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Sagrada Orden v. NACOCO

G.R. No. L-3756, June 30, 1952

FACTS

Sagrada owned owned land and warehouses which were forcibly taken during the Japanese occupation, and was taken over by Alien Property Custodian (APC) of the USA after the war in 1946.

APC entered into a custodianship agreement with the Copra Export Management Company.

When Copra Management vacated the property, NACOCO occupied it.

Sagrada filed an action to recover the property, but before the court could hear the case, the parties entered into an agreement giving back the property to the plaintiff.

The CFI approved said agreement but ordered NACOCO to pay the rent from 1946.

NACOCO argues that it should not be liable to pay the rent from the period when APC took control of the property up to when NACOCO first took possession of the property.

ISSUE

W/N NACOCO is liable to pay rent from the period when ACP took control up to when NACOCO first took possession over the property.

RULING

First, in order for there to have liability, there must be an obligation. Obligation must arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-Contracts; (4) Delicts; (5) Quasi-delicts. The enumeration is exclusive.

The liability for rental payment does not stem from any of those 5 sources of obligations.

There was no offense because NACOCO entered the premises with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the APC.

From 1946 up to the date of the judgment, the APC had the absolute control of the property, with the power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner.

Additionally, there was no agreement between APC and NACOCO fro NACOCO to pay rentals.

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ARTICLE 1156

Law;

Contracts;

Quasi-contracts;

Acts or omissions punished by law; and

Quasi-delicts.

Generally, obligations emanate in one hand, FROM LAW, and on the other hand, FROM PRIVATE ACTS such as:

Contracts

Quasi-contracts

Delicts

Quasi-delicts

Private acts are produced by

Bilateral acts (contracts)

Unilateral acts

Unilateral acts arises from

lawful acts such as QUASI-CONTRACT; or

unlawful acts such as DELICTS and QUASI-DELICTS

LAW

Obligations arising from LAW (Ex Lege)

These obligations are NOT to be PRESUMED Because they constitute a limitation upon individual freedom, imposing duties which the obligor cannot avoid.

ONLY those expressly determined in the NCC of the Phils. Or in special laws are DEMANDABLE.

EXAMPLES of obligations arising from law

the obligation to pay taxes in accordance with tax statutes.

And in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code, the obligation of the spouses to support each other

2. CONTRACTS

Obligations arising from Contracts

This obligation have the force of law between contracting parties and should be complied with in GOOD FAITH

EXAMPLE

Contract to a sale of a car

one party is obligated to transfer the ownership of the automobile, while the other is obligated to pay for it.

3. QUASI-CONTRACTS

Obligations arising from quasi contracts Created out by order by the court

Quasi-contract is a juridical relation arising from certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts with the objective of preventing unjust enrichment or benefit at the expense of another.

Its basis is law, thus it is not predicated on consent, being unilateral act. FORMS OF QUASI-CONTRACTS

NEGOTIORUM GESTIO - it is when a person takes charge of the agency or management of another's abandoned or neglected business or property without the owner's consent

SOLUTIO INDEBITI - it is when something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered thru mistake.

EXAMPLE

A person orders some perishable items online by providing his address and paying for the same. At the time of the delivery of the goods, the deliveryman delivers them to the wrong address. Instead of denying the delivery, the receiving party accepts the goods and consumes the same. The case went to the court, and the court ordered to issue a quasi-contract, according to which the recipient has to pay back the cost of the item to the party who paid for the item initially. Since the receiving party enjoyed the benefits of the goods they are bound to compensate the former party.

4. DELICTS

Obligations arising from acts or omissions punished by law

In a broad term, obligations arise from a wrongful act which causes damage to someone's personality, his family, or his property, and for which the victim or his heirs is entitled to compensation.

EXAMPLE

Under the Revised Penal Code

Murder and theft are prohibited

If you commit any of them

You will have the obligation to pay damages and fined

Or be put in jail

5. QUASI-DELICTS

Obligations arising from quasi-delicts

when there is damage suffered by the plaintiff

There is fault or negligence on the part of the defendant

Only affects private concerns

It merely repairs damage by means of indemnification

It includes all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes

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CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES 

G.R. No. 28771, March 31, 1971

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 87

Except for modest presents that the spouses may offer one another on the occasion of any family celebration, any donation or grant of gratuitous advantage made by the couple while they are married is void. The prohibition shall also apply to couples who cohabit as husband and wife but are not legally wed.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Felix Matabuena gave a house to Petronila Cervantes, his common-law spouse, in 1956. Felix and Petronila were wed in March 1962. After five months, Felix passed away intestate, leaving behind his sister Cornelia and Petronila. The property that was donated to Petronila was afterwards sought after by Cornelia, the deceased's sole sister and the closest collateral relative, on the grounds that "any donation between the spouses during the marriage must be void" as stated in Art. 133 of the Civil Code.

