#Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy Response

[zvaigzdelasas]

Iran is now a “legitimate target” for Israeli missile strikes, one of the country’s most senior ministers has told the Telegraph, raising the prospect of an all-out war with Tehran.

In a wide-ranging interview, Nir Barkat, Israel’s economy minister, also said Palestinians from the West Bank would never be allowed to work in the country again and would be replaced by more than a quarter of a million imported foreign workers.

He also complained that the war in Gaza had not been fought aggressively enough.

Mr Barkat, who is favourite to succeed Benjamin Netanyahu as leader of the ruling Likud party, said Israel could afford to keep fighting and open up a new front with Lebanon, despite the billion shekel (£200 million) a day cost of the conflict.

He said that as “big as the crisis is, it is also a really big opportunity”, with governments around the world needing Israel’s technical expertise to combat global jihadism.[...]

The risk of the war spreading to Lebanon and as far as Iran will alarm Western leaders, with Mr Barkat becoming increasingly influential in the ruling party.

Polls suggest the economy minister would win five more seats than Mr Netanyahu if he replaced him as Likud’s leader.

Mr Barkat, 64, said: “Iran is a legitimate target for Israel. They will not get away with it. The head of the snake is Tehran. My recommendation is to adopt the strategy that President Kennedy used in the Cuban missile crisis. What he basically said then was a missile from Cuba will be answered with a missile to Moscow.[...]

Israel is edging towards a full-blown war with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, having evacuated the north of the country. Mr Barkat said a second war was affordable while “the threat of Hezbollah must be eliminated”.

“Whatever it takes,” he said[...]

The economy is expected to grow by two per cent this year, down from five per cent forecast prior to the war.[...]

As the country lurches to the Right in the aftermath of October 7 and with Mr Netanyahu’s personal ratings plummeting, Mr Barkat appears to be making a play to replace the prime minister as party leader.[...]

Mr Barkat rejected any suggestion that Palestinian labourers, who previously came into Israel daily to work in the construction and other industries, would be allowed to return. Daily crossings for labourers into Israel from the West Bank have been on hold since October 7.

He likened the Palestinian Authority running the West Bank to the Hamas leadership in Gaza.

“You know what the difference is? Nothing,” said Mr Barkat. [...]

Israel has long been reliant on workers coming into the country from Gaza and the West Bank, but Mr Barkat, whose ministry is responsible for the construction industry, said: “We are done with Palestinian employees. The rationale behind it is very simple: we only want foreign employees from peaceful countries. We don’t want employees from enemies.[...]

India is the likeliest target for a recruitment drive with the promise of wages seven to ten times higher than at home. “Everybody wins,” said Mr Barkat.

“If you don’t do what I proposed, it’s as if we didn’t learn the lessons of October 7.”[...]

On the conduct of the war in Gaza and in the face of international condemnation of Israel’s tactics, Mr Barkat said: “Israel is being very cautious[...]

The reality is at certain points in time I prefer a much more aggressive approach.”[...]

["]This is a religious war.” [he said]

24 Jan 24

[usafphantom2]

Photographing the Soviet Union/Russian intentions in Cuba in October 1962

Buddy Leroy Brown flew the U-2 over Cuba. He met with President Kennedy, who shook his hand and said, “You take good photographs, Captain Brown!’Buddy later flew the SR 71 over Vietnam, North Korea, the border of China, and the border of Russia. He was my neighbor at Beale Air Force Base, California. I have the book he left for his family that has never been published. I have shared before about Colonel Brown’s incredible career In the SR-71; this time, I want to share about the U-2.

In August of 1957, as a first lieutenant, he started ground school in preparation for flying the U-2. This time, it was a little different. because he had to learn to use a sextant and how to take his own star shots for Celestial navigation. After a few flight checks, Brown is upgraded to combat-ready. Being combat-ready meant you were ready to go and fly any place in the world safely. Buddy said he said I would like to add something significant here “Being a Reconnaissance pilot, especially in the U-2 you do not have the pleasure or the advice or the council of other people to confer with when things go wrong.

If an emergency happened while you were over hostile territory it was you and only you who would be responsible for making the correct decision on what actions you would take. If your decision was wrong you could cause an international incident and embarrass our government or even cause your death.

” Many places that we flew the targeted government would like nothing better than to have shot you out of the sky.” We were always at WAR we were always at risk. As a U-2 pilot, you were held to a higher level of maturity, flying ability, and responsibility. We were much more worried about making a mistake in our decisions than we were about getting shot down.

NO ONE, And I mean no one wanted to be flown back to Omaha and briefed the Generals on what happened to justify their decision. Buddy goes on to say “In my opinion, reconnaissance is the single most important thing a military can provide. Not only to this country but to the free world. To provide the intentions of a hostile government is so important.”

A simple statement, but during the Cuban crisis, taking pictures of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba revealed the Soviet's intentions and possibly prevented a nuclear war.

More to come about the U-2 during the Cuban missile crisis. part 1

Written by Buddy Brown. Paraphrased by Linda Sheffield

@Habubrats71 via X

[loneberry]

Nuclear War (again)

“Nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.” —John F. Kennedy

On NPR Up First this morning there is an interview with nuclear expert Matthew Bunn from the Harvard Kennedy School, who puts the odds of Putin using nukes at 10 - 20 percent. This is not comforting at all. Even 2 percent is too high.

Some say: Putin won’t use nukes because doing so is irrational—NATO would put him in his place. Well, invading Ukraine was irrational. Implementing a broad conscription was irrational. Yet the most hawkish military commentators inside Russia are consistently getting their way, and they’re now clamoring for the use of nukes. If Putin is faced with battlefield defeat and/or the defeat of his regime, I’m not sure he would see the use of nukes as the most irrational option, especially since every move he makes is predicated on the belief that the west is weak and cowardly.

Let’s play this out. If Putin uses tactical nukes in Ukraine, what will the response be? The most hawkish members of NATO will likely respond militarily. If Poland or one of the Baltic states strikes Russian targets or gets embroiled in a war with Russia, then all of NATO (including the US) will be dragged in under Article 5 of NATO (the principle of collective defense). The distance on the escalation ladder between “tactical” nukes and ICBMs is short (this is why many reject the term “tactical nuclear weapons” outright and assert that the breaking of the nuclear taboo would be catastrophic). A direct confrontation between nuclear superpowers (Russia and the US) should be avoided at all costs.

Some say, well, NATO doesn’t have to respond with nukes. They could just strike Russian military targets, such as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, using conventional missiles. Sure. But then NATO is at war with Russia and we are in WWIII, i.e. a direct confrontation between the nuclear superpowers of the US and Russia. We are where we were in the early days of the war when stupid but well-meaning people chanted and tweeted “NATO close the skies!”

Yet Biden resisted those insane cries, which were also coming from Zelenskyy and even some corners of his own administration. It turns out that the only upside of living in a gerontocracy is that Biden has lived through the age of mutually assured destruction. The present never rewards restraint—all incentives push toward the most hawkish posture. But history does reward restraint. Remember General Curtis LeMay hounding John F Kennedy to bomb Cuba’s missile sites and invade Cuba? Remember the Cuban Missile Crisis, the psychopathic and grim calculus of Only a third of humanity would be wiped off the planet?

A question remains: What should the US do if Russia uses tactical nukes? First, implement more sanctions on Russia, including secondary sanctions on India and China if they continue to buy discounted Russian oil. (Though China and India might voluntarily ditch Russia if they used nukes.) Second, supply more arms to Ukraine, including missile defense systems and potentially more powerful arms. Such a move would still be escalatory but potentially the least escalatory of all the options. Ukraine has a highly effective military that has proven they can make good use of western-supplied arms. And of course, the goal at every juncture should be a negotiated settlement and end to this madness.

[darkmaga-retard]

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4882868-negotiate-with-moscow-to-end-the-ukraine-war-and-prevent-nuclear-devastation/

Negotiate with Moscow to end the Ukraine war and prevent nuclear devastation

by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Donald Trump Jr

The New York Times reported Thursday that the Biden administration is considering allowing Ukraine to use NATO-provided long-range precision weapons against targets deep inside Russia. Such a decision would put the world at greater risk of nuclear conflagration than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis.

At a time when American leaders should be focused on finding a diplomatic off-ramp to a war that should never have been allowed to take place, the Biden-Harris administration is instead pursuing a policy that Russia says it will interpret as an act of war. In the words of Vladimir Putin, long-range strikes in Russia “will mean that NATO countries — the United States and European countries — are at war with Russia.”

Some American analysts believe Putin is bluffing, and favor calling his bluff. As the Times reported, “‘Easing the restrictions on Western weapons will not cause Moscow to escalate,’17 former ambassadors and generals wrote in a letter to the administration this week. ‘We know this because Ukraine is already striking territory Russia considers its own — including Crimea and Kursk — with these weapons and Moscow’s response remains unchanged.’”

These analysts are mistaking restraint for weakness. In essence, they are advocating a strategy of brinksmanship. Each escalation — from HIMARS to cluster munitions to Abrams tanks to F-16s to ATACMS — draws the world closer to the brink of Armageddon. Their logic seems to be that if you goad a bear five times and it doesn’t respond, it is safe to goad him even harder a sixth time.

