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Sleeping Giants:  Why the Department of Homeland Security poses the greatest threat to our privacy

With the exponential reliance on technology comes an exponential sharing of our data. Consider this app, which is used to predict periods and provide fertility information to users. On the one hand, it helps its users predict fertility, the symptoms that may be prevalent during pregnancy, accompanying moods, change in libido, vaginal secretions and so forth, which may allow users to become more familiar with their bodies and take control of their reproductive health.  On the other, it provides companies with essential data which they use to strategically market products that are related to menstruation, pregnancy, or even to bolster political initiatives like those that seek to abolish abortions and restrict bodily autonomy (Glenza, 2019). Many people consider this privacy theft or express the sentiment that this gathering of data by businesses and companies is unethical. However, when discussing privacy concerns, the most dangerous entity to make use of one’s data is law enforcement as seen through the Department of Homeland Security’s current use of people’s data.  

Before delving into what makes law enforcement’s access to data so alarming, we must make ourselves aware of some of the core issues at hand when addressing privacy.  In unearthing the details of the recent Cambridge Analytical scandal, a very specific term arose - ‘psychographic targeting’. Psychographic targeting refers to the ability to ‘target’ consumers (in this case the population of the United States which used Facebook) based on a ‘digital footprint of human behavior’ which had been amassed by assessing user data to answer the question of why we like what we like. Psychographics is concerned with “understanding cognitive attributes, such as customer emotions, values, and attitudes, among other psychological factors” - including strong emotional responses (CBI Insights, 2019).  This data exists within the links we click, what we say in comments and what we comment on, our ‘likes’ and ‘loves’, what pages we ‘follow’, who we ‘follow’, the conversations we have with people in instant and direct messages, what time of day we access social media, how often we do so, for how long, and many other behaviors we may feel are innocuous or private and personal.  

The cataloging and utilization of these behaviors has been supported by companies seeking to use the information for profit – be that payment by political campaigns such as Trump in 2016 and the period-tracker app listed above, or companies which provide services or products and hope to present their product in an opportune time and place to those that are more likely to purchase.  This data accumulation for profit has become intrinsic in our market to the degree that it has been coined Surveillance Capitalism - a “form of information capitalism that aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control” (Zuboff, 2015).  This profit motive allowed the widespread ability to continuously surveil and document the global population on an individual level.  The seemingly ubiquitous data collection for profit has been highly contested in public discourse.

Unlike corporations, the majority of society has already accepted the dominion of bodies of law enforcement. Law enforcement has the means to forcibly detain and, in many cases, end the lives of anyone they decide is a ‘threat’ with extensive militarized and social backing.  Engaging with social media provides law enforcement with information that can erroneously be used to irrevocably alter or end the lives of ourselves or others.  We are watching this unfold before our eyes in cases of the inhuman enactment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainment and deportation of immigrants and targeting of activists who aim to limit such actions.

While it appears that Facebook is attempting to limit access to data by many corporations, this does not apply to the law enforcement agency ICE.  Dating as far back as 2012 and as recently as April of this year, DHS has been utilizing data collected via social media.  A recent review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Social Media Monitoring conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice found eight ‘common threads’ to categorize this surveillance:

1. “Social media information is collected from travelers, including Americans, even when they are not suspected of any connection to illegal activity.”  In 2016, DHS began asking those traveling to the United States to voluntarily provide their social media identifiers – over 23 million people annually.

2. “Social media checks extend to travelers’ family, friends, business associates, and social media contacts.”  In conducting a background check on those seeking entry to the United States, DHS identifies those that the individual contacts most frequently and surveys those individuals for potential concerns, including downloading the entirety of their social media data via Twitter, Facebook, etc.

3. “DHS frequently uses social media information for vague and open-ended evaluations that can be used to target unpopular views or populations” Specifically those from countries with high Muslim populations including refugee applicants from “Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, as well as North Korea”.  This was illustrated as recently as last month when news stories appeared discussing a Harvard student who was denied entry to the US at Logan airport in Boston due to social media content posted by people the student was connected to on social media (Keane, 2019).

