#greendogs

[segacity]

Overgrown 'Greendog: The Beached Surfer Dude!' SEGA Mega Drive Support us on Patreon

[hdawg1995]

aaAAAHHHHHHH I'M SHARING MY ART FIGHT BECAUSE I CAN!

[searching4rinoa]

Segaugust 2 #2 - James Pond/Greendog: The Beached Surfer Dude

[kaiasky]

ughk, cant believe im saying this but read Quine. your view of analytic philosophy is a strawman trapped in the 1940s

Re this: Admittedly I've only read "On What There Is" and "Two Dogmas" and both were a while ago. But Quine is very much in the "nodding along when he's disputing other previous claims, frowning when he's making his own" camp. To focus on On What There Is:

So I like a lot of Quine's focus on taking down the idea that X must exist to speak of X, and in particular I like that he questions the idea that analytic and synthetic statements are distinct w/ incompleteness and undecidability. It feels like a convincing argument that the two cannot be a binary.

And conceptually, I like Quine's idea of ontological pluralism. If you want to speak only of sense-bundles, fine. if you want to speak of objects, great. if you want to speak of categories and attributes, alright. We may develop multiple and use them as we see fit, being explicit about which ones we use! awesome.

But to get there, one has to swallow Russel's theory of descriptions, which is kinda an "you can have any color car you want, so long as it's black" type of bargain. Like...

Notably, first-order logic does not allow us to reason about predicates. We cannot say, for instance, that given ∃x: Dog(x) and ∃x: White(x) that ∃ Pred: Pred(x) ↔ Dog(x) ∧ White(x). That is, we cannot form a useful theory of attributes. There can be no green-doggedness until and unless somebody decides to dye their dog green. (We cannot solve this by introducing a IsA(GreenDog, Dog) predicate, that's second-order.) We can return to "all conceivable objects ontologically exist, but they may not be real", i.e. ∃x: Pegasizes(x) but not ∃x: Pegasizes(x) ∧ IsReal(x). This instantiates every possible predicate, giving us our categories. But that's deeply unsatisfying, it leads to all the issues Quine identifies; we must accept the ontological existence of infinite pegasi satisfying every conceivable combination of predicates, none of which exist. This is fine if we want to argue that properties and categories don't exist. But if we are trying to be an ontological relativist and simply identify the ontologies of various theories, it seems to pose an incredibly unwieldy theory if we want to talk about the platonic existence of e.g., prime numbers.

Also note that we are unable to express Quine's theory in terms of itself. That's fine, I mean, it's kinda a hallmark of foundations of math/logic, but, for instance, we cannot say ∃ Prop: (∀x: ¬Prop(x)), e.g. we cannot say "in this ontology, there are empty names."

It is very peculiar about conditionals/temporals/constructs. For instance, we may either reason from an ontology where Me(x) refers to me throughout time and in all hypothetical situations, or one where Me(x) refers only to myself now. Having to concern ourselves with whether x=y or the two are merely related by a predicate TheSame(x, y) is deeply unappealing to me.

Suppose someone insists that there is a predicate gorrn that half of all objects satisfy, but refuses to elaborate on what gorrn is. It is incorrect to say "there is nothing that is gorrn"--we might take 'this guy says so' as the definition of gorrn; we are already potentially taking "people say it's Pegasus" as the sole significance of pegasize. But really, what we want to say is "I consider gorrn irrelevant." It's hard to say how this is different from making an ontological claim about gorrn as a predicate, not as the existence of a gorrn x.

It's very hard to reason about non-existent objects. "Pegasus is not the same as Medusa" has no obvious expression. If we don't permit the existence of Pegasus, the sets {x: Pegasus(x)} and {x: Pegasus(x) ∧ Medusa(x)} are both the empty set. If we DO permit the existence of Pegasus, then we get the familiar explosion of possible pegasi, at least one for every telling of the myth, at which point I'd like to introduce my OC Pegadusa, everybody's favorite snake-headed horse who satisfies ∃x: Pegasus(x) ∧ Medusa(x).

We might say, yes, good, if we are speaking of Pegasus and Medusa we have implicitly adopted a different ontology, and of course this just goes to show that truth depends on ontology, which is relative and depends on language, fact, and context. But what is meant by "Bigfoot is fake but he also isn't a yeti". Are we switching ontologies mid-sentence? Are we incapable of holding both Bigfoot's fakeness and his relationship to the yeti in the same ontological framework? I don't think so.

numbers arent fucking real,

You can definitely make things work with mid-sentence unknowable subtle ontology-shifting, where in any conversation we employ as many ontologies as sentences.

But... at some point, you can make things work with anything, as Quine points out with the Wyman example. Sure, you can have a theory with infinite things that are, none of which exist. Is it useful??

Which is the ultimate question with Russel's and any sort of ideal language philosophy, right. Does rephrasing something as propositional logic give you additional clarity? I really don't think so; when someone says "Pegasus has wings", what additional clarity does Quine grant us? IDK.

(In some sense, I the generous-to-Quine read is this is a bit of like... I've been swimming in the Russel-Quine-juice forever right. if someone says there are no brown cows means for all x if x is a cow x is not brown. i'm not like 'holy shit you solved logic, you are the best logician since demorgan'. i'm just like yeah propositional logic, sure. so the ways it's unsatisfying are much more salient than like, the benefits you get from oh i can phrase my argument in propositional logic this is useful for being specific and unambigious.)

[chocolatethunder63]

Wuzzup with this ? OMG we buy anything

#greendogs#nasty#notme#really

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[radhanj]

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[segacity]

Clamped Down 'Greendog: The Beached Surfer Dude!' SEGA Mega Drive

[houseofcabral]

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[kneehoming-knee]

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[dojoe-tokyo]

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[shop4stylz]

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