mozambique2017-blog

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Women’s rights in Mozambique

As Tripp (2013) highlights, enormous gains have been made since the 1970s in women’s political representation throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including Mozambique. Here, 40% of parliament was comprised of women in 2016 and equal rights among men and women are constitutionally protected; however, the actual protection of women’s rights in Mozambique continues to face several shortcomings, particularly in the realm of agriculture, where women comprise the majority of the work force but are underrepresented in land ownership (this will be the focus of my case study).

As Berry and Lake (2017) posit, post-conflict nations provide vast opportunities for women’s empowerment and leadership given the ability of conflict to “disrupt preexisting social hierarchies and reconfigure gender power relations” (p. 2). This was certainly true of Mozambique, where following a 15-year civil war, a vibrant women’s movement emerged with the aid of a newly developing democracy and positive relationships with the international community and external women’s rights influences (Tripp, 2015, p. 139). Moreover, conflict provided unique opportunities for women in agriculture in the 1990s: with the rise of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the close of the Mozambican civil war, many women were left widowed or in circumstances that otherwise permitted their promotion to head of household in rural areas. Berry and Lake’s position on post-conflict possibilities for empowerment are thus especially pertinent to Mozambique, where conflict created an unequal male-female population ratio and thus pushed women to assume roles and responsibilities previously managed primarily by men (indeed, within Mozambique’s population of peoples aged 25-54, 3.7 million are female while only 3.3 million are male, and similar gaps are evident within other age groups).

Nonetheless, women often remain disadvantaged within agriculture as well. While women represent 87% of the agricultural workforce, they comprise only 25% of owners holding official rights to land use. Moreover, despite equal rights for men and women existing on a legal or constitutional level, these rights are nonetheless often formulated with patrilineal principles in mind when it comes to land rights or land use (Kaarhus & Martins, 2012, p.13). Further, where matrilineal principles have traditionally been the norm in regard to land use or inheritance (such as in northern Mozambique), they are often delegitimized through a construction of matriliny as archaic or customary, whereas patriliny is civilized, official, and validated by the State - something perhaps influenced by European colonial practices in the region, which often deliberately shifted power to favor men within matrilineal groups (p. 14). As Berry and Lake (2017) write, there still exists a “dichotomy between legislative and representative gains for women (policy) and the broader realization of women’s rights and gender emancipation (practice)” in post-conflict states (p.8). Such is true of Mozambique, where official or formal representation in politics and labor may not necessarily entail justice in practice: while Mozambican women may currently enjoy greater representation and legal protection than in the past, their lived experiences, particularly those of low-income women or women from otherwise marginalized groups, indicate various chasms within Mozambican women’s rights.

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Week of 3/26

Earlier last week, Germany and Mozambique signed accords to establish support for Mozambique’s public finances, education, and economic development sectors. Germany pledged to grant over 118 million euros to support these three sectors, and pledged an addition 39 million to finance a power transmission line between Mozambique and Malawi. Ambassador Wolter of Germany also stated that Germany hoped to improve state management of Mozambique’s private sector, although none of the pledged funds are intended for this purpose.

Further, the risk firm Kroll, which has been hired to complete audits related to Mozambique’s secret debts (the ones they did not disclose to donors last year, leading to slashing of aid for the country) has requested an extension into its investigation. In a statement by the Attorney General’s office, Mozambicans discovered that the extension is due primarily to delays in receiving information from foreign jurisdictions, but that progress is being made otherwise.

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Mozambique and international aid

Mozambique is heavily dependent on foreign aid and the presence of NGOs, which are often focused on development projects. The Nexus Commonwealth Network, which provides guidance and support for those seeking to do business in Commonwealth nations, reports that "Reconstruction has been a significant focus of NGOs”, of which they register over 250 since 2002, and that “NGO assistance has been significantly spurred by two primary events, namely the end of the civil war in 1992 and the catastrophic floods of 2000″. However, until 2016, many believed that Mozambique’s dependency on foreign aid, which has steadily declined in recent years, would largely cease once its gas and mining industries boomed. For example, in 2012, The Guardian reported on the country’s gas and coal promise and profiled a European investor who “believes the country can steadily replace dependency on foreign aid with its burgeoning private sector”. The article notes that many are weary of a possible “resource curse”; however, the comments investors and Mozambicans alike indicate they are optimistic about the future of the country’s private sector and the possibility that foreign aid dependency will soon be a reality of the past.