4. “DHS is continuously monitoring some people inside the United States and plans to expand these efforts.”  DHS monitors those who have come to the U.S. after their entry to watch for any changes in status, even if they have been deemed to not be any sort of ‘threat’ whatsoever.

5. “DHS is increasingly seeking and using automated tools to analyze social media.”  DHS uses tools provided by data-collection firms such as Palantir to aggregate data and assess any patterns or concerns.

6. “Social media information collected for one purpose is used by DHS in a range of other contexts, increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation.” Much of the risk-assessment designation software has proven to be flawed and passes through many sources, leading to something akin to a game of telephone.

7. “Social media information collected by DHS is shared with other law enforcement and security agencies under broad standards.” DHS has shown itself to be less-than-judicial in its discernment of who it provides an individual’s data with for further analysis, providing slim and wobbly justification for such sharing.

8. “DHS systems retain information for long periods, sometimes in violation of the department’s own rules.” DHS often holds on to the entirety of one’s social media history far exceeding set standards, which creates an opportunity for the inevitable cultural evolution to change the context of content.  What means one thing in 2007 may mean something wholly different in the year 2020 (Levinson-Waldmen, Patel, DenUyl, & Koreh, 2019).

These conclusions are staggering, and the information collected is already being put to use.

In early 2017, ICE agents utilized data acquired via Facebook and the data-analytics firm Palantir to locate an immigrant suspected of ‘criminal activity’.  Earlier this year it obtained cellphone information from an immigrant it was pursuing in Detroit from the app and ran it through high-grade surveillance software to aid in locating the individual for deportation. It collects photos of individuals engaging in ‘suspicious behavior’ - wearing clothes ICE associated with gang colors or mannerisms which can be used in conjunction with highly-flawed facial recognition software (Fang, 2018). It compiles data regarding ‘anti-trump’ protests and organizers of such events, photos and locations of advocates of migrant rights.  These examples are limited in comparison with what is known about these data surveillance activities, and likely represent a drop in the bucket when held up against what remains unknown.

When confronted with these incredibly dangerous privacy concerns, it brings the question of what we may do as an individual to protect against such gargantuan threats to our privacy.  While many call for government oversight, the government cannot be entrusted as they themselves are guilty of mismanaging and using our data for unjust activities which directly limit our freedom.  It could be easily said that the United States government is structurally reliant on tools which oppress and control the population.  For these reasons any action on behalf of lawmakers may prove a further disservice to upholding the privacy of Americans.

On the individual level, in addressing self-regulation, there are myriad formulas for attempting to maintain personal privacy and retain control of ones’ safety and autonomy.  The first step in combatting data collection is to be conscious of the issues at hand and aware of what it is we are posting.  Tagging other users, location data, photos of faces which can be run through facial recognition software, hashtags such as #blacklivesmatter are all trackable and open to data accumulation which may prove to have consequences. There are alternative messaging platforms available to avoid the use of iMessage, WhatsApp, and messaging services provided by social media platforms.  Signal is a prime example of such. Signal limits the storage of user data, is encrypted, allows for user-set limits for how long messages stay on your device, and is very easy to use.  Unlike other end-to-end encrypted messaging apps such as WhatsApp and iMessage, Signal does not upload any information to a cloud nor parent company.  This was substantiated by a recent government subpoena wherein Signal was forced to hand over its data.  In doing so it was revealed that Signal only retains “phone number, account creation date, and time of user’s last connection.” (Jeong, 2017) While this is pretty minimal compared to the majority of apps, it still leaves a trail.

