature is the one Vogel decides is the best since it will enact the most activism in our society.

Vogels last account of nature made be think about what this view would say about Nature as Origin. Does nature as origin exist here? This view, though Vogel doesn’t go into it, would probably say that nature as origin once existed; however, the nature we know now, the trees, the mountains, the grass, is constructed through our practices. In other words everything in the natural world is somehow touched by us; once upon a time there was a nature or origin, a completely separate entity than nature, but now it’s extinct. My question is: there must be places on Earth that untouched by humans, right? A quick google search gives you places that are “pristine” or “unexplored,” yet even these places could have once been walked upon by a human thousands of years ago. Lets give these “unexplored” places the benefit of the doubt. Say it’s true that no human every walked upon it’s earth, this still wouldn’t mean that our practices haven’t affected it in some way. In fact there’s no way our practices haven’t affected it! Think about the pollution we put in our air, or the the chemicals in our water. Since everything on the earth touches the air or the water, then it must be affected by humans. No to mention the rise in temperatures from human activity that have melted glaciers and raised sea levels!

Word count:756

Vogel, Steven (1998). Nature as Origin and Difference: On Environmental Philosophy and Continental Thought. Philosophy Today 42 (Supplement):169-181.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #23: Can a Date Fix the Name?

Kelsey Coppinger

Nov 19, 2018

Class #23: Can a Date Fix the Name?

Zoe Todd and Heather Davis begin their article On the Importance of Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene by describing some aspects of naming the new epoch the Anthropocene. They state that when we accept we are currently living in an epoch that is determined by the action of humans we are making a political act. They explain further that this isn’t just a matter of “whether or not” this new time should be named Anthropocene but it’s also a matter of when this time began or will begin. This time period for the new epoch is known as the golden spike. Many claim that the mid-twentieth century is when it began. However, Todd and Davis argue that we should place the golden spike at 1610 because this will point to colonialism as the source for our environmental crisis. Additionally many note that in naming this epoch Anthropocene we fail to recognize power relations. Again Todd and Davis disagree suggesting that we keep the name because it “implicitly aligns itself” with colonialism (pp. 763). He believes that the name when linked with colonization gives us the power to decolonize the Anthropocene and “draws attention to the violence at its core” (pp. 763).

Todd and Davis, after accepting the Anthropocene is the most fitting name for this epoch, move forward to explain why we must place the golden spike at the start of colonization. They gives us two reasons. The first is it opens up the geologic questions and implications beyond Western thinking and into Indigenous knowledge. The second is that it allows us to understand the current environmental crisis “as inherently invested in a specific ideology defined by proto-capitalist logic based on extraction and accumulation through dispossession” (pp. 764). In other words  it allows us to see colonialism, which was based on taking away rights, property, or possessions from the indigenous people, as the root of our environmental crisis today.

In their next section, Dates and Consequences, Todd and Davis explain why the mid-twentieth century date is inadequate for the start of the Anthropocene. They state that this date doesn’t “differentiate between countries, ideologies, or ways of life” (pp.766) meaning the experience of the Anthropocene is not the same for all people. It’s not a universal experience and does not have universal blame. They also bring up Geographers Simon L. Lewis and Mark A. Maslin who also proposed 1610 as the the golden spike date. They explained that the amount of plants and animals that were exchanged during this time drastically changed our ecosystems, and that the drop in carbon dioxide levels during this time correspond to the genocide of the Native Americans along with the resulting regrowth of forests (pp. 766). These prove that colonialism, global trade, and coal brought about the Anthropocene which brings in the issue of power relations.

Next, Todd and Davis discuss how the logic of the Anthropocene is the same as the logic of colonialism. They go as far as saying that the Anthropocene is an extension and enactment of colonialism, for both the Anthropocene and colonialism erase difference with genocide and forced integration. Todd and Davis finish their article by discussing the decolonization of the Anthropocene. This would include “self-governance for indigenous peoples, the return of stolen lands, and reparations for the descendants of captures Africans” and arguably most importantly “it also fundamentally questions the bound and the legitimacy of the nation-state structure itself” (pp. 774).

My main issue with naming this epoch the Anthropocene, as discussed in last class #21,  was that it placed the blame equally on all types of people. This way of thinking is clearly Westernized since the West had and still has a much bigger impact on the environment than less developed countries and indigenous people. Additionally indigenous people are way more affected by environmental change than other groups! Take a look at this article posted by the UN (http://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/pdf/Backgrounder_ClimateChange_FINAL.pdf ) which give tons of examples of how Indigenous people are affected by climate change. Thus, naming this epoch Anthropocene, was a violation against groups of people who had very little to do with the environmental crisis. However, Todd and Davis brought up a very interesting point which was the “when” of this new epoch. Placing the Anthropocene at the start of colonization places the blame, rather on everyone equally, on the West itself. Can the term Anthropocene truly not blame certain groups of people for our environmental crisis when the term itself means human action as the root of our crisis? I think that it could if people are educated about the when and not just the name.

Word count: 779

Davis, Heather, and Zoe Todd. 2017. “On the Importance of a Date, Or, Decolonizing the Anthropocene”. ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies 16 (4), 761-80.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #21: Why we Should Ditch Anthropocene: is a Name Just a Name?

Kelsey Coppinger November 11, 2018 Class #22: Why we should ditch Anthropocene: is a name just a name? In Donna Haraway’s chapter Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene from her book Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene she discusses what we should name this current epoch that we’re in. She begins by asking a series of hypothetical questions about what will happen in the future. From these questions she concludes that “surely such a transformative time on Earth must not be named the Anthropocene!” (pp. 1) which starts the main point of her chapter. She explains that anthropocene is a term first coined by Eugene Stoermer. He referred to this term as the growing evidence for the effects that humans have on the Earth. Later, Paul Crutzen proposed that we needed a new term for this new epoch marked by a high magnitude of human activities. These Anthropogenic markers were evident in the air, water (dying coral), and rocks (pp. 4). Haraway sees that this name is fitting but believes we need to move beyond this. She believes that human exceptionalism which is based on the idea that humans are unique is not longer grounded in evidence. She claims that this warrants a new name for our age. Man is so clearly cound up with other organisms that it's not right to name a time period solely after humans.

Next, Haraway adds that many have a naive faith in technology. They hope that it will eliminate the effect  that burning fossil fuels have on our environment, and save us all. However, this really isn’t the case. As Brad Werner points out “global capitalism “has made the depletion of resources so rapid, convenient and barrier-free that ‘earth human systems’ are becoming dangerously unstable in response” (pp. 5). Haraway then brings up a second view that some hold of utter despair. These people believe that there is nothing to be done. What Haraway is trying to do is subvert these two opposing attitudes towards climate change and massive species extinction. Haraway state what we should do instead is stay with the trouble. This means taking an active stance; it involves the activity of making kin and changing our understanding of what kinship means.

Thirdly, Haraway suggests that the name Capitalocene is better, but still not quite there. Capitalocene is defined by the capitalist economy being the main cause of environmental issues. Haraway asserts that no individual revolt against capitalism would do anything. It will take a collaborative effort against capitalism to change our society. However, Haraway state that we shouldn’t be like Eickman: a nazi organizer who failed to think. What she means by this is that currently we are all going with the flow of capitalism instead of incorporating new ways of thinking that aren’t embodied with in the ideology of capitalism. Despite Capitalocene being an improvement it still makes the figure of man big.

