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EMPERATRIZ LABAYO-ROWE, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-53417| December 8, 1988

ART 412

 Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (petitioner) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan."At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and Emperatriz J. Labayois her real name; that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating her civil status as "married" is not correct because she was never married to Vicente Miclat, the father of her child; that the date and place of marriage appearing in the said birth certificate as 1953-Bulan is not true as they were never married; that the questioned entries were reported by Vicente Miclat; and that she is at present married to an American by the name of William Rowe. Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order directing the local civil registrar to correct the entries. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga appearing for the Son. Gen. filed a notice of appeal questioning the propriety of the lower court's order to correct the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below as appearing in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat. In its Resolution, the appellate court ordered the certification and elevation of the case to this Court inasmuch as the appeal involves a pure question of law.

Issue: Whether or not correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of the surname as well as the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of her child may be made under a summary procedure thus making the order of the CFI proper?

Ruling: No. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "(n)o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without judicial order." It has been held that the corrections contemplated in Article 412 include only corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature. In Go vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Malabon, this Court ruled that the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said article should be those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing.

 If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of the mistake.

 However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.

 This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature which does not cover cases involving controversial issues. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. The Republic, however, is appealing the part of the questioned Order which directed the change of the petitioner’s status as well from "married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." In David vs. Republic, this Court held that where the petition for correction of entries in the civil registry, if granted, will have the effect of changing not only the civil status of the petitioner but as well as her child's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," the same cannot be granted except in an adversary proceeding. The matter should be threshed out in an appropriate action as the corrections involve substantial alterations, and not mere clerical errors. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the case before Us, aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973Constitutionwhich directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code

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Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

ART 391

Facts: On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, while Eduardo was 39. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.” The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.   In his defense, Eduardo insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus, his former wife from the first marriage, for more than 20 years.

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.   It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.

CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. The CA averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. It held that before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Rubylus’ presumptive death as the absent spouse. Eduardo now filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.

RULING: YES.RPC states that:  Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the RPC means that the requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

The burden of proof is upon the petitioner. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code and that could constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.

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Cruz v. CA, 346 Phil. 872

ART. 221

FACTS: Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. On March 22, Rowena Umali accompanied her mother to the hospital and spent the night there, for the operation was to be conducted on the following day. Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. On the day of the operation, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed. Because of this, Dr. Cruz called Lydia in her office. Consequently, Lydia informed Rowena that the operation must go on as scheduled.

While Lydia’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet ampules, and Rowena’s sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished. However, Dr. Cruz asked again the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for breath–apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other hospital.

In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.

Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali’s death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Manifestation of negligence:

1. untidiness of clinic

2. lack of provision of supplies

3. the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong in the way Dr. Cruz conducted operation

4. no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was conducted

ISSUE: WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

RULLING: NO. DR. CRUZ IS ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS STILL CIVILLY LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral damages, 50k exemplary damages).

Elements of reckless imprudence

1. Offender does / fails to do an act

2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary

3. Without malice

4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence

5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender’s employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time, place

Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff. Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused Lydia’s death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.

The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia’s death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’ allegation that the cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’ fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.

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Grande v. Antonio, 727 Phil. 448 2014

ART 213

FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE: Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation?

RULING: Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: "Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force."

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255.

An administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R No 170633, October 17, 2007 We held: After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

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People v. Manahan, 315 SCRA 476

ART 194

Facts: Teresita Tibigar, 16 y/o was a stay-in waitress at Espiritu Canteen. Teresita was raped by Manuel Manahan, brother-in-law of the owner, who was temporarily residing in the same canteen. Within the same month the raped occurred, Teresita returned to Pangasinan and thereafter became pregnant. When her parents discovered it and learned of her story, they brought her to the hospital where she was examined and proceeded to the police to give her statement.  With the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel of rape.  Teresita gave birth to Melanie Tibigar. Court found Manuel guilty and sentenced him to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim 50k as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion  Case went to SC on automatic review.

Issue: WON Court committed error in acknowledging Melanie as a child of Manuel and ordering him to support the offspring of his indiscretion.

