#we are in for a long ride waiting for season 5 and all this infighting will not be beneficial at all

[madwheelerz]

Since there's already a meltdown happening, I will calmly express my opinions on Mike's sexuality and leave y'all with a message.

So, if you've hung around enough, you probably know that I think Mike is gay. I'm going to highlight some of my points that I've been wanting to talk about for a while, but didn't because of well *wildly gestures at the meltdown*.

Anyway,

1) The entire fiasco with comparing Mike's reaction to the ladies store with his reaction to the fleshflayer and the comment about him being scared.

2) This is actually what I came to think about. The reason I don't think Mike likes girls has to do with a variety of things, but outside of Will he's the only one of the party that doesn't mention how hot Phoebe Cates is.

They removed his crush on Jennifer Hayes, which I always find odd because we wouldn't even be having a debate if that was there. El is the only girl he's shown to date, but their portrayal is so...juvenile ig?

Like the contrasts between byler and mlvn start immediately from the season that they get together. The sheer difference in his reaction between getting dumped by El vs. his reaction to Will yelling at him.

You could also argue that Nancy and Steve didn't have a particularly deep connection, but we don't doubt he likes girls. He flirts with the customers, and he gets a date to the pep rally. We see him with other girls.

Jonathan is the only character we see who has eyes for one person. We don't doubt his feelings for Nancy, though. We hear him and Nancy go on about the traits that they love about each other.

I know Mike has a girlfriend, but so do Dustin and Lucas. An offhand comment about how great Phoebe Cates looks or an implication of him having a crush on Jennifer Hayes would go a long way.

3) His realization when he kissed El. I think he definitely realized something at that moment.

4) Meta stuff - "boys only", finds a girl in the boys' locker room and is upset, kicked out of the girls' bathroom.

Anyway, who's to say for sure anyway. I will not be interacting with the tag for a bit. Parting message in the tags. Above all, stay safe y'all.

[oumakokichi]

How do you think chapter 2 would have gone if the Kubs hadn't mixed up who got what pads? We might have seen a bloodbath.

Personally, I’ve always seen the Monokumerz’ “mix-up” assomething that was deliberately scripted and arranged, rather than an actualmistake. While Monokuma and all of the Monokumerz no doubt operate on a veryintelligent AI, they still respond directly to the Mother Monokuma, and thereforeto the ringleader.

All of the plot-points involving the Monokumerz, from theirinfighting to their “rebellion” against Monokuma, to them slowly but surelygetting picked off each chapter, seems to point to them all being there to addextra drama of their own for the audience’s sake, so that the killing gamenever gets “too boring.”

They’re an entire cast of “Poochie the Dog,” basically:cheap mascots to provide base humor and try to get the audience roped into anew season of Danganronpa, only to be written off deliberately because theywere never meant to be deep or to stick around for long. The only reason theywere brought back in Chapter 5 at all was because the ringleader desperatelyneeded the Exisals around to enforce order and protect Monokuma from the restof the group.

This would mean that any “mistakes” or “mess-ups” on theirpart were actually all just a part of the script, which I think is highlypossible. I don’t think Kirumi was actually handed her own Monopad by accidentor mistake so much as I think it was all a very deliberate move on theringleader’s part. I think the “mix-up” and “accidental swapping” of everyoneelse’s motive videos was actually scripted, in order to try and avoid givingeveryone their motive all at once. The ringleader wanted something that wouldwork as an “interesting plotline” for the chapter, but they certainly didn’twant everyone trying to kill each other all at once.

However, as for whether watching all of those motive videosat once would’ve really led to a bloodbath or not… Well, it’s kind of hard tosay actually. The characters certainly seem to think so at the end of Chapter2, after hearing about both Kirumi and Hoshi’s motive videos, but I’m not socertain myself.

The motive videos weren’t exactly a surefire guarantee toget someone to kill. We know, for instance, that Hoshi saw his, but there areimplications that he wasn’t even entirely suicidal afterwards. Despite beinggiven a motive that was very clearly supposed to make him want to give up onlife entirely, there are a few glaring holes in Kirumi’s story that Hoshi just “gaveup his life willingly”—namely the fact that she handcuffed him after knockinghim out, and that he struggled against her hard enough to leave scratches onthe sink.