Lastly Haraway makes a final suggestion that the name Chthulucene is the most fitting for the current epoch that we’re in. She explains that we need to figure out how to live on a damaged planet. Chthulucene is embedded with in the world and rejects the idea of progress for the sake of progress. She calls for being together in this heap of tentacles.

My biggest issue with Haraways line of thinking was that naming our epoch anything besides the “anthropocene” would lift the blame off of us as a species. It is indeed true that we alone are the ones destroying rainforests, killing off species, polluting our oceans, and much much more. We are the sole destructors of our world. As soon as we name our epoch something un-human oriented it may suggest that we somehow aren’t to blame, or are less to blame. For instance Capitalocene immediately puts the blame on just the way our society is. Does this really get individual people to feel any sort of burden on the fact that their are sea turtles with plastic up their nose? It’s so much easier to turn a blind eye when “it’s just the way our society is.” The one part that convinced me that maybe it shouldn’t be names anthropocene was point 8 on pp. 7 of the objections of anthropocene. This point suggested that the name was privileged. It doesn’t make sense to blame everyone equally. Some people in some parts of the world truly do not contribute to environmental change. This term is very Westernized. Is there a name that we could come up with that could place the blame on Western human activity?

Word count: 748

“Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene,” in Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Duke University Press, 2016.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #20: Empowering our Environment with Feminism

Kelsey Coppinger November 8, 2018 Class #20: Empowering our Environment with Feminism

Carolyn Merchant in Feminism and the Philosophy of Nature starts with the defining the term ecofeminisme. Ecofeminisme represents the power that women possessive to change the way we view the environment to guarantee human survival. She then discusses three specific types of feminism and ecofeminism. The first type is liberal feminism. The goal of liberal feminism is to pass new laws and regulations that will change the relationship between human and nature. The second, radical ecofeminism, analyzes the problems with patriarchy and presents solutions that would free both women and nature. The last type of feminism according to Merchant is socialist ecofeminism. This analyzes capitalist patriarchy and suggest the total reform of the domination and use of both nature and women that is present in today's market economy.

Next, Merchant considers each feminism in depth. She explains that liberal feminists see environmental issues stemming from the lack of regulation in terms of our rapid overuse of our natural resources. They believe that equal educational opportunities could lead to women with jobs that have the ability to make a change. Radical ecofeminism examines the idea that in Western culture women and nature are historically linked together and then devalued. They believe in direct political action to improve our environment. Additionally radical feminism sees spirituality as a source for change. They celebrate the connection between women and nature through revival of ancient rituals. The connection between the two is a source of female power. Additionally Merchant mentions that the hazardous waste and pollution that we put into the environment affect women’s reproductive health negatively. Merchant then counter argues radical feminism by explaining that the dualities of of male/female and culture/nature would suggest that “if “female is to male as nature is to culture” then women’s hopes for liberation are set back by association with nature” (pp. 293). Lastly Merchant examines socialist ecofeminism. Socialist ecofeminism views the source of male domination as the capitalist patriarchy within the workforce. The cause of environmental problems stems from the idea that women and nature are exploited by men. They take issue with the treatment of nature as passive. Unlike radical feminism they ground their analysis in social reproduction. Their main idea is to develop “non dominating relations with nature and supplying all peoples with a high quality of life” (pp. 294). Merchant states that while these types of feminism may seem very different their shorter-term objects overlap. She then concludes that the socialist feminism has potential for the most thorough critique of the domination issue which is that of women and nonhuman nature (pp. 291).

Next, Merchant examines a certain shift that took place in history. This shift was from the organic worldview to the mechanistic model of nature. This transition was brought about by the scientific revolution (later amplified by the Enlightenment). It’s this shift that is responsible for our current view of nature. It is the locus of our problem. Merchant then describes the Organicist model. She says that in this model nature is seen as a nurturing mother; it’s seen as an unpredictable, chaotic, uncontrollable woman; it emphasizes the self, the cosmos, and society, all as an organism- all alive and all dependent on each other. Further in this model there was a definition of order. Each part (farmer, butcher, etc) was functioning properly for the whole which was determined by nature. Lastly Merchant says all of this limits the kind of behavior that is acceptable since no one would rape a nurturing mother. Then this model shifted into the mechanistic model. This new model viewed nature as mechanical and purely rational; it saw nature as something to be controlled and dominated. Nature was seen as the machine that humans controlled. Merchant then discusses the reason for this shift. She states that there was a perception on disorders with in our society. For instance there was a shift of the Earth being the center or our solar system to realizing the sun actually is. So, there was a need for a new definition of order because of these discoveries within our society. Another reason for this shift, says Merchant, could have been that we needed a new model of nature to keep up with technology.

Lastly Merchant looks at what we can learn from this diagnosis. She notes that women history is linked with the environmental history. Understanding this we can then look back and think about the ways in which we interpreted historical part. For instance different figures like Newton, and certain events. We can re-examine the way that the Mechanistic worldview was created and rethink their contributions, like Bacon, to our world situation. She isn’t demonizing these figures but rather simply re-evaluating them.

Merchant’s view of historical figures made me rethink a lot of what I learned in my history classes over the years. It is true that the history that we know is dominated by male stories. We know of important women like Abigail Adams, or Harriet Tubman, but they always appear to be characters in a large male-dominated story. Additionally the contributions of different male scientists have actually been proven to be fraud. Many women didn’t receive recognition that they deserved, like Esther Lederberg in her discovery of replica plating or Rosalind Franklin who helped discover that the structure of DNA was a double helix. I think that textbooks should start examining history from a female's perspective. Some purpose the term “herstory” to be adopted which is just a feminist account of history. If this can help view the natural world in a different light than that’s great! But, at the very least it will give women credit for their accomplishment and help counter the sexist world we live in.

Word count: 953

Merchant, Carolyn, et al. “Feminism and the Philosophy of Nature.” Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, Sierra Club Books, 1990, pp. 291–299.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #19: Ecological Feminism and the Importance of a Name

Kelsey Coppinger November 5, 2018 Class #19: Ecological Feminism and the Importance of a Name

Karen Warren starts her essay The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism with the definition of ecological feminism. She states that ecological feminism is the position that there are important connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature. Warren's’ argument is that ecological feminism provides a framework which “takes seriously” the connection between the domination of women and the domination of nature. At the base level feminism is a movement to end all sexist oppression even if different feminists argue about how to get there. Warren then explains that a feminist issue depends on context, and it is when an understanding of an issue leads to an understanding of the oppression of women. Warren jumps to says that environmental degradation and exploitation must be a feminist issue since it affects women’s lives.

Next, the idea of conceptual framework is presented. Warren states a conceptual framework is “a set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions which shape and reflect how one views oneself and one’s world” (pp. 283), and an oppressive conceptual framework is a socially constructed lens which contributes to oppression. For instance a patriarchal society is an oppressive conceptual framework in which the lens leads to the domination of men and the subordination of women. Warren then claims there are three features of oppressive conceptual frameworks. The first is value-hierarchical thinking; the second is value-dualism; the third is logic of domination (pp. 283). Warren claims that the first two wouldn’t make a conceptual framework oppressive. They are simply descriptions. The value hierarchical thinking, for example one that ranks height, only becomes oppressive when we say the tallest person gets priority. For value-dualism we can say there is a difference between men and women, but it only become oppressive when we say one is superior to another. Thus, claims Warren, it is the logic of domination that justifies the subordination of one over another. She calls this the “explanatorily basic” (283).

