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Superpowers : US, EU, Russia, others

In 2011, as part of the export control reforms initiative, the US government came up with the concept of Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA) — a move towards a licence-free or license exemption regime. Two lists were created — STA-1 and STA-2 — and countries that were not part of either list had to apply for a licence for every item on the Commerce Control List (of dual-use items).

STA-1 and STA-2 established a hierarchy among those the US was willing to certify as “good countries” that would not contribute towards “proliferation” in the world. The STA-1 list has 36 countries — including NATO allies and bilateral treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia — whose non-proliferation controls the US considers to be the best in the world. These countries are also among those that are part of the four multilateral export control regimes — the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. STA-1 countries, America’s most trusted allies, have licence-free access to almost 90% of dual-use technology, and are eligible to import items that are controlled for reasons of national security, chemical or biological weapons, irrespective of whether the technology or item impacts regional stability or American national security.

Countries in the STA-2 list enjoy some form of licensing exemption, but cannot access dual-use items/technology that may impact regional stability, or contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, etc. Before being elevated to STA-1 this week, India was in this list, along with seven other countries — Albania, Hong Kong, Israel, Malta, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan.

It was effectively a logical extension of several years of high-level U.S.-India talks on defense technology cooperation through the aegis of the bilateral Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Under the designation, India would have access to sensitive U.S. defense technologies in the same way that U.S. treaty allies do — in theory at least.Russia

Russia has now firmly moved towards Pakistan and depends heavily on China for selling oil. Modi needs to win Russia back.

Informal summit : Sochi agendaless meeting with putin, wuhan with china

Now with the Trump administration upending the rules of global governance, there is renewed concern in the three capitals that their foreign policies need greater coordination if only to preserve their equities in the global order

India, of course, has a long-standing relationship with Russia but that is undergoing a shift in light of rapidly evolving geopolitical realities. While the top leaderships of the two nations have continued to engage with each other, divergences have been cropping up with disturbing regularity.

is Russia’s increasing tilt towards Pakistan as it seeks to curry favour with China. Moscow had historically supported New Delhi at the United Nations Security Council by repeatedly vetoing resolutions on the Kashmir issue. Today, however, there is a change in how Moscow views its regional priorities in South Asia.In a significant development, the joint declaration issued at the end of the first-ever six-nation Speaker’s Conference in Islamabad held in December 2017 supported Pakistani line on Kashmir.This declaration signed by Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey underscored that “for ensuring global and regional peace and stability, the issue of Jammu and Kashmir needs peaceful resolution by Pakistan and India in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions.” Pakistan’s Kashmir fixation meant that it forced other interlocutors to bring the Kashmir issue to the declaration.

During his visit to New Delhi in December, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov publicly called on India to join China’s Belt and Road initiative

Lavrov also made his displeasure clear over New Delhi’s warming up to the idea of a quadrilateral engagement involving the US, India, Japan and Australia in the Indo-Pacific. He suggested “that sustainable security architecture in the Asia Pacific region cannot be achieved through bloc arrangement.”

For India, the prism is different as it has to manage the negative externalities emerging from the rise of China in its vicinity.Chinese power is now intruding into India’s traditional sphere of influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The growing power disparity between India and China is making the border situation unstable. China-Pakistan nexus is proving difficult to contain as India gets ready to face a two-front challenge.China refuses to recognise Indian global power aspirations and has not yielded on key Indian security demands. As a result, while Russia may find cooperation with China as a perfectly legitimate response to its problems with the West, India does not have that luxury

As India resets its engagement with China and as Russia adjusts to its growing isolation in the western world, time has come for renewed Indo-Russian engagement. For a relationship that largely relies on defence and where the deeper economic underpinnings are lagging, the need of the hour should be to have candid conversations about the current state of play in the relationship.

Where does the Russia sanction impact India?

India and Russia, with proposed defenceprojects worth over $12 billion hanging in balance, are working on a road map to get around the new US sanctions regime that seeks to deter countries from buying Russian weapon systems.

Russia’s partnership with China has resulted from Moscow’s need to offset the impact of the sanctions on its flagging economy, and more broadly to dilute US influence. Yet this partnership is hampered by deep mutual mistrust; Russia is increasingly wary of China’s growing influence, particularly in Central Asia, which Russia perceives as its own back yard.

Just as it needs China to push back against the US and buy Russian oil, Moscow values India’s role as a balancer against China and for its energy- and arms-thirsty market. For example, to constrain China’s growing clout, Russia pushed for India’s permanent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

For the US, the desire to bring India closer into its orbit has more to do with curbing Chinese influence than with containing Russia. For this same reason, both Russia and the US have become important for India to balance a rising China, although the former is actively upsetting this balance. In this regard, Russia’s growing strategic convergence with Pakistan and China is built on a common goal to counter US influence and has little to do with India. Nevertheless, it has had significant bearing on Indian security interests.