[pagebypagereviews]

In the high-stakes world of presidential decision-making, "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis" offers readers an exhilarating seat at the table where the fate of nations is often decided. With unbridged access to the nerve center of the White House, this enthralling book pulls back the heavy curtain, revealing the tense and often unseen dramas that unfold within those highly confidential walls. The Situation Room, synonymous with crisis management and pivotal decisions, serves as the backdrop to this gripping account that captures the essence of leadership under pressure, as experienced by the most powerful individuals in the United States. The book not only dives deep into the historical crises that have shaped the modern world but also underscores the profound responsibility shouldered by the occupants of the Oval Office. Written with a keen eye for detail and a palpable sense of urgency, "The Situation Room" dissects the intricate web of protocols, personalities, and the high-octane decision-making process that is seldom observable by the public eye. It meticulously examines how Presidents, from John F. Kennedy to the incumbent, have navigated the treacherous waters of international and domestic emergencies. By offering an intimate glimpse into the complex problems and split-second decisions that define presidential legacies, this book stands out as a critical piece of literature, illuminating the daunting challenges and monumental decisions that ripple across the globe, often originating from a single room. It solves the enigma of presidential leadership in crises, offering unprecedented insights into the psyche and the mechanisms that drive the most consequential choices made by the world's most powerful leaders. Plot The book "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis" meticulously unpacks the intricate workings and pivotal moments within the White House's most secretive conference room. This text, which is non-fiction, does not follow a traditional narrative plot but rather provides a detailed chronology of critical incidents that have shaped the history of the United States. The author unveils a series of real-life scenarios wherein presidents and their advisors have congregated in the Situation Room to navigate through some of the most perilous national and international crises. One emblematic case detailed in the book includes the tense deliberations that led up to the killing of Osama bin Laden, showcasing how the room serves as a fulcrum for decision-making during times of profound uncertainty and immediate threat. Characters The characters that dominate "The Situation Room" are a succession of U.S. Presidents and their close aides, each portrayed through their interactions and decision-making processes within the eponymous room. National Security Advisors, Secretaries of State, Defense, Intelligence Chiefs, and military personnel regularly feature as instrumental figures. A striking character portrait emerges of individuals such as John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, showing a leader navigating the treacherous waters of nuclear brinkmanship, or Barack Obama, poised and calculating as he oversees Operation Neptune Spear. These character profiles offer insight into the heavy responsibilities shouldered by leaders and the multidimensional personalities that emerge in the heat of pivotal moments. Writing Style The author of "The Situation Room" employs a highly detailed and investigative writing style, weaving together complex historical details with a narrative that is both accessible and gripping. With a reporter's eye for detail and a storyteller's flair for drama, the prose often reads like a thriller, keeping readers engaged with cliffhanger moments and intricate descriptions of the room's atmosphere during key events. The precision of language used to describe protocols, security measures, and the technological sophistication of the room—contrast strikingly

with the human elements of emotion and tension that thread through decision-making in real time. The writing style, thus, manages to bridge the gap between a history text and an engrossing non-fiction drama. Setting While "The Situation Room" covers a variety of locations as it follows different administrations, the primary setting—the Situation Room itself—almost takes on the character of a silent observer throughout the narratives. Located in the basement of the White House West Wing, this iconic conference room is shrouded in mystery, rarely glimpsed by the public. The author paints a vivid picture of a high-tech nerve center, equipped with secure communication lines to military commanders and intelligence assets worldwide. Descriptions of this space encapsulate the pressure-cooker atmosphere of global stakes; it's a sanctum where time seems to compress as decisions must be made swiftly, often with incomplete information. Unique Aspects One of the unique aspects of "The Situation Room" is its exploration of the evolution of technology and communication within the locus of the White House's crisis management hub. It details the transformation from the room's establishment in the 1960s to its present-day status, equipped for the digital age, with insights into how each technological leap has impacted decision-making processes. Additionally, the book uncovers the private human experiences behind public political sagas. The candid recounting of emotions felt by Presidents and their advisors in moments of national and global crisis provides a poignant look at the personal dimensions of governance. Lastly, the text stands out for granting readers unprecedented access to classified discussions and the weighty ambience of a place where history is continually forged behind closed doors. Similar to The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis Book Review ```html table width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; table, th, td border: 1px solid black; th, td padding: 10px; text-align: left; .pros background-color: #e8f5e9; .cons background-color: #ffebee; th background-color: #f5f5f5; Pros Detailed Insider Accounts: Provides a behind-the-scenes look at decision-making in high-stress situations, offering readers an intimate glance at presidential leadership. Historical Relevance: Participants and observers of past events provide firsthand experiences, thereby adding depth to historical context. Educational Value: Offers learning opportunities about political processes and crisis management at the highest levels of government. Storytelling: Combines facts with narrative to engage and maintain the reader's interest throughout the book. Accessibility: Complex concepts and situations are broken down in a manner that is accessible to a broad audience without sacrificing detail. Cons Subjectivity: The accounts are subject to the personal biases and recollections of the individuals interviewed, which may affect the objectivity of the narrative. Complex Structure: Multiple storylines and perspectives might be confusing and make it difficult for some readers to follow. Length: The thorough detail might overwhelm readers seeking a more concise overview of the events discussed. Political Bias: Potentially perceived bias due to the political affiliations of either the subjects or the author could alienate some readers. Specialized Audience: The material may primarily appeal to those with a keen interest in politics and history, rather than a general audience. ``` **Notes for the Code Usage:** 1. **Structure:** The table format helps to clearly demarcate the pros and cons, making it easy to differentiate between them. Each section corresponds to a row in the table with a descriptive header. 2. **Border Styles:** A solid 1px black border is used around each section. This ensures that despite the information density, the structure remains clear and easy to navigate. 3. **Styling:** Alternating background

colors are used for the 'Pros' (light green) and 'Cons' (light red) to visually separate the two types of content and draw attention to each. 4. **Content Organization:** Within each section, content is presented in list format using the unordered list HTML tag (` `), which contributes to tidy organization and enhances readability. 5. **Emphasis on Key Aspects:** Bold text is used for the key aspects (`` tag) to highlight the specific attributes of pros and cons, making it easier for users to scan the table and understand the main points. Evaluating the Author's Credentials and Background When considering the purchase of "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis," it's crucial to examine the credentials of the author to ensure their insights are authoritative and well-informed. Research the author's background, including their experience within political circles or direct involvement with the events detailed in the book. An author with first-hand knowledge of presidential decision-making or crisis management will add a layer of credibility and depth to the narrative that is invaluable to understanding the complexities discussed in the text. Understanding the Scope and Depth of Content Potential readers should look into the span of history covered by "The Situation Room" to assure that it aligns with their interests or research needs. The book might focus on a particular presidency, a specific geopolitical era, or a series of crises. Moreover, the depth of analysis provided on the subject should be considered; some readers may prefer a detailed account of a single event while others might appreciate a broader, more sweeping historical perspective. Evaluate the table of contents or seek reviews that address how comprehensively the book tackles the subject matter. Assessing Editorial Reviews and Reader Feedback Professional critiques and editorial reviews from reputable sources play a pivotal role in determining the quality of a historical or political analysis book. Such reviews can offer an informed opinion on the book's accuracy, readability, and contribution to existing literature. Equally important are reader reviews, which provide a sense of the book's accessibility and enjoyment to the general public. By evaluating a balance of professional and reader feedback, you can better gauge whether "The Situation Room" meets both scholarly and personal interest standards. Comparative Analysis with Similar Works When deliberating on the purchase of a book like "The Situation Room," it is beneficial to compare it against similar titles. This includes looking at other books that discuss presidential decision-making, crisis management, or historical events in a comparable context. Consider how this book stands out in its approach—does it offer unique perspectives, previously undisclosed information, or a particularly engaging narrative style? By contrasting it with similar works, you may determine whether it fills a gap in your collection or offers a distinct viewpoint worthy of exploration. Quality of Publication The physical quality of the book should also be a consideration. Is it available in hardcover or paperback, and which format best suits your needs for durability and comfort? Assess the typesetting, the quality of any photographs or illustrations, and the paper stock. Books that are well-produced can endure frequent handling and remain valuable over time, which is particularly important for those that will serve as reference material or are likely to be revisited multiple times. Price Point and Availability Price can be a determining factor in any buying decision. Compare the cost of "The Situation Room" against similar books and consider whether the price reflects the depth of content and the authority of the author. Also, take into account the availability of the book—whether it is easily obtained new, used, or as an e-book, and how this might affect the price. Books that are harder to find may command a higher price, but ensure that the additional cost is justified by the book's value to you.