Warren claims that there are three reasons why a logic of domination as the explanatorily basic is important for ecofeminism. The first claim is that without it there would be no way of claiming the moral superiority of humans over say, rocks. The second claim is that in many ecofeminists in the West view the idea of women being equated to nature as oppressive. It follows that women when identified with nature are seen in the realm of the physical while men are identified with human in the realm of the mental. Thus men are superior. Warren points out that logically the patriarchal framework and the second claim ought to be rejected. She moves on to explain how different ecofeminists argues about the second claim, but states that despite these differences they can all agree upon “the way in which the logic of domination had functioned historically within patriarchy to sustain and justify the twin dominations of women and nature” (pp. 284).  In other words women and nature are placed together in the logic of domination. They’re seen as passive, uncontrollable, and irrational. What justifies the subordination of women is the same thing that justifies the subordination of nature.

Warren gives an example of deforestation in India and how it disproportionately affects women. In developing countries women are at home so they have a more intimate connection with nature. Warren states that historically nature and women have been devalued while ecofeminism is trying to re-value them. She even shows how our language and use of language tends to relate women to nature for instance the term “mother nature.” Additionally the portrayal of women in mythology shows Goddesses associated with nature. Furthermore Earth is often portrayed like a woman laying there ready to be cultivated or impregnated. Just like women, the Environment is something to be exploited. For ecofeminism the important connection between the domination of women and nature is recognized. Warren explains that since the sexist oppression is connected with the oppression of the natural world then feminism is also against the oppression of nature. Warren further that both of these kinds of oppression are connected with all other forms of oppression. So, Feminism clearly will reject patriarchy and so will ecofeminism since its patriarchy that allowed for the unjust domination of exploitation of nonhuman nature.

Warren’s claim takes issue with the logic of domination. It doesn’t actually address the problem with the identification of women with nature, which many would argue is a major issue. However, I took her claim of ecofeminism as not  stating that nature and women are the same, but rather historically their identified as the same. To make this more clear, Warren should specify if she’s stating a historical truth or an actual truth. Additionally I think the same argument that Warren makes for feminism could be made for anti-racism. Black people are often portrayed with nature. For example the recent cartoon of Serena Williams after the US open portrayed her with racist features that reflected the Jim Crow caricatures. These caricatures show black people as uncivilized portraying them with “monkey like” features. Another recent example is  the comment that was made by Roseanne Barr about Valerie Jarrett calling her the offspring of “Muslim brotherhood and Planet of the Apes.” Additionally African Americans were forced to pick cotton, or grow wheat during slavery. They were subordinated into being closer to nature than the slave-owners. So, why call this ecofeminism? Why not call is “eco-anti-rasism?” Or why not just call it social-ecology? The name suggests the importance, and arguable this name is claiming feminism as more important than anti-racism.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/12/asia-pacific/social-issues-asia-pacific/melbournes-herald-sun-reprints-racist-cartoon-serena-williams/

Word count:909

Warren, Karen J. « The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism », Multitudes, vol. no 36, no. 1, 2009, pp. 170-176.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #18: Is the culture of Capitalism Killing our Trees?

Kelsey Coppinger Nov 1, 2018 Class #18: Is the Culture of Capitalism Killing our Trees?

Murray Bookchin in his essay What is Social Ecology asserts that ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems. He explains that questions concerning environmental issues cannot be answered without addressing problems within our society. He believes that the hierarchical mentality and class relations give rise to the idea of dominating the natural world. Bookchin states that the symptoms of these issues, like population growth, are not the root of ecological problems and we cannot focus on the these things. Instead we must focus on our society’s structure itself. This structure is one that suggests a “grow or die” mentality. Then Murray warns that it is economic growth, gender oppression, and ethnic domination that shape the future of the natural world- not any form of spirituality.

In Murray’s next section called Nature and Society he states that nonhuman nature is constantly evolving and changing. He also says that humans belong in nature since we evolutionarily came from it. We did not appear like aliens. We “remain rooted in our biological evolutionary history” (pp. 466). He believes that we cannot separate the human from the nonhuman because this reveals a failure to think organically, and that nature and society can be linked into one nature. This nature consists of human nature and biotic nature. In this sense the social emerged from the biological. In another section titled The Idea of Dominating Nature, Murray explains that the idea of dominating nature is rooted in the idea of domination of human by human. The way humans interact with each other uphold the idea of hierarchical mentality. He states, “social ecology refuses to ignore the fact that the harm elitist society inflicted on the natural world was more than matched by the harm it inflicted on humanity” (pp.473). Additionally it sees that human flourishing and nature flourishing go hand in hand.

Next, in Murray’s section Grow or Die! he explains that the mentality of capitalism inherently destroys our ecosystem. We constantly feel the need to expand which leads to limitless growth. Entrepreneurs strive to be ahead of other entrepreneurs in profit. Thus the key to capitalism is expansion; the notion of progress is associated with economic growth. Thus capitalism is structurally amoral. A society based on this grow or die notation will lead to the complete destruction of our natural world. In his last section, Murray describes in length what social ecology seeks. He states that social ecology should “challenge the entire system of domination itself and seek to eliminate the hierarchical and class edifice that has imposed itself on humanity and defined the relationship between nonhuman and human nature” (475).

I found Murray’s argument to be very accurate in the sense that capitalism leads to environmental destruction. It’s not only capitalism but also the society and culture that surround capitalism. It appears that now a days people in the West are concerned with getting the bigger better product. Whether it be the newest iphone (which ironically is literally getting bigger and bigger), or the newest sports car, we have become a very materialistic society only concerned with expansion. It definitely appears to be the case that environmental destruction stems from the idea that we need to be the best and have the best. We need to constantly grow, and like Murray says, if we don’t grow we’ll die; we’ll fall down the social ladder.

I understand that “green capitalism” is not the answer as Murray would argue. We cannot just use the economy we have to help us because we end up with ads from Coca Cola company that have a “green” label, yet since when is filling our oceans with plastic bottles environmentally friendly? However, let's take Patagonia for example. Obviously Bookchin would have an issue with this company since it lays in the realm of capitalism. Yet, Patagonia has a commitment to the environment and to social issues. They state on their website, “Our goal is to reduce the adverse social and environmental impacts of our products and to make sure they are produced under safe, fair, legal and humane working conditions throughout the supply chain.” The donate 1% of all profits to environmental groups. They go above and beyond most companies in reducing the harmful effects of capitalism on the environment. This includes suing Trump for taking away two million acres of protected land in Utah! While patagonia is still under the capitalist umbrella, I think this is the best solution we can ask for at this point. It would be almost impossible to get rid of capitalism al-together in the small time frame we have before we use up all our resources. So, why not praise companies that are doing the best they can and encourage other companies to do the same?

Word count: 799

Patagonia's website: https://www.patagonia.com/sustainability.html

Bookchin, Murray. “What Is Social Ecology?” Social Ecology and Communalism, AK Press, 2007.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #16: Dear Virtue Ethics, it’s anthropocentrism and relativism not you..

