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Obligations and Contracts. Article 1199

ART. 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform one of them.

The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking. (1131)

Kinds of obligation according to object:

(1). Conjunctive obligation. — one where the debtor has to perform several prestations; it is extinguished only by the performance of all of them.

(2). Alternative obligation - several objects being due, the fulfillment of one is sufficient, determined by the choice of the debtor who generally has the right of election.

(3). Facultative obligation - only one thing is due but the debtor has reserved the right to substitute it with another.

EXAMPLE:

D borrowed from C P10,000. It was agreed that D could comply with his obligation by giving C P10,000, or a color television set, or by painting the house of C.

The delivery of the P10,000, or a color television set, or the painting

of the house of C, is sufficient to comply with the obligation. Performance must be complete. C cannot be compelled to accept, for instance, P5,000 and half of the television, thereby establishing a co-ownership between them, or P5,000, and the painting of a part of his house. (Art. 1199, par. 2.) In the case of Agoncillo, et al. vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424. wherein there was an agreement provided that the defendants are to convey the house and lot in the event of failure to pay the appellees the debt in money at its maturity, the issue was whether or not the agreement that the defendant-appellant, at the maturity of the debt, will pay the sum of the money lent by the appellees or will transfer the rights to the ownership and possession of the house and lot bequeathed to the former by the testator in favor of the appellees, is valid. It was held that the stipulation is valid because it is simply an alternative obligation, which is expressly allowed by law. The agreement to convey the house and lot on an appraised value in the event of failure to pay the debt in money at its maturity is valid. It is simply an undertaking that if debt is not paid in money, it will be paid in another way. In the case of ONG GUAN CAN v. CENTURY INSURANCE CO.

The clause cited by the appellant is as follows: "The Company may at its option reinstate or replace the property damaged or destroyed, or any part thereof, instead of paying the amount of the loss or damage, or may join with any other Company or insurers in so doing, but the Company shall not be bound to reinstate exactly or completely, but only as circumstances permit and in reasonable sufficient manner, and in no case shall the Company be bound to expend more in reinstatement than it would have cost to reinstate such property as it was at the time of the occurrence of such loss or damage, nor more than the sum insured by the Company thereon." This clause of the policies is valid, its effect is to make the obligation of the insurance company an alternative one, that is to say, that it may either pay the insured value of the house, or rebuild it

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Obligations and Contracts. Article 1167

ART. 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.

Article 1167 refers to an obligation to do, i.e., to perform an act or render a service. It contemplates three situations: 1. The debtor fails to perform an obligation to do. 2. The debtor performs an obligation to do but contrary to the terms thereof. 3. The debtor performs an obligation to do in poor manner.

— In obligation to do (positive personal obligations), if the obligor fails to do that which he has obligated himself to do, the obligee can have the obligation performed or executed at the expense of the former, and, at the same time, demand for damages by reason of the breach. Case Digest:

Tanguilig vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 78 [1997].) FACTS: 1. Herce contracted Tanguilig to construct a windmill system for him, for consideration of 60,000.00. Pursuant to the agreement Herce paid the downpayment of 30,000.00 and installment of 15,000.00 leaving a 15,000.00 balance. 2. Herce refused to pay the balance because he had already paid this amount to SPGMI which constructed a deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected since the deepwell, and assuming that he owed the 15,000.00 this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after strong winds hit their place. 3. According to Tanguilig, the 60,000.00 consideration is only for the construction of the windmill and the construction of the deepwell was not part of it. The collapse of the windmill cannot be attributed to him as well, since he delivered it in good and working condition and Herce accepted it without protest. Herce contested that the collapse is attributable to a typhoon, a force majeure that relieved him of liability. 4. The RTC ruled in favor of Tanguilig, but this decision was overturned by the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of Herce. Hence the petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the agreement to construct the windmill system included the installation of a deep well. 2.Whether petitioner is under obligation to reconstruct the windmill after it collapsed. HELD: 1. NO. The installation of a deep well was not included in the proposals of petitioner to construct a windmill system for respondent. 2. YES. The Court held that the petitioner is under obligation to reconstruct the collapsed windmill. The Court has consistently held that in order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the loss or destruction of the object of the contract. In the case at bar the petitioner failed to show that the collapse of the windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event. Interestingly, the evidence does not disclose that there was actually a typhoon on the day the windmill collapsed. Petitioner merely stated that there was a "strong wind." But a strong wind in this case cannot be fortuitous — unforeseeable nor unavoidable. On the contrary, a strong wind should be present in places where windmills are constructed, otherwise the windmills will not turn.