Supplementary Material and Resources Last, but not least, consider if "The Situation Room" comes with additional materials or resources that enrich the reading experience. This might include access to online archives, interactive features, appendices, or bibliographies that can guide further research. Such supplemental content can significantly enhance the learning and exploration journey, turning the book into a gateway for deeper investigation into the subject matter. FAQ for The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis Book Review What is the main focus of "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis"? The book primarily focuses on critical events and decision-making processes that take place in the White House Situation Room, particularly during times of national and international crises. It offers an intimate look at how various U.S. presidents have handled emergencies, both public and covert, by showcasing the intense discussions and rapid strategizing that occur within the walls of this secure meeting space. Is the book written from a historical or a fictional perspective? The book is written from a historical perspective and is based on factual recounts of events and situations that U.S. presidents have faced while in office. It aims to present an accurate rendering of the role the Situation Room plays during times of crisis. Does the book cover multiple presidents, or is it centered on one in particular? The book spans multiple presidencies and covers a variety of situations that different commanders-in-chief have encountered over the years. It aims to provide insights into the diverse approaches and leadership styles exhibited within the Situation Room during pivotal moments in history. Are the accounts in the book firsthand or secondary sources? The book's accounts are drawn from a combination of firsthand accounts, including interviews with former presidents, their advisors, and other insiders, as well as from in-depth research using secondary sources such as declassified documents, archival material, and historical records. How does the author ensure the accuracy of the events described in the book? The author utilizes rigorous research methods, corroborating stories with multiple sources, and often relies on access to formerly classified material and personal testimonies of individuals with firsthand knowledge of the Situation Room operations. The credibility of the information is further bolstered by the author's credentials and expertise in the subject matter. Is the book approachable for readers unfamiliar with political jargon? While the book deals with complex political events and concepts, the author makes a concerted effort to present the information in an accessible manner. Technical terms and acronyms are usually explained to ensure that readers without a background in politics or military strategy can follow along and understand the content. How up-to-date is the information in the book? The book is as up-to-date as possible within the context of its publication. It includes analyses and case studies of various presidencies up to the book's cutoff point, which would typically be shortly before its publication date. Readers should be aware that any crises or developments that have occurred after the book's publication would not be covered. Can I find a review of the decisions made during recent crises? That depends on the timeliness of the book's publication in relation to recent events. The book may include reviews of decisions made during crises up to a certain point, but very recent or current situations may not be included if they unfolded after the author completed their manuscript or if there has not been sufficient time to research and analyze them comprehensively. In conclusion, "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis" offers a rare and illuminating glimpse into the high-stakes world of presidential decision-making during moments of profound national challenge.

Through gripping narrative and unprecedented access, this book takes readers behind the secured doors of the White House's most secretive conference room, shedding light on how the nation’s leaders cope with complex crises that shape history. This book is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in American politics, international relations, or leadership dynamics. With its detailed recounting of pivotal events and insightful analysis of presidential strategies, the book provides lessons that extend far beyond the confines of the Oval Office, offering guidance and reflections on decision-making, crisis management, and the balance of power and responsibility. By delving into the context and aftermath of each depicted scenario, "The Situation Room" does more than just recount history; it offers an education in the intricate mechanics of governance and diplomacy. Readers come away with a greater appreciation for the pressures faced by presidents and their advisors, and an understanding of the critical role that the Situation Room plays in our nation’s security and legacy. Whether you are a student of political science, a history enthusiast, a professional in leadership or crisis management, or simply someone who seeks a deeper understanding of the American presidency, this book is an enlightening choice that brings unprecedented clarity to the complex and often unseen workings of the highest level of government. "The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis" is more than just a recounting of history; it is an enduring reminder of the weight that the office of the presidency carries and the human element at the core of global events. This insightful book is a beneficial read that will leave you with a greater awareness of the intricacies of leadership in times of crisis and the indelible impact such decisions have on the fabric of the world. Other The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis Book Review buying options

[dragontrailz]

Deep Green Political Sketch - July 15th 2024

"Mr Zelensky urged his Western allies to put an end to “all limitations” placed on donated weapon systems in a speech on the fringes of the Nato summit in Washington."

[Source: Telegraph - 11th July 2024]

Zelensky has been a central part of the mechanism, in the rachetting up of tension between NATO and Russia.

He's a very dangerous fool and a Fascist. His strongest military brigade, Azov, are an elite Neo-Nazi fighting unit.

All of this has been obvious for some time, but largely hidden from those who only consume mainstream media. Why do some of you fly the Ukraine flag? [Exceptions can be made for Ukrainians, or those with family connections to that country]. Would you fly the Azov flag alongside it with the Nazi Wolfsangel symbol?

I don't think you would. So why are you so confused about this?

1. Stop swallowing British Intelligence seeded as Disinformation and Masquerading as Media.

2. Educate yourself as to what the 'Integrity Initiative' is/was. If you don't understand this, you will remain confused about what is on the horizon.

3. Stop falling for all this Russophobic Racist Hate. The Guardian are the worst spreaders of this: Luke Harding, James Ball, Carole Cadwalladr, George Monbiot etc. They've all been outed as seeding NATO disinformation, some of them multiple times.

The Russians are not the real enemy. The real problems lie much closer to home within the Military Industrial Complex. We should not be provoking The Kremlin. After Putin came to power, both Blair and Clinton said he was a man they could do business with. Then it all changed and now he's the enemy again.

A key moment was the Maidan Coup in Ukraine in 2014. That was a US-funded colour revolution. That provoked a Russian response, which was to take Crimea - hardly surprising, under the circumstances, given it's strategic position on the Black Sea.

Then the trouble started in The Donbas and Lugansk regions in the South East of Ukraine.

The Guardian at the time had not been completely taken over by the Security Services and two articles from 2014 remain, which tell us what was happening there at the time. Read them.

They are by: John Pilger and Seumus Milne. I think that might have been the last column Pilger wrote for the Guardian. Milne went on to become one of Corbyn's key advisers.

Look at the history of what's happened and work out what the key moments were that changed the relationship between the UK and Russia from an economic one to a military confrontation.

I can tell you more, but if you don't work it out for yourself, you might not believe it. That's how propaganda works. The BBC, Guardian, The Telegraph - they all reinforce overlapping narratives until 80-90% of the nation become confused.

At that point that the paralysis sets in which allows for dangerous lies to be peddled e.g. 'Saddam Hussein has Weapons of Mass Destruction'. By the time the first shots are fired, it will be too late.

Why are NATO provoking the Kremlin by encircling Russia with military bases and then installing missiles in these border areas, and then, worse still, threatening to fire them into Russia.

This is nuclear brinkmanship. The last time it was this bad was either Able Archer (1983) or the Cuban Missile Crisis (1963).

But in the latter case John F. Kennedy was in charge and he was able to think clearly and his opponent Nikita Khrushchev wasn't stupid either. In the former case, it was Thatcher and she may not have been a nice person, but she wasn't a dimwit like Starmer. Reagan was a bit thick though and that was the problem there.

Joe Biden is going senile. Keir Starmer is a serial liar who will do anything to gain the approval of The Establishment and gain more credit and power. He's another Narcissist, drunk on power, who has navigated his way to the top job, via a series of elaborate deceptions. Yet, he's well out of his depth, despite meeting with top people from the UK and US Secret State multiple times before he even took power. So, he was well briefed. So, how has he read it all so wrong?

He's a member of the Trilateral Commission - if you don't know what this, then look it up (clue: it's a secret power clique between 3 nations: UK, US and Japan).

All of this is opensource information. It's all out there, most of this has been in the public domain for months or years.

I'm going to start writing up some research I've been doing for the past 4-6 years, and will soon by starting a new blog. Any assertions made will be backed with evidence that's either peer-reviewed or multi-sourced. Then you can decide for yourself where humanity is at in July 2024.

The bulk of the work is based around the MSc I started in 2018 on 'Sustainable Food and Natural Resources'. I did not complete the Masters, but I did get a Postgraduate Diploma - with Distinction. This will give the work a 'Deep Green Ecological' foundation.

As I looked back to the origins of philosophy for solutions (Proudon for example), I also looked forward and tried to understand the emerging threats of the 2020s: creeping Fascism, Artificial Intelligence and exotic climate 'technofixes': SMRs for nuclear power, nuclear fusion, biomass, CCS, BECCS, a 'Hydrogen Economy'; and potentially the most dangerous of all theses scams: the ones that claim they can reverse biodiversity loss (gene-editing, synthetic food, biodiversity offsetting and gene banking).

People in France understand these issues, that's why a new left-wing Alliance (New Popular Front) were recently able to defeat the dual threat of Macronism (Neoliberalism) and Marine Le Pen's National Rally (Far-right), whilst also partially co-opting Macron and neutralising the threat of him being leader again.

Why are people in the UK so uneducated and ignorant? We don't have a movement that's anything like as educated or organised as those in France.

That's because key figures have acted as obstacles to progress over the last 20-30 years or so (George Monbiot, Vince Dale, Jonathan Porritt) and because campaigns have been infiltrated or smothered. Some of the people obstructing progress have been outed, but they are still there interfering - Paul Mason is a good example in that respect.

It does now seem that October 7th 2013, and Israel's Genocidal response to it has ripped the mask off the West's claim to be the global authority on common sense, diplomacy and democracy. That was always a lie, but at least now, you can all see that lie.

With regards to France:

Learn about who Jean-Luc Mélenchon is and why he's far smarter than Corbyn ever was.

His party, La France Insoumise or 'France Unbowed' form part of the radical left alliance. Rather than let the media define how you view this political faction, why not do some more research and find our for yourself.

But don't stop there, keep researching and find the future you want to build. Then go and make it happen.

Here's one entry point to learn about 'France Unbowed'

Julian Assange: 'If wars can be started by lies, then peace can be started by truth.'

