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Cases for Obligation and Contracts - Article 1181

 Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.

a. Suspensive – conditions precedent/antecedent. The happening of w/c will give rise to the acquisition of a right – future & uncertain event. 

b. Resolutory – conditions subsequent – rights are lost once the requirement is fulfilled.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Don Ramon Lopez Sr. signed a deed of donation in 1939 in favor of Central Philippine University with the following conditions:

a) Central Philippine University should only use the land for the construction and operation of the medical college;

b) The aforementioned college shall not transfer, sell, or convey to a third party;

c) The property mentioned above shall be designated as the "Ramon Lopez Campus," and any money derived from it shall be deposited in the "Ramon Lopez Campus Fund."

Don Ramon's heirs, filed a complaint against Central Philippine University for failing to uphold the terms, seeking the cancellation of the donation, reconveyance, and damages on May 31, 1989. The heirs further claimed that Central Philippine University and the National Housing Authority had agreed to exchange the donated property for another parcel of land that belonged to the latter.

The petitioner claimed that private respondents' ability to file the action had lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner failed to adhere to the resolute conditions that were written on the back of the petitioner's certificate of title without a specific deadline for doing so.

HELD:

Yes. According to Art. 1181, which deals with conditional obligations, the achievement of rights as well as the extinction or loss of those already attained depend on the fulfillment of the conditional event. As a result, it is a definitive agreement when one person lends land to another subject to the latter's construction of a school on the property. Prior to the fulfillment of the requirement, the donation had to be valid. The contribution may be canceled and any rights the donee may have obtained will be declared lost and terminated if the requirement was not met, as is the case in the present instance.

The petitioner has already had more time than a reasonable fifty (50) years to take advantage of the chance to fulfill the requirement, even if it is onerous, in order to make the contribution in its favor permanently legal. Petitioner has completely cut off on its duty as donee for an unreasonable amount of time and failed to fulfill its commitment. Therefore, it is only fair and just to pronounce the subject donation already invalid and canceled for all intents and purposes, requiring the petitioner, as donee, to reconvey the given property back to the donor's heirs, who are the private respondents in this case.

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EL BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA

G.R. No. L-11390

March 26, 1918

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged numerous tracts of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Engracio left the Philippines after that and went back to China, where he passed away on January 29, 1810. The mortgage holder subsequently started the foreclosure process, but because the defendant is a non-resident, notice had to be given by publishing. Additionally, it was ordered that a copy of the summons be sent to the defendant at his or her last-known address, which is in Amoy, China. Whether the Clerk complies with this requirement is not shown. Nevertheless, the case continued following publication in a Manila-based newspaper, and judgment by default was granted.

The verdict was also made public, and following that, a public auction with the bank as the highest bidder was held. The court approved this sale on August 7, 1908. Vicente Palanca, acting as the administrator of the original defendant's estate, filed a move around seven years after the sale was approved, asking the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment as well as to throw out all future proceedings. The foundation of this application was that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the matter at hand, hence the order of default and the judgment entered in response were invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action.

RULING:

A party may voluntarily attend in court and submit to the judge's authority, or the court may exercise its coercive power on the individual to obtain jurisdiction over them.

The establishment of legal proceedings wherein, pursuant to special legal provisions, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective may result in jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the litigation, as can the seizure of the property under legal process, bringing it into the actual custody of the law. In the latter circumstance the property, though at all times within the prospective power of the court, may never be taken into real custody at all.

In attachment proceedings, where the property is taken at the outset of the action, or at some later stage of its course, and held to abide the final event of the lawsuit, an illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure can be discovered. The process to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land serves as an example of what we refer to as potential jurisdiction over the res. Here, the court, without actually taking physical possession of the property, assumes, at the request of someone claiming to be the owner, to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over the property and to decide the title in the petitioner's favor against everyone else.