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A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. (Art. 1305.) It is the formal expression by the parties of their rights and obligations they have agreed upon with respect to each other.

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An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Obligation is a juridical necessity because in case of non-compliance, the courts of justice may be called upon to enforce its fulfi llment or, in default thereof, the economic value that it represents.

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Essential requisites of an obligation.

An obligation as defined in Article 1156 is constituted upon the concurrence of the four (4) essential elements thereof, namely:

(1) A passive subject (called debtor or obligor) or the person who is bound to the fulfi llment of the obligation; he who has a duty;

(2) An active subject (called creditor or obligee) or the person who is entitled to demand the fulfi llment of the obligation; he who has a right;

(3) Object or prestation (subject matter of the obligation) or the conduct required to be observed by the debtor. It may consist in giving, doing, or not doing

(4) A juridical or legal tie (also called effi cient cause) or that which binds or connects the parties to the obligation.

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Francler P. Onde v. The Office of the Local Civil

Registrar of Las Piñas City, G.R. No. 197174,

September 10, 2014, Villarama, J

PRINCIPLE/S:

Special Proceedings

a) RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172, allows administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name

Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order.

Effect on change of first name:

- Jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers.

- Exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court

Effect on correction of clerical or typographical errors:

- The correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.

- The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors

b) Substantial correction requires adversarial proceedings (Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)

- Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations.

- Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.

c) Parties to implead under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

- Local civil registrar

- All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and named Office of the Local Civil Registrar. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry : 1) Date and place of marriage of his parents

From: December 23, 1983 - Bicol

To: Not Married

Entry: 2) First name of his mother

From: Tely

To: Matilde

Entry: 3) His first name

From: Franc Ler

To: Francler

RTC dismissed the petition. Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

(1) WON the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.

(2) WON the correcting of entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings,

HELD:

1) YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048 provides that clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. R.A. No. 9048 provides that jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. Hence, the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.

2) YES. Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. These substantial alterations can be corrected through appropriate adversary proceedings. Hence, correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings since it will affect his legitimacy. It will convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.

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Johanna Sombong v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 111876,

January 31, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.

Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.

Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be their guardian.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child.

The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody.

The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

Held: Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”

In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.

It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.

The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.

1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of person.

The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met her lost daughter.

Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical and analytical.

In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’ foster child, Cristina. According to one witness, there were several babies left in the clinic and it wasn’t certain if Arabella was given to the petitioner.

2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. Moreover, the way the respondents obtained custody isn’t material to the habeas corpus issue.

3. Private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of petitioner due top her lack of a stable job and her separation from a married man.

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Teresita Sagala-Eslao v. CA, et al., 266 SCRA 317

January 16, 1997

FACTS:

When Maria Paz's husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted custody of her youngest child Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law. She then returned to her mother's house with Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After this she returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband's willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days old. Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child

RULING:

No. The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution.

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Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92

Facts:

Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an action against her husband Rafael to obtain separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor children Guillermo and Sergio and attorney’s fees and other costs.

The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, upon hearing the cause of the trial (in light of a doctrine laid down in a former case)—a decision that the plaintiff now appeals.

Aurelia sought separate maintenance on the ground of cruelty and infidelity. Proof showed that the defendant is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4 different women and another one before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the plaintiff, pushing the latter to finally leave their home and establish a separate abode with the children.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from respondent-appellee after she left their domicile

Ruling:

Yes. While the Court ruled in Arroyo vs Vasquez de Arroyo that unproved or insufficient charges of cruelty are not enough to establish a case for separate maintenance, it maintained that in cases where spouses are found guilty of conjugal infidelity, innocent parties are entitled to right to relief.

In the case at bar, the Court holds that “the law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.” The respondent, being a recurrent, gravely offends the sanctity of the marriage tie and should thus, not be relieved from his duty to support his wife as provided by law. The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s right to custody of her children will no longer be disturbed and that she is entitled to P500 monthly allowance, attorney’s fees and other expenses.