In more recent years, however, international donors have been concerned over transparency in the country, and this has led to conflicts with Mozambique’s international development aid. In 2014, donors dramatically decreased their aid to Mozambique in response to the state-backed purchase of a tuna fishing fleet (the same one that would complicate Mozambique’s relationship with aid once again three years later in 2017). This event follows a trend of dwindling aid for Mozambique: the above source reports that aid constituted half of Mozambique’s state budget in 2010 and only a third in 2013, and that several European countries ceased paying aid to Mozambique altogether. Nonetheless, as the same source notes, aid commitments for 2014 totaled over $560 million.

In 2012, Stewart writes that the biggest change for Mozambique’s aid has been the shift from project aid to direct budget support. This change was intended to increase accountability between donors and government and to unite donors towards a common development goal amid concerns about transparency and corruption. Nonetheless, we can assume that the shift has had only mild success given the events of 2016: As I’ve noted before, Mozambique did not disclose over a billion dollars in debt to donors last year, leading the IMF and World Bank to cease disbursing aid to the country. In April 2016, the UK also decided to halt its aid, and from 2015 to 2016, US aid to Mozambique dropped by over $140 million.

In summary: Mozambique previously had a somewhat positive relationship with foreign aid, as it was assumed that with the rise of its coal and gas industries, it could hope for future independence and a thriving private sector that would make aid and NGOs focused on development unnecessary. In this respect, Mozambique’s prospects made it look like an international aid “success story”. More recently, however, it faces some conflict: it will likely take several years before Mozambique is able to profit from its private gas and mining, yet in the meantime it has grown less able to depend on foreign aid following claims of corruption or lack of transparency by donors.

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Week of 3/20

As I’ve mentioned previously, the latest Mozambican election inflamed a RENAMO insurgency by militants loyal to the second largest party in the country. Felipe Nyusi, the current president, confirmed this week that he had communicated directly via telephone with one of the insurgency’s leaders, Alfonso Dhlakama. 

RENAMO and FRELIMO recently extended a ceasefire by two months (it will now end in early May) with the hopes of coming to a more stable and conclusive peace agreement.

Nyusi’s communication with Dhlakama hoped to clarify an incident that could potentially violate the ceasefire. Following Dhlakama’s version of events, the ceasefire remains in place and the two sides hope to reach a peace agreement in May. However, numerous ceasefires have fallen apart or proved unsuccessful since 2014 and it remains to be seen whether current negotiations will lead to any level of lasting peace.

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Mozambican politics today

Felipe Nyusi is the fourth president of Mozambique, a democratic republic. He belongs to the FRELIMO party, which has won every presidential election since the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992. FRELIMO is the political party that led the resistance against Portugal which led to independence. Following independence, FRELIMO established a one-party state in 1977 and a Marxist-Leninist platform, but conflict arose when the anti-Communist rebel group RENAMO developed with support from the white population of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. The ensuing civil war displaced 5 million people and killed millions more.

Following civil war, Mozambique was established as a multiparty state with a president, prime minister, and a national assembly along with a Supreme Court. Mozambique’s first elections took place in 1994, with FRELIMO winning the presidency and the majority of parliamentary seats. During the most recent election, 29 parties participated but accused the national election commission of favoring the three biggest parties. RENAMO has always come in second, and consistently disputes the validity of elections to no avail. According to Freedom House, which categorizes Mozambique as “partly free”, elections are generally considered free and fair despite reports of ballot stuffing and similar issues. Thus, transfers of power have always been peaceful within the FRELIMO party, but have generally caused suspicion and even occasional violence on behalf of political opponents (a RENAMO insurgency has developed in response to the 2014 elections).

Moreover, freedom of the press and freedom of expression are broadly protected by law, but some contemporary realities limit these freedoms. For example, the government owns the the largest Mozambican newspaper, and while internet has generally always been available throughout the country, the price of internet access increased greatly in 2015. Many hypothesized that this occurred because the government hoped to restrict access to information throughout Mozambique. The 2015 murder of a well-known journalist and founder of a large independent newspaper in Mozambique has also aroused suspicion among government critics as to how far freedom of the press extends in the country.

In summary: no coups have taken place, but Mozambique’s violent civil war lasted 16 years. There have been 4 peaceful transfers of power within the FRELIMO party since independence. Elections are generally regarded internationally as free and fair, but are often disputed within Mozambique by members of opposing parties. While freedom of expression and freedom of the press are generally protected by law, the last several years have seen restrictions in both and the possible intimidation of critics.

