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MOGOYAG VS. MARUHOM

(Art. 1412)

Facts:

The case involves over the dispute of ownership and possession of a market stall in Marawi City.

The respondent Hajji Abubacar Maruhom was awarded the market stall by the islamic city of Marawi in 1982.

In 1985, he orally sold the store to hajja Fatima Gaguil Magoyag and Hajji Hasan Madlawi Magoyag for P 20,000.00. After the initial payment Magoyag's took the possession of the stall however, they stopped paying the monthly rentals after the initial downpayment. And therefore the instant petition was filed against Magoyag by Maruhom.

ISSUE:

W/N the Deed of assignment was considered a valid contract of sale or loan bet. the parties.

RULING:

The Court held that the transaction bet. petitioners and respondent was a sale. As such, under ordinary circumstances, petitioners could recover possession of the property from respondent. Unfortunately in this case, the court cannot grant petitioners the relief that they are praying for recovery of possession of the market stall bec. of unlawful act did also by Maruhom.

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BPI VS. SANCHEZ

(Art. 1385)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land located at Panay Avenue Quezon City. The land was originally owned by Vicente Victor Sanchez, Kenneth, Nereo and Imelda (Sanchez).

Jesus Garcia, a businessman related to Trans American Sale and Exposition offered to buy the land from Vicente for P 1.8 Million. However, the party failed to come to an agreement within the specified period of time.

After sometime, Feliza Yap, widow of Kenneth Sanchez, continued and agreed to sell the property under certain conditions, then, Garcia told her to hand him down over the necessary documents and he shall take care of it, including the transfer of title. So, Yap turned over to Garcia the original TCT while Garcia paid her P 50,000.00.

Then, Garcia took possession of the land and demolished the house in the property even without the knowledge and consent of Yap.

ISSUE:

W/N there was a valid recession of agreement bet. the Sanchezes and Garcia.

RULING:

The court held that there was a valid recession of agreement as this case reveals that the buyer is acted in bad faith/builder of bad faith. That even they knew the fact that the property still belonged to the Sanchezes and yet, they continue to build townhouses without the authority and consent of the land owners.

Therefore, the court declared the sale of the said property Null and Void.

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COCA-COLA BOTTLERS INC. VS. SORIANO

(Art. 1358)

Facts:

The case involved spouses Efren and Lolita Soriano, who were engaged in the business of selling coca-cola products in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Coca-Cola required security for the continuation of their business and convinced the Soriano spouses to hand them over the two certificates of title of their property and sign a document.

Coca-Cola assured them that the document would not be notarized. Later on, when the Soriano spouses wanted to stop selling Coca-Cola products they demanded for the return of their two certificates of title, however, they discovered that their land had been mortgaged to Coca-Cola and subsequently foreclosed.

ISSUE:

W/N the contract bet. spouses Soriano and Coca-Cola was valid even without the notarization.

RULING:

The SC found that the defective notarization of the mortgaged deed stripped it of its public character, and reduced it to a private document. However, the court clarified that the public document is not essential for the validity of the enforceability of a mortgage.

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THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH VS. PANTE

(Art. 1331)

Facts:

The RCC owned a 32 square meter lot in Dinaga Canaman, Camarines Sur. In 1992, the RCC entered into a contract with Mr. Regino Pante for the sale of the lot. The fixed price of the lot was amounting to P 11,200.00 and Pante made a downpayment of P 1,120.00 with a remaining balance payable in three years.

However, in 1994 the Church sold again the said Lot to spouses Nestor and Fidela Rubi, and spouses Rubi erected a concrete fence over the lot, blocking Pante's access to the road. Pante filed an action to annull the sale bet. the RCC and spouses Rubi, claiming that he was the rightful buyer of the lot.

ISSUE:

W/N the contract of Pante with the RCC was valid.

RULING:

The SC held that the contract bet. Pante and the RCC were valid, and that there was no misrepresentation that would vitiate the church's consent to the sale.

In this case, the consent of both parties was free, voluntary, and with reasonable understanding of the obligation, thus, the SC denied the Church petition for annulment due to Pante's alleged misrepresentation.