The motive videos seem to work very similarly to the flashbacklights, as shown by the fact that Kirumi only “remembered” that she was theprime minister of Japan after watching her own. We can assume that some of theother motive videos included flashback effects like this which were intended tohelp provide a motive to kill—but that causes problems in its own way. Namely,if everyone had watched their motive videos in a big group, a lot of reallyobvious contradictions probably would’ve occurred which would’ve pointed outthat the videos (and therefore their own memories) weren’t nearly astrustworthy as they all thought they were.

In Chapter 2, Ouma especially seemed to think that by havingeveryone watch their own motive videos in a big group, it would be the easiestway to get the motives out of the way and have everyone confront them directly.This was the same course of action that the dr1 characters suggested themselvesfor the “embarrassing secrets” motive in dr1 Chapter 2—confessing their secretsdirectly likely would’ve circumvented the issue, even if it was unbearablypainful or humiliating. And Momota also confesses to Saihara later on inChapter 2 that he actually had the same idea as Ouma and thought that everyonewould’ve been able to “cooperate” much better had they actually confrontedtheir motive videos directly.

If we assume that Kirumi was scripted to receive her ownmotive video no matter what, then having everyone watch all of the motivevideos at once (including their own and each other’s) would’ve actually tippedeveryone off as to who had the most incentive to kill, and they all would’vebeen able to keep an eye on one another much better, even if they couldn’ttrust one another. And if they’d been able to pinpoint contradictions in themotive videos’ stories and points where they overlapped, well, it’s quitepossible they would’ve started questioning their own memories a lot sooner.

Technically, Kirumi’s motive video should’ve already been apoint of contention among the characters. Momota claims in his FTEs to know theprime minister of Japan, and seems like he wholeheartedly believes it. Thiswould mean that he’d have been somewhat familiar with the man who hired Kirumi—despitethe fact that Kirumi’s very clearly never seen him before, and should’ve theoreticallyknown all of her client’s friends while working as a stand-in. I put the factthat this never comes up down to plotholes and lazy writing on Kodaka’s part,but it could’ve worked really well as a pretty early indication that theirmemories and the flashback lights were never as reliable as they seemed.

Of course, in the end it’s impossible to say what would’vehappened exactly. It’s possible there really might’ve been a bloodbath—if everyonehad panicked and hadn’t been able to get their emotions under control, thengetting all their own motives might’ve led a few characters to fly off thehandle. I can’t imagine this would’ve been a particularly exciting outcome foreither the ringleader or the audience, though, since it would’ve meant everyonedying way too early for the story to continue, so that might be another reasonthat it was engineered so only one person received their own motive, ratherthan everyone getting them all at once.

These are just a few guesses as to what might’ve been. I’mpersonally more inclined to think that everyone watching their videos might’vebeen a good idea in the end, especially since the credibility of the videoswould’ve gone way down the more they all saw, but an all-out bloodbath would’veprobably been just as possible, and not something I think the ringleader wasinterested in at all.

In sdr2, Junko herself rigged certain motives so that amurder would definitely occur among certain groups of people, because she wasclearly growing bored and impatient while waiting for the deadline to countdown. In ndrv3 though, I think that rather than wanting to guarantee a motive,the ringleader wanted to include scenarios that would be “more likely” amongcertain characters.

They take a much more passive backseat to every case exceptChapter 1, so I think they simply hoped that things would turn out according totheir scenarios, rather than knowing for sure. For instance, it wasn’tguaranteed that Kirumi, who had everyone riding on her shoulders, would killHoshi, who had absolutely no one left to live for—but it was an interestingplotline that worked out in the ringleader’s favor nonetheless.

This was a fun question, anon!Thank you for stopping by!

[wsmith215]

NFL’s worst betting seasons of the Super Bowl Era

8:51 AM ET

NFL NationESPN

The NFL season is still pretty far away. We know the 2020 schedule, and opening lines have been released for Week 1, Monday Night Football games and some other key matchups.