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PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMES. JOSEFINA ANG CHAY AND MERCEDITA ANG CHAY, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES,

VS.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. L-28507 July 31, 1970

FACTS:

Paz Sta. Ana, a Filipino national, was Jose Hernandez's widow. In 1934, she entered into a second marriage, this time with a Chinese man named Alejandro Ang Chay. Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay are the products of this second marriage. However, Paz and Alejandro decided to live apart from one another in 1939, leaving the two kids with the mother.

The two girls were registered as "Josefina Hernandez" and "Mercedita Hernandez" by Paz. They used the same name to complete education, find employment, file income taxes, and cast ballots. The two had always thought of themselves as Filipinos until their mother told them in January 1966 that their father is Chinese and that their real surname is Ang Chay. Following the Secretary of Justice's opinion allowing delayed registration of elections of Philippine citizenship in some meritorious cases, petitioners signed statements electing Philippine citizenship and took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. These documents were duly registered in the Civil Register of Manila on 9 February 1966.

Josefina and Mercedita submit a petition on February 23, 1966, asking to have their names changed to Josefina Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez, respectively. They want to adopt Filipino names by adding their last names "From the time they began attending school until they completed their education and entered the workforce, Ang Chay changed to "Hernandez," the last name by which they have become widely recognized.

After the hearing, a decision in favor of the petitioners was made, and it was decided to alter their last names from "Ang Chay" to "Hernandez." "for all intents and purposes under the law. On the question of the propriety and viability of the grounds for the petitioners' action for a name change, the Republic of the Philippines filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners be allowed to continue using the surname Hernandez?

RULING:

Yes. A person requesting a name change must first demonstrate proper cause or a compelling justification for doing so because it is a privilege and not a matter of right. And what might qualify as a proper and compelling reason will rely on the specifics of each case and the trial court's judgment.

The petitioners' ongoing use of the names by which they are recognized and with which they have always conducted their different social and professional activities in good faith is legitimately justified in the current action. The petitioners had no idea that their father was Chinese or that their correct last names should have been Ang Chay. Petitioners have been carrying the family name, "Hernandez"; that they finished their schooling and got employments, voted in the local and national elections, and paid their income taxes, under that surname.

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FEDERICO YLARDE AND ADELAIDA DORONIO, PETITIONERS,VS.

EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO AND COURT OFAPPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

FACTS:

Edgardo Aquino worked as a teacher in the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan, which was run by Mariano Soriano. Aquino made the decision to assist in clearing the area where there were some concrete blocks left over from the old school shop that had been demolished during World War II. After class, he gathered 18 of his male students, who were between the ages of 10 and 11, and had them dig a hole to bury the stone next to a one-ton concrete block. He called four of the 18 students, including Novelito Ylarde, the next day to finish the excavation.

Aquino and his four students exited the hole once the depth was appropriate for the concrete block. While he went to meet another teacher for the key to the school workroom where he can acquire some rope, Aquino left the kids in charge of leveling the loose earth. He warned the kids "not to touch the stone" before departing. Three of the kids jumped into the pit gleefully after he left. Then, suddenly, the last one leaped onto the top of the concrete block, causing it to slip toward the aperture. Sadly, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall and died 3 days later as a result. A lawsuit for damages was brought against the two by Ylarde's parents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages?

RULING:

According to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, at an academic institution only the instructor shall be held accountable for the crimes committed by their students, however in an arts and trades institution, only the institution's leader should be. In other words, except in cases where a technical school is involved, the director of such institution will be held accountable for the actions of its pupils. In accordance with the Reddendo Sinquilis Canon, the term "teachers" should be applied to "pupils and students" and the term "heads of institutions of arts and trades" to "apprentices."

The private respondent Aquino's careless act of leaving his students in such a hazardous location had a direct causative relationship with the death of the youngster Ylarde. It was only natural for the kids to play when they were left alone. Everything that happened was a natural and likely result of private respondent Aquino's careless actions. It goes without saying that if it weren't for the unsafe scenario that private respondent Aquino produced, which put the lives of all the students involved in genuine danger, the child Ylarde would not have perished.