Ruling: SC deleted that portion of the judgment.

“Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to “acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so,” and “in every case to support the offspring.” In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man.”

“As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero,”the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.””

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Tongoy v. CA G.R. No. L-45645; June 28, 1983

ART 177

Facts: This case is an action for reconveyance of the 2 parcels of land in Bacolod City. The 1st land is Hacienda Pulo which title was registered in the name of Luis D. Tongoy and the 2nd is Cuaycong property which title was transferred to Luis D. Tongoy. The properties were mortgaged in the year 1936 by said Luis D. Tongoy for a period of 15 years; that the mortgage obligations to the PNB were fully paid on April 17, 1956; that the release of mortgage was recorded in the Registry of Deeds on May 5, 1958; and that the case for reconveyance was filed in the trial court on June 2, 1966.

Issue:

1) W/N the rights of herein respondents over subject properties, which were the subjects of simulated or fictitious transactions, have already prescribed.

2) W/N the 10-year prescriptive period should not be counted from the date of registration in the name of the trustee.

Ruling: Evidently, the deeds of transfer executed in favor of Luis Tongoy were from the very beginning absolutely simulated or fictitious, since the same were made merely for the purpose of restructuring the mortgage over the subject properties and thus preventing the foreclosure by the PNB. As stated in Articles 1409 and 1410 of the New Civil Code, the within action for reconveyance instituted by the respondents which is anchored on the said simulated deeds of transfer cannot and should not be barred by prescription. There is no implied trust that was generated by the simulated transfers; because being fictitious or simulated, the transfers were null and void ab initio-from the very beginning and thus vested no rights whatsoever in favor of Luis Tongoy or his heirs. When the mortgages were constituted, respondents Cresenciano Tongoy and Norberto Tongoy were still minors, while respondent Amado Tongoy became of age on August 19, 1931, and Ricardo Tongoy attained majority age on August 12, 1935. Still, considering that such transfer of the properties in the name of Luis D. Tongoy was made in pursuance of the master plan to save them from foreclosure, the said respondents were precluded from doing anything to assert their rights. It was only upon failure of the herein petitioner, as administrator and/or successor-in- interest of Luis D. Tongoy, to return the properties that the prescriptive period should begin to run. The prescriptive period is ten year-from the date of recording on May 5, 1958 of the release of mortgage in the Registry of Deeds.

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Sy-Quia v. Sy-Quia, G.R. No. 62283, November 23, 1983

Article 172

FACTS: Plaintiffs (all Chinese citizens) claim that they are the heirs of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, being married to Yap Puan Niu in or about the year 1847 in Amoy, China; thereby, they are entitled to the inheritance left by Vicente. On the other hand, defendants (Filipinos) are as found by the lower courts, the legitimate heirs of Vicente as he was married to Petronila Encarnacion (a native of Vigan, IlocosSur) on June 9, 1853 as shown in their certificate of marriage. Plaintiffs allege that they are the rightful heirs and that the subsequent marriage of Vicente was void. Defendants maintained that the claim ofthe plaintiffs regarding the alleged first marriage of Vicente were fraudulent. The plaintiffs presented witnesses and got their respective depositions in China to prove that the first marriage took place. The lower courts found that there is no marriage to Yap contrary to the allegations of the plaintiffs. The decision is based on the improbability of the allegations of the plaintiffs that Vicente lived in China for around four years after such marriage. There being no valid marriage certificate presented and the testimonies of the witnesses presented contradict each other. In the plaintiffs' subsequent pleadings, they prayed that the decision be reversed and that the properties of Vicente be distributed to them according to the laws of China

ISSUE: Whether or not Chinese law will apply?

RULING: No. Vicente is a Filipino citizen. It is an admitted fact the Vicente was a native Chinaman and therefore a foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or 18940, when he was 12 years of age. He having resided in these Islands since then and until January 1894, when he died, that is to say for a period of more than 53 years, having obtained for the purpose the necessary license or permission, and having been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native woman in the city of Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the Province of Ilocos and later in this city of Manila, with the intention of residing here permanently, engaging in business generally and acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that by virtue of all these acts he acquired a residence and became definitely domiciled in these Islands with the same rights as any nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in force in these Islands while he lived here and until his death.