#France #Melenchon #FranceUnbowed #FranceInsoumise

#Zelensky #Fascism #Starmer #JoeBiden #VaughanGething #Ukraine #MaidanCoup #Russia #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Genocide

#CubanMissileCrisis #AbleArcher #NuclearBrinkmanship

#Guardian #IntegrityInitiative #Harding #Cadwalladr #Monbiot #Mason #NATO #Disinformation

#Climate #DeepGreenEcology #Biodiversity #NutrientCycles #FoodWebs #PlanetaryBoundaries #EcocideLongList #Proudon

[brookstonalmanac]

Events 11.20 (after 1960)

1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis ends: In response to the Soviet Union agreeing to remove its missiles from Cuba, U.S. President John F. Kennedy ends the quarantine of the Caribbean nation. 1968 – A total of 78 miners are killed in an explosion at the Consolidated Coal Company's No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia in the Farmington Mine disaster. 1969 – Vietnam War: The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) publishes explicit photographs of dead villagers from the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. 1969 – Occupation of Alcatraz: Native American activists seize control of Alcatraz Island until being ousted by the U.S. Government on June 11, 1971. 1974 – The United States Department of Justice files its final anti-trust suit against AT&T Corporation. This suit later leads to the breakup of AT&T and its Bell System. 1974 – The first fatal crash of a Boeing 747 occurs when Lufthansa Flight 540 crashes while attempting to takeoff from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 59 out of the 157 people on board. 1977 – Egyptian President Anwar Sadat becomes the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel, when he meets Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and speaks before the Knesset in Jerusalem, seeking a permanent peace settlement. 1979 – Grand Mosque seizure: About 200 Sunni Muslims revolt in Saudi Arabia at the site of the Kaaba in Mecca during the pilgrimage and take about 6000 hostages. The Saudi government receives help from Pakistani special forces to put down the uprising. 1980 – Lake Peigneur in Louisiana drains into an underlying salt deposit. A misplaced Texaco oil probe had been drilled into the Diamond Crystal Salt Mine, causing water to flow down into the mine, eroding the edges of the hole. 1985 – Microsoft Windows 1.0, the first graphical personal computer operating environment developed by Microsoft, is released. 1989 – Velvet Revolution: The number of protesters assembled in Prague, Czechoslovakia, swells from 200,000 the day before to an estimated half-million. 1990 – Andrei Chikatilo, one of the Soviet Union's most prolific serial killers, is arrested; he eventually confesses to 56 killings. 1991 – An Azerbaijani MI-8 helicopter carrying 19 peacekeeping mission team with officials and journalists from Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is shot down by Armenian military forces in Khojavend District of Azerbaijan. 1992 – In England, a fire breaks out in Windsor Castle, badly damaging the castle and causing over £50 million worth of damage. 1993 – Savings and loan crisis: The United States Senate Ethics Committee issues a stern censure of California senator Alan Cranston for his "dealings" with savings-and-loan executive Charles Keating. 1993 – Macedonia's deadliest aviation disaster occurs when Avioimpex Flight 110, a Yakovlev Yak-42, crashes near Ohrid, killing all 116 people on board. 1994 – The Angolan government and UNITA rebels sign the Lusaka Protocol in Zambia, ending 19 years of civil war. (Localized fighting resumes the next year.) 1996 – A fire breaks out in an office building in Hong Kong, killing 41 people and injuring 81. 1998 – A court in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan declares accused terrorist Osama bin Laden "a man without a sin" in regard to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. 1998 – The first space station module component, Zarya, for the International Space Station is launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. 2003 – After the November 15 bombings, a second day of the 2003 Istanbul bombings occurs in Istanbul, Turkey, destroying the Turkish head office of HSBC Bank AS and the British consulate. 2015 – Following a hostage siege, at least 19 people are killed in Bamako, Mali. 2022 – The 2022 FIFA World Cup begins in Qatar. This is the first time the tournament was held in the Middle East.

[johnnusz]

Robert F. Kennedy, jr. Is Out Only Hope for President. Check this out & go to www.Kennedy24.com to help and donate. Biden is too old and Trump/DeSantis to radical.

We want to take a moment to thank you all for the incredible response we’ve received since Mr. Kennedy launched his campaign on April 19th in Boston. The past 3 months have been exhilarating, and we couldn’t thank you enough.

Our Campaign is Blasting Off, Dennis Kucinich on Fox News

Yesterday, Kennedy 2024 Campaign Manager and longtime progressive leader Dennis Kucinich appeared on Fox News to discuss the campaign’s progress and how we raised an incredible $3 million in 3 days — thanks to all of you!

Team Kennedy Kucinich on Fox Our Campaign is Blasting Off!

Kucinich, whose political career spans over 50 years and who served 8 terms in Congress from Ohio, said he’s never seen this groundswell of support for a political campaign in his lifetime.

“I have never seen anything life this…The more people hear Mr. Kennedy, the more they like what they hear and I think he’s the man for the moment,” Kucinich told Fox News.

Mr. Kennedy’s message of unity and his appeal as an authentic truth-teller is resulting in a broad coalition of support across the political spectrum and our fundraising reflects that. Our momentum is building!

Thousands of Kennedy Supporters Rally on the Fourth of July!

As Mr. Kennedy’s appeal to the American public takes off, this past week his supporters rallied in countless parades to share his message of hope and unity in their communities.

On Independence Day, in small towns and big cities across the nation, from Amherst, New Hampshire to Oak Park, Illinois to Hillsboro, Oregon and Santa Cruz, California, patriots and Kennedy fans young and old spread the news about Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s plan to heal the divide in American politics.

A Podcast on the CIA, Power, Corruption, War, Freedom, and Meaning with Lex Fridman and RFK, Jr.

On the 4th of July, Mr. Kennedy sat down with Lex Fridman, the Russian-American computer scientists, podcaster, and research scientist at MIT, to discuss U.S. history, the war in Ukraine, the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK’s assassination, the CIA’s influence, and his 2024 campaign.

If you have time to listen to this podcast, you’ll see why there’s no better candidate in modern history to be the next president of the United States.

In this interview, RFK, Jr. deftly explains the delicate diplomatic dance that his uncle, President John F. Kennedy, and his father, Robert F. Kennedy, Sr., played with Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962 as the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles on Cuba, less than a hundred miles off the coast of Florida.

This was the greatest threat that America faced at the height of the Cold War, and the Kennedys went against the advice of their own generals and opened diplomatic channels with Krushchev to avoid nuclear war.

Now as the U.S. continues to send billions of dollars of weapons, tanks, and missiles to the Ukraine, the world stands on the brink once again — listen as Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. channels the wisdom of peace and reconciliation to a polarized world.

There has never been a more urgent time to grow this campaign. While summer is traditionally the time that armies march and wars are waged, we need your support to bring peace, wisdom, and intelligence back to U.S. foreign policy and the White House.

[dan6085]

Here are 20 of the most controversial US Presidents of all time:

1. Andrew Johnson (1865-1869) - Johnson was the first US President to be impeached and was accused of violating the Tenure of Office Act and obstructing Reconstruction efforts after the Civil War.

2. Richard Nixon (1969-1974) - Nixon resigned from office after the Watergate scandal, in which he was accused of conspiring to cover up a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters.

3. Bill Clinton (1993-2001) - Clinton was impeached over allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice related to his affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky.

4. James Buchanan (1857-1861) - Buchanan is often criticized for his handling of the secession crisis and his failure to prevent the outbreak of the Civil War.

5. Donald Trump (2017-2021) - Trump was impeached twice, first for abuse of power related to his efforts to pressure Ukraine to investigate a political rival, and second for incitement of insurrection related to the January 6, 2021 attack on the US Capitol.

6. Andrew Jackson (1829-1837) - Jackson is known for his controversial policies related to Native American removal and his opposition to the Bank of the United States.

7. Franklin Pierce (1853-1857) - Pierce is known for his support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which led to violent conflict over the issue of slavery.

8. Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) - Hoover is often criticized for his handling of the Great Depression and his failure to take sufficient action to address the economic crisis.

9. John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) - Kennedy's presidency was marred by scandal, including allegations of affairs and his involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

10. James Polk (1845-1849) - Polk is known for his controversial policies related to westward expansion and his support of the Mexican-American War.

11. Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) - Grant's presidency was marked by corruption scandals and economic turmoil.

12. Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) - Reagan's presidency was controversial for his economic policies, including the deregulation of the financial industry, and his involvement in foreign affairs, such as the Iran-Contra scandal.

13. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) - Roosevelt's presidency was controversial for his expansion of the federal government's role in the economy and his decision to intern Japanese Americans during World War II.

14. George W. Bush (2001-2009) - Bush's presidency was controversial for his handling of the Iraq War and his response to Hurricane Katrina.

15. Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) - Johnson's presidency was marked by controversy over the Vietnam War and his civil rights policies.

16. Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) - Truman's presidency was controversial for his decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan and his handling of the Korean War.

17. Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) - Wilson's presidency was controversial for his involvement in World War I and his support of the Treaty of Versailles.

18. John Adams (1797-1801) - Adams' presidency was marked by controversy over his handling of foreign affairs, including the XYZ Affair and the undeclared naval war with France.

19. James Garfield (1881) - Garfield's presidency was cut short by his assassination, but he was controversial for his support of civil service reform and his opposition to political machines.