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LICAROS VS. GATMAITAN (Art. 1304)

Facts:

Licaros the petitioner invested in Anglo Asean Bank (AAB), a private bank registered in Vanuato. Then Licaros encountered difficulties in retrieving his investment from AAB, he then, sought the assistance of Gatmaitan, a well known reputable banker. So Gatmaitan offered to assume the payment of Licaros debt to AAB.

They executed a memorandum of agreement stating that Gatmaitan agreed to pay Licaros the amount owed by the AAB, however, the AAB did not give its consent to the agreement. Then Licaros demanded the payment from Gamaitan, but the latter refused. So Licaros filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati.

ISSUE:

W/N the MOA was an assignment of credit of conventional subrogation.

RULING:

The MOA is a conventional subrogation.

In conventional subrogation it requires the consent of the original creditor, which in this case is the AAB. And since, AAB did not give its consent, therefore, the MOA was not valid.

As a result, Gatmaitan was not liable for the debt owed by AAB to Licaros.

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Manalili Vs. GSIS

(Art. 1277)

Facts:

The case involved Ricardo Manalili, a world war II veteran and the Government Service Insurance System. Manalili holds nackpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the treasurer of the Philippines. Then he obtained a real estate loan from GSIS secured by a mortgage of his property, but Manalili failed to pay the monthly amortization leading GSIS for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of his property.

However, there was a contention on Manalili's brief, that his obligation to GSIS has been extinguished due to the confusion or merger of rights arising from the reimbursement he is about to receive from the government under his back pay of certificate of indebtedness.

ISSUE:

W/N the claim of Manalili that his obligation has been extinguished due to the merger of rights.

RULING:

The SC ruled that there was no confusion or merger of rights because GSIS indicates that it is a private corp. with a personality distinct from gov't, and under these circumstances, no compensation, let alone confusion or merger of rights can be extinguished Manalili's outstanding obligation to GSIS.

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EPCI BANK VS. NG SHEUNG NGOR. et.al. (Art. 1250)

Facts:

Respondent Ng Sheung Ngor, Ken Appliance Div. Inc. and Benjamin E. Go filed an action for annulment / or recormation of contract against petitioner Equitable PCI Bank and its employees, Aimee Yu and Bejan Apas.

Respondent claimed that Equitable induced them to avail of its credits facilities by offering low interest rates and that they were unaware that the promissory notes contained escalation clauses allowing Equitable to increase interest rates without their consent.

ISSUE:

A.) W/N the escalation clause violated the principle of mutuality of contract.

B.) W/N there was extraordinary deflation.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favor of Equitable PCI Bank.

A) The SC stated that the promissory notes were valid, however, the escalation clause was found to violate the principle of mutuality of contract.

B) On the second issue the court said that there was no extraordinary deflation as the BSP did not declare it, and there was no agreement between the parties to consider its effect.

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LAM VS. KODAK PHILS.

(Art. 1223)

Facts:

Spouses Alexander and Julie Lam, entered into a contract with Kodak Phils. for the purchase of 3 units minilab system.

The contract specified the term and condition of the sale, including the price, payment, terms and delivery schedule. Then, Kodak delivered 1 unit of minilab equipment in Tagum City Davao, but failed to deliver the remaining units.

On the other hand, Spouses Lam, issued a post dated check for the first delivery, but they stopped paying due to the facts that Kodak phils. Did not deliver the other units.

Then, Kodak Phils. cancelled and demanded the return of the delivered unit, but Spouses Lam refused, so, Kodak Phils. filed a complaint of Replevin.

ISSUE:

W/N the contract within the parties is divisible or indivisible.

RULING:

The contract between the parties is divisible, and both parties are entitled for restitution. The Lam spouses were ordered to return the delivered unit, while the Kodak Phils. were ordered to return the partial payment of the Spouses Lam.

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JOSEFA VS. SAN BUENAVENTURA

(Art. 1196)

Facts:

San Buenaventura is the owner of a 364 sqmtr. land in Pasig City. In 1990, Josefa entered into a contract of lease with San Buenaventura over the said parcel of land for 5years.

Upon the expiry date, San Buenaventura wrote Josefa informing him that the lease would no longer be extended, but he may continue with a lease at a rental rate of 30k per month.