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MOZAMBIQUE. Mucoroge. 2002.

by Alex Webb

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Rui Tenreiro (Mozambican, b. 1979, Mozambique, based Stockholm, Sweden) - Frame from The Tower, an ongoing work for a feature-length animation set in Palestine, directed by Mats Grorud.

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Week of 3/19

As I discuss in my previous post, Mozambique’s natural gas reserves are of great interest to foreign multinationals. Eni, the Italian multinational gas company, has spent time looking for a partner to make the growth of the natural gas industry a reality. In early March, Exxon signed on to the partnership, paying $2.8 billion for a 25% stake in Eni’s gas resources in Mozambique.

In addition, Mozambique currently suffers from a cholera outbreak that is said to have infected over 1200 people. While only 2 have died from the outbreak, officials vocalize their concern over the fact that they have been unable to prevent the spread of the disease outside of Maputo - 4 of 13 Mozambican provinces have been infected so far. Mozambique has suffered from similar outbreaks in recent years during the country’s rainy season.

The outbreak is no doubt fueled by continued water shortages in Maputo, where despite heavy rains and an increase in the stored water of local dams, restrictions on water use remain in place. This limited water provides the perfect environment for the bacteria associated with cholera to flourish.

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Mozambique and International Investment

Following independence, a civil war lasting 15 years complicated the growth of Mozambique’s economy. Nonetheless, the discovery of oil and gas reserves provides some hope for the future of the country: in early 2015, CNN reported that Liquefied Natural Gas will add $39 billion to the Mozambican economy over the following 20 years. CNN also reported that major multinationals have begun investing in drilling projects off the Mozambican coast, citing the American Anadarko Petroleum company as an example.

Mozambican officials and politicians have expressed hope that these gas reserves will finally propel the country out of the extreme poverty it is often known for internationally: nonetheless, the Financial Times reported in late 2014 that Mozambican civil society groups were concerned about whether negotiations between Frelimo and large multinationals would take place transparently. These groups indicated that the private interests of Frelimo politicians might get in the way, and that the lines between business and politics have often blurred in Mozambique.

Further, other disasters related to Mozambique’s financial instability might discourage (or at least complicate) foreign involvement in national gas drilling projects. As I discussed during the week of 1/16, Mozambique’s failure to disclose $1.4 billion in sovereign debts to the IMF led the IMF to suspend foreign aid to the country and Mozambique to default on a debt of nearly $60 million. It is unlikely that Mozambique would be able to pay these or other debts off until they can begin cashing in on their gas reserves; however, such complications might discourage investors and prevent them from accessing reserves in the first place.

All reporting that I encountered related to Mozambique’s gas reserves referred to Anadarko Petroleum and their investment in coastal drilling; however, in May 2016, it was reported that Anadarko was also cutting down on funding in the country following a decrease in international oil prices.

Mozambique’s mining industry is also in a precarious position. The international fall in coal prices led to 4000 laborers being laid off in Tete in August 2016. In response to this fall in coal prices, there has been increased interest in iron-ore mining in Tete, which could possibly substitute coal. Baobab Resources, an Australian company, recently launched the Tete Iron & Steel project in the region, and it is expected that Mozambique can begin to cash in on these reserves by 2020.

Like Guinea or Nigeria, Mozambique and its natural resources are of great interest to large multinationals. While there is not yet any evidence of rampant cronyism or corruption as a result of the country’s negotiations with these multinationals, there is some indication that not all Mozambican citizens will benefit from these relationships. For example, nearly 200 people in the Tete region will be displaced as a result of iron ore mining. Although discussions for official resettlement are underway, some lawyers working with the Association for Legal Support and Assistance to Communities have indicated that the resettlement process is already extremely flawed and that residents were not given a real choice in the matter.

Moreover, Boabab Resources indicates that their project in Mozambique is “attracting unprecedented government support and is strategically aligned with the 2015 presidential manifest and 5-year plan”. Because these partnerships are so dependent on Felipe Nyusi’s presidency, we can thus assume that should political instability rock negotations (not unlikely given the continued Frelimo-Renamo tensions), a political and economic situation similar to that of Guinea can take place.

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Week of 2/13

At least seven people, including a child, have died this last week because of tropical cyclone Deneo. It has caused much destruction in the southern part of the country, and continues to threaten parts of Zimbabwe and South Africa. This storm has left many neighborhoods without electricity or impeded travel by knocking down trees or creating other obstacles to movement.

While very few people have died from the flooding, as many as 130,000 people have been displaced by the storm and over 20,000 homes have been damaged. In addition, dozens of schools and hospitals have also been damaged. While the cyclone has since been downgraded, the threat of heavy rainfall and high winds remains pertinent. Mozambique is also no stranger to such weather; floods and similar storms have killed hundreds in the last two decades.