Kelsey Coppinger October 24, 2018 Class #16: Dear Virtue Ethics

Brian Treanor in the chapter Virtue Ethics and Environmental Virtue Ethics from his book Emplotting Virtue begins by introducing Aristotle's work from Nicomachean Ethics. He summarizes that Aristotle asked about the characteristics of a good man, which Treanor explains is the equivalent of asking about the goal of a human life. Aristotle also explained that a human is good if he or she achieves this goal. Aristotle is interested in a final good. This good is desirable in itself. He calls this good eudaimonia. Treanor explains that this, while often translated as happiness, actually refers to flourishing. A human is able to obtain this good by showing “the excellences characteristic of human beings” (pp. 27). Treanor points out that the problem with this is finding a way to achieve this eudaimonia. He rejects wealth as being a way, and explains that Aristotle said a sort of life that would achieve eudaimonia, or flourishing, must be active, revolve around reason, and most importantly cultivate certain virtues.

Next, Treanor summarizes that Aristotle presents the idea that certain external goods lead to flourishing and in part these external goods are simply fate. For instance how one is brought up and whether one is encouraged to be good is a large part of how one turns out. As Treanor puts it, “A person must be brought up in such a way that being good matters to her” (pp. 29). This is because virtues are cultivated by a process of habituation. We develop certain virtues by practicing them, and further, practicing them perfectly. Next, Aristotle says that we cannot define virtues, but this doesn’t mean virtue ethics should be invalid. He explains that there are too far versions of virtues and virtues that are not far enough. Treanor gives the example of the virtue,  courage. The “too far” version of this virtue is rashness and the “not far enough” is cowardice. One should aim for the mean, or middle, of the two extremes. So, says Treanor, it is especially important to practice virtues the right way as to not cultivate extreme versions of the virtue (pp. 30). Furthermore, the right way includes acting out of goodness. This means if you do an act “to avoid social re-probation” or “accidentally” then you have not acted in a virtuous way (pp. 34).

Treanor goes on to describe virtue in the environment. He points out two underlying themes. The first is the naturalistic approach of Food and Hursthouse, and the second is the attention to narrative found in MacIntyre, Nussbaum, and Ricoeur. The naturalistic approach asserts that virtue of a certain type of living thing should be viewed in the context of the type of being it is. In other words both the type of being that the living thing is and the characteristic functions of that type of being should be evaluated when claiming it as a “good” living thing (pp. 37). Next, Treanor says that narrative plays an important role in virtue ethics, but he will go more in depth about this in later chapters.

Treanor then recognizes that virtue language was already occurring in many philosophical pieces, but it was Louke van Wensveen who was the first to identify it as a distinct field of study. He points out that there are four approaches to environmental virtue ethics, but claims that a combination of these approaches are often found together when speaking of environmental virtue ethics. Treanor then states that virtue ethics presents environmental ethics into the larger picture of human flourishing which lifts the burden of protecting the environment off our shoulders and presents “environmental virtues as essential to the good life” (pp. 39). Additionally it “dispenses with the impossible task of coming up with a single rule or litmus test” (pp. 41). Thirdly it focuses “on the agent rather than the action” which naturally encompasses the environment. Lastly, virtue ethics supports a discourse of flourishing rather than a discourse of sacrificing. For instance right now most people think of all the things they must sacrifice to save the environment like driving to work, stopping the use of plastic straws, giving up meat, but environmental virtue ethics will lead to people viewing these actions as not sacrificial but rather as a form of flourishment. As Treanor puts it, this helps because “nobody wants to sacrifice, but everyone wants to flourish” (pp. 42).

I thought that Treanor's idea was appropriate for short term relief of our environmental problems. If we view forest destruction or ocean pollution as bad for human flourishing I do think a lot more people would be willing to jump into active responses for protecting our Earth. On the other hand this may be bad long term. If we have an anthropocentric view of the world then in the future this selfishness could lead to destruction. However, since our Earth is in such bad condition and will not last much longer, I think that a short solution is necessary at this point. Even if it proves to be disastrous in the future, I think we need to cross that bridge as it comes. As of now there will be no future if we continue down this path.

Additionally there is the issue of relativism with this approach. There will be individual variability in the virtues that humans cultivate. For instance courage will look different on different people. Someone who has agoraphobia would look courageous simply leaving their house, but someone without this phobia leaves their house without thinking twice everyday. Even further we can take examples of courage from different cultures. Japanese samurai warriors followed a code of ethical conduct called Bushido. Bushido still resonates in contemporary Japanese culture including examples from WW11. This ethics said that the biggest form of cowardice for the samurai warrior would be dishonor and disloyalty to his daimyo, a feudal lord. If he lost his honor then the only way to regain it was by committing seppuku- a form of suicide (Szczepanski). Compare that to western culture. It is not seen as courageous to commit suicide. In fact a lot of people view it as giving up and cowardly. It even goes against many people’s religious beliefs.  So how would we determine if someone has hit the “mark” for cultivating the virtue of courage when it varies from person to person and from culture to culture?

Video of Bushido culture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5JJo_Xg2etU

Word count: 1068

Szczepanski, Kallie. “Learn What Is Bushido, the Samurai Code.” Thoughtco., Dotdash, www.thoughtco.com/what-is-bushido-195302.

Treanor, Brian. “Virtue Ethics and Environmental Virtue Ethics.” Emplotting Virtue: A Narrative Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics, State University of New York Press, 2014, pp. 25–43.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #15: Is Virtue Ethics an Adequate Approach to our Environmental Crisis?

Kelsey Coppinger

October 21, 2108

Class #15: Virtue Ethics

Philip Cafaro starts his essay Virtue Ethics by introducing what exactly virtue ethics is. He explains, “Virtue Ethics is the branch of ethics that focuses on issues of character, excellence, and human flourishing” (375). More importantly, he says, many philosophers have come to understand virtue ethics as an adequate approach to environmental issues. Since some philosophers can’t get on board with the idea that non-human entities have intrinsic value or inherent worth, they find their ground in virtue ethics instead. They argue that protecting the environment is necessary for humans to flourish.

Next Cafaro reviews four influential works in the development of environmental virtue ethics. The first is John O’Neills’ Ecology, Policy, and Politics. This piece argues that the environment should be protected in order to preserve the resources that nature gives us that are need for people to flourish in high capabilities. The second is by Louke van Wensveen and called Dirty Virtues. This describes the criteria for counting as genuine ecological virtue. Next, Thoreau's Living Ethics by Philip Cafaro himself is introduced. This looks at David Henry Thoreau’s work and concludes that it’s adequate for developing an environmental virtue ethics. Lastly Character and Environment by Ronald Sandler is brought up. This contains a defense for environmental virtue ethics which looks at the “criteria for judging right action and whether virtue ethics approaches are necessarily anthropocentric” (pp. 376).

Next Cafaro reviews the criticisms and defenses for environmental virtue ethics. One criticism is that it is “undertheorized and ad hoc” (pp. 376). Additionally different theorists argue about what makes a virtue a virtue. Wensveen argues that virtue must contribute to environmental sustainability since we depend on the environment. Generally most point to virtue contributing to human flourishing. However, their accounts of flourishing may differ. Another criticism Cafaro points out is that like virtue ethics in general, the argument can be made that environmental virtue ethics does not provoke action. Virtue ethics provides criteria for what kind of traits to cultivate but doesn’t imply what we should do. Cafaro points out that some may counter-argue that ethics isn’t supposed to provide rules, and cultivating the right virtue, especially wisdom, will allow people to act the right way in situations. Another counterargument is that we could develop “v-rules” that tells us how to act. Yet another counter-argument, and Cafaro says “perhaps the strongest” (pp. 377), is to place the focus on flourishing, not just of humans, but of all living things. The last criticism of environmental virtue ethics is that it is anthropocentric since it focuses on how saving the environment will help us flourish. Some respond to this by arguing that “any reasonable ethic” (pp. 377) must focus on our needs and wants. This will actually motivate people to protect our environment.