20. Gerald Ford (1974-1977) - Ford's presidency was controversial for his pardon of Richard Nixon and his handling of the economy and foreign affairs.

These presidents faced significant criticism and controversy during their time in office, and their legacies remain the subject of debate and discussion today.

[opedguy]

Lavrov Says Biden Not Handling Ukraine

LOS ANGELES (OnlineColumnist.com), Oct. 31, 2022.--Warning that 79-year-old President Joe Biden is not taking the Ukraine War seriously, 72-year-old Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis more seriously.  Lavrov says that Biden has been pushing the world to the brink of nuclear war by feeding Ukraine unlimited cash and lethal weapons.  While there are differences between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Ukraine War, Lavrov makes a point that diplomacy between the U.S. and Russian Federation is at an all-time low.  In 1962, Kennedy was not in a hot war with the Soviet Union, something very different today.  Biden decided to pay Ukraine to fight a proxy war against the Russian Federation,  spending close to $70 billion trying to topple the Russian Federation. So, the risks of WW III and nuclear war are far greater than 1962.

Biden changed the nature of the Ukraine war March 26 when he said in Warsaw, Poland that Putin should no longer remain as Russian president.  Once Biden made it personal, that he wanted to get rid of Putin, the Kremlin took the war differently, saw the conflict a one between the U.S. and Moscow.  Then, one month later, 69-year-old Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in Ramstein, Germany that the aim of the Ukraine War was to degrade the Russian military to the point it could no longer wage war.  Kennedy wasn’t talking about destroying the Soviet Union in 1962.  He wasn’t engaged through Ukrainian proxies in a war effort to topple the Kremlin.  Yet that exactly what Biden’s doing with U.S. tax dollars.  Ukraine no longer fights to get back its sovereign territory, it fights, as Ukraine’s 44-year-old President Volodymyr Zelensky said, to get rid of 70-year-old Russian President Vladimir Putin.

When it comes to dangers of WW III or nuclear war they’re far greater today than in 1962 when a Cold War dominated relations Moscow and Washington relations.  No one in the U.S. media, more driven by political agendas today, admit that the U.S. with Ukrainian proxies, is at war with the Russian Federation. “I hope that in today’s situation, President Joe Biden will have more opportunities to understand who gives the orders and how,” Lavrov said. “This situation is very disturbing,” referring to the fact that the U.S. fights a proxy war using Ukrainian troops against the Russian Federation.  Lavrov said that Kennedy and Krushchev were far more responsible in resolving the crisis than Biden.  Lavrov would like to see more effort on the part of Biden to move the Ukraine conflict from the battlefield to the peace table. Zelensky thinks he’ll have more leverage if he reclaims lost sovereign territory.

Everyday that the war goes on, more miscalculation, mishaps or mistakes can drive the conflict toward WW III or nuclear war. Lavrov wants both sides to take diplomacy more seriously, something rejected by Kiev. “The difference is that in the distant 1962, Khrushchev and Kennedy found the strength to show responsibility and wisdom, and now do not see such readiness on the part of Washington and its satellites,” Lavrov said.  How anyone at the White House can dismiss Lavrov’s statements is anyone’s guess?”  Lavrov tries to point to the real cause of the Ukraine War, that the West breached its agreement that NATO would not encroach on Russian national security in a post-Cold War world.  With NATO adding more countries to its alliance, Putin felt he had to draw a line in the sand with Ukraine.  Putin was uncomfortable with the U.S. setting up a puppet regime on his border.

In the big picture, the U.S. has far more national security interests with Moscow than Ukraine.  While Biden saw the necessity of defending Ukraine, he’s trashed the historic relationship between nuclear-armed superpowers.  Biden can’t have it both ways, fighting a proxy war against the Russian Federation and, at the same time, expecting to continue diplomatic relations.  Biden’s dangerously close to break off of diplomatic relations with Moscow, something that would have disastrous consequences for both countries.  Biden and Zelensky have spurned all of Putin’s peace overtures, putting out conditions for ending the conflict.  Putin offered to end the conflict in March if Kiev would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk.  Kiev did not have control of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk before the war started Feb. 24.

Lavrov made a plea to Washington to show the same kind of wisdom that helped Kennedy and Khrushchev end the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  Everyday that goes by, Ukraine has more damage to its already dilapidated infrastructure.  Today’s Russian strike on Kiev’s energy infrastructure is more retaliation for Ukraine’s strike on Russian naval fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea.  How many more retaliatory strikes are Ukraine and Moscow willing to endure as the Ukraine War goes into it ninth month.  Lavrov asked Biden to show the same kind of judgment as Kennedy when he was forced to compromise to keep Soviet ICBMs out of Cuba. Biden needs to ask himself how the Ukraine war benefits the U.S. or Ukraine, other that allow Zelensky to retaliate against Putin.  Russian isn’t going to magically collapse as Biden and Zelensky wished.  They’re destroying Ukraine daily without any benefit to Kiev and Washington.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He’s editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

[indynerdgirl]

The nightmare scenario terrified all of humanity, from Washington to Moscow to every capital. But there were two extraordinary exceptions. There were two lunatics who welcomed Armageddon from ground zero in Cuba: Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The fact that they did, and why, must be known and remembered, especially given the odd admiration for Fidel and Che by many misinformed young Americans.

“If the nuclear missiles had remained, we would have fired them against the heart of the U.S., including New York City,” Che gleefully admitted in November 1962 to Sam Russell of Britain’s Daily Worker. “The victory of socialism is well worth millions of atomic victims.”

Che was willing to fire those atomic weapons and launch a nuclear war that he understood would lead to the liquidation of Cuba. Che biographer Philippe Gavi said that the Argentine revolutionary had bragged that “this country is willing to risk everything in an atomic war of unimaginable destructiveness to defend a principle.”

The principle was communism.

Keith Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy, recounted how “Che Guevara specifically said that he was ready for martyrdom” (that is, to be an international martyr to the religious-like cause of communism) and “ready for Cuba, as a country, to be a national martyrdom.” Payne quotes the response of a shocked Anastas Mikoyan, the leading Soviet official under Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who responded to the martyr-like fanaticism: “We see your willingness to die beautifully. We don’t think it’s worth dying beautifully.”

Che was an unhinged zealot who described himself as “bloodthirsty.” Fidel Castro was no better.

If Fidel would have had his way in October 1962, Cuba would have ceased to exist. The fact is that Fidel actually recommended to Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev that they together launch an all-out nuclear attack upon the United States and even urged Khrushchev to do so if U.S. troops invaded the island.

This is no secret. Castro openly admitted it. Robert McNamara, JFK’s secretary of defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was taken aback by Castro’s candor when the two men publicly discussed the incident 30 years later in an open forum in Havana. Fidel told McNamara flatly, “Bob, I did recommend they [the nuclear missiles] were to be used.”

In total, said McNamara, there were 162 Soviet missiles on the island. The firing of those missiles alone would have led to (according to McNamara) at least 80 million dead Americans, which would have been half the U.S. population, plus added tens of millions of casualties.

[...]

It should also be acknowledged — and known among Catholics — that Pope John XXIII played a role in trying to mediate the conflict. The Pope had received a direct message from the Catholic president conveying the high stakes. Upon reading Kennedy’s dispatch, John XXIII drafted a statement that went to the embassies of the United States and the USSR. The Pope read his message on Vatican Radio. It appeared in newspapers worldwide, including Pravda, which headlined this specific appeal from the pontiff: “We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity.” The Kremlin clearly appreciated and approved of the Pope’s intervention. Two days later, Khrushchev agreed to pull the missiles.

Historian Ron Rychlak described John XXIII’s role as “crucial” but “often overlooked.” Indeed, it is.

And so, in October 1962, nuclear Armageddon was averted. In October 2022, we pray that any use of nuclear weapons by Moscow will again be averted. Sixty years ago, it took the skill and resolve of key statesmen and religious leaders — in Washington, in Moscow, at the Vatican — to pull the world back from the precipice. Do we have such men with such abilities in those posts today?

We shall find out.

[zvaigzdelasas]

On october 16, 1962, John F. Kennedy and his advisers were stunned to learn that the Soviet Union was, without provocation, installing nuclear-armed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. With these offensive weapons, which represented a new and existential threat to America, Moscow significantly raised the ante in the nuclear rivalry between the superpowers—a gambit that forced the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. On October 22, the president, with no other recourse, proclaimed in a televised address that his administration knew of the illegal missiles, and delivered an ultimatum insisting on their removal, announcing an American “quarantine” of Cuba to force compliance with his demands. While carefully avoiding provocative action and coolly calibrating each Soviet countermeasure, Kennedy and his lieutenants brooked no compromise; they held firm, despite Moscow’s efforts to link a resolution to extrinsic issues and despite predictable Soviet blustering about American aggression and violation of international law. In the tense 13‑day crisis, the Americans and Soviets went eyeball-to-eyeball. Thanks to the Kennedy administration’s placid resolve and prudent crisis management—thanks to what Kennedy’s special assistant Arthur Schlesinger Jr. characterized as the president’s “combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve, and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated, that [it] dazzled the world”—the Soviet leadership blinked: Moscow dismantled the missiles, and a cataclysm was averted.