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Portuguese lusotropicalism in Mozambique

Nugent (2012) does not spend too much time discussing the nature of Portuguese decolonization in-depth; nonetheless, he does allude to some components of Portuguese rule that, coupled with an understanding of modern Portuguese history, can give us an idea of the empire’s colonial presence in Mozambique and the manner through which it withdrew in the 70s.

It is difficult to come to any conclusions based on Nugent’s comments alone about whether the Portuguese saw Mozambicans as a means to achieve economic ends or whether they did see themselves as benevolent rulers intent on completing a civilizing mission. Nugent’s comments indicate that both are possible: he highlights, for example, that “when the Portuguese Estado Novo [the dictatorship that followed a 1926 coup] [...] depicted its African population as beasts of burden, to be yoked to metropolitan progress, it came close to denying the common humanity of Africans” (p. 11). Later, however, Nugent also uses Portuguese lusotropicalism as an example of Europe’s claims that Africans could “derive some betterment from their engagement with Europeans”.

Lusotropicalism was a theory of Portuguese colonial rule proposed by Brazilian scholar Gilberto Freyre. The basis of the theory was that the Portugese were more effective colonizers because of a history that was supposedly absent of racism. This led to rule “characterized by racially egalitarian legislation and human interaction”, and was used to justify Portuguese rule in "tropical, non-European territories” (Bender, 1978, p. 3). Proponents of this theory suggested that because Portuguese colonizers were poor, humble, and raised in culturally/racially diverse contexts, they did not possess the same desire to subdue and oppress Africans as colonizers from industrialized Europe did. They maintained that Brazil, which possessed a large mestizo population, was “living proof” of this absence of Portuguese racism.

I believe it is safe to say that the Portuguese did not embody this vision, and that lusotropicalism was a discourse introduced to the empire at its weakest to justify imperial rule in Portugal’s few remaining colonies. Oliveira Salazar, who first rejected lusotropicalism, later used it to his advantage as the empire continued to wane throughout the 20th century.

Moreover, the transition of power that took place in the 1970s leads me to believe that the Portuguese did indeed look upon Africans as “beasts of burden” more so than as agents in need of some civilizing assistance, at least toward the later part of its empire. A resistance movement began in Mozambique in 1964. The independence war that followed only ended once a Portuguese coup in 1974 replaced the Estado Novo and put in place a new government that supported colonial independence.

The resistance was led by Frelimo, the group that would ultimately become the leading political party of Mozambique. This group was comprised of indigenous Africans with a Leninist platform (we can assume that Mozambique thus falls into the category of African socialism). The party that developed in opposition to Frelimo was Renamo, and the two parties continue to have a bitter and often violent relationship (this was the basis for the civil war that ensued following independence). Renamo was explicitly anti-communist.

After a decade of resistance, Mozambique had failed to continue as a source of economic prosperity for Portugal. Now, as the Portuguese empire continued to decline, it would be a waste of time and resources to try and maintain the colony of Mozambique. A transition government was put in place, and full independence was achieved in 1974.

According to Nugent, other colonizing powers were often forced to grapple with the “colonial contradiction” that complicated their colonial presence and made it difficult to execute a clean, systematized manner of decolonization. By contrast, the Portuguese were largely forced to recede as a result of the chaotic political climate within Portugal at the time. While the Portuguese in the 20th century attempted to propagate lusotropicalism as evidence of the empire’s benevolent nature and commitment to African civilization, the circumstances of Portugal’s government in the 1970s suggests that the empire decided to recede from Mozambique only after it realized that staying put would lead to sure economic ruin. Had Portugal’s government been in a state of greater economic and political stability in the 1970s, perhaps Mozambique would have lingered as a colony for a few years more under the guise of lusotropicalism; however, the 1974 coup and the Portugal’s poverty made Mozambican independence in 1975 inevitable. 

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Week of 1/30

As I mentioned in a previous post, a major national security threat for Mozambique has recently manifested in the rise of rebels associated with the Renamo party, which opposes Frelimo, the government currently in power. This party divide constitutes the biggest social cleavage in Mozambique, and is what gave rise to the violent civil war that erupted in the country following independence.

This week, President Nyusi began peace talks once again with these rebels. Previously, foreign mediators from the EU had participated in peace negotiations, but no resolution was achieved under their guidance.