I think that cultivating virtues could lead to a lot of change and action especially in regards to the animal world. If we cultivate virtues that help us flourish then we need to cultivate virtues that help the environment flourish. If we don’t then the environment will plummet and humans will go extinct. So, since animal agriculture is the leading cause of species extinction, ocean dead zones, water pollution, and habitat destruction (http://www.cowspiracy.com/facts/) then we must cultivate virtues that will lead to the demise of the dairy and meat industries. The virtues that will help destroy these institutions are kindness and compassion. If we feel compassion for the animals being tortured, raped, and murdered then we will be less inclined to buy milk, eggs, or hamburger at the grocery store. Additionally if these are the types of virtues we are cultivating then this is actually not an anthropocentric ethic. Feeling compassionate towards animals and not eating them because we feel their pain as our pain isn’t self-oriented. We aren’t not eating them because it will help us flourish, but because it will stop their suffering.

Word count: 650

Cafaro, Philip (2001). Environmental Virtue Ethics. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2):1-3.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #14: Light Enlightens Us

Kelsey Coppinger

October 16, 2018

Class #14: Light Enlightens Us

Andrew Light begins his essay Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics by describing his frustration with modern day environmental ethics. He thinks environmental ethics as a field isn’t making nearly enough impact on our society as it did in the 80’s and early 90’s with William Cronon and Robert Bullard. If this field of philosophy isn’t contributing to real world application, like policies, actions etc, then it’s not fulfilling its inherent potential. Light gives us an example of some alternative medical ethics that was of no use to the medical world. Human health clearly concerns different moral issues, so an ethic that was unable to apply itself to these issues would be of no use and a failure. The same goes for environmental ethics. Light then brings up Callicott and how he argues that environmental ethics is indeed fulfilling its potential. However, Light points out that most environmental ethicists merely debate amongst themselves over differences in issues regarding the morality of nature. With that Light names his viewpoint, “methodological environmental pragmatism” (319). 

Next Light lays out a definition of environmental ethics. He states that it is an applied ethic that looks at the moral grounds for protecting, preserving, or restoring the nonhuman environment. Additionally it improves the relationship between the natural world and humans. Light says environmental ethics, unlike other ethics, is not a form of “extensionism” but instead is based upon the idea that things outside human beings have intrinsic value in themselves. Light says many philosophers, like Hayward, agree upon the rejection of anthropocentrism for environmental ethics. However, some environmental ethicists argue that a “weaker” form of anthropocentrism is adequate. 

Thirdly, Light take a very interesting view on the role of the philosopher in environmental ethics. He claims that they’re responsible for making these changes. He equates the philosopher as the moral translator. He believes it would be morally permissible to twist certain ideas if it changes people minds about the environment and gets them to act. It’s about motivating the public. For instance if someone is anthropocentric it would be okay to use an argument that is anthropocentric in order to persuade them. Light believe in pluralism and rejects moneism. Pluralism will use many frameworks. Light argues that the world is so complex and has so much diversity that it would be impossible to come up with one framework that works all the time. He sees a toolbox of theories in which we can pick and choose which theory to us, like utilitarianism or deontology, as we see fit. Thus Light’s main idea is to use whichever theory necessary to persuade people globally to protect our environment. 

One problem I found with Light’s essay was when he stated that Regan, or Singer, or any other philosophers we’ve looked at thus far, are not doing an adequate job. He suggests we must jump right into action. However, I agree with Regan in that we must change our beliefs before we can change our habits. If we change our core, and our fundamental mindset, then it is much more likely to stay with us. If we only change our habits, then we may easily forget why we are acting the way we are acting. The habits will be much more easily forgotten. Additionally there are many downsides to pluralism. The first is that individuals may resort to what’s convenient for them and maybe not what is best for the environment or for others. Secondly there is know way of knowing which “tool” to use in the toolbox of theories. It would appear that we would need an ethic to use these ethics. Lastly if we use any means necessary to persuade people to change, like anthropocentrism, then in the future these arguments could be detrimental. 

Word count: 625

Light, Andrew (forthcoming). 39 Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #13: Two Factor Egalitarianism Further Explored

Kelsey Coppinger

October 15, 2018

Class #13: Two Factor Egalitarianism Further Explored

Donald VanDeVeer begins his his essay Interspecific Justice by reviewing parts of Peter Singer’s essay. He believes that Singer perhaps went too far when he suggests there is “conflict of interest” when a rat bites a slum child. He reviews how Singer argued for the theory of sentience, meaning moral agents have a duty to organisms who can feel pain and suffering. VanDeVeer points out that this would mean we can kill animals if it’s painless, and it’s unclear what “equal consideration” of the interests of all sentient animals mean. He explains that he will use Regan and Singer’s views, but construct them in his own way leading to the “interspecific justice” view. VanDeVeer then makes five points. In the first section “Interests and Conflicts of Interests” he says that it is in a beings best interest not to suffer; however there are exceptions. Additionally this doesn’t mean that it’s in a beings best interest not to die since one can die painlessly. Lets just assume “interest not to suffer” includes interest not to die. Then, VanDeVeer argues that the problem is how to weigh this interests and how to deal with conflict of interests between humans and animals. 

Next VanDeVeer looks at speciesism. He goes over five different types of speciesism. The first is radical speciesism which states that it is morally permissible to treat animals in any fashion one chooses. So, one could morally eat animals, hunt animals, or animals for fashion. The second is extreme speciesism which says that when there is conflict of interest between humans and animals it is morally permissible to act so that even a basic interest of an animal is subordinated in order to promote any kind of interest of a human. In this case animals do have interests, but a human can still use animal fur for fashion. The third is interest sensitive speciesism which is when in a time of conflict of interest it is morally permissible to act so that any interest of an animal is subordinated to promote a like interest of a human, but a basic interest of an animal may not be subordinated to promote a peripheral interest of a human. In this case it would be morally permissible to eat an animal if we needed it to survive, but it would not be okay to use an animal for leather or fur. The fourth speciesism is two factor egalitarianism and has three components. It essentially says that since animals “lack significant psychological capacities” that humans have we can 1) sacrifice them if it benefits our like interests, 2) sacrifice their basic interest if it benefits a serious interest, and 3) sacrifice their peripheral interest if it benefits our basic interests. Lastly VanDerVeer introduces Species Egalitarianism which states that when there is a conflict of interest it is morally permissible to subordinate the more peripheral interest to the more basic interest. Every one of these cases of speciesism is tested against two assumptions. If they fail either assumption then they’re not an adequate ethic. The first is animals have an interest in not suffering. The second is intuition is reason enough. Lastly, VanDerVeer goes on to explore two factor egalitarianism as the ultimate ethic to accept. 