The donation was made when Felix and Petronila were not yet married and were merely cohabiting, thus the trial court determined that the case was not covered by the restriction.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during the marriage applies to common-law relationships?

RULING: 

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.

However, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila does not necessarily mean that the Cornelia will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Petronila were legitimated by marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

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FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN vs. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO

A.C. No. 2115, November 27, 1990

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 172

The birth record listed in the civil register or a ruling; or a declaration of legal filiation in a written document, either public or private, that is signed by the parent in question, can prove a child’s legitimate filiation.

Having the status of a legal child openly and consistently; or any other method permitted by the court's rules and particular regulations, may support the legal filiation in the absence of the above-mentioned proof.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Sometime in 1971, the complainant was sexually assaulted by the respondent. As a result, she begot a son, for a time the respondent supported the said child but eventually lost interest and stopped. Aside from the fact that the complainant was a married woman with eight children, and also a directress of a school at the time of the assault, made her desist from filing a charge against the respondent.

Respondent admitted having acted as a lawyer for the school and for the family of the complainant but denied sexually assaulting the complainant. He argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to get even with him after having been humiliated when he declined her request to commit a "breach of trust."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent should be disbarred for immoral conduct.

RULING:

No. The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971. Yet, no criminal charge was filed, and it was only about eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative complaint was presented before this Court. Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the Respondent as if nothing had happened. The was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.

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UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al

G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994

FACTS:

Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the 36 years common-law wife of the late Menilo B. Uy, Sr. for which they had four children. On October 1990, soon after the death of Menilo, Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy initiated proceedings for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Menilo. Represented by their children, Natividad moved to hold the proceedings and filed Partition of Properties Under Co-ownership to the Estate of Menilo. A Compromise Agreement was then submitted which was approved and a writ of execution was issued. Tshiate claimed that she is the surviving spouse of Menilo by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she then filed a motion contending that said compromise agreement was a patent nullity and prayed that she and her son be allowed to intervene which the court allowed her and setting aside the compromise judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not property of co-ownership can be claimed by the allege surviving spouse

RULING: The decision Court of Appeals was SET ASIDE REINSTATING the order of the trial court. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between Natividad and Menilo, the property evidently acquired during the period of their common-law relationship. The Family code is in effect on this case since Menilo died after its effectivity. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

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VIRGINIA A. LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 57, and MAURICIO D. LEONOR, JR.

G.R. No. 112597 April 2, 1996

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 412

Without a court order, no entry in a civil register may be amended or rectified.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favor of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void

RULING: Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all”.

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ANGELITA JONES. vs. FELIX HORTIGUELA

G.R. No. L-43701, March 6, 1937

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 384

The absentee's absence may be declared when two years have expired without any news about him or since the receipt of the last news, and five years when the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing. On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of her mother and that her mother’s marriage to Felix was null and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking effect of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-year prescriptive period. With this, the marriage would be null and void and would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void.

Whether or not Felix is a legitimate heir of Marciana.

RULING:

Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. The validity of the marriage makes him a legitimate heir.

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PASCUAL ROMANO and JUANA LLEANZA DE ROMANO vs. CRISOSTOMO PARINAS and CARIDAD DONATO DE PARINAS

G.R. No. L-10129, April 22, 1957

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 221

Subject to the necessary legal defenses allowed by law, parents and other people exercising parental control are civilly liable for the harms and damages brought on by the actions or inactions of their illegitimate children residing in their presence and under their parental authority.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Spouses Romano filed an action for damages in the amount of P10, 000 against Spouses Pariñas, the latter being the parents of Antonio who is a minor. It was alleged that Spouses Pariñas allowed Antonio to drive a motor vehicle having a passenger one Editha Romano, and because of his lack of foresight and experience, the vehicle overturned resulting in the death of Editha.

Defendants, in their answer, set up the defense that they never permitted their son to drive any motor vehicle, if on the occasion alleged in the complaint he drove a jeep, it was upon the persistent plea of Editha Romano. They alleged that the accident, if it happened, was due to her fault and negligence.

After filing their answer, defendant also filed a motion asking that Caridad Donato, wife of defendant Crisostomo Pariñas, be dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of parties-defendants, contending that under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code, the father is primarily responsible for the damages caused by the minor children, except only in case of his death or incapacity when the mother also becomes answerable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not dropping Caridad, mother of Antonio, from the case pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code was proper.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It ratiocinated as follows:

The legal provisions on which the action of plaintiffs is predicated are Articles 2176 and 2180 of the new Civil Code. xxx

It appears clear from the above that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, and this obligation is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

And one of the acts mentioned therein is "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother", answers for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.