As we wait for the real action to begin, we decided to take a look at some of the worst betting seasons in NFL history. Our NFL Nation reporters give their perspective on the worst individual seasons against the spread, using research from ESPN Stats & Information.

Steve Spurrier and the Bucs went 0-14 in 1976 and covered the spread in only two games. Manny Rubio/USA TODAY Sports

This expansion team was classic “Yucks” (short for “Yuckaneers”) football, going 0-14 in its inaugural season and becoming the first team in modern NFL history to go winless in a season. The Bucs failed to score any points in five games and finished last in the league in points scored (125 for the season) and touchdowns (14).

Although the Bucs drafted a future Pro Football Hall of Famer in Lee Roy Selmon, the rest of the team had little talent. NFL free agency didn’t start until 1993, and back then, NFL rules allowed existing teams to protect all but five players on their active rosters, which means that to form the team, Tampa Bay was relegated to selecting from a pool of aging, injured players. — Jenna Laine

1980 Steelers (3-13, .188)

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If 1972 marked the start of Pittsburgh’s dynasty, the 1980 season signaled the end of it. After winning Super Bowl XIV against the L.A. Rams in January, the Steelers started to lose effectiveness the next season and ended their streak of eight consecutive playoff appearances with a 9-7 regular-season finish. The defense, once the cornerstone of the championship seasons, went from second in yards allowed to 15th and surrendered 313 points (also 15th). The Steelers came out on the losing end of several close games, dropping seven games by an average of 7.5 points, including three by two or fewer points. After the season, running back Rocky Bleier retired, kicking off a slew of retirements of key players over the next couple of seasons and a slide into mediocrity that marked the 1980s. — Brooke Pryor

1981 Patriots (3-13, .188)

When the Patriots were visiting the Baltimore Colts in the season finale on an eight-game losing streak, some called it the “Stupor Bowl” because the loser would earn the top pick in the next year’s draft. The Patriots lost to finish the season 2-14. Eight of the team’s losses were by seven or fewer points. Matt Cavanaugh and Steve Grogan split the quarterback duties. Tony Collins was the leading rusher (873 yards on 204 carries with seven TDs). Don Hasselbeck (46 catches) and Stanley Morgan (44) were leading receivers on a club that had one Pro Bowler (guard John Hannah). — Mike Reiss

2007 Ravens (3-13, .188)

NFL: Best bets on win totals, playoffs NFL draft: Prop bets that cashed CFB: “The Bear’s” best bets for 2020 Conference bets: SEC | Big Ten | ACC Heisman: Value bets, early picks

It was an imperfect storm in terms of projecting Baltimore in 2007. The Ravens were coming off their most successful season, a 13-3 record and a No. 2 seed in the playoffs. But injuries caused the season to unravel quickly and led to the firing of coach Brian Billick. How bad was it? The Ravens went through three quarterbacks: an aging Steve McNair, an underperforming Kyle Boller and a rookie fifth-round pick in Troy Smith. Baltimore covered only three times, which included a near-upset of the undefeated Patriots in which the Ravens were 19-point underdogs. The season hit bottom in Week 15, when the favored Ravens lost in overtime to the 0-13 Dolphins. That still ranks as one of the most embarrassing losses in franchise history. — Jamison Hensley

2011 Rams (3-13, .188)

Third season’s a charm? That certainly wasn’t the case for coach Steve Spagnuolo, who watched as his team sputtered to a 2-14 finish behind a dismal offense that ranked worst in the NFL and averaged only 12.1 points per game. The defense didn’t fare much better, as it was pushed around for an average of 25.4 points per game, which ranked 26th in the league.

There was notable talent on the roster, including running back Steven Jackson and defensive linemen Chris Long and Robert Quinn, but the Rams could not overcome a plethora of injuries and subpar coaching. Spagnuolo was fired after the season.

Andy Reid’s tenure in Philly ended after a 4-12 season (3-13 ATS) in 2012. Rich Schultz /Getty Images2012 Eagles (3-13, .188)

Andy Reid’s distinguished 14-year run in Philadelphia came to an end after a very difficult 2012 season in which the Eagles finished 4-12. It started off well enough, with the Eagles winning three of their first four games, but that was promptly followed by an eight-game slide and a splintering inside the building.