I thought it was interesting to read about different types of interests. I’ve been thinking a lot about speciesism and what it means to be a speciesist and this essay cleared things up for me a little bit. It was hard for me to say, because i rationally and instinctively knew it was wrong, that dogs and humans lives have the same value. Yet, i also knew in my heart that I don’t believe the human species is somehow superior to all other species. Brining in basic and peripheral interests helped sort this out in my brain. However, I don’t think Two Factor Egalitarianism is the most adequate ethic. For one it is almost impossible to measure “psychological capacities.” Do we measure this in intelligence, rational? How do measure the intelligence of certain species? Further I have to wonder what would happen to babies if we accepted this ethic. Babies clearly don’t have rational nor are they intellectually developed. So, their “psychological capacities” are low. Not only is there no way of testing which organism has more psychological capacities, but if the pig was shown (since they are very smart) to be more intelligent than an infant then would the pigs life take priority over the childs?! In some cases when a pig is tested against 18 month children, the pig actually appears smarter (Who’s smarter)! The same argument could be applied to intellectually disabled adults. If we test this against the second assumption then we would have a gut feeling that this would be wrong and would have reason to reject Two Factor Egalitarianism. Lastly I propose we put a pig and a dog on a boat. One has to be pushed off the boat for the other to survive. Pigs are actually smarter than dogs, and thus arguably have higher “psychological capacities” (Pigs). Yet I bet 75% of people would say that they would push the pig off. Their “gut feeling” is telling them the dog should live. Shouldn’t this and the point made before then mean that this version of speciesism cannot be an adequate ethic?

Word count 866

“Pigs Are Intelligent and Sensitive, So Why Are You Eating Them?!” Mercy For Animals, 14 Jan. 2016, mercyforanimals.org/pigs-are-intelligent-and-sensitive-so-why.

VanDeVeer, Donald (1979). Interspecific justice. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):55 – 79.

“Who's Smarter - Pigs or Kids? (VIDEO).” One Green Planet, 25 Feb. 2014, www.onegreenplanet.org/news/whos-smarter-pigs-or-kids-video/.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #12: Animals are not Chairs

Kelsey Coppinger October 11th, 2018

Class #12: Animals are not Chairs

Calicott begins his essay Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair by explaining what animal liberationists believe in. He says that they believe animal equality and an end to speciesism is the next step, since women's rights and minority rights have already been won. Calicott points out that Leopold, however; wants to include the entire biotic community in this next big liberation movement. Calicott claims that this seems a little absurd. Calicott recognizes that Leopold not only supports sport hunting, but in some cases encourages it. Calicott states that in fact the Leopold land ethic and the environmental ethic of animal liberation are actually very different ethics. He instead believes in something called the Triangular affair. This idea views ethics as three points of a triangle: human ethic, and ethics and animal ethic.

Calicott goes on to introduce ethical humanism in which many “lower animals” are treated as a mere things, or not an end in themselves. He explains that this is pure speciesism. Calicott presents the same argument that we’ve explored before, which is the argument that sentience is the reason to include animals within our moral sphere.  He says that humane moralists see a clear cut off point for which an organism should or should not have moral rights. He starts to introduce the components of humane moralism. He says the first component is Benthamic- good is equivalent to pleasure and evil to pain. Next, he explores the big difference between the land ethic and animal movements. Which he sees to be that in some cases Leopold would argue it is a moral obligation to kill a species of animal if it benefits the biotic community as a whole. Additionally animal liberationists are concerned about domestic animals, while Leopold is concerned with wild animals. This means that the land ethic is holistic while animal liberation movement is not. Calicott also explains that the land ethic is in-egalitarian, meaning that different individuals get different values based on their contribution to the whole. Calicott’s remainder of the essay involves his defense of the land ethic.

There were a lot of issues with Calicott’s arguments. I did appreciate him noting that the land ethic and the animal liberation movement are two separate ethics. However, he made some statements and claims about domestic animals that were glaringly wrong. He states that domestic animals are different from wild animals. This distinction comes from the fact that they are “creations of man” (pp. 30). Thus they were bred to “docility, tractability, stupidity, and dependency” (pp.30). He suggests that they’re artifacts and compares them to mere chairs and tables. Additionally he claims if they were released like animal liberationists want, there would be a devastating effect on our ecosystem and they would die anyways. He furthered his senseless argument by claiming domestic animal’s pain isn’t valid. Lastly he even went so far to say vegetarianism would result in an explosion of human population and claimed plant based diets are bad for the environment. 

Frankly, Callicott’s argument for the defense of the land ethic infuriated me. I cannot even remotely see the validation of equating a living, breathing, animal to a chair. That statement alone should set off red-flags for every person that reads this essay. Just looking at one video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CL5htSOieRI) of cows jumping for joy after being released from a slaughterhouse is proof that they’re not even close to being chairs. They feel pain, joy, love, happiness. A mother and her calf have a very close bond. So, a mother cow whose baby is ripped away from her feels pain just like a human mother would (Cows). Moving forward with Calicott’s claim that veganism or vegetarianism is bad for the environment is insane. There have been so many studies that prove veganism is good for the environment and it’s even widely accepted across the world. Just for reference one can go to cowspiracy.com or watch the documentary. Some facts include: 1)  Animal agriculture is responsible for 18 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, more than the combined exhaust from all transportation. 2) 2,500 gallons of water are needed to produce one pound of beef. 3) Animal agriculture is the leading cause of species extinction, ocean dead zones, water pollution, and habitat destruction (Facts) These are just a few of the facts about animal agriculture that prove Callicott is wrong. Lastly Calicott battled with a hypothetical that would never happen in real life. There is no way that tomorrow some bill will be passed that will liberate all animals. The most likely things that will happen, and is already happening, is a gradual decline in the meat and dairy industry that will slowly put them out of business. In all, Callicotts argument was riddled with flaws and thus should not be accepted as a valid argument.

Word count: 806

Callicott, J. Baird. “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair.” In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, State University of New York Press, 1989.

“Cows for Dairy.” Cows for Dairy – Woodstock Sanctuary, woodstocksanctuary.org/learn/animals-used-for-food/cows-for-dairy/.

“Facts and Sources.” COWSPIRACY, www.cowspiracy.com/facts/.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #11: Is the Rights View the Right View?

Kelsey Coppinger October 3 , 2018

Class #11: Is The Rights View the Right View?

Regan begins The Case for Animal Rights by lining out three goals he has for the animal rights movement. The first is to get rid of animal testing in labs, the second to get rid of animal agriculture, and the third to get rid of commercial and sport hunting and trapping. He explains that “you don’t change unjust institutions by cleaning them up” (pp.143) For example a veal calf kept in a cage is just as unjust as a veal calf kept in a pasture before it’s killed. Regan also gives the example of cosmetic testing vs. medical research. He states that it’s not the pain, suffering or deprivation that makes these acts wrong and instead the fundamental wrong is in the whole system itself. This system is one that allows us to view animals as our resource. Regan then notes that we need a change in our beliefs in order to change our habits and this change will be very complicated, exhausting, and call in the efforts of many many different types of people.

Next Regan starts to identify and then refute different philosophies that would deny rights to animals. He begins with Indirect duty views. These views say that we have no duties directly to animals only duties regarding them. He gives an example of his neighbor kicking his dog. When his neighbor kicks his dog- clearly his neighbor has done something wrong. This view would say his neighbor has done something wrong to him for it’s wrong to upset him, and it’s wrong to damage his property, but his neighbor has done nothing wrong to his dog. This wrong is the equivalent to his neighbor smashing his windshield. Regan asks how can one justify this view? Well, he says the two ways these view could be justifiable would be 1) the dog doesnt feel pain or 2) only human pain matters. Regan answers this by saying firstly well, clearly dogs feel pain, and secondly pain is pain no matter what; if it’s morally wrong to inflict pain on humans then we cannot rationally ignore my dogs pain (pp. 144).   