However, Josefa refused to vacate the premises, raising the statement of the renewal clause in their contract of agreement, resulting in a complaint filed by San Buenaventura against him for Unlawful Detainer.

ISSUE:

W/N the renewal clause gives Josefa the right not to vacate the said property.

RULING:

The SC held that the renewable clause is clear and admits of no other interpretation, however, the contract is renewable only upon the mutual agreement of both parties.

In this case, San Buenaventura, the owner expressly stated that he would no longer want Josefa to lease his property.

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Ursal Vs. Court of Appeals ( Art.1169)

Facts:

Ursal entered into a contract with spouses Moneset, a contract to sell. Then Ursal made a downpayment of 50k while spouses Moneset promised her that they will be handling down the TCT of the said lot.

However, the Moneset failed to deliver the TCT, so Ursal stopped paying the installments, neither did she consign payment for the remaining balance.

ISSUE: W/N the contract to sell vested ownership in Ursal.

RULING:

No, there should be no special preference granted to Ursal in redeeming the property. What she had with the Monesets was contract to sell in which case, ownership was not transferred to her due to suspensive condition of full payment.

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Obligations and Contracts

Cases Assigned

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Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.

Gregorio Araneta Inc. Vs. Phil. Sugar Estate Dev't Corp. Lmtd.

Facts

Jm tuazon corp. Inc. Is the owner of tge big tract of land situated in Quezon city phils. Otherwise known as sta. Mesa heights subdivision.

In 1950 thru Gregorio Araneta Corp. (Tuason Inc.) sold a portion thereof to PSED Ltd. The parties stipulated in the contract of purchase and sale with mortgaged, that the buyer will.

👉Build in the parcel of land Sto. Domingo Church and Convent.

And the seller will:

👉Construct streetson the four corner sides of the said land, and tge northeast side shall be name Sto. Domingo Avenue.

Their contract stipulated period is "on reasonable time"

However, when PSED finished their construction of the church and convent, Mr. Gregorio Araneta was unable to construct the street due to squatter who do not want to leave the said land.

The PSED filed a complaint against Mr. Gregorio Araneta, they seek to compel the latter to comply with the obligations stated and stipulated in the deed of sale.

ISSUE : WON the lower court erred in applying article 1197 of the civil code.

Ruling:

Yes.

The S.C. Ruled that the lower court erred in applying art. 1197 of the civil code. 1.) if the period set witbin the reasonable time the court can only determine wether that reasonable time has already lapse or not. 2) if the court must indeed fix the period it mist be under the circumstances of the parties.

1. The court must determine if the parties intended a period.

2. Determine what period is intended

In the case at bar, both parties are aware that tge area was full of squatters, thus the S.C fixed the period for the performance of the period as until all tge squatters inbthe affected areas were finally evicted.

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OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS

Article 1165. When what is to be delivered is a DETERMINATE thing, the creditor in addition to the right granted him by Art. 1170 may compel the debtor to make the delivery.

If the thing is INDETERMINATE or GENERIC, he may ask the obligation be complied with at the expense of the debtor.

If the obligor delays, or has promised the same thing to two or more persons who do not have the same interest, he shall be reponsible for any FORTUITOUS EVENT until he has effected the delivery. (1096)

The General Rule: in DETERMINATE THING or specific real obligation, lost due to a fortuitous event will extinguished the real obligations.

Exemptions:

👉 If the debtor or obligor delays.

👉 If the obligor is guilty of bad faith.

General rule: for INDETERMINATE THING or generic real obligation as for fortuitous event. " a generic thing is never lost/never perish"

Case: YU TEK CORP. VS. BASILIO GONZALES (G.R. No. L-9935)

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R. A. No 10172

Substantial entries, summary proceeding insufficient

RAMON CORPUZ TAN VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY OF MANILA

Facts:

🔹Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his record of birth and alleged that he was born on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul Hospital at the city of Manila.

🔹That he had been using his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his lifetime, that when he later secured a copy of his certificate of live birth, he discovered that his name was entered as "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" instead of his true and correct name.

🔹That the aforesaid error in the entries of his certificate of live birth were due to the inadvertence and error of the hospital personnel who prepared the said document.