Former offensive line coach Juan Castillo, who was shockingly named defensive coordinator the previous season, was fired from that role in October amid infighting on the staff and was replaced by Todd Bowles. A litany of injuries to key players, including Jason Peters and Michael Vick, impacted Reid’s ability to fend off the collapse. — Tim McManus

2014 Titans (3-13, .188)

The 2014 Titans won only two games and finished 1-5 within the division. Ken Whisenhunt’s first season as head coach was a forgettable one, as Tennessee had its worst season since 1994. Before the season, the Titans didn’t pick up quarterback Jake Locker’s fifth-year option. Locker attempted only 146 passes in 12 games and was placed on injured reserve before retiring when the season was over. Eight of the Titans’ losses were by at least 14 points. — Turron Davenport

1987 Bengals (3-12, .200)

Cincinnati’s 1987 campaign was sandwiched between two pretty good seasons. The Bengals suffered a loss to San Francisco early in the season before the NFL Players Association went on strike. Cincinnati lost two of its three games with replacement players. That form continued once the 24-day impasse ended, as the Bengals dropped nine of the final 11 games that season. To add to the team’s problems, longtime quarterback Ken Anderson retired in June, leaving a short transition into the Boomer Esiason era. Cincinnati finished the season with a 4-11 record (one game wasn’t played because of the strike) and was a woeful 3-12 ATS. — Ben Baby

1981 Colts (3-12-1, .200)

The Colts’ defense found its way into the record books in 1981. Too bad it wasn’t for anything good. Indianapolis set then-NFL records for yards (6,793) and points (533) allowed in a season. The unit gave up at least 21 points in all 16 games and at least 25 points in all but two games. To make things worse, the Colts scored only 259 points on offense that season. Things were so bad for the Colts that owner Bob Irsay sat with the assistant coaches, put on headphones and called plays during a game against Philadelphia. The Colts lost to the Eagles 38-13. — Mike Wells

1997 Cowboys (3-12-1, .200)

This was a team that had all but cashed out on Barry Switzer on its way to a 6-10 record. The Cowboys lost their last five games and were far removed from the team that won a Super Bowl in Switzer’s second season. The torch was passed to Green Bay on Nov. 23 in a 45-17 Packers win at Lambeau Field. The Bengals, riding the high of Boomer Esiason’s insertion into the lineup, even beat the Cowboys.

Perhaps this was the end of the Triplets’ dominance, but nobody really knew it at the time. Jerry Jones hired Chan Gailey as Switzer’s replacement, and Dallas made the playoffs in 1998 and 1999, but though Troy Aikman, Emmitt Smith and Michael Irvin remained, this team no longer struck fear into opponents. — Todd Archer

2003 Raiders (3-12-1, .200)

Talk about Super Bowl hangovers. A season after being thumped by once and future coach Jon Gruden and the Buccaneers 48-21 in Super Bowl XXXVII, the Raiders had the same pieces in place for another run at the Lombardi trophy. Alas, they got old overnight. Reigning MVP quarterback Rich Gannon got hurt, and neither Rick Mirer nor Marques Tuiasosopo could right the ship. After a 2-2 start, the Raiders dropped five straight and 10 of their last 12, prompting coach Bill Callahan to refer to his team as “the dumbest team in America, in terms of playing the game” after a Week 13 loss to the Broncos. That did not go over well in the locker room, especially with Charles Woodson, and the season, which was long since lost, became an unmitigated disaster. The Raiders did not have another winning season until 2016. — Paul Gutierrez

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[flauntpage]

The NFL's Growing Class Divide Could Undermine a Potential Player Strike

Richard Sherman is right. There's only one way for NFL players to get guaranteed contracts—or really, any other concessions—from league owners. And it doesn't involve asking nicely.

"If we want as the NFL, as a union, to get anything done, players have to be willing to strike," the Seattle Seahawks cornerback told ESPN on Wednesday. "That's the thing that guys need to 100 percent realize.