Judgment reversed, with cost against appellee.

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Malkinson v. Agrava, 54 SCRA 66

Facts:

On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified petition to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid, Spain on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson who alone of his parents extended him recognition.

The petitioners claim that the child concerned has been living with them under their care and custody since their marriage in 1972. Petitioner Frederick Malkinson is an American citizen, while his spouse is a Filipino citizen and owns a property in the Philippines. They claim that it is to the best interest of the child that he be adopted by the spouses who are qualified for such legal adoption.

Respondent Judge Hon. Corazon Agrava dismissed the abovementioned petition in November 1972 because the court opined that the position was insufficient due to the fact that the petitioner husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen of the country.

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien, who is neither a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines nor otherwise legally disqualified from adopting a Filipino. Respondent court again denied the same in December 1972.

Issue:

WON an alien who is not legally disqualified may adopt a Filipino.

Held:

If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided. Article 335 of the New Civil Code only provides that non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly disqualified and prohibited to adopt, while Article 339 provides that only an alien with whose state our government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be adopted.

Inclusio unius exclusion alterius (The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another)

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Ultimately, under the plain language of the law, alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner such as the petitioner-husband from adopting a Filipino child. Under Art. 338 of the Civil Code, the petitioner-wife who is also the natural mother, is authorized to adopt her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child while the petitioner husband is likewise authorized to adopt his step-child and that such adoption would strengthen the family solidarity of the petitioner-spouses and the child.

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Alfon v. Republic

g.r. no. L-51201, May 29, 1980

Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 1952; she was registered in the Local Civil Registrar’s office and was baptized under the same name.For 23 years, she lived with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When she started schooling, from her 1st grade until she graduated her bachelor’s degree she used the name Estrella Alfon. Petitioner also exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.The lower court granted the change of first name but denied with respect to the surname, because of the Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides “Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.”

Issue:Whether or not Legitimate and Legitimated Children should exclusively use the name of the father

Held:The Supreme Court granted not only the change of first name but also her last name. The word “principally” as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Haw Liong v. Republc; proper or reasonable causes that may grant the change of name:1. When the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonour or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce.2. When the request for a change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledge or legitimated.3 When the change is necessary to avoid confusion.In the case presented, it has been shown that petitioner has borne the name Estrella S. Alfon since childhood, until she finished her tertiary education. There is therefore sufficient justification to grant fully her petition which is based on solid and reasonable ground, to avoid confusion.

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Consolacion Lumain De Aparicho v. Hipolito

Paraguya G.R. No. L-29771, May 29, 1987

FACTS: Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests.

2) Under Art. 255 of the Civil Code stating that: “Children born after 180 days following the celebration of the marriage and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action against the defendant for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. Defendant was the declared owner of portions A, B, H, F and G and all its improvements. Portion G is the land in question. He also assailed that Consolacion is not a natural child of the decedent Rev. Fr. Lumain.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is entitled to the possession of portion G of the sketch exhibit “E-1”, with all the improvements.

2) Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is a natural child of the late Rev. Fr. Lumain.

3) Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is liable to pay the defendant-appellant for moral damages.

HELD: 1) NO. The portion G of Exhibit E-1 which appellant bought from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be ceased: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband.” Appellant argues there is no evidence of physical impossibility on the part of husband Anastacio. Under Article 265 of the Civil Code, it is stated that “The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.” However, the Supreme Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of Consolacion. In the last will and testament of Rev. Fr. Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as only heir. As Rev. Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

3) NO. Appellee merely pursued an honest claim to the property in question. No bad faith had been imputed nor had the alleged damages suffered been established. The essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad faith and the fact that moral damages was suffered as shock, mental anguish, or anxiety although the amount of damages suffered need not be shown.

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Jao v. CA , G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987

FACTS:

Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

RULING:

Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father of the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.