It is therefore clear that the responsibility of the father and mother is not simultaneous, but alternate, the father being primarily responsible, and the mother answering only "In case of his death or incapacity."

Since in the instant case the father and mother is both living and capable, as can be gleaned from the allegations of the complaint, it follows that it is improper to join the mother as party-defendant. It is true that there is sufficient averment in the complaint that both the father and the mother have allowed their son to drive a motor vehicle without proper license or permit thereby imputing acts of negligence to both of them. But from this it cannot be inferred that there is a cause for action against the mother, for under the law her liability can of death or incapacity of her husband. The lower court therefore acted properly in dropping her from the complaint.

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JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 213

Parental responsibility will be exerted by the parent the court names in the event of a separation. Unless the chosen parent is unfit, the court must take into account all pertinent factors, notably the child's preference if they are older than seven.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.

RULING:

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

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ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL. vs. ESTHER PERALTA

G.R. No. 13114, August 29, 1961

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 194

Support includes everything required for a family's nourishment, housing, clothes, medical care, education, and transportation, within the limits of their financial means.

The education of the individual eligible for financial assistance mentioned in the sentence before shall include any post-maturity schooling or training for a trade, profession, or occupation. Transportation costs should include those for getting to and from job or school.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Saturnino Silva, an American citizen and US Army officer, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia. While deployed in the Philippines, Saturnino married appellee Esther which was allegedly executed since no documents for the purpose of marriage were prepared. The said marriage produced a child. While in the US for medical treatment, Saturnino divorced therein Priscilla and contracted another marriage now with appellant Elenita Ledesma. Upon Saturnino’s return to the Philippines, Esther demanded support for the child and upon his refusal, instituted a suit. Thereupon, Elenita moved to enjoin Esther from representing herself as wife of Saturnino and prayed for the award of moral damages for the humiliation and distress she suffered upon learning his husband had a child. Esther filed a counterclaim for actual damages and fees due to the harassment and moral damages caused by Saturnino’s marital relation with Elenita and his subsequent refusal to acknowledge their offspring. The trial court found for Esther. Appellant spouses now prays for reconsideration of the decision alleging the award of the pecuniary damages is unwarranted by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellee Esther Peralta is entitled to damages because of Saturnino’s affair and abandonment.

RULING:

The damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of Silva’s deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife (when Silva knew all the time that he could not marry Esther Peralta because of his undissolved marriage to an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee). It is clear that Esther Peralta would not have consented to the liaison had there been no concealment of Silva’s previous marriage, or that the birth of the child was a direct result of this connection. That Esther had to support the child because Silva abandoned her before it was born is likewise patent upon the record, and we cannot see how said appellant can be excused from liability therefor. Silva’s seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his illegitimate child were likewise the direct cause for the filling of the support case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case could have been filed in Davao, we do not believe that this error in selecting a more favorable venue (due to her unfamiliarity with the technicalities of the law) should be allowed to neutralized the appellant Silva’s responsibility as the primary causative factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee.

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CAMELO CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 172

The birth record listed in the civil register or a ruling; or a declaration of legal filiation in a written document, either public or private, that is signed by the parent in question, can prove a child’s legitimate filiation.

Having the status of a legal child openly and consistently; or any other method permitted by the court's rules and particular regulations, may support the legal filiation in the absence of the above-mentioned proof.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as petitioner’s household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a month, petitioner’s wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner’s wife dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and claimed that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial, Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondent’s claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.

RULING:

No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.

More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child. With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

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ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 155

The family residence is shielded from execution, forced sale, or attachment, with the exception of:

(1) For failing to pay taxes;

(2) For loans taken out before the family home was established;

(3) For obligations protected by liens on the property before or following such constitution; and

(4) For debts owed to workers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen, and other parties who provided labor or materials for the building's construction.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is legal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise, a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified. The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.

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UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al

G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 148

Only the assets gained by both partners via their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry must be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions in cohabitation situations that do not fall under the previous Article. Their contributions and corresponding portions are assumed to be equal unless proven otherwise. Joint deposits of cash and credit documentation shall be subject to the same rule and presumption.

If one of the parties is legally wed to another person, that person's portion of the co-ownership will go to the absolute community or conjugal partnership that exists as a result of that legally binding union. If the party who acted in bad faith is not legally wed to another person, then their will be forfeited in the way specified in the last sentence of the article before this one.