Then Regan identifies a view called Contractarianism. Contractarianism says that morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by. This covers those who understand and accepts the terms and also whoever these people love or care about. So, young children, our dog, our cats, would all be covered. So, we have duties regarding these things but no direct duties to them. I can’t hurt your dog because you care about them. In other words the pain and suffering that an animal feels who isn’t cared about isn’t wrong and doesn’t matter (like farm animals or lab rats). So what is wrong with this view? Regan says that these rules are made by groups of people who have enough of them to enforce power.  This is good for people who are asked to sign but not good for people who aren’t. In other words it’s good for majority groups but not good for minority groups. He explains that this will lead to social, economic, moral and political injustice. Regan asserts that since this view isn’t even an adequate theory for humans, we cannot possibly ascribe it to animals (pp. 144-145). 

Furthermore, Regan does recognize that this is an extreme version of contractarianism. He introduces John Rawls who gives us a more subtle version of contractarianism. This version says we should ignore the accidental features of being human. So, whether one is black, white, or male or female. However this theory fails to recognize our direct duty we have to children and intellectually disabled adults. It’s so clearly wrong to kill a child even if say that child was orphaned. Again if this isn’t an adequate theory for humans it cannot be for animals. So all in all any indirect duty views cannot be justified.

Regan moves forward to introduce the cruelty kindness view which says that we have “a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them” (pp. 145) Once again Regan says this is an inadequate theory. He gives an example of a generous racist. Then also says, “Absence of cruelty does not assure that they avoid doing what is wrong” in which he gives an example of people who have abortions. Next, Regan brings up utilitarianism which has the principle of utility. This states an act is the right act if it brings about the most amount of happiness or pleasure to people and wrong if it produces more pain than pleasure to more people. The great attraction of utilitarianism is egalitarianism: all people’s interests hold the same weight. Regan says this is wrong because the value is in the pleasure of people not the individual themselves. For example if theres a cup with sweet liquid and bitter liquid- what has value is what is inside not the cup itself. In this case we’re the cup and pleasure and pain are the liquids. What he’s trying to say is that this view means we have no inherent value. He gives a lengthy example of his Aunt Bea in which killing her would give the most amount of happiness to the most amount of people, and yet if people found out about the act of killing her they would probably say that it was morally wrong of him to kill his aunt. Regan concludes, “A good end does not justify an evil means” (pp. 147). 

Regan then begins to lay out his own framework for what he believes is rationally the most satisfactory moral theory. He calls it the rights view. He begins by explaining we all have something called inherent value which means value within ourselves. We aren’t just mere containers like the cup example. We also all have it equally- it doesn’t matter your sex, race, religion, etc. For any being to fail to show respect for another beings value is to act immorally. More importantly since we all hold equal inherent value this view in principle denies moral tolerability of racial, sexual, or social discrimination and denies a good end justifying an evil means. In other words it would be wrong for me to kill my aunt bea since she herself holds value. 

Okay so we have this view which seems to make sense but can we apply this to animals? Regan seems to think so. He says eah animals can't make baba ganoush or build a bookcase or do a complex math problem, but can you? If you can’t that doesn’t mean you should have less inherent value than those who can. Regan states it’s the similarities not differences that matter the most, and the basic similarity is: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life. Our usefulness to others doesn’t matter. We all have our own interests, we all feel things. All our dimensions of life like pain pleasure all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived. The same goes for all animals. They too are experiencing subjects of a life. (pp. 148). He goes onto refute any claims made against his rights view including animals having no inherent value, and less inherent value. 

I loved this essay and agreed with a lot more in it than I did with Peter Singer’s essay. Singer’s theories I find fascinating and though I do believe that we, as humans, have a very specie-istic view of the world, I think Singer’s suggestions were a little radical and didn’t give a clear view on moral significance. Anyways, one problem I found in Regan’s essay was when his argument for referring to animals as having no inherent value was “this is blatant speciesism.” After reading so much about Singer’s problem with speciesism, it doesn’t appear that this is an argument that can be justified. What does Regan see is wrong with speciesism? Clearly a human life has more value than a frogs life, or even in most cases a dog's life. So, what is Reagan's thoughts on speciesism and where does he draw the line in valuing animals over humans or vice versa. 

Additionally, looking at what is going on in the world today with the massive amount of animals killed per year for meat, I believe it’s incredibly important to adopt Regan’s view that animals aren’t our resources. Over 56 billion farmed animals are killed each year by humans (Food). An animal wants to live. They have interests just like humans. We can see that clearly in this video https://www.kinderworld.org/videos/meat-industry/what-animals-feel-before-slaughter/ where a cow desperately trys to avoid being slaughtered and is so clearly afraid to die. Not to mention the environmental impact that ending animal agriculture would do. While Regan doesn’t look at the environmental side I think that it’s important to see that if we change our beliefs on animal rights then our habits will begin to change and thus positively impact our environment. We can look at Cowspiracy for the facts on the animal agriculture’ role in the environment. http://www.cowspiracy.com/facts/

Word count: 1512

“Food.” Animal Equality, 26 Apr. 2016, www.animalequality.net/food.

Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press, 2010.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #10: End Speciesism!

Kelsey Coppinger October 1, 2018

Class #10: End speciesism!

Peter Singer begins his argument in All Animals are Equal by explaining that historically the human race has continuously had a problem with being prejudice. He explains that in addition to the Black Liberation movement and the Women’s right movement we must now create a movement to end speciesism. He explains that just like the Women’s movement did at the time, this may seem absurd at first. Clearly though, women and men are much more similar than women and dogs. So how can we extend our moral sphere to animals that are different than us in obvious ways, like rationality? Well, Singer says, “the basic principle of equality … is equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights” (pg. 27). In other words just like it’s pointless to talk about a man's right to abortion, it’s also pointless to talk about a pigs right to vote. 

Singer next asserts that when we refer to equality we do not mean “actual equality” since it’s a matter of fact that everyone differs (size, shape, intellect). Additionally he says we can’t base our opposition to racism and sexism on factual equality since the claim to equality is not dependent on intelligence, physical strength etc. He proves that any factual differences among two humans give no grounds to give them different moral consideration. Singer concludes that if the difference in “intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends” then we can’t use it to justify using animals for our own ends. 

Singer then explains that equality for consideration is based on sentience. He states that if a living organism has the capacity to suffer then that alone gives it the right to equal moral consideration. He also talks about speciesism, which is when a human gives more moral consideration to other humans simply because they belong to the same species. A speciesist will eat pigs or other animals in order to pleasure their tastes. In this case they are prioritizing their own trivial interests over the basic interests of another species. Additionally this speciesism is seen in laboratories with animal testing. Animal testing for medicine has been proven to have little value to humans since we are so drastically biologically and psychologically different. Singer says that if an experimenter isn’t prepared to experiment on an orphaned infant then to experiment on non humans is discrimination. Lastly Singer points out that it is morally wrong to experiment on an “imbecile”, yet it is somehow okay to do to a dog who just like the “imbecile” doesn’t hold the degree of intelligence as other humans. Singer says this is blatantly favoring members of our own species simply because they are members of our own species (pp. 37). 