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ZENAIDA MEDINA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, FELICIANO CASERO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

VS.

DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

FAUSTO D. LAQUIAN FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

MAXIMINO Q. CANLAS FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

G.R. No. L-26953              

March 28, 1969

Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)

FACTS:

Joseph Casero was born to petitioner Zenaida Medina on February 4, 1961, at the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, which respondent Dra owned and ran. Single Venancia Makabali helped with the delivery. The third child Zenaida had with Feliciano Casero, a married man, was a boy.

The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali was born to be. The latter cared for Joseph as if he were her own child and had Dra cure his poliomyelitis at her expense. Fe del Mundo was sent to school and cared for in Manila while he was getting better. The child's true mother did not visit or support him at any time from birth until August 1966.

The trial revealed that petitioner Zenaida Medina cohabited with Feliciano Casero and her two other children, ostensibly with the consent of Casero's legal wife, who lives elsewhere, even though the children of both women get along well. The trial also revealed that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic and that Zenaida herself makes between 4 and 5 pesos per day.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petition for  rights and duties of parents and children should go to the petitioner (parent)

RULING:

After removing from Dra. The Court determined that it was in the child's best interest to remain with his foster mother and rejected the writ requested. Makabali a pledge to give the kid a free option of whoever to live with when he turns 14 years old. As was already mentioned, the real mother appealed.

It is implied that the reason the respondent won't give up the boy is to force the petitioner to foot the bill for the child's upbringing. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Given Zenaida's limited resources, Makabali was aware (at least during the trial) that any expectation on her behalf is illusory, but she nonetheless indicated her readiness to look out for and teach him.

No evidence of an abuse of discretion has been presented; rather, the challenged order is justified by fact and law, and as such, we hold that it should be upheld. Appellant incurs costs.

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MOSSESGELD VS. CA

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)

FACTS:

Marissa Mossesgeld, a single woman, gave birth to a child in 1989. Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan was the name given to the infant on the birth certificate, which was signed by the father, Eleazar Calasan, a married lawyer, as the informant. Eleazar also signed an affidavit admitting his fatherhood for the child.

Eleazar personally delivered the certificate of live birth to the Mandaluyong civil registrar's office for registration because the hospital administrator refused to write Calasan as the child's surname on the certificate. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.

Eleazar requested a mandamus order from the Regional Trial Court of Pasig to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to use his surname on the birth certificate of his purportedly illegitimate kid. The petition was rejected by RTC. Later, he substituted the child's mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner in a motion for leave to amend and to admit revised petition. MR was rejected. The decision was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

RULING:

No. Illegitimate children must use their mother's last name, be under her parental control, and be eligible for support in accordance with this Code, according to Article 176 of the Philippine Family Code.

Whether the father acknowledges paternity or not, this is the rule. Therefore, even with the purported father's assent, the Local Civil Registrar appropriately declined to register the certificate of live birth of the petitioner's illegitimate child using his surname. Of course, the putative father, despite being a long-married guy, is allowed to officially adopt his own child. In the event of adoption, the child should be regarded as the adopter's legal child and shall be permitted to use the adopter's last name.

The provisions of Article 366 of the Philippine Civil Code, which granted a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the father's surname, have been virtually repealed by the Family Code. The categories of recognised natural children and natural children by legal fiction have been eliminated as the Family Code only recognizes legitimate and illegitimate children.

Even with the approval of the father, a mandamus cannot be used to force the local civil registrar to enter the father's surname on the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child. Mandamus cannot be used to force someone to do something that is against the law.

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HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE

G.R. No. 198680

July 8, 2013

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be roved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

FACTS:

The Ypons sued respondent Ricaforte, also known as "Gaudioso E. Ypon," in an action for cancellation of title and reconveyance with damages (the subject complaint) (Gaudioso). They claimed in their complaint that Magdaleno left certain lots upon his intestate and childless death. To the detriment of the petitioners, who are Magdaleno's collateral relations and successors-in-interest, Gaudioso, who asserted to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication and caused the revocation of the aforementioned certificates of title.