Unfortunately, despite the efforts we attempt at safeguarding our privacy, the reality is that it may already be too late.  Due to the retention of backlogs, deleting profiles is not likely to be a sufficient measure of protection.  There is also evidence that those who do not use social media are subject to profiling through data provided by their friends who do.  Computational social scientist David Garcia, discovered that using data provided by active users, “he could predict characteristics such as the marital status and sexual orientation of users’ friends who were not on the social media network”.  He describes the interactions we have on and offline to be similar to touching each other with wet paint – no matter the amount of interactions, nor how long ago, one will be able to discern which layer and color of paint corresponds to your hand (Brookshire, 2017).  The fact of the matter is, that the mechanisms which support these threats are large and sturdy.  Shoshana Zuboff describes the process thusly:

These new institutional facts have been allowed to stand for a variety of reasons: they were constructed at high velocity and designed to be undetectable. Outside a narrow realm of experts, few people understood their meaning. Structural asymmetries of knowledge and rights made it impossible for people to learn about these practices.  

This disparity stood as consumers became increasingly reliant on new tools, and with no precedents to look to, there were no effective barriers against such dangerous sharing.  By the time the general layman became aware of those dangers, the tools we had accepted were at that point necessary for social engagement, and the technology far beyond our ability to curtail.  We had already shared so much it was too late to put the genie back in the bottle.    

It would seem we are at an impasse.  We are at a stage wherein we are finally becoming aware of the dangerous implications of our own actions.  Concurrently, we are dependent on the very systems which jeopardize and utilize the most nuanced aspects of our personal activities and tendencies.  These matters are combined with an incredibly frightening time in U.S. history wherein people are again subject to unlawful detainment by the Department of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement.  This compounds and intensifies the stakes greatly.  In addressing these concerns, an individual will not be able to combat such forces on their own and there are no “life hacks” to come to our rescue.  If there is any hope for us to regain ‘privacy’, it will take immense collective action to stop the speeding train of data collection and surveillance capitalism.

References

Brookshire, B. (2017, August 24). On social media, privacy is no longer a personal choice. Retrieved from https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/scicurious/social-media-privacy-no-longer-personal-choice?tgt=nr

Fang, L. (2019, April 29). Homeland Security Used a Private Intelligence Firm to Monitor Family Separation Protests. Retrieved from https://theintercept.com/2019/04/29/family-separation-protests-surveillance/

Glenza, J. (2019, May 30). Revealed: women's fertility app is funded by anti-abortion campaigners. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/30/revealed-womens-fertility-app-is-funded-by-anti-abortion-campaigners

Jeong, S. (2017, November 27). The Motherboard Guide to Avoiding State Surveillance. Retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a37m4g/the-motherboard-guide-to-avoiding-state-surveillance-privacy-guide

Keane, S. (2019, September 6). Harvard student gets to classes after being denied US entry over friends' social media posts. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/harvard-student-gets-into-us-after-entry-denied-over-friends-social-media-posts/

Levinson-Waldmen, R., Patel, F., DenUyl, S., & Koreh, R. (2019). Social Media Monitoring: How the Department of Homeland Security Uses Digital Data in the Name of National Security. Social Media Monitoring: How the Department of Homeland Security Uses Digital Data in the Name of National Security. Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019_DHS-SocialMediaMonitoring_FINAL.pdf

(2019, April 4). Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media Directive 110-01. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/publication/privacy-policy-operational-use-social-media-directive-110-01

Staff, W. I. R. E. D. (2018, March 22). The Cambridge Analytica Story, Explained. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/amp-stories/cambridge-analytica-explainer/

(2019, April 18). What Is Psychographics? Understanding The 'Dark Arts' Of Marketing That Brought Down Cambridge Analytica. Retrieved from https://www.cbinsights.com/research/what-is-psychographics/

Zuboff, S. M., Möllers, N. M., Wood, D. M., & Lyon, D. M. (2015). Surveillance Capitalism: An Interview with Shoshana Zuboff. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 257–266. doi: 10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.13238

[skoolthangs]

Whose privates are these, anyway?

1) After reading our lecture 8 items and watching The Curly Fry Conundrum, discuss the term "self-regulation". 

 The term self-regulation refers to the individual user of social media, taking their privacy concerns into their own hands, and deciding how much personal information they are submitting to media platforms which may use that data and being the moderator of the dispersal of the amount of information of what they share with those who collect data. 