I agree with Peter Singer that we do need a new liberation movement for animals. However, this liberation movement should be to end the most blatant forms of speciesism. I’ve been a vegetarian since I was four years old on my own terms, and vegan for the past three and a half years. Once I found out what meat was I immediately stopped eating it. However while I don’t believe in eating meat, like Singer, or testing on animals, I also was bothered by some of the ideas in his essay. Singer would believe that the value of a dogs life and the value of a humans life hold the same weight. This seems a little preposterous. Killing a human over a dog goes against my gut intuition and I think a lot of people would agree with me. I propose instead ending the most obvious forms of speciesism like eating animals for taste and using animals in laboratories. Additionally I can’t help but wonder if Singer lived by his rules. Did he really never kill a mosquito, or would he really take the interests of another person over the interests of, say for instance, a pigeon? Lastly the idea of sentience being the reason to consider animals then if we can kill them without pain would this be morally okay?

Word count: 681

Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal.” Philosophic Exchange , 5th ed., vol. 1, pp. 25–37.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #9: Just Being Alive

Kelsey Coppinger September 26, 2018

Class #9: Just Being Alive

Kenneth Goodpaster begins On Being Morally Considerable by asking several questions about what the requirements are for being inside the moral sphere. This could also be asked as: who or what gets moral consideration? Goodpaster argues that neither does being a rational being nor does having sentient meet the criteria alone for being worthy of moral consideration. He believes that the only criteria should be being alive. He goes onto make four distinctions he deems necessary for his argument. The first distinction is that the notion of moral rights is different than that of moral considerability. The second distinction is between that of moral considerability and moral significance. Goodpaster explains that just because something may have moral considerability does not mean that all things have equal moral considerability, and additionally the two things must be kept completely separate. He claims “The question of whether a tree has moral consideration must be kept separate form the question of whether a tree has more or less consideration than a dog” (moral significance) (pg. 311). The third distinction Goodpaster makes is that of the difference between questions of intelligibility and questions of normative substance. Lastly the fourth distinction is “there is another respect in which the present inquiry involves framework questions rather than questions of application”(pg 313). 

Goodpaster’s strategy in the paper is to look into what other philosophers have proposed the criteria for moral consideration to be and evaluate where these have worked or not. He begins by introducing a philosopher named G. J. Warnock. Warnock argued against Kant who stated that being a rational being, or a potential rational being, is what makes one worthy of moral consideration. Warnock argued that clearly if someone with a mental disability (potential rational being) is deemed incurable, by no means would this kick them out of the moral sphere. Warnock concludes that moral consideration is grounded in the capacity to suffer. Both W.K. Frankena, and Peter Singer support Warnock’s claim. On the other hand, Goodpaster disagrees and counter argues that “there is something to take into account, something that is not merely potential sentience” (pg. 316). 

Next, Goodpaster introduces Joel Feinberg who argues for something called the “interest principle” (pg 318). Feinberg concludes that only beings who have (or can have) interests deserve moral consideration. While Feinberg does recognize that plants are capable of having conditions that are either “good” or “bad” for them, he does not want to include them in the moral sphere. He rejects that have interests. Goodpaster once again counters this claim. He concludes that plants do have interests and thus the “interest principle” must either grow into a “life principle” or it “requires an arbitrary stipulation of psychological capacities” (pg 320). All in all Goodpaster concludes that sentience and narrowly conceived interests are not supported as a condition for moral considerability since they neglect non sentient living beings. 

Goodpaster’s distinction between moral significance and moral consideration is one of the more important parts of his essay. Often times we get these mixed up, and think that just because someone may believe that a tree is included in our moral sphere it must mean they believe that the value of the tree’s life is the same as a humans. This was important for me specifically to hear because whenever I hear ethics that include the bio community I tend to picture an extreme environmentalist's point of view. I could never imagine a plant having the same moral consideration as a dog or horse. This distinction helped me realize that adopting a land ethic doesn’t mean I must believe in equal moral significance for all. However, while I do understand that Goodpaster didn’t want to jump into moral significance, I think it would be interesting to hear what his view is on rules to follow for who gets moral priority. So, moral significance is something I would like to hear more about and possibly hear about rules and conducts to follow when there are conflicting interests. 

Word count: 664

Goodpaster, Kenneth. “On Being Morally Considerable.” The Journal of Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Inc., pp. 308–325.

[kelseycoppinger]

Class #8: Respect for Nature or Respect for all living things?

Kelsey Coppinger September 24, 2018

Class #8: Respect for nature or Respect for all living things?

At the start of The Ethics of Respect for Nature, by Paul W. Taylor is an outline for the rest of his essay. Taylor declares that we should adopt a “respect for nature” (RFN). He describes this as an ultimate moral attitude towards nature. He then explains that a human centered theory towards environmental ethics understands responsibilities with regard to biotic communities. However, these responsibilities are based on whether or not they benefit ourselves (humans). On the other hand a life centered theory states that we have a “prima facie moral obligation” towards plants and animals because they have inherent value. In other words their well being is an end in itself (pg. 198).

Taylor next explains that there are two main concepts that must be adopted in order to take on the life-centered theory of ethics. The first is that “every organism, species population, and community of life has a good of its own which moral agents can intentionally further or damage by their actions” (pg 199).The second concept is an elaboration on inherent worth. Inherent worth is made up of two principles. The first is the principle of intrinsic value. He states that if we regard biotic communities as entities with intrinsic value then we can think of our responsibilities towards them as “owed to them as their due” (pg 201). In other words the duties we owe are grounded in intrinsic value. The second principle is the principle of moral consideration. Together the two main concepts of the good of a living thing and inherent worth makeup RFN. 

Lastly Taylor explains the belief system of a biocentric outlook on nature, which he feels is essential to justify the attitude of respect for nature. The first component is that we as people are members of the biotic community. We know this because if we were to be taken away from the Earth, not only would the Earth continue to exist, but it would also prosper. The second component is the Earth’s natural ecosystem is a convoluted web in which everything is dependent on each other. The third component states that we must understand every element of the biotic community as teleological centers of life. Lastly Taylor’s fourth component of the biocentric outlook and that is the denial of human superiority. 

Taylor’s third component of the biocentric outlook left me with some questions. He explained that we must look at all parts of the ecosystem as teleological centers of life, and gave the example of seeing the perspective of a plant. It made me wonder if we view plants as wanting to live and promoting their own well being, would it then be wrong to pick them and then eat them? Clearly if we cannot eat plants nor animals then we wouldn’t survive for very long. Another point that Taylor made about the plants and animals having intrinsic value made me wonder about non-living organisms. Obviously it’s a tragedy and detrimental to our Earth if glaciers melt or national wild parks disappear. Not all “beautiful” parts of nature are living. It appears that Taylor's “respect for nature” is in fact just a respect for living organisms. So how we could extend Taylor’s argument to protect ALL of the biotic community? Well, for every non-living member of the biotic community, it could be argued that if they were to disappear it would hurt a living member of the community (which holds intrinsic value) so, therefore non-living members are valuable only because they are valuable to living members. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, nor is it wrong. In fact I think this respect for all living things is one of the best ethics we could have for nature. There will never be a real world situation in which destroying a river, or lake, or glacier, doesn’t hurt a single living organism. Thus, nature is indeed protected by the RFN. 

Word count: 650

Taylor, Paul W. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Respect for Nature, Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 197–218.