In his response, Gaudioso claimed that his certificate of live birth, two letters from the Polytechnic School, and a certified true copy of his passport were proof that he was the legally recognized son of Magdaleno. In addition, he asserted that the petitioners have no legal grounds to sue him, the complaint does not establish a cause of action, and the case is not being brought by the genuine parties-in-interest because there is no evidence that the petitioners have been legally recognized as Magdaleno's heirs.

Due to a lack of a cause of action, RTC dismissed the case. It stated that even though the plaintiffs in the case had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a prior special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be regarded as the decedent's compulsory heirs. On the contrary, Gaudioso had satisfactorily established through the documentary evidence he provided that he is Magdaleno's son and, therefore, his compulsory heir. The Court also refused their move for reconsideration due to the counsel's failure to specify the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued. Thus, the current petition, which only addresses pure legal issues, was promptly appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper

RULING:

Yes, because the petitioners in a prior special action for heirship reasons failed to prove their link to Magdaleno.

The general rule is that, rather than in a regular suit to reclaim ownership and/or possession, the identification of the decedent's legitimate heirs must be done in the appropriate special proceeding for that purpose.

A civil action is one in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the prevention or redress of a wrong, while a special proceeding is a remedy in which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a specific fact. This definition is found in Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Since the petitioners in this case are looking to create a status or right, it is blatantly obvious that the declaration of heirship can only be made in a special proceeding.

For practical reasons, there are some exceptions to the general rule. For example, when the parties in a civil case voluntarily submitted the issue of heirship to the trial court and had already provided their evidence therein, and the RTC had subsequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been started but had been finally closed and terminated and could not be re-opened.

None of the aforementioned exclusions or others of a similar sort seem to apply in this situation.

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MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO

vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES

G.R. No. 132537October 14, 2005

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)

FACTS:

Rice property in Nueva Vizcaya was given to Marietta dela Cruz Sta by Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (dead), the mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo. Ines. When Marietta was in charge of the rice fields, Josephine and Socorro sought an accounting of the harvest as well as the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) for the land.

Marietta was found guilty by the trial court, and it was mandated that she hand over the owner's copy of the TCT and pay restitution. A writ of execution was issued in order to collect damages, and as a result, a plot of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta's name was auctioned at a public auction, with Josephine placing the highest price. Hinahon, Marietta's husband, and their children filed a complaint with the Nueva Vizcaya Regional Trial Court (RTC) seeking the cancellation of the sale on the grounds that the house and lot that was sold at public auction was their home and was therefore exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property can be sold.

RULING:

Yes. The family home is protected from execution, forced sale, or attachment under article 155 of the Family Code, according to the Supreme Court, with the exception of debts committed before the family home was established. While the respondent maintains that the house and land was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not regarded constituted as such at the time Marietta accumulated her obligations.

According to established legal precedent, it can only be considered to have been established as the family residence when the Family Code went into effect on August 3, 1988. Marietta's liability started years before the levied property was designated as the family residence in 1988 because the case against her was filed in 1986 for actions taken as early as 1977. Marietta's debt comes under the exception described in Article 155 of the Family Code: obligations accrued before the establishment of the family home.

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SIMON R. PATERNO, PETITIONER, v. DINA MARIE LOMONGO PATERNO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 213687

January 08, 2020

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)

FACTS:

Dina Marie Lomongo and Simon Paterno had been wed for more than ten years when Paterno departed the house in 1998. Lomongo said he had left her for another woman. Simon submitted a petition asking for his marriage to be declared completely null and void. It was finally accepted two years later, finding that both partners were psychologically unable to uphold their marriage commitments. The decision was made to be final, leaving the issue of how the union's assets would be divided, liquidated, and delivered to their daughter to be resolved. Throughout her testimony, Lomongo discussed the riches she and Paterno had accumulated during their ten-year marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all properties acquired by the spouses prior to the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage under Article 146 of the family Code were co-owned by them pursuant to Article 147.

