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In both Tennis and AFL, the confrontational space has an unpredictable effect on decision making. When looking at tennis, the moment the ball is on your side of the court, there is nothing the opposition can do to influence your next play. The ball can be placed in a difficult spot, but the immediate play space cannot be reduced. On the 3rd freeze frame, we can see the distance between oppositional players. Once the shot was made by the serving team, the primary rules do not allow them to get any closer. We can see in the 4th freeze frame the serving team have ‘pressured the net’ reducing the confrontational space, increasing the pressure. Although they cannot get extremely close to the opposition, just by approaching the net confrontational pressure is increased. The decision making required from each of these shots is dynamic. As the ball approaches at a fast pace, effectors such as confrontational space are influencing this decision (Johnson, 2006). There are no common decisions for any given situation, although the situation may be similar, there are always factors that are different (McPherson & Kernodle, 2003). When talking about the AFL examples, in the 1st freeze frame moment the hawthorn player receives the ball, there is instant confrontational pressure on him. The initial nature of the pressure has an effect on the individuals intimate play space as he feels he needs to dispose of the object. In the 2nd freeze frame the Collingwood player is under a similar level of pressure, attempts to turn to pass and creates a turn over. The reason for this is the player was too slow in making a decision on where to pass that the immediate play space become to small for a pass to occur. Due to the confrontational pressure of the opposition, the player in possession was given limit in time on when the ball need to be releases, forcing the error. McPherson & Kernodle’s idea can apply to this situation too, the numerous defenders and positioning of his team member is continually influencing the decision to be made.

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The attention required by the tennis players above is at a significantly high level, so too is the level of their movement skill acquisition. In the first clip when slowed down, it is evident on how much concentration is needed, there are 6 shots made within 3.4 seconds, giving an average reaction time of 0.57 seconds per shot. The level of attention required can be depicted through the feature integration theory. There are a range of features combined that stimulate the vision of the players. Treisman (1997) explains it as the features act as the ‘glue’ that integrates the initially separable features into an object, then pieces them together. So in terms of tennis, the features would be the opponents body and arm, their racquet and the ball. All within a split second these features combined allow for an image to be processed of where the ball is going to be returned. So in the 0.57 seconds given to return, the features of the environment are all combined within the player’s attention. In the second rally, the shots performed by the player on the serving team who didn’t serve, shows an elite level of skill. It is clear that he is at the later stage of Gentiles model. In the 3rd rally, players from both teams show ability to adapt to the movement of making a shot in any situation potential showing economy in their efforts. As the skills are open they show a high level of diversification adapting to where the ball is being placed to return. It is the reaction time and the quick decisions making that places these players as experts in contrast to novice tennis players (Gentile, 1972). This quick decision making can be explained through the research of Del Villar Et al (2007) who explains that the expert has the ability to organise and structure their knowledge, which makes makes them more efficient in the identification of relevant information (features such as racquet and arm) leading to quicker and more appropriate decision-making.

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Communication within team sports is essential in the success. As Tennis and AFL are two different sports the communication methods are quite different, however there are aspects that are the same. The method of communication is suited to the style of game play. For example, in doubles tennis the points are quick but there is a moment at the end of each point for verbal communication to occur. This is similar in AFL when there is a stoppage, verbal messages can be delayed. However, during the play, communication between tennis players is minimal as there is no time to conduct a message, verbal cues are relied on as a mode of communication. In the first clip we can see the two tennis players discussing the position of the next serve, this can also be communicated with the next clip through the hand signal which signifies the intent of the following play. The third clip shows the two players sitting down during a break communicating most likely what is happening within the game. This is a chance to remind and assist in the implementation of strategies and 
tactics. The next two clips show non verbal cues conducted by the AFL players, one to communicating where to pass the ball, the next to assist team members improve their resources, posture and position. These ideas of communication uses are developed through the grammar of games (Forrest, 2017a). Similarly, with tennis, in the AFL, at each quarter time break, the team is able to gather and discuss any patterns or changes to strategy. What isn’t shown in the clips but is evident within team sports such as AFL is the use of verbal communication. From all these communication methods, there must be agreement from both sides for it to be effective. Effective team communication must be interactions that enhance the teams function. Sulivan and Gee (2007) describes team communication as a four factor construct acceptance, distinctiveness, positive Conflict, and negative conflict. Linking with all the examples above, acceptance is required for effectiveness.