🔹However, it was denied by the RTC and the CA on the ground that they are substantial entries to the extent of affecting the citizenship, hence, a petition was file at the SC.

ISSUE: Won the rulings of the lower court are correct and why?

RULING:

Yes,

The alleged error could not be considered as clerical error on a readily apparent mistake. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the correction sought would be definitely have an effect on his filiation with the persons named in the certificate of live birth.

The name "Tan Ko" has been consistently used not only in the entries for petitioner's name, but also d

for that of his parents. Verily, the "correction" of the petitioner's from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon Corpuz Tan" would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the name of his parents as entered in the certificate of live birth.

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R. A. No. 10172

An act authorizing the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to correct clerical errors in the date and month in the date of birth or sex of a person appearing in the civil register without need of a judicial order, amending for this purpose republic act number ninety forty-eight.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HONORABLE JUDGE GEORGE MACLI-ING

Facts:

🔹Petitioner filed before the lower court to correct the entries in the respective registries of birth of Oscar Sy and Jose Sy.

🔹They sought to be corrected in the birth certificate of Oscar Sy is the name of his father from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao, upon the claim that Esteban is only his father's nickname. also, in the birth certificate of Joe therein be corrected to read as Jose.

🔹They presented several evidence such as, alien certificate of registration, immigrant certificate of residence, annual report of person of alien, and income tax return from 1972, all states the name of Sy Piao.

🔹They also presented the school records in both high school and at St. Louis University in Baguio of Oscar Sy that the name of his father was Sy Piao.

ISSUE:

Won the civil registry erred in encoding the real name of Sy Piao.

RULING:

The petition was granted by the lower court it states that Sy Piao and Esteban Sy is one and the same person, and, it was published in the newspaper of general circulation. The court also added that clerical mistakes or harmless and inoccuous errors maybe corrected under the summary of proceedings under Article 412 and tule 108 of RRC.

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FAMILY CODE

Proof of Filiation

CASIMIRO MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

🔺Teopista Toring claimed that she was the daughter of Brigida Toring, single, and Casimiro Mendoza, a married man.

🔺She claimed that Casimiro recognized her as an illegitimate child because of the following circumstances:

🔹She bought her a passenger truck when she got married and made her husband as driver.

🔹Casimiro later sold the truck and gave her the proceeds, he also gave her money to buy a lot from her brother.

🔹Casimiro allowed her son to build a house in his lot.

🔹Casimiro opened an account with her as one of the co-depositor

🔹Two witnessess Gaudencio and Isaac both relatives of Casimiro also testified that the latter gave dole-out to Teopista through them.

🔹However, her claimed was contested by Vicente Toring (his brother) he resisted Teopista's claim. He also professed that he is the only illegitimate child of Brigida Toring to Casimiro Mendoza, and that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who abandoned her.

ISSUE:

Won Teopista failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro.

RULING:

Yes, the lower court rendered a judgement that Teopista was not in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by direct acts of the latter or of his family.

To establish the open of continuous possession status of an illegitimate child it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. Continuous does not mean that the concession of the status shall continue forever, but only it shall not be intermittent in character while it continues.

The possession of such status means that the father treated the child of his own directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) there must be a showing of permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous clear manifestation of paternal affection.

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TITLE - X - EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY

SALEN et. al. VS. BALCE

Facts :

🔸Gumersindo Balce was convicted of homicide by inflicting wounds to Severino Salen which resulted in his death.

🔸Balce, a legitimate son of Jose Balce, who was then single 18 years of age and was living with his father.

🔸As a results of Salen's death G. Balce was accused and convicted with homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000. 00 for indemnity. The plaintiff brought this action against defendant before the court to recover the sum of P2, 000.00 with legal interest.

🔸However, the defense said that the law upon which plaintiff predicate their right to recover does not apply here, for the reason the the law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.

ISSUE:

Won the parents of Balce can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2, 000.00 which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him.

RULING:

Yes.

The ruling of the lower court was reversed. Under Art. 2180 of the civil code provides that: the father in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company. This provisions covers not only obligations arise from quasi-delicts but also those arises from criminal offenses.