A ceasefire between the two parties remains in place until March. During that time, they are expected to progress in their peace negotiations without the presence of foreign mediators.

President Nyusi’s announcement that peace talks will continue took place on Heroes’ Day, a national holiday in Mozambique. This is symbolic given the origins of the holiday, which honors Eduardo Mondlande, the founder of Frelimo. He was assassinated 48 years ago and is considered “pai da unidade nacional”, or “the father of national unity”. Nyusi’s comments encouraged Mozambicans to reflect on the country’s values and the need for national unity.

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Demographics

Over 99% of Mozambique’s population consists of indigenous Africans. The country also has minority populations of Europeans (0.06%) and South Asians (0.08%). A mestiço population accounts for just 0.02% of the population.

Within the indigenous population, the majority are Makua people, who total more than 4 million. The Sena total 1.7 million, and the country also has small populations of Shona, Tsonga, Swahili, and Makonde peoples.

28% of Mozambicans practice Roman Catholicism, reflecting the legacies of Portuguese colonialism. Nonetheless, a significant portion of the population (18%) practices Islam. Other Christian denominations constitute nearly 30% of the population’s religious practice.

The country suffers from a high dependency ratio; nearly 45% of its population is below the age of 15. Further, life expectancy (53 years) is low comparable to Western European and North American countries, and a high prevalence of HIV (11%) also plagues the country’s population.

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Workers with baskets harvest tea leaves on lush terraced slopes,  Near Vila Junqueiro, Mozambique, Volkmar Wentzel.

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Manuel Roberto - Moda, Maputo Mozambique, 1980s

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Week of 1/23

Mozambique is currently suffering from heavy rains that have flooded parts of the country and killed as many as 44 people. Although the rainy season began in October, the rains have become increasingly deadly, especially after the banks of Zambezi river burst this last Monday. Some schools and hospitals have been flooded, and the country’s daily newspaper, Noticias, reports that thousands of homes have been destroyed. Over the last several weeks, the National Institute of Disaster Management has provided support and aid to over 18,000 people.

These rains have severely affected the country’s drinking water reserves, and earlier this week, the Maputo Regional Water Company was pumping water to neighborhoods in different cities on alternating days.

In addition, this week President Erdogan of Turkey has urged President Nyusi to open a Mozambican embassy in Turkey as the two countries continue to develop a bilateral relationship that seeks to maximize trade between the two nations. In the last year, President Erdogan has visited numerous African nations as he attempts to develop more effective diplomatic and economic relationships across the continent. Currently Turkey’s investments in Mozambique are greater than $250 million.

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Direct vs. Indirect rule in Mozambique

As I touched on in my last journal entry, Portuguese rule of Mozambique was not highly centralized and did not fall anywhere near the direct/indirect rule spectrum Crowder discusses in his piece. Instead, individual Portuguese merchants and officials exercised a great deal of autonomy during the early colonial period, at first competing with Swahili merchants and tradesman before largely taking over.

Further, although all European states concerned themselves to varying degrees with “civilizing” the people of their colonies, Portugal appeared less concerned with this than it did with extracting resources and exploiting Mozambique’s trade networks. Because other colonies, like Brazil, provided greater riches, we can imagine that they were a greater priority for the Portuguese - further, we can infer based on the comparative popularity of Catholicism that the civilizing mission was not as high of a priority in Mozambique as it was in Brazil. While the overwhelming majority of Brazilians practiced and continue to practice Catholicism, the faith remains in practice by less than 30% of Mozambicans.

These details lead me to believe that Portuguese rule in Mozambique was largely indirect, as they were far more concerned with the riches this colony might provide than with transforming Mozambican civilization altogether. Its role in the colony is further complicated when it shifts power to private companies that are largely British-owned toward the end of the 19th century. These sought to maintain Portuguese rule while fostering economic development, and while this method largely phased out when Oliveiro Salazar came to power, we can see that this change further highlights Portugal’s attempts to keep up with the global economy after the loss of Brazil to independence. Further, its consistent use of forced labor again leads to the conclusion that their primary preoccupation was wealth, as opposed to a Christian calling to “civilize” - even though this calling was certainly present at various times during Mozambique’s colonial period.

Unlike the British and the French, the Portuguese did not rely on complex relationships between European officials and local chiefs; while these relationships certainly existed, Portugal was far more concerned with employing forced labor upon colonial subjects in order to extract as many resources as possible from Mozambique, and deferred in large part to individual settlers and merchants to maintain control for much of this colonial period. This continued until its reliance on private British-owned companies to maintain rule over this colony.