 This is in opposition to the majority of platforms which users interact with, which collect information of browsing data, voice and photo data, 'likes', etc and share that to help advertisers better predict how to get the users' money. That data is incredibly lucrative, making social media users sought after, as Jennifer Golbeck stated in reference to a statement made about Facebook, "The users aren't the customer they're the product". Self-regulation is users curating what content they provide to internet platforms which may be subject to use and sale by and for such platforms.

 2) Currently, there is a huge battle between 1st amendment privacy, information sharing, and data mining online. In your opinion, should we do away with online privacy and just self regulate ourselves? Or should the government step in and start regulating online content?

 In my opinion, a government which was not controlled by capitalist pursuit would not allow such issues to arise. However, the government which we are living under at this juncture in the United States is intrinsically capitalist. For that reason 'it' (as though it is some behemoth and not consisting of several moving and equally sustaining parts for other complicated reasons) will not regulate content in a way which protects citizens. 

 I believe that to not regulate oneself is foolhardy. Not simply to protect against those that seek to swindle us out of our bucks, but to protect against the government and police forces. Corporations and this government are equally interested in controlling citizens in order to secure profits. ideally, no information should be bought and sold without users' explicit consent, nor should it be bought and sold without directly benefitting those whose information is being utilized. That would, of course, render the system pointless, however, the rate at which data mining occurs under a guise of some sort is nothing short of reprehensible. 

 Games like Pokemon Go and it's predecessor Ingress provide companies with data regarding the location of gathering points, walking and driving patterns; apps which are marketed to assist women in understanding the symptoms and patterns of their menstrual cycles are surreptitiously omitting their being built to provide intimate information which is utilized by anti-abortion groups; you can mention something in a conversation with your friend and have a keyword picked up by your phone which will alter the advertisements you see; facial recognition software is being applied in several law enforcement agencies nationwide. 

 Any government worth the title would not allow such opportunities for social control, and unfortunately, the average social media consumer does not have a full understanding of how much data they are providing without their intention or permission, nor of routes to pursue to block or avoid the collection of this data. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on a layman to self-regulate in a way that they may wish they had, which leaves it to the governing body, which goes back to my initial point.

[skoolthangs]

Blog Blog Won

Including digital technology in classrooms is a multifaceted issue which bears discourse as it is becoming increasingly commonplace.  I believe the inclusion of digital or online media is a beneficial addition to curriculums. Expanding access to information beyond physical limitations can expose students to ideas and ways of being that otherwise may not be readily apparent.   Normative schooling models are often presented in a hierarchical context with the ‘teacher’ in charge and gatekeeping students’ ability to progress and achieve goals.  Technological acuity can undo these power dynamics and arm students with the ability to find their own information and be exposed to a broader world which is far more enriching than playing into the ‘receiver’ role that pervades education.  

Aside from the work it can do to decolonize learning, it can assist instructors with providing free resources to students, eliminating the need for expensive textbooks as with the classes I have attended thus far at Antioch.    Teachers can avail themselves of content which may be more current, more diverse, or more tailored to individual learning styles than whatever may be at hand.

While I feel that technology enhances learning, it is absolutely worth naming and addressing that if digital technology enhances learning, then those who cannot access media-based devices and the internet are forced out (re: ’the digital divide’), kept in the container of their physical environment.  Schools who cannot afford such materials for their classrooms and students at large already serve populations which are marginalized, and over-penalized from the womb to the tomb.  To set these individuals even further back adds another dimension to the systemic traumas they endure.

Of course, inequity is endemic in the educational system.  It was not designed to support marginalized folks so this is a non-surprising issue.  Regardless of the medium - computerized technology, books, paper, music and art programs, those who ‘have’ will benefit from their access while those who do not will not.

Ideally, people would have equal access to all of the tools that our society at large is gaining dependence on, including digital media.  Due to the increasing dependence and entrenchment of digital technology in our lives at large, powerholding individuals in educational institutions should provide this access to digital technology and comprehensive knowledge of it to themselves and the students they serve.