Every sentence in the above paragraph describing the Cuban missile crisis is misleading or erroneous. But this was the rendition of events that the Kennedy administration fed to a credulous press; this was the history that the participants in Washington promulgated in their memoirs; and this is the story that has insinuated itself into the national memory—as the pundits’ commentaries and media coverage marking the 50th anniversary of the crisis attested.

Scholars, however, have long known a very different story: since 1997, they have had access to recordings that Kennedy secretly made of meetings with his top advisers, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (the “ExComm”). Sheldon M. Stern—who was the historian at the John F. Kennedy Library for 23 years and the first scholar to evaluate the ExComm tapes—is among the numerous historians who have tried to set the record straight. His new book marshals irrefutable evidence to succinctly demolish the mythic version of the crisis. Although there’s little reason to believe his effort will be to any avail, it should nevertheless be applauded.

Reached through sober analysis, Stern’s conclusion that “John F. Kennedy and his administration, without question, bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the onset of the Cuban missile crisis” would have shocked the American people in 1962, for the simple reason that Kennedy’s administration had misled them about the military imbalance between the superpowers and had concealed its campaign of threats, assassination plots, and sabotage designed to overthrow the government in Cuba—an effort well known to Soviet and Cuban officials.

In the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy had cynically attacked Richard Nixon from the right, claiming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had allowed a dangerous “missile gap” to grow in the U.S.S.R.’s favor. But in fact, just as Eisenhower and Nixon had suggested—and just as the classified briefings that Kennedy received as a presidential candidate indicated—the missile gap, and the nuclear balance generally, was overwhelmingly to America’s advantage. At the time of the missile crisis, the Soviets had 36 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 138 long-range bombers with 392 nuclear warheads, and 72 submarine-launched ballistic-missile warheads (SLBMs). These forces were arrayed against a vastly more powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal of 203 ICBMs, 1,306 long-range bombers with 3,104 nuclear warheads, and 144 SLBMs—all told, about nine times as many nuclear weapons as the U.S.S.R. Nikita Khrushchev was acutely aware of America’s huge advantage not just in the number of weapons but in their quality and deployment as well.

Kennedy and his civilian advisers understood that the missiles in Cuba did not alter the strategic nuclear balance.

Moreover, despite America’s overwhelming nuclear preponderance, JFK, in keeping with his avowed aim to pursue a foreign policy characterized by “vigor,” had ordered the largest peacetime expansion of America’s military power, and specifically the colossal growth of its strategic nuclear forces. This included deploying, beginning in 1961, intermediate-range “Jupiter” nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey—adjacent to the Soviet Union. From there, the missiles could reach all of the western U.S.S.R., including Moscow and Leningrad (and that doesn’t count the nuclear-armed “Thor” missiles that the U.S. already had aimed at the Soviet Union from bases in Britain).

The Jupiter missiles were an exceptionally vexing component of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Because they sat aboveground, were immobile, and required a long time to prepare for launch, they were extremely vulnerable. Of no value as a deterrent, they appeared to be weapons meant for a disarming first strike—and thus greatly undermined deterrence, because they encouraged a preemptive Soviet strike against them. The Jupiters’ destabilizing effect was widely recognized among defense experts within and outside the U.S. government and even by congressional leaders. For instance, Senator Albert Gore Sr., an ally of the administration, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that they were a “provocation” in a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1961 (more than a year and a half before the missile crisis), adding, “I wonder what our attitude would be” if the Soviets deployed nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Senator Claiborne Pell raised an identical argument in a memo passed on to Kennedy in May 1961.

Given America’s powerful nuclear superiority, as well as the deployment of the Jupiter missiles, Moscow suspected that Washington viewed a nuclear first strike as an attractive option. They were right to be suspicious. The archives reveal that in fact the Kennedy administration had strongly considered this option during the Berlin crisis in 1961.

It’s little wonder, then, that, as Stern asserts—drawing on a plethora of scholarship including, most convincingly, the historian Philip Nash’s elegant 1997 study, The Other Missiles of October—Kennedy’s deployment of the Jupiter missiles “was a key reason for Khrushchev’s decision to send nuclear missiles to Cuba.” Khrushchev reportedly made that decision in May 1962, declaring to a confidant that the Americans “have surrounded us with bases on all sides” and that missiles in Cuba would help to counter an “intolerable provocation.” Keeping the deployment secret in order to present the U.S. with a fait accompli, Khrushchev may very well have assumed America’s response would be similar to his reaction to the Jupiter missiles—rhetorical denouncement but no threat or action to thwart the deployment with a military attack, nuclear or otherwise. (In retirement, Khrushchev explained his reasoning to the American journalist Strobe Talbott: Americans “would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine.”)

Khrushchev was also motivated by his entirely justifiable belief that the Kennedy administration wanted to destroy the Castro regime. After all, the administration had launched an invasion of Cuba; had followed that with sabotage, paramilitary assaults, and assassination attempts—the largest clandestine operation in the history of the CIA—and had organized large-scale military exercises in the Caribbean clearly meant to rattle the Soviets and their Cuban client. Those actions, as Stern and other scholars have demonstrated, helped compel the Soviets to install the missiles so as to deter “covert or overt US attacks”—in much the same way that the United States had shielded its allies under a nuclear umbrella to deter Soviet subversion or aggression against them.

Khrushchev was also motivated by his entirely justifiable belief that the Kennedy administration wanted to destroy the Castro regime. After all, the administration had launched an invasion of Cuba; had followed that with sabotage, paramilitary assaults, and assassination attempts—the largest clandestine operation in the history of the CIA—and had organized large-scale military exercises in the Caribbean clearly meant to rattle the Soviets and their Cuban client. Those actions, as Stern and other scholars have demonstrated, helped compel the Soviets to install the missiles so as to deter “covert or overt US attacks”—in much the same way that the United States had shielded its allies under a nuclear umbrella to deter Soviet subversion or aggression against them. [...]

The Soviets were entirely justified in their belief that Kennedy wanted to destroy the Castro regime.

Kennedy and his civilian advisers understood that the missiles in Cuba did not alter the strategic nuclear balance. Although Kennedy asserted in his October 22 televised address that the missiles were “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas,” he in fact appreciated, as he told the ExComm on the first day of the crisis, that “it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was 90 miles away. Geography doesn’t mean that much.” America’s European allies, Kennedy continued, “will argue that taken at its worst the presence of these missiles really doesn’t change” the nuclear balance. [...]

Moreover, unlike Soviet ICBMs, the missiles in Cuba required several hours to be prepared for launch. Given the effectiveness of America’s aerial and satellite reconnaissance (amply demonstrated by the images of missiles in the U.S.S.R. and Cuba that they yielded), the U.S. almost certainly would have had far more time to detect and respond to an imminent Soviet missile strike from Cuba than to attacks from Soviet bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs. [...]

On that first day of the ExComm meetings, Bundy asked directly, “What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?” McNamara answered, “Not at all”—a verdict that Bundy then said he fully supported. The following day, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen summarized the views of the ExComm in a memorandum to Kennedy. “It is generally agreed,” he noted, “that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of power—i.e., they do not significantly increase the potential megatonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil, even after a surprise American nuclear strike.”

Sorensen’s comment about a surprise attack reminds us that while the missiles in Cuba did not add appreciably to the nuclear menace, they could have somewhat complicated America’s planning for a successful first strike—which may well have been part of Khrushchev’s rationale for deploying them. If so, the missiles paradoxically could have enhanced deterrence between the superpowers, and thereby reduced the risk of nuclear war.

Yet, although the missiles’ military significance was negligible, the Kennedy administration advanced on a perilous course to force their removal. The president issued an ultimatum to a nuclear power—an astonishingly provocative move, which immediately created a crisis that could have led to catastrophe. He ordered a blockade on Cuba, an act of war that we now know brought the superpowers within a hair’s breadth of nuclear confrontation. The beleaguered Cubans willingly accepted their ally’s weapons, so the Soviet’s deployment of the missiles was fully in accord with international law. But the blockade, even if the administration euphemistically called it a “quarantine,” was, the ExComm members acknowledged, illegal. As the State Department’s legal adviser recalled, “Our legal problem was that their action wasn’t illegal.” Kennedy and his lieutenants intently contemplated an invasion of Cuba and an aerial assault on the Soviet missiles there—acts extremely likely to have provoked a nuclear war. In light of the extreme measures they executed or earnestly entertained to resolve a crisis they had largely created, the American reaction to the missiles requires, in retrospect, as much explanation as the Soviet decision to deploy them—or more.

The Soviets suspected that the U.S. viewed a nuclear first strike as an attractive option. They were right to be suspicious. [...]

What largely made the missiles politically unacceptable was Kennedy’s conspicuous and fervent hostility toward the Castro regime—a stance, Kennedy admitted at an ExComm meeting, that America’s European allies thought was “a fixation” and “slightly demented.”

In his presidential bid, Kennedy had red-baited the Eisenhower-Nixon administration, charging that its policies had “helped make Communism’s first Caribbean base.” Given that he had defined a tough stance toward Cuba as an important election issue, and given the humiliation he had suffered with the Bay of Pigs debacle, the missiles posed a great [electoral] hazard to Kennedy. [...]