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Alejandra Arado Heir, etc. V. Anacleto Alarcon, et, al., G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015

Artcle 172

Facts: Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their union had no offspring. Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas’ marriage to Florencia.

Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died subsequently leaving the properties to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child has a right to inherit from his father.

RULING: No, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter’s last will and testament. Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. In Gallanosa v. Arcangel that in order that a will may take effect, “it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.”

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Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008

Article 159

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to sell it though public auction. Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.

Issue: Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

Ruling: No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. According to Article 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

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DBP v. Judge Adil, L-48889, May 11, 1988

Article 124

FACTS: On February 10, 1940, spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank of the Philippines, in the sum of P2,000, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the amount in ten equal yearly amortizations.

As the obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse if the ten-year period, Confesor, who was then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961, expressly acknowledging the said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.

The spouses still failed to pay the obligation on the specified date. As a result, the DBP filed a complaint on September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City. The city court ordered payment from spouses. The CFI of Iloilo reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a promissory which was executed in consideration of a previous promissory note which has already been barred by prescription is valid.

RULING: Yes, the second promissory note is valid because the said promissory note is not a mere acknowledgement of the debt that has prescribed already. Rather, it is a new promise to pay the debt. A new promise is a new cause of action. Although a debt barred by prescription is enforceable, a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable.

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Republic v Enriquez (166 SCRA 608)

ART. 102

FACTS: Commissioner of the Internal Revenue served a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property on the Maritime Company of the Philippines to satisfy various deficiency taxes of said company. The First Coast Guard District acknowledged receipt from the Commissioner of several barges , vehicles and 2 bodegas of spare parts belonging to taxpayer Maritime.

                Ramon Enriquez (Deputy Sheriff of Manila) levied on 2 barges of Maritime pursuant to a writ of execution issued in a Civil Case involving Maritime where the aforesaid company lost. Enriquez then scheduled a public auction sale including the aforementioned properties.

                The Commissioner wrote the sheriff informing him that the barges were no longer owned by Maritime as the said barges had been distrained and seized by the BIR in satisfaction of the deficiency taxes. This letter was filed on June 19, 1986 at the office of the sheriff.

                On June 23, 1986, the sheriff sold the 2 barges and issued certificates of sale to the highest bidder which was the levying creditor.

                On June 24, 1986, Commissioner filed a petition for prohibition praying that the respondent be ordered to desist and refrain from further proceedings in connection with the execution and that respondent’s notice of levy be null and void. The CA dismissed the petition holding that the sheriff did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BIR Warrant of Distraint prevails over the writ of execution issued by an RTC.

RULING: BIR Warrant of Distraint prevails. It is well settled that the claim of the government prevails on a tax lien superior to the claim of a private litigant predicated on a judgment. The tax lien attached not only from the service of warrant of distraint but from the time the tax became due and payable.

In the case, the Distraint was made by the Commissioner long before the writ of execution was issued by the RTC. There is no question that at the time of the writ of execution, the 2 barges were no longer properties of Maritime. The power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionable belonging to the judgment debtor. Execution sale affect the rights of the judgment debtor only, and the purchaser in an auction sale acquires only such right as the judgment debtor had at the time of sale.

There is no further need for petitioner to establish his rights over the 2 barges as evidence clearly proves that the barges are under distraint and in fact seized by the Commisssioner.

*Notice of Levy and Execution Sale annulled. Respondent is enjoined from further proceeding with the sale.

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Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. de Batocael G.R. No. 146683November 22, 2001

ART 87

FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.  Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco.  Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room.  On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.  However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.  She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco.  When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower.  The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.  Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden.  Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.  The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.  This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.  Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550.  The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

RULING: The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.   The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco.  Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

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Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 34 S.R.A. 499

Article 56 of Persons and family Relations

Facts: In Dennis v Dennis [1955], the wife attempted to have sexual intercourse with another man. The latter however was unable to accomplish his purpose owing to a nervous disability from which he suffered. Thus, there had been neither penetration nor emission. The wife petitioned for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. The husband, in response, alleged adultery committed by his wife with another man.