RULING:

The co-ownership of properties acquired during the union is not something the parties assert that is covered by Article 147. In the Valides case, this was said. Despite the fact that they are already legally divorced, the petitioner's reasoning suggests that whatever property they both acquire before the judicial declaration will fall under the co-ownership system as long as they are legally wed until a court declares their union to be null and void. The petitioner should be informed, however, of the legal effect of a confirmation of a void ab initio marriage: it is retroactive to the time of the marriage ceremony.  In summary, the marriage ceremony was nullified as if no marriage had taken place when the trial court deemed her marriage to Paterno void in 2005 due to both parties' psychological incapacitance. 

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NAGUIAT V. CA

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)

FACTS:

Naguiat approved Queao's request for a loan from them in the amount of P200,000.00. On August 11, 1980, Naguiat endorsed to Queao Associated Bank Check No. 090990, dated August 11, 1980, for the sum of P95,000.00. The Corporate Resources Financing Corporation had already issued the check to Naguiat. In addition, she issued her own Filmanbank Check No. 065314, payable to Queao and dated August 11, 1980, for P95,000.00. The money from these checks was to be used as collateral for the loan Naguiat gave to Queao.

Queao signed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on August 11, 1980, in favor of Naguiat as collateral for the loan and sent the latter the owners' duplicates of the titles of the mortgaged properties. The mortgage deed was notarized on the same day, and Queao issued a promissory note to Naguiat for P200,000.00, with interest accruing at 12% annually and due on September 11 of the following year. Additionally, Queao issued a Security Bank and Trust Company check for P200,000.00, postdated September 11, 1980, and made payable to the order of Naguiat.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Queao had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be covered by the two checks Naguiat had issued or endorsed.

RULING:

The court ruled that the notarized documents' inherent presumption of truthfulness is rebuttable since it is subject to clear and persuasive evidence to the contrary, as it was in this instance.

Naguiat, on the other hand, provided zero proof that the cheques she issued or endorsed were ever cashed or deposited. The lending contract was not perfected by the simple act of issuing the checks. Because it is stated in the Civil Code that the delivery of bills of exchange and other commercial papers, such checks, only has the effect of payment once they have been cashed. The loan contract cannot be considered complete until the checks have achieved the impact of payment. The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the perfection of the contract of loan. Since Naguiat presented no such proof, it follows that the checks were not encashed or credited to Queaos account.

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ANTONIO PEREZ v. ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ

G.R. No. L-14874

September 30, 1960

Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son, Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff’s wife and Benigno’s mother. It is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on a young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason, acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be declared a prodigal and placed under guardianship; that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the continued waste and dissipation of her properties. After this was done, the trial court, by order of September 30, 1958, ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present proceedings.

RULING:

While Article 116 of the Civil Code states that, "When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief.

The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper. Because regardless of the parties, the Court, at any time, could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had jurisdiction, and could dismiss the case if it found it had no power to act therein. The ordered appealed from is hereby affirmed.

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AHERN v. JULIAN

GR No. 13952

February 6, 1919

Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. (178a)

FACTS:

The objector, Torribio Julian, a judgment creditor who was seeking payment under his judgment, opposed the petitioner's discharge on the grounds that a specific piece of land registered in the name of the petitioner's wife, Sofronia Garcia de Ahern, is in fact marital community property under the terms of article 1407 of the civil code. The petitioner, William Ahern, filed for voluntary insolvency from his garage business in Manila. The petitioner's attorney is adamant that the facts on file tends to demonstrate that all of this land was owned separately by Ahern's wife and not by the community. a Court of First Instance ruling may be appealed to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in Cabanatuan be considered communal property.

RULING:

The petitioner should be forced to list the Cabanatuan property on his schedule of assets or as property that is subject to the payment of his debts, the court agrees with the trial judge. When the law places the burden of proof on the party, requiring them to prove the legitimacy of the transaction against a presumption of fraud, it is their job to present this court with a full and accurate account of all the facts surrounding the case if they want to be believed. Petitioner didn't succeed in doing so. The court upholds the CFI's decision.