"You're going to have to miss games, you're going to have to lose some money if you're willing to make the point, because that's how MLB and NBA got it done. They missed games, they struck, they flexed every bit of power they had, and it was awesome. It worked out for them."

If this sounds like Bargaining 101 for Dummies—use the leverage you have to force the outcome you want, duh—well, that's how power works. Heading into its next round of collective bargaining, the NFL Players Association will be exactly as strong—or as weak—as the ability of its members to stand together, withhold their labor, shut the sport down, and take one on the financial chin so that owners, advertisers, and broadcasters take one, too.

Given what happened the last time the union struck a deal with the league, Sherman and his peers may be severely hamstrung. They've been put in a position where the haves and the have nots might not find common ground.

Look, walking out on work is hard. Especially for football players. They play a brutal sport, and typically have a short window of time to earn what they can before their brains and bodies break. Forming a picket line means giving up money they'll never get back, all so somebody else can make more in the future. It's not particularly surprising that the NFLPA historically has been lousy at it.

That said, the league's current Collective Bargaining Agreement likely makes a potential future strike even tougher. How so? Start with the bottom line. Under the previous agreement negotiated by former union head Gene Upshaw in 2006, players received 59 percent of annual NFL revenues minus a roughly $1 billion set-aside that went directly into owners' pockets; under the current deal negotiated by NLFPA executive director DeMaurice Smith in 2011, players receive 47 percent, minus a similar set-aside.

In other words: players took an 12 percent haircut that former player Sean Gilbert estimated would cost players $10 billion over the 10-year life of the agreement. Former NFLPA executive committee member Sean Morey told VICE Sports that amount could be closer to $15 billion. Whatever the final number ends up being, every dollar clawed back gives owners more resources to ride out a possible work stoppage when the current CBA expires in 2020—and more importantly, saps the union's ability to fill a war chest of its own, something players will need if they're foregoing paychecks.

But that's not the most union-busty thing about it.

It's one thing to end up with a smaller slice of the money pie; sometimes that happens. It's quite another to agree to divvy up that slice in a way that weakens—albeit inadvertently—your own position. And that's what the CBA seems to do, primarily by fostering what former Tampa Bay Buccaneers general manager Mark Dominik told Kevin Clark of The Ringer is "a have-and-have-not league" in which a small number of star veterans earn big bucks while the rest of the labor pool becomes increasingly younger, cheaper, and more disposable.

When the unintended consequences of the CBA may be making your job harder. Photo by Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports

Modern NFL rosters look a lot like the shifting American economy. The rich get richer. Almost everyone else fights for scraps. Consider the New England Patriots: according to the NFL salary database at spotrac.com, the defending champions have three players making more than $10 million a year, six making more than $5 million, and 53 making less than $1 million (the latter number of players will drop following training camp and preseason roster cuts). Similarly, the Super Bowl runner-up Atlanta Falcons have three players making more than $10 million, six making more than $5 million, and 61 making less than $1 million.

Why the divide? According to Clark, franchises have become increasingly adept at structuring player contracts in ways that are "eradicating the NFL's middle class and costing its lower tier much of its leverage"—mostly through language that reduces pay if players get hurt and/or fail to make their teams' 46-man gameday rosters. Former NFL player-turned-injury insurance salesman Nick Grisen told Clark that those two tricks cost players at least $48 million in 2015 and 2016.

However, the primary culprit is how the CBA treats rookies. Before 2011, incoming players were free to bargain with the teams that drafted them; today, they're subject to a wage scale, three-year renegotiation waiting periods, and team contract options that all conspire to suppress salaries. The last top draft pick under the old agreement, quarterback Sam Bradford, signed a contract worth a guaranteed $50 million; by contrast, the first top pick under the current deal, quarterback Cam Newton, received only $22 million guaranteed.

When the NFLPA agreed to limit rookie pay, the idea was that salary savings would end up in the pockets of experienced players. That's exactly what has happened—for a fortunate few. Otherwise, teams have been incentivized to avoid pricey and (presumably) injury-prone veterans, the better to load up on healthy, hungry, cost-controlled youngsters. As Ben Volin of the Boston Globe explains:

... why would a team pay big money to a free agent when it can simply draft a cheaper, healthier alternative and have him locked in to a near-minimum salary for at least three seasons?