But even weightier than the domestic political catastrophe likely to befall the administration if it appeared to be soft on Cuba was what Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin called “the psychological factor” that we “sat back and let ’em do it to us.” He asserted that this was “more important than the direct threat,” and Kennedy and his other advisers energetically concurred. Even as Sorensen, in his memorandum to the president, noted the ExComm’s consensus that the Cuban missiles didn’t alter the nuclear balance, he also observed that the ExComm nevertheless believed that “the United States cannot tolerate the known presence” of missiles in Cuba “if our courage and commitments are ever to be believed by either allies or adversaries” (emphasis added). [...]

The risks of such a cave-in, Kennedy and his advisers held, were distinct but related. The first was that America’s foes would see Washington as pusillanimous; the known presence of the missiles, Kennedy said, “makes them look like they’re coequal with us and that”—here Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon interrupted: “We’re scared of the Cubans.” The second risk was that America’s friends would suddenly doubt that a country given to appeasement could be relied on to fulfill its obligations.

In fact, America’s allies, as Bundy acknowledged, were aghast that the U.S. was threatening nuclear war over a strategically insignificant condition—the presence of intermediate-range missiles in a neighboring country—that those allies (and, for that matter, the Soviets) had been living with for years. In the tense days of October 1962, being allied with the United States potentially amounted to, as Charles de Gaulle had warned, “annihilation without representation.” It seems never to have occurred to Kennedy and the ExComm that whatever Washington gained by demonstrating the steadfastness of its commitments, it lost in an erosion of confidence in its judgment.

This approach to foreign policy was guided—and remains guided—by an elaborate theorizing rooted in a school-playground view of world politics rather than the cool appraisal of strategic realities. It put—and still puts—America in the curious position of having to go to war to uphold the very credibility that is supposed to obviate war in the first place.

If the administration’s domestic political priorities alone dictated the removal of the Cuban missiles, a solution to Kennedy’s problem would have seemed pretty obvious: instead of a public ultimatum demanding that the Soviets withdraw their missiles from Cuba, a private agreement between the superpowers to remove both Moscow’s missiles in Cuba and Washington’s missiles in Turkey. (Recall that the Kennedy administration discovered the missiles on October 16, but only announced its discovery to the American public and the Soviets and issued its ultimatum on the 22nd.)

The administration, however, did not make such an overture to the Soviets. Instead, by publicly demanding a unilateral Soviet withdrawal and imposing a blockade on Cuba, it precipitated what remains to this day the most dangerous nuclear crisis in history. In the midst of that crisis, the sanest and most sensible observers—among them diplomats at the United Nations and in Europe, the editorial writers for the Manchester Guardian, Walter Lippmann, and Adlai Stevenson—saw a missile trade as a fairly simple solution. In an effort to resolve the impasse, Khrushchev himself openly made this proposal on October 27. According to the version of events propagated by the Kennedy administration (and long accepted as historical fact), Washington unequivocally rebuffed Moscow’s offer and instead, thanks to Kennedy’s resolve, forced a unilateral Soviet withdrawal.

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the opening of previously classified archives and the decision by a number of participants to finally tell the truth revealed that the crisis was indeed resolved by an explicit but concealed deal to remove both the Jupiter and the Cuban missiles. Kennedy in fact threatened to abrogate if the Soviets disclosed it. He did so for the same reasons that had largely engendered the crisis in the first place—domestic politics and the maintenance of America’s image as the indispensable nation. A declassified Soviet cable reveals that Robert Kennedy—whom the president assigned to work out the secret swap with the U.S.S.R.’s ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin—insisted on returning to Dobrynin the formal Soviet letter affirming the agreement, explaining that the letter “could cause irreparable harm to my political career in the future.”

Only a handful of administration officials knew about the trade; most members of the ExComm, including Vice President Lyndon Johnson, did not. And in their effort to maintain the cover-up, a number of those who did, including McNamara and Rusk, lied to Congress. JFK and others tacitly encouraged the character assassination of Stevenson, allowing him to be portrayed as an appeaser who “wanted a Munich” for suggesting the trade—a deal that they vociferously maintained the administration would never have permitted.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. “repeatedly manipulated and obscured the facts.”

The patient spadework of Stern and other scholars has since led to further revelations. Stern demonstrates that Robert Kennedy hardly inhabited the conciliatory and statesmanlike role during the crisis that his allies described in their hagiographic chronicles and memoirs and that he himself advanced in his posthumously published book, Thirteen Days. In fact, he was among the most consistently and recklessly hawkish of the president’s advisers, pushing not for a blockade or even air strikes against Cuba but for a full-scale invasion as “the last chance we will have to destroy Castro.” Stern authoritatively concludes that “if RFK had been president, and the views he expressed during the ExComm meetings had prevailed, nuclear war would have been the nearly certain outcome.” He justifiably excoriates the sycophantic courtier Schlesinger, whose histories “repeatedly manipulated and obscured the facts” and whose accounts—“profoundly misleading if not out-and-out deceptive”—were written to serve not scholarship but the Kennedys.

Although Stern and other scholars have upended the panegyrical version of events advanced by Schlesinger and other Kennedy acolytes, the revised chronicle shows that JFK’s actions in resolving the crisis—again, a crisis he had largely created—were reasonable, responsible, and courageous. Plainly shaken by the apocalyptic potentialities of the situation, Kennedy advocated, in the face of the bellicose and near-unanimous opposition of his pseudo-tough-guy advisers, accepting the missile swap that Khrushchev had proposed. “To any man at the United Nations, or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade,” he levelheadedly told the ExComm. “Most people think that if you’re allowed an even trade you ought to take advantage of it.” He clearly understood that history and world opinion would condemn him and his country for going to war—a war almost certain to escalate to a nuclear exchange—after the U.S.S.R. had publicly offered such a reasonable quid pro quo. Khrushchev’s proposal, the historian Ronald Steel has noted, “filled the White House advisors with consternation—not least of all because it appeared perfectly fair.” [...]

By successfully hiding the deal from the vice president, from a generation of foreign-policy makers and strategists, and from the American public, Kennedy and his team reinforced the dangerous notion that firmness in the face of what the United States construes as aggression, and the graduated escalation of military threats and action in countering that aggression, makes for a successful national-security strategy—really, all but defines it.

The president and his advisers also reinforced the concomitant view that America should define a threat not merely as circumstances and forces that directly jeopardize the safety of the country, but as circumstances and forces that might indirectly compel potential allies or enemies to question America’s resolve.[...]

This notion that standing up to aggression (however loosely and broadly defined) will deter future aggression (however loosely and broadly defined) fails to weather historical scrutiny. [...]

Moreover, the idea that a foreign power’s effort to counter the overwhelming strategic supremacy of the United States—a country that spends nearly as much on defense as does the rest of the world combined—ipso facto imperils America’s security is profoundly misguided. Just as Kennedy and his advisers perceived a threat in Soviet efforts to offset what was in fact a destabilizing U.S. nuclear hegemony, so today, both liberals and conservatives oxymoronically assert that the safety of the United States demands that the country must “balance” China by maintaining its strategically dominant position in East Asia and the western Pacific—that is, in China’s backyard. This means that Washington views as a hazard Beijing’s attempts to remedy the weakness of its own position, even though policy makers acknowledge that the U.S. has a crushing superiority right up to the edge of the Asian mainland. America’s posture, however, reveals more about its own ambitions than it does about China’s. Imagine that the situation were reversed, and China’s air and naval forces were a dominant and potentially menacing presence on the coastal shelf of North America. Surely the U.S. would want to counteract that preponderance. In a vast part of the globe, stretching from the Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and from Greenland to Guam, the U.S. will not tolerate another great power’s interference. Certainly America’s security wouldn’t be jeopardized if other great powers enjoy their own (and for that matter, smaller) spheres of influence.

This esoteric strategizing—this misplaced obsession with credibility, this dangerously expansive concept of what constitutes security—which has afflicted both Democratic and Republican administrations, and both liberals and conservatives, is the antithesis of statecraft, which requires discernment based on power, interest, and circumstance. It is a stance toward the world that can easily doom the United States to military commitments and interventions in strategically insignificant places over intrinsically trivial issues. It is a stance that can engender a foreign policy approximating paranoia in an obdurately chaotic world abounding in states, personalities, and ideologies that are unsavory and uncongenial—but not necessarily mortally hazardous.

2013

[scrollofthoth]

I’m just so filled with rage right now it’s hard for me to think about anything else. If you’re reading this, chances are I am angry at you. I’m angry that the political Left in this country has been so damned self-centered that they have turned themselves into a bastion of hypocrisy, and I despise hypocrisy.

How do you not understand that you have sabotaged yourself? How do you not understand that your outpouring of condemnation for the unjustified attack on Ukraine makes you look like fools to the rest of the world? How do you not understand that your complete inaction, when the US goes around bombing people around the world, destroys your credibility? For years I have spoken against the atrocities committed in our name and virtually no one listened. No one cared when I pointed out the US was bombing hospitals and schools in Afghanistan. No one cares when the US uses drone strikes in multiple countries around the world and bombs weddings and funerals. I know at this point some of you are preparing your our-side/their-side argument that you have been trained to do.

It’s sad that I have to say what Putin has done is a monstrous war crime. It’s even sadder when I am ignored when I say that every US President in the last fifty years is guilty of war crimes as well. Has history been erased? Has Orwell’s prediction truly come to pass? Does anyone remember the last time we came close to nuclear war, the Cuban Missile Crisis, was almost the exact same issue? That we insisted that the USSR will not put weapons that close to our borders and we threatened nuclear annihilation over it? Except Kennedy is seen as completely justified, and the US has the right to do these things, but others do not.

