#I'd want to make both a synchronization procedure and a duplication procedure

[faolonfiendrender]

I fully believe that if we go far enough on the whole "radical human augmentation including brain uploads/reconstruction" some very fundamental assumptions are going to have to be challenged. For instance, the notion of "one person"

Like, as it stands, most of society says one living brain and its body, at least electorally.

Because there really isn't a way to fix hive mind edge cases without opening other cans of worms.

Like, if I were designing a brain upload for myself, I would make the body I shove myself into later a standardized-ish design with a special made data transfer procedure so that if two divergent copies of me meet, we can merge memories, and then do my best to remerge frequently to avoid the psychological damage of this scheme. This gives me most of the benefits of the one mind-multiple nodes schema while making my various bodies harder to hijack and avoiding the requirement of get.

So, if there are ten to twenty copies of the same person, with independent minds but periodically merged memories, is that one person? How long without merging before one of the versions is a new person?