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Magbaleta v. Gonong, 76 SCRA 511 1977

Facts: Judge Gonong of the CFI of Ilocos Norte, on August 31, 1976 and October 8, 1976, denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them, notwithstanding that Catalino is the brother of Rufino Mabaleta, the husband of Romana. The suit was to have a parcel of land, which was in the name of Rufino, declared to be the property of Catalino, who claims that Susana is trying to take possession of said land from his representative, with her contending that she had bought the same from the spouses Rufino and Romana. Said orders by the CFI were also alleged to be issued in violation of NCC 222 and RoC Rule 16, Section 1, there being no allegation in Catalino’s complaint that his suit, being between members of the same family, contained prior earnest efforts toward a compromise. The refusal to dismiss the complaint was based on the ground that Susana, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, was a stranger, so the aforementioned provisions did not apply.

Issue: WoN the ruling of Judge Gonong was correct

Held: Yes, it was. Ratio: Though the Code Commission recognizes the need for compromise before a lawsuit between family members is allowed, this consideration does not make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. One who is a stranger to the family would not be willing to suffer the delay and complications between or among relatives, which would require prior compromise efforts. Also, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.

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Melicio Domingo v. Sps. Molina G.R. No. 200274,

April 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

FACTS: The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a parcel of land. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina. 10 years after Flora’s death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. The RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim. The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. The CA also held that Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights, excluding Flora’s interest, over the lot to the spouses Molina.

ISSUE: Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal?

RULING: YES. Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership

among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property. The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "only the rights, interests and participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora Dela Cruz, is hereby sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the said vendees x x x x ”. At the time of the sale, Anastacio’s undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora’s heir on the conjugal properties. Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest). The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.

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Equitable PCI Bank vs. OJ- Mark trading

G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010

Facts:

Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.

Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation; thus, they offered to settle their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot, which at that time, was not transferred in their name. While petitioner’s officers held a meeting with respondent Martinez, the latter however failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago.

Consequently, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. On the other hand, respondents filed a civil case for TRO and annulment of the extrajudicial sale. They alleged, among others, that the REM is void for having been illegally notarized; that the petitioner acted in BAD FAITH because it did not officially inform them of the denial or of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by “dacion. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the TRO. The same was affirmed by the CA, the latter holding that respondents have sufficiently shown their proprietary right over the condominium unit sought to be foreclosed, entitling it to the questioned TRO.

Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 contending as follows: 1) it has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage because the respondents failed to settle their obligations; 2) there respondents have no right to an injunction because they have no clear right to a dacion en pago.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third- party mortgagor’s property.

Held: The Court REVERSED the decision of the CA. The Court held that respondent spouses are NOT entitled to an injunctive writ because their rights are merely contingent and not in esse.

According to the Court:

1. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.

2. There was no bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

3. Respondent-spouses’ alleged “proprietary right” in the

mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents’ averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation.

4. The contention that the family home is exempt from execution is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM.

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Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282, 1986

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife,Eustaquia Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land located in Barrio Kasuga, Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia Pichan - although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him - as well as paternity of two of the plaintifs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial court gave his denials no credence. Said court, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been married to Eustaquia, and that the plaintifs were his children with her.

The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. 0n the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. Martin Lacerna appealed with the intermediate appellate court. However, the said court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

It appears that while the case was being heard in the trial court, not certificate of landtitle to the land had yet been issued to Lacerna. The original certificate of Title was issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in intermediate Appellate Court. It states on the face that it is issued in the name of a Martin Lacerna, Filipino, legal age,married to Epifania Magallon, the latter being the present petitioner.

The confirmative decision of the Intermediate Appellate court had become final and executory. The judge issued a writ of execution commanding the Provincional Sheriff to order the Lacerna to divide and partition the property located Davao del Sur, 1/2 of which is the share of Pichan in the conjugal property and plaintifs being Pichan's children are also entitled thereto. The said writ was served to both Lacerna and Magallon. Magallon then filed with the trial court a Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution alleging that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin Lacerna.

ISSUE: Whether or not Magallon is bound by final judgment rendered in an action to which she was not made a party.

HELD: No. As observed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear land that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto. But whether the petitioner, is a lawful wife or a mere live-in partner, the court simply cannot believe that she never became aware of the litigation concerning the land until presented with the writ of execution. What is far more probable and credible is that she has known of the lawsuit since 1956 when Martin Lacerna "married" her. Her silence and inaction since then and until barely a year ago bespeak, more than anything else, a confession that she had and has no right to the land and no defense to offer to the action, either on her part or on the part of Martin Lacerna. Had she even the semblance of a right, there is no doubt she would have lost no time asserting it.