Even if both parties act in bad faith, the aforementioned forfeiture provisions still hold true.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the 36 years common-law wife of the late Menilo B. Uy, Sr. for which they had four children. On October 1990, soon after the death of Menilo, Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy initiated proceedings for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Menilo. Represented by their children, Natividad moved to hold the proceedings and filed Partition of Properties Under Co-ownership to the Estate of Menilo. A Compromise Agreement was then submitted which was approved and a writ of execution was issued. Tshiate claimed that she is the surviving spouse of Menilo by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she then filed a motion contending that said compromise agreement was a patent nullity and prayed that she and her son be allowed to intervene which the court allowed her and setting aside the compromise judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not property of co-ownership can be claimed by the allege surviving spouse

RULING: The decision Court of Appeals was SET ASIDE REINSTATING the order of the trial court. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between Natividad and Menilo, the property evidently acquired during the period of their common-law relationship. The Family code is in effect on this case since Menilo died after its effectivity. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

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ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL. vs. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL.

G.R. No. 28771, March 31, 1971

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 109

Each spouse shall have the following as their sole and separate property:

(1) What the partner brings into the marriage as their own;

(2) Anything each spouse receives as a gift during the marriage;

(3) acquired by a right of redemption, a trade-in, or an exchange with assets belonging to just one spouse; and

(4) Anything bought only with the wife's or the husband's money.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage.  Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00.  The property in question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”.  The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children.  The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount.  A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

RULING:

All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal.  It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belongs exclusively to the husband and wife.  In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife.  At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income. Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALAN ALEGRO

G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 42

Unless there is a ruling nullifying the prior marriage or declaring it void ab initio, the subsequent marriage mentioned in the preceding Article shall be automatically ended by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse.

At the request of any interested party, a sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of the reappearance shall be entered in the civil registry of the parties' residence with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of the reappearance being adjudicated by a court if such fact is disputed.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For some time, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid

RULING: No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

[lostinlex]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO A. PANGASINAN

G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 36 

A marriage that was entered into by a party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically unable to fulfill the fundamental duties of marriage shall also be void, even if such incapacity does not become apparent until after the marriage has been solemnized.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Respondent Danilo Pangasinan (Danilo) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Josephine Pangasinan (Josephine) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) after thirty years of marriage on the grounds of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Danilo claims that Josephine had unfavorable characteristics from the beginning of their relationship, including being competitive, domineering, headstrong, and having an exaggerated sense of entitlement and self-importance. Additionally, Josephine and Danilo argue frequently over insignificant details and money issues. This assertion was corroborated by Dr. Natividad Dayan's (Dr. Dayan) Psychological Evaluation Report, which found that Josephine and Danilo were psychologically unable to carry out their fundamental marital duties.

The RTC declared the marriage of Danilo and Josephine void from the beginning, noting that the totality of evidence presented show that they failed to establish a functional family. The RTC also gave credence to the evaluation report of Dr. Dayan. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision upon review. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration of nullity of marriage of Danilo and Josephine based on their psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Danilo failed to establish the totality of evidence to establish psychological incapacity of the parties. As declared by the Court in Santos v. CA, psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Further, a person’s psychological incapacity to comply with his/her marital obligations must be rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the time of the marriage, although manifestation of which may only be evident after marriage. In the present case, the Court found that there is no reliable and independent evidence establishing Josephine’s psychological condition and its association in her early life. Aside from what Danilo relayed to Dr. Dayan, no other evidence supports his claims. Further, Dr. Dayan’s testimony is inadequate to establish the correlation between Josephine’s personality and her inability to comply with her marital obligations to Danilo. At most, it only establishes that their personalities are different and that their frequent arguments in handling finances and managing their business affairs are money-related. Thus, the Court held that Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.

[lostinlex]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

FAMILY CODE - ARTICLE 36 

A marriage that was entered into by a party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically unable to fulfill the fundamental duties of marriage shall also be void, even if such incapacity does not become apparent until after the marriage has been solemnized.

ARTICLE 48 

The Court should instruct the prosecuting attorney or fiscal appointed to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collaboration between the parties and to ensure that evidence is not manufactured or suppressed in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

No judgment shall be founded upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment in the cases mentioned in the sentence before.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

In 1985, Roridel and Reynaldo were wed in Manila. Reynaldo displayed immaturity and recklessness in the early years of their marriage, as seen by his propensity to spend time and money with his friends, his reliance on his parents for financial support, and his dishonesty in matters concerning money. Roridel took over as the family's only provider of income. Then, she left her position in Manila and traveled to Baguio. A week later, Reynaldo abandoned her and their child. In fact, the couple has been apart for more than three years.

Invoking Reynaldo's psychological incompetence, Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void under Article 36. She provided testimony from herself, two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist as evidence. Reynaldo merely showed up for the pre-trial and did not offer any evidence. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. Solicitor General appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeal and ruled in favor of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:  1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a) medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the complaint (c) sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it must be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; 4) it must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the marital obligations of marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of parents and their children; 7) interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic of Church of the Philippines, although not binding, should be given great respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.