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Team strategy and tactics are built on players and their ability to break down the opposition. In the two clips seen above, both have a similar strategy in terms of a rebound. In the first clip the Collingwood kick wide is intercepted by Geelong who return it back into their scoring fifty-meter arc. However, it is again intercepted by Collingwood who then kick it the opposite way. This is an action rule which is applied by many AFL teams. The action rule to go out the opposite way it came in is also applied by Sydney against Hawthorn. The action rule predicts that due to the play coming from the opposite side of the ground the team with the rebound will have an outnumber if a quick turnover occurs. This idea is proven with the Sydney example creating a force ratio of 6 on 4 within the fifty arc or 3 on 1 on the opposite side the ball came in. Due to both the action rule and the force ratio influence, the decision is to go where all the numbers are. The moment Scott Pendlebury and Rhyce Shaw take their respective intercept mark, they immediately begin to think dialectic in nature. This concept is described by Grehaigne, Richard & Griffin (2005) who also emphasise action rules as use of theoretical knowledge where the decision is based on the knowledge of why something is true or correct. In this instance the correct decision is related to the force ratio of their own players and the team action rule to go out the opposite side. What is also evident with both situations is a level of reserve. Progression on one side of the field didn’t work so their next option was to go down the other. The mark in defence acted as a starting point of the next attempt to progress forward or an immediate restart after the first attempt has failed (Gréhaigne, Godbout & Bouthier, p.169, 1999).

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The play action of deception can be a tactical advantage to an individual or a team. The first example shows Lewis Jetta faking a pass, forcing the hawthorn player to react to that, assuming the pass would be made. Similarly, in the second AFL clip where Curtly Hampton draws a player and fakes a pass. In both clips, after a certain point of action, the defender becomes ‘committed’ to the act anticipating that that given action will occur (Mawby, R., & Mitchell, p.316, 1986). As Jetta notices the defender’s commitment to the original action as their position changes, he pulls back and decides not to pass. The feedback received by Jetta is within a closed loop, adjustment of his action not to pass is immediate and as a result the skill is altered. However, for the defender, the feedback occurs too slow, and he had already committed to the pass before he could alter his defensive stance. A similar concept can be explored within tennis, in particular the drop shot. As seen in both clips of tennis, the drop shot is unpredictable to the opponent. The key objective to net/wall/court sports is to place the ball where it cannot be returned, and a drop shot is a method of success. The drop shot is difficult to read therefore the anticipation of the return is quite difficult. The drop shot needs to be played at the right moment, for example in the first clip Murray is playing off the base line so Federer as a result plays a drop shot. It is within this situation potential and due to the position of the opponent, that this shot can be made. Thomas and Thomas (1994) describe this as procedural knowledge, so when in this situation the procedure is to make a drop shot due to previous knowledge. This can be aligned with cognitive map within the grammar of games, as previous experiences allow for the decision to be made (Forrest, 2017b).

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In the footage, the defensive position of the player ‘on the mark’ limits the player in possession in where they can kick the object. In both AFL examples, the player on the mark forces the kick down the line. The player on the mark’s posture and position is tall with arms up, and on the goal side of the kicker, not allowing a progression to be made through the middle of the field. This relates to the two action rules: ‘Reduce the number of potential receivers’
 and ‘Reduce the effective space of one's opponent
 to challenge the opponent’s progression down the field’ developed by Grehaigne and Godbout (1995). A similar concept is explored by Grehaigne, Wallin and Godbout (2005) who describe that as a defensive player moves closer to the player with the object the more area is covered. By standing in this position the play space needed to pass into the centre corridor is reduced, so too is the confrontational space between the player on the mark and the player in possession. Therefore, the effective play space is limited to only going down the line. Similarly, in the tennis clip, the player circled in blue places herself in a position where she is covering the area behind her and the area in line with her partner. As a result, the Swiss team is limited in their decision on where to hit the ball. The one up one back game play configuration is an aspect of the team strategy that has been implemented in order to prevent the opposition from placing the ball in an area where it cannot be returned (Blaskower, p.4, 2007). In order for this to occur there has to be a level of competency between the two team members, one knows they have to stay on the base line where the other attacks the net.

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