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CONCHA C. APACIBLE and ESPERANZA AGUILAR, Petitioner v. MARIA CASTILLO,  Respondent

GR No. 49041

March 20, 1944

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)

FACTS:

On July 22, 1915, Maria Castillo was born in Manila. Her parents, Vicente Castillo(who died in Balayan, Batangas on May 10, 1939) and Juana Malayto, lived as husband and wife for several years without being married in holy wedlock. On August 21, 1915, Vicente Castillo reported Maria Castillo's birth to the Bureau of Health and signed the required form of the birth certificate certifying his paternity. Vicente Castillo and the petitioner Esperanza Aguilar got married five months later, on December 23, 1915.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the voluntary acknowledgement contained in the certificate of birth, is void for lack of judicial approval as required by Article 133 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. Even though Article 133 of the Civil Code's second paragraph, which states that "The approval of the court, to be granted after hearing the prosecuting officer, shall be necessary to the acknowledgment of a minor, unless such acknowledgment is made in a certificate of birth or in a will," is still in effect and that the court's approval of the acknowledgment of a minor child may be obtained under that provision, the absence of such approval may be made up by the child's consent given. And that in the current instance Maria Castillo expressly petitioned the court to consider her as such and to permit her to participate in Vicente Castillo's intestacy as an heir of his, in addition to continuing to accept the status of an acknowledged natural daughter of Vicente Castillo after she had reached majority.

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ANTONIO A. S. VALDES v. RTC

GR No. 122749

1996-07-31

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)

FACTS:

Consuelo Gomez and Antonio Valdes had five children together. In accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code, Valdes requested and received a declaration of the nullity of the marriage. According to Article 147 of the Family Code and in accordance with Articles 50, 51, and 52, the judgment awarded includes child custody and the liquidation of their shared assets. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification and stated that the family code contained no rules on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage".

ISSUE:

Whether or not circumstances where the parties are psychologically incapacitated are covered under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes. When a man and a woman, who are not legally prohibited from getting married, solely cohabitate as husband and wife under a null marriage or without the advantages of marriage, the terms of Article 147 apply. Any "male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the impediments indicated in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code is considered to be "capacitated" in the sense of having the legal competence to enter into a marriage.

The laws on equal co-ownership will apply to property obtained by both spouses via their employment and industry under this property regime. There is a presumption that whatever property acquired during the union was done so with their combined labor. If a party's "effort consisted in the care and upkeep of the family household," that party will still be regarded as having jointly contributed to the purchase of the property.

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MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. BEING THE JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENTS

G.R. No. 137567

June 20, 2000

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

FACTS:

In order to declare their marriage null and void due to their psychological incapacity, the petitioner filed. Charmaine Felix, the petitioner's wife, claimed that the petitioner left the marital residence and moved in with Milagros Salting. Following that, Charmaine lodged a concubinage-related criminal complaint. The petitioner submitted a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case to prevent the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. The petitioner claimed that the criminal case's resolution was adversely affected by the civil lawsuit that was pending to declare his marriage null and void. The aforementioned request was turned down by Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes. The petitioner's request for reconsideration was also turned down.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for a declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity is pending is a crucial issue that should justify the suspension of the concubinage criminal case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court determines that the petitioner's argument is without merit. It is not relevant to the concubinage issue whether the petitioner's marriage has been declared null and void or not. It must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts on which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in order to justify the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case.

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TEODORO C. TORTONA v. JULIAN C. GREGORIO

GR No. 202612

2018-01-17



Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

FACTS:

This case stems from a supposedly executed Deed of Absolute Sale between sisters Rufina, the putative seller, and Rafaela, the alleged buyer. Respondents are Rafaela's heirs, while petitioners are Rufina's heirs. Rufina and Rafaela shared two pieces of land with their siblings over their lifespan. They each received a 1/10 part of a parcel in Longos Bacoor Cavite in equal, undivided portions. In Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, they also split equally in undivided 1/5 shares of a second parcel.

The petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of real property with damages sometime in 1997. They claimed their cousin Emilio made them an offer of balato for the first parcel's sale to the DPWH. Emilio claimed that the two homes had previously been sold by Rufina to Rafaela throughout their lifetimes, according to the respondent. The petitioners emphasized the fact that their mother was illiterate and couldn't even write her own name. They said that she only signed documents with her thumbprint and that she was always helped by at least one of her kids. As a result, they argued that if the sales to Rafaela were real, they ought to have been aware of them.

Additionally, the petitioners called NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez, who performed an investigation to establish the veracity of the disputed thumbprints on the Deed of Absolute Sale, as a witness.

He mentioned that he contrasted the thumbprints in question with Rufina's actual thumbprints found in the accepted documents. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale as null and void. Gomez noted that "the purported thumb marks of Rufina in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale were not identical with her standard thumb marks in the standard documents" and came to the conclusion that "the thumbmarks appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale were not impressed by Rufina."

CA reversed it decision and found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court's conclusions were suspect. It held that, ultimately, petitioners failed to prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that the thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by Rufina, the seller, and Rafaela, the buyer, is void since Rufina never agreed to it and because the thumb prints she appears to have put on it are fake.

RULING:

In this scenario, the disputed Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. It gains from the assumption of regularity as a result. The party contesting its implementation must show that thumbprints added to it by a pretend party are fake and fabricated. The obligation therefore shifts to the petitioners to establish, through clear and convincing evidence, that the thumbprints of the seller, as they appear on the Deed of Absolute Sale, are fabricated and not those of their mother.

The petitioners were successful in meeting their obligation to provide persuasive proof of forgery. The petitioners themselves narrated in an honest way how their illiterate mother never handled her property without the help of one of her kids. They provided documents with their mother's thumbprints on them, indicating that at least one of them was there to help her, as proof of this. When these same documents were compared to the disputed Deed of Absolute Sale, it was clear that the thumb prints on the latter were fake.

The common presumption that notarized documents were properly performed may have supported the case of the respondents, but this presumption must be overturned in light of the substantially stronger evidence provided by the petitioners. As opposed petitioners' proof, all that respondents produced was the testimony of the notarizing lawyer, whose own activities are tainted with suspicion.

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JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 227605

December 05, 2019

JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 227605

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

FACTS:

In 2002, Minoru Takahashi and Juliet were wed in Manila. After ten years and a soured relationship, Juliet and Minoru were given a divorce report by the mayor of Fukuyama City.

Juliet subsequently submitted a petition to recognize the Divorce Report. The Divorce Report from May 22, 2012, as well as the Certificate of All Matters and its English translation, were among the papers submitted by the petitioner. However, the RTC rejected her plea. According to the RTC, Juliet was the one who obtained the divorce decree, which is against Philippine law. She was unable to submit the divorce decree itself, and the divorce report cannot serve as a substitute for the actual divorce order. The CA rejected Juliet's appeal after siding with the RTC.

She argues in her petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court that she and her husband filed the divorce report rather than the RTC's claim that she alone obtained the divorce because she has trouble comprehending Japanese. The Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters met the Rules of Court's criteria for demonstrating foreign documents because the Japanese embassy properly verified them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Filipino wife who filed for divorce abroad is eligible to submit a petition for the Philippines to recognize the divorce judgment.

RULING:

The Court approved the petition but remanded the matter to the lower court so that an examination of whether Japanese law had been sufficiently established could take place. It was decided that even if the petitioner had obtained the divorce decree, this did not work against her because the purpose of Article 26 of the Family Code is to prevent situations where a foreign national who has been granted divorce would have his or her Filipino spouse still legally wedded. The Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters' authentication by the Japanese embassy was also deemed to be sufficient conformity with the rules on the authenticity of foreign documents.