Issue: Whether the wife was guilty of adultery?

Ruling: The Court of Appeal found that adultery is not proved unless there is some penetration. It is not necessary that the complete act of sexual intercourse should take place. If there is some penetration adultery may be found. In the present case, the wife was not guilty of adultery since no penetration had taken place.

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Rep. v. Quinonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020

FACTS: Remar A. Quinonez and his wife Lovelyn got married on August 16, 1997 at the Saint Vincent de Paul Parish in Mangagoy, Bislig City. After their wedding, the couple stayed at the house of Lovelyn's parents and they begot two (2) children namely, Emar A. Quiñonez born on January 20, 1998 and Diana Love Quiñonez born on December 15, 1999. To support his family, Remar started working as a security guard at the National Food Authority Warehouse in October 1997, although later on, he transferred to Cebu City for an opportunity to earn a bigger salary.

 

When Lovelyn's father received his retirement pay, Lovelyn asked her husband's permission to go on a three-month vacation in Manila to visit some relatives. Despite Remar's reluctance, he agreed to his wife's request. During the first three months Lovelyn constantly communicated with Remar through cell phone. It was also at this time that Remar resigned from his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao City, where he worked as a security guard at the Surigao City Hall of Justice.

Remar informed Lovelyn that as soon as she arrive from Manila, they would be living together in Surigao City with their two children. Thereafter, the calls and text messages tapered off until the communication between the spouses ceased altogether. At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cellphone, so he inquired about her from their relatives in Bislig City. Someone informed him that his wife was then already cohabiting with another man and would no longer be coming back out of shame. after almost ten (10) years of trying to know about the whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile, Remar filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death before the RTC.

ISSUE: whether declaration of Lovelyn's presumptive under Article 41 of the Family Code correct.

 

RULLING: No, Lovelyn Uriarte Quiñonez is not considered absentee under Article 41 of the Family Code. According to the RTC, Remar was able to show that he had exerted diligent efforts to locate his wife, considering that he spent his meager resources to look for her in Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila, Batangas and Cavite — places where he was told his wife had been seen. In addition, Remar consistently communicated with Lovelyn's relatives in Bislig City to ascertain whether they had any information regarding the latter's whereabouts. In sum, the RTC found Remar's efforts sufficient for purposes of declaring Lovelyn presumptively dead.

 

The Court commiserates with Remar's plight. Nevertheless, the Court cannot uphold the issuance of a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage where there appears to be no well-founded belief of the absentee spouse's death, but only the likelihood that the absentee spouse does not want to be found. Therefore, the petition of respondent Remar A. Quinonez to have his wife, Lovelyn Uriarte Quiñonez declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage isdenied.

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Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014)

 FACTS: Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.

 

Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

 

In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were students and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army,Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizzaand he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividads psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.

 

Both parties underwent psychological examination. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct.

 

The OSG, representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an oppositionto the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.

 

The RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.

 

The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.

 

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render Natividad incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations."

 

The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

 

The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.

 

RULLING: yes, the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.

The law defined "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

 

To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family.

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JAIME F. VILLALON vs. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON G.R. No. 167206 (2005)

 FACTS: this case is for the petition for annulment of marriage of Jaime F. Villalon to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.

 

            According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their relationship tended to be "one-sided" since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions. Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.11 Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.12 Petitioner surmised that it was respondent’s nature to be silent and withdrawn.

 

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jaime F. Villalon and Ma. Corazon N. Villalon be considered void ab inito?

RULLING: No, the marriage between Jaime F. Villalon and Ma. Corazon N. Villalon canot be considered void ab inito. The court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondent’s life and that the latter did not need or want him. Respondent’s uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioner’s discontentment with the marital relationship.

The Supreme court agreed to the decision of the CA that refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. Therefore, the marriage between Jaime F. Villalon and Ma. Corazon N. Villalon canot be considered void ab inito.

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Republic v. Obrecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

 

Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California. He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

 

RULLING: No, Orbecido cannot remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code because Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien and since he failed to prove that his wife was already naturalized as an American citizen and obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 therefore he was still barred from remarrying.