From seeing the Soviet Union as the strategic counterweight to China and Western powers in the Cold War days to as recent as the cooperation over the Brahmos missile project and the Essar-Rosneft oil deal, India has benefited immensely from its relations with Russia.

. As Russia becomes more beholden to China, the contours of India-Russian ties in the future will be increasingly shaped by Beijing-Moscow relations.

could leave India open to sanctions under the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which mandates the US administration to punish entities engaging “in a significant transaction with...the defense or intelligence sectors” of Russia. newly enacted American law that ‘could’ potentially determine the purchase of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia as a sanctionable activity.

Russia today provides India around 70 percent of its defence needs. And importantly, the defence cooperation is not exactly restricted to a buyer-seller relationship; it includes now joint design, research and development, joint production, training, and service-to-service contacts. Russia is always prepared to share its most sensitive and newest developments in technology to India that the United States and other Western nations have been reticent to do. The BrahMos missile system is a shining example of this type of collaboration.

It is Russia which has unhesitatingly established nuclear power stations in India, something that cannot be said of the United States even after the conclusion of the much-hyped civil nuclear deal. And it is Russia which has provided the most vocal support for India becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Time is ripe to involve Indian private sector companies into Indo-Russian defence joint ventures.The ‘Make in India’ program can be leveraged to do so. Two major military-industrial conferences of Indian companies and Russian OEMs have been held in Delhi and Moscow in 2017

USA

What strengthens India-US defence cooperation?

In 2016, the Obama administration granted India the custom-made status of a Major Defense Partner of the United States — a status akin to that of a major non-NATO ally, without using that exact designation.

It was effectively a logical extension of several years of high-level U.S.-India talks on defense technology cooperation through the aegis of the bilateral Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Under the designation, India would have access to sensitive U.S. defense technologies in the same way that U.S. treaty allies do — in theory at least.

India would be upgraded to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Tier 1 Strategic Trade Authorization level, granting India access to a large scope of exports without specific licenses.

The change comes ahead of a highly anticipated inaugural U.S.-India ‘two-plus-two’ meeting that will bring together the top foreign and defense officials from both countries for a high-level consultation on strategic and defense issues.The two countries are expected to conclude a so-called foundational agreement on military communications — the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) — during the meeting

Why does this list matter?

One of India’s key objectives in signing the civil nuclear deal with the United States in 2008was to gain access to high technology that it had been denied, especially from the 1970s through the 90s.

In 2011, as part of the export control reforms initiative, the US government came up with the concept of Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA) — a move towards a licence-free or license exemption regime. Two lists were created — STA-1 and STA-2 — and countries that were not part of either list had to apply for a licence for every item on the Commerce Control List (of dual-use items).

STA-1 and STA-2 established a hierarchy among those the US was willing to certify as “good countries” that would not contribute towards “proliferation” in the world. The STA-1 list has 36 countries — including NATO allies and bilateral treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia — whose non-proliferation controls the US considers to be the best in the world. These countries are also among those that are part of the four multilateral export control regimes — the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. STA-1 countries, America’s most trusted allies, have licence-free access to almost 90% of dual-use technology, and are eligible to import items that are controlled for reasons of national security, chemical or biological weapons, irrespective of whether the technology or item impacts regional stability or American national security.

Countries in the STA-2 list enjoy some form of licensing exemption, but cannot access dual-use items/technology that may impact regional stability, or contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, etc. Before being elevated to STA-1 this week, India was in this list, along with seven other countries — Albania, Hong Kong, Israel, Malta, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan.

Where else has the US accommodated Indian interests?

The US Senate late on August 1 passed a defence-spending bill that sought to amend a law threatening secondary sanctions against American strategic partners, such as India, who conduct “significant” business with Russia.

The move, which is being seen as a major relief to India, paves the way for it to purchase the Russian S400 Triumf.

Analysts in India were of the view that if the US did not provide the waiver from sanctions, it had the potential to be an irritant in US-India strategic ties. The National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), 2019, has been passed in the House of Representatives and is now awaiting US President Donald Trump’s signature. The NDAA amended sections in the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), passed by the US Congress exactly a year ago on 2 August 2017.

Over the past decade, India has been diversifying its weapons purchases with countries such as France and Israel, and the US, with almost $15 billion worth of orders, emerged as the top source for defence equipment.

India is reciprocating the US gesture

India is in talks with the U.S. to procure an advanced air defence system to defend the National Capital Region (NCR) from aerial attacks.

The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) is a tweaked India-specific version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), which the U.S. has with several countries it has close military to military cooperation. It is also one of the three foundational agreements — as referred to by the U.S. LEMOA gives access, to both countries, to designated military facilities on either side for the purpose of refuelling and replenishment. The agreement will primarily cover four areas — port calls, joint exercises, training and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Any other requirement has to be agreed upon by both sides on a case-by-case basis.

The three agreements — Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA) are referred to as the foundational agreements which the U.S. signs with countries with which it has close military ties. They are meant to build basic ground work and promote interoperability between militaries by creating common standards and systems. They also guide sale and transfer of high-end technologies.