#(*obscure from a practical perspective not a dynastic one)

[afishtrap]

Historians have debated the nature of pre-modern China's foreign relations since John King Fairbank conceived of a 'Chinese world order' more than thirty years ago.1 The theory 'posited ... a Chinese myth of central superiority',2 by which the Chinese emperor, as the self-proclaimed son of Heaven, extended a benevolent rule over less enlightened barbarian neighbours whose rulers were eager to bask in the glow of Chinese culture and civilization. Scholars have long recognized that the practice fell short of the theory: recent works on particular periods show that the Chinese were more realistic in their approach to foreign affairs than casual perusal of their dynastic histories may suggest.

Swope, Kenneth M. “Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592-1596.“ The International History Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 757-782.

Most modern accounts of the conflict, even from the Chinese perspective, argue that the Chinese acted out of self-interest to preserve a buffer state. Korea guarded the northern approach to the capital; in 1592 as in 1950, the Chinese were loath to allow a powerful enemy to control the east bank of the Yalu River. Thus the Ming, who could have bolstered their own defences and left the Koreans to their fate, chose instead to send tens of thousands of troops and to spend millions of taels of silver in Korea's defence. Throughout the remainder of 1592 and 1593, the Ming court, led by the Wanli emperor, debated how much help China should give to Korea. The emperor, who himself took the decision to help Korea to drive out the Japanese, recognized the Ming's obligation; if they refused their aid, they would not only imperil themselves, but also lose prestige in the eyes of other tributary states. The scale of China's efforts to help Korea, unparalleled in Chinese history, is a testament both to the Ming's acceptance of domino theory and their special relationship with the Yi.

[...]

At the suggestion of the minister of war, Shi Xing (1538-99), the Ming chose a friend of his family, an obscure merchant named Shen Weijing (fl. 1540-97) to parlay with the Japanese. He set out in September for Pyongyang to meet the local Japanese commander, Konishi Yukinaga. At their first meeting, Shen, despite his small retinue, tried to overawe Konishi with his fearlessness and haughty bearing. Having made him a gift of python- embroidered robes, symbol of the wealth and generosity of the Ming, Shen threatened him with a million-man army that would drive the Japanese forces into the sea. When Konishi replied, 'The Koreans have prevented us from re-establishing trade relations and raised troops to hinder us, so we invaded them,' Shen demanded that the Japanese troops should withdraw from Pyongyang as it lay in Ming territory. When Konishi, pointing to the map, stated: 'This is clearly Korea,' Shen replied: 'For a long time they have received our imperial commands and therefore they have many palaces [meaning they enjoy prosperity]; though this may be Korea's land, it still borders the Superior Kingdom. Therefore you may not stay here.' To a statement from Konishi that the Japanese would not withdraw from any territory they held, Shen allegedly replied: 'We can come back with an army of tens of thousands. What do we have to fear from the likes of you?'

The discussion raised the crucial question of the status of Korea. The Japanese, who regarded Korea as an independent state, rejected the Ming claim that, independent or not, it was affiliated with the Chinese empire and, as such, entitled to claim protection. The Koreans themselves, who were not present, could be provocatively ambivalent. When addressing the emperor or high Ming officials, they spoke as if they acknowledged their dependence: when addressing one another, or states such as Ryukyu they considered to be inferior in status within the Chinese tributary system, they implied independence and sometimes paramountcy. Japan they regarded as an equal or as an inferior depending upon the occasion. Certain that Shen had a secret agenda, though uncertain what it might be, and fearful that he would agree to Konishi's demands, Yi officials distrusted both men. They were determined to resist both the partition and the occupation of their territory.

[...]

The meeting between Shen and Konishi set the pattern to be followed for several years. Neither was truthful; each made promises he could not keep on the basis of authority he did not possess; and each misled his own government as well as the other. Nonetheless, they were trying to devise a settlement acceptable to both China and Japan, if not to Korea. The Ming, although willing to recognize Hideyoshi as a vassal king, and invest him with the title of King of Japan, would not allow Japanese troops to remain on Korean soil. If the troops withdrew, however, Konishi could not perpetuate the fiction that the Ming had conceded Hideyoshi's demand for equality as the result of Japan's victory in the war. Judging from subsequent events, Konishi and Shen were trying to buy time by negotiating the troops' graduated withdrawal, in the hope that Hideyoshi would decide that the occupation of Korea was not worth the cost and would settle for the resumption of Japan's formerly lucrative tribute trade with China. Shen hoped that then the Ming need never learn of Hideyoshi's true aim and the crisis in Sino-Japanese relations would be averted.