While the CBA promises minimum salaries for veterans—$715,000 this year for players with 4-6 years of experience, $840,000 for 7-9, and $940,000 for 10-plus—many times it works against them.

"I've had teams tell me all the time, 'Your guy is a minimum-salary guy, he's too expensive,' " [an] agent said. "I have veteran players that would play for $50,000 if they could" ...

Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that after remaining constant over a 17-year span, NFL career lengths were shrinking at an "unprecedented rate"—dropping by about two and a half years from 2008 to 2014. Clark reports that the number of NFL players age 31 or older has fallen 20 percent from a decade ago. Volin notes that in 2016, about half of the league's players were 25 or younger—which means most of them were still locked into their rookie contracts.

The overall result? A star system economy in which the NFL's on-field labor force is split into two castes:

1. A well-paid minority of recognizable veteran players, mostly quarterbacks, who through skill and injury luck have managed to become the league's equivalent of the petite bourgeoisie;

2. A poorly-paid majority of disposable, relatively anonymous short-timers who function as the league's proletariat, grinding and hoping to last long enough to make it into the upper class.

When only one of your is locked into a cost-controlled salary for the next half-decade. Photo by Bill Streicher-USA TODAY Sports

NFL income inequality isn't all bad. Nor is it totally avoidable. The league always will have superstars, as well as third-string special teams fodder.

Still, the unintended hollowing out of a healthy middle class may have severe consequences for union strength and solidarity. Imagine it's 2020. You're Smith or a player union leader, trying to rally your members for a strike—or maybe just imploring them not to cross a picket line, even though their mortgages are going unpaid and their bills are piling up.

How much motivation do star players have to fight tooth-and-nail against a league that's already taking pretty good care of them? Conversely, how many of your rookie scale players want to drag out a work stoppage in which every missed game check represents a significant chunk of all the money they'll ever be able to earn playing football?

For NFL owners, this is the sneaky genius of the current CBA—in fact, I'd be surprised if league negotiators back in 2011 didn't see probable player class stratification as a feature of the deal, not a bug. In 1999, NBA owners took advantage of infighting between star and rank-and-file union members to negotiate a CBA that limited the maximum amount of money any one player could make; in 2011, the league exploited the same divide to slash the players' share of overall NBA revenues by seven percent.

NFL owners aren't strangers to this tactic. When the league and union were battling over allowing free agency in the late 1980s and 1990s, the NFLPA used group licensing revenue to fund a series of antitrust lawsuits against the NFL. In response, a clever league marketing executive named Frank Vuono devised a plan to undercut the union's efforts: convince top quarterbacks to stop assigning their licensing rights to the NFLPA, and instead partner with the league in order to make more money for themselves.

Vuono called his concept "the Quarterback Club." He promised players between $20,000 and $100,000 of extra annual income, cash they wouldn't have to share with their fellow union members. Most of the game's biggest stars—John Elway, Dan Marino, Troy Aikman, and Phil Simms among them—bought in. (As Matthew Futterman notes in his book Players: The Star of Sports and Money, and the Visionaries Who Fought to Create a Revolution, Joe Montana never joined, but only because he wanted to be paid more than anyone else). The QB Club and the union's licensing arm, Players Inc., sparred on and off for the next decade, and it wasn't until the NFLPA bought the QB Club from the league in 2002 for a reported $4 million that the players were "made whole again."

The lesson? Divide and conquer works. Which brings us back to Sherman, and the upcoming CBA negotiations. Could players actually exercise maximum show-stopping leverage, either by striking or credibly threatening to do so? It's possible. They know they got walloped on the last deal; they're openly envious of the big-money guaranteed contracts being handed out in the NBA; they're increasingly tired of commissioner Roger Goodell and the league handing them Ls on everything from player discipline to marijuana use to brain trauma protection. On the other hand, it's difficult to maintain solidarity when your credit card is being declined, or when rocking the boat might cost you a yacht. A financial house divided cannot stand—and as NFL players spoil for a 2020 fight, they would do well to look a little less like Dowton Abbey.

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