I want the images coming out of Ukraine to be burned into your brain. The burned-out buildings, the people fleeing, people terrified that they will be killed in their beds. Look at the bombed schools and apartments. Also remember the people in Russia protesting right now despite the certainty that they will be arrested. I want you to know deep in your hearts that this is us. We do those things. All the time. And the only reason our government is mad is that we reserve the right to be the only ones doing it.

As you open your mouth to “Stand with Ukraine” I want you to remember that is the same mouth that was silent about Afghanistan, and Iraq, and Yemen, and Pakistan, and all the other places we habitually bomb or give others the bombs to do it with. I’m sure you are going to tell me that you have the right to not be silent now. No. You don’t. I don’t believe you actually care about people suffering. Your hypocrisy has undermined your credibility. You have forgotten the first rule of morality, that you are first responsible for what you do. What your country does in your name. And you have forsaken that responsibility. I want you to stand with Ukraine. But first, you must apologize for being silent and promise to do better.

[antoine-roquentin]

The last of the many books Cohen authored was 2019’s War with Russia?, detailing his ideas on how the complex multi-front nature of the post-2016 cold war escalations against Moscow combines with Russiagate and other factors to make it in some ways more dangerous even than the most dangerous point of the previous cold war.

“You know it’s easy to joke about this, except that we’re at maybe the most dangerous moment in US-Russian relations in my lifetime, and maybe ever,” Cohen told The Young Turks in 2017. “And the reason is that we’re in a new cold war, by whatever name. We have three cold war fronts that are fraught with the possibility of hot war, in the Baltic region where NATO is carrying out an unprecedented military buildup on Russia’s border, in Ukraine where there is a civil and proxy war between Russia and the west, and of course in Syria, where Russian aircraft and American warplanes are flying in the same territory. Anything could happen.”

Cohen repeatedly points to the most likely cause of a future nuclear war: not one that is planned but one which erupts in tense, complex situations where “anything could happen” in the chaos and confusion as a result of misfire, miscommunication or technical malfunction, as nearly happened many times during the last cold war.

“I think this is the most dangerous moment in American-Russian relations, at least since the Cuban missile crisis,” Cohen told Democracy Now in 2017.

“And arguably, it’s more dangerous, because it’s more complex. Therefore, we — and then, meanwhile, we have in Washington these — and, in my judgment, factless accusations that Trump has somehow been compromised by the Kremlin. So, at this worst moment in American-Russian relations, we have an American president who’s being politically crippled by the worst imaginable — it’s unprecedented. Let’s stop and think. No American president has ever been accused, essentially, of treason. This is what we’re talking about here, or that his associates have committed treason.”

“Imagine, for example, John Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis,” Cohen added. “Imagine if Kennedy had been accused of being a secret Soviet Kremlin agent. He would have been crippled. And the only way he could have proved he wasn’t was to have launched a war against the Soviet Union. And at that time, the option was nuclear war.”

“A recurring theme of my recently published book War with Russia? is that the new Cold War is more dangerous, more fraught with hot war, than the one we survived,” Cohen wrote last year.

“Histories of the 40-year US-Soviet Cold War tell us that both sides came to understand their mutual responsibility for the conflict, a recognition that created political space for the constant peace-keeping negotiations, including nuclear arms control agreements, often known as détente. But as I also chronicle in the book, today’s American Cold Warriors blame only Russia, specifically ‘Putin’s Russia,’ leaving no room or incentive for rethinking any US policy toward post-Soviet Russia since 1991.”

“Finally, there continues to be no effective, organized American opposition to the new Cold War,” Cohen added.

“This too is a major theme of my book and another reason why this Cold War is more dangerous than was its predecessor.

In the 1970s and 1980s, advocates of détente were well-organized, well-funded, and well-represented, from grassroots politics and universities to think tanks, mainstream media, Congress, the State Department, and even the White House. Today there is no such opposition anywhere.”

[meret118]

On the morning of Sunday, October 14, 1962, Juanita Moody exited the headquarters of the National Security Agency, at Fort Meade, Maryland, and walked the short distance to her car, parked in one of the front-row spaces reserved for top leadership. The sky was a crystalline blue, “a most beautiful day,” she recalled later. Moody had just learned that the U.S. Air Force was sending a U-2 spy plane over Cuba to take high-altitude photographs of military installations across the island. Moody was worried for the pilot—twice already in the past two years a U-2 spy plane had been shot out of the sky, once over the Soviet Union and once over China. She was also worried for the country. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were worsening by the day. President John F. Kennedy, American military leaders and the intelligence community believed that the Soviet military was up to something in Cuba. Exactly what, no one could say. “I went out and got into my old convertible at the precise moment I had been told this pilot was going to get into his plane,” Moody said.

What unfolded over the next two weeks was arguably the most dangerous period in the history of civilization. Close to 60 years later, the Cuban Missile Crisis is still considered a nearly catastrophic failure on the part of America’s national security apparatus. How America’s top agents, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence analysts and elected officials failed to anticipate and uncover the buildup of a nuclear arsenal on America’s doorstep, less than 100 miles off the coast, is still being studied and debated. At best, the story of American intelligence activities before and during the crisis is far from complete. One of the most extraordinary omissions to date is the central role played by Moody, a 38-year-old code-breaking whiz and the head of the NSA’s Cuba desk during the perilous fall of 1962. Even today her name is largely unknown outside the agency, and the details of her contributions to the nation’s security remain closely guarded.

[padm3601]

Jesse C - Foreign Policy

I know domestic policy is important but I just absolutely love foreign policy. Wars, militaries, diplomats, energy policy, trade deals, global economics, political philosophy, they’re all important elements that allow us to live our day-to-day lives in safety. 

Public Administrators are responsible for establishing and negotiating our concerns as a country into these policies. I believe it is a hot topic as we are actively achieving advancements in technology and global communications. The more connected we are as a world; the more foreign policy becomes prominent. 

  With that being said, take into consideration the de-escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. That was a perfect example of a well-executed decision-based use of foreign policy. President Kennedy had two options in this take of foreign policy: he could take a militaristic approach, or he could speak diplomatically to Russia to end the conflict. President Kennedy chose to enact a strong-handed approach. He established a blockade around Cuba and provided a military-backed threat that kept Soviet transportations from crossing the blockade. This example of foreign policy is just one of many situations where public administrators in power are making smart decisions to keep our country from conflict. There have been hundreds, if not thousands, of situations that were de-escalated or negotiated to create safety for our country.

Foreign policy takes on many forms. There are 5 prevalent theories of foreign policy that define how a state, or power, will react to a situation. Realism, Liberalism, Economic Structuralism, Psychological Theory, and Connectivism. These 5 theories are crucial to understand as a public administrator as they are utilized in the critical decision-making processes they undergo every day.

Realism is defined as a state, or power, acting in its own best interest. Realism puts the safety of the state first, and the benefits for the state first. As quoted by Machiavelli, “It is much safer to be feared than loved.” Generally, a state or power, will react to ensure the national security of its existence.

Liberalism can be described as attempting to neutralize a problem with cooperation, fairness, and generally with free trade.

Economic structuralism is a theory defined by Karl Marx. This theory can be explained as capitalism is bad and it damages the economic structure of weaker states. Capitalistic countries are known for utilizing the low-cost advantages of a weaker state to pump money back into their organization. Leaving the weaker state in a cycle of unfair labor.

Psychological theories go in-depth with bringing down the process of international politics to the individual level. This creates opportunities to understand why a public administrator can make rash decisions, or act in corrupt manners. This can also be flipped, and can identify trends in a very kind public administrator making sacrifices for the good of the people in the public administrator’s state, or in a foreign state. A big question psychological theorist answer is “why is political decision making inconsistent”.

Finally, constructivism, is about social and ideological reformation and movement. If infrastructure, or a system, needs to be changed it will be changed through a reformation of social practice. Constructivist changes usually weighs in factors such as human rights, gender equality, and racial equality.

Understanding the primary theories of foreign policy allows a regular citizen of the state to understand the most important question, “WHY was this decision made?”. When you understand these theories and know which one generally applies to your public administrator you can interpret their decision-making process in a whole new light. Having the ability to answer questions such as “why are we at war with this country?” or “why are we using our tax dollars to provide aid to a country that has no benefit to the US?” will help you understand politics and the world a bit better. With the power of the Internet and social media platforms such as Twitter, we are in constant communication with people who reside in foreign countries. It is eye-opening as an American citizen to have the ability to speak with someone who was just bombed by America. They will share pictures and videos and speak on the damage we brought upon their country, which leads us to ask the questions of “why did we do this?”. Understanding foreign policy gives us the insight and the ability to understand the decision-making process that our public administrators underwent.

  Sources

Frazier, Brionne. (2021, February 17). What Is Foreign Policy? Definition and Examples. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/foreign-policy-definition-examples-4178057

Elrod, Richard B. “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System.” World Politics, vol. 28, no. 2, 1976, pp. 159–174. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2009888.

“The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis.

Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory. 5th ed., Pearson, 2011.