thomasspeaks-blog

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zeewater

Over de rotsen stort water zich - brullend Wil wild geruis goed hoorbaar zijn Over de rotsen stort de maan haar stralen In wit zilverlicht de zee zo hullend Getwee’ lopen zij over ’t strand Tezaam’ trotseren zij de vloed Getwee’ lopen zij af van ‘t land Tezaam’ tonen zij hun overmoed Hoort daar ginder raven krijsen Lijkepikkers, wachtend op ’t gerecht Ziet de beul zijn touw vast hijsen De lijkepikker, wachtend op 't gerecht Standvastig staan hun benen op de grond Tot de onderstroom haar kracht vertoont Standvastig houden zij elkander vast Tot de bovenstroom haar macht vertoont Getwee’ rollen zij door ’t water Tezaam’ rollen zij door de zee Getwee’ beseffen zij hun flater Tezaam’ sleurt de zee hen beiden mee Hoort daar ginder kraaien krijsen Lijkepikkers, wachtend op ’t gerecht Ziet de beul zijn touw vast hijsen De lijkepikker, wachtend op 't gerecht Als in koor fluist’ren de raven Als in ’t geniep zingen zij tevreê: “’t Is toch maar een kleine klus Voor de beuleman en zijne lus.” De jongen heeft haar hand verloren Beklimt hij alleen - de rotsige kust Is wat haar lot heeft bezworen Doch is hij zich dat nog niet bewust Alleen zoekt hij nu hulp te halen Alleen zoekt hij een reikende hand Alleen, doorweekt is hij bestemd tot falen Staat hij daar alleen aan de kant.

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Tintin and Theology and Mission between Neocolonialism and Postcolonialism

“My dear friends, today we will talk about your Fatherland: Belgium.” Reinterpretations of the theology of mission are too little, too late. While U.S. conservatism is exported to African countries, there is a more liberal branch of theology that addresses the matter of mission as well. It appears, that despite much less fundamentalist, this branch does have its own problems. If this article is reflexive of the general debate, there is a lot of talk but nothing really is being said.

In this article (see title, 2004), J. Rieger writes about the historical connection between colonialism and mission, and the connection between neo-colonialism and mission in the present situation of globalisation. The historical understanding of mission which strongly connects it with colonial power and authority. Rieger argues for another approach in which we allow ourselves to leave things in the hands of those to which the mission is directed and, ultimately, in the hands of God, rather than taking into account our own perspective and projecting that onto others. The relational aspect remains, but it the relations of power and authority are reversed. It also means that we take a deeper look at ourselves: in order to become part of the solution, ‘we need to develop a self-critical attitude that helps us reflect on how we have come to be (and still are) part of the problem.’

When I was a young boy, I used to read the adventures of Tintin. I still do, occasionally. But there is one album that I no longer enjoy reading, having aged: Tintin au Congo (Tintin in Congo, 1931). In this album, the scout-reporter travels to the Congo – a Belgian colony at the time – and has various adventures and encounters. One of those encounters is with a catholic priest who teaches at a school. The story unfolds in a manner that Tintin takes over the class and teaches the children about the Fatherland: Belgium.   At the time, it must have been ’93, I did not understand this. How could black children born and raised in Africa consider a European country their fatherland? 

In later editions, this was changed to Tintin teaching subtractions. Of course, the album reflects the Zeitgeist in which it was written. It remains, today, problematic.

Yet already in 1934 there was what I would consider a radical shift in the stories of Hergé. In his journeys to the Orient, Tintin rescues a Chinese young man from drowning. The young man, Chang, asks Tintin why he saved him. Tintin does not understand the question. In response, Chang tells him that that is not a thing white people tend to do. Following that, the two exchange the cultural biases their societies have about each other. This album, Le Lotus Bleu (1936, The Blue Lotus) is strongly linked to the actual events of the time, and portrays imperialist Japan as a threat to the Chinese.

Les adventures de Tintin et Milou were initially published in the conservatist, right-wing catholic periodical Le Petit Vingtième. Having that in mind, it is of no particular surprise that the earliest albums are reflective of this environment: it is not only evident in Tintin en Congo, but also in Tintin en Amérique (1932, against American capitalism) and Tintin au Pays des Soviets (1929, against bolshevism). Hergé was contacted by a chaplain of the University of Louvain, who worried that wrong and biased depictions of China could be counterproductive since there was a number of Chinese students studying at said University who read Le Petit Vingtième. 

Over the years, Tintin evolved from a colonialist to a cultural relativist. Or pragmatist. This shift began with The Blue Lotus, continued in L’Oreille Cassée (The Broken Ear) which criticised Western countries profiting from weapon’s trade in revolutionary Latin America (most notably: Basil Zaharoff/Vickers Armstrong, who profited from a conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay through the supply of weapons to both sides).

His attitude ultimately culminated in one of cultural relativism, or at least pragmatism. Tintin et les Picaros (Tintin and the Picaros). In this album, three of Tintin’s friends are arrested on the charge of espionage. Eventually travelling to San Theodoros, South America, to help his friends, Tintin meets the former dictator General Alcazar who seeks to regain power through means of a revolution against General Tapioca. Alcazar is sponsored by the western International Banana Company, Tapioca by the Bordurian (reflective of communist/fascist totalitarianism) leader Kurvi-Tasch (in French and Dutch: Plekszy-Gladz. A serious loss of translation). Only by aiding Alcazar can Tintin rescue his friends. In the final scene we see that in the wake of the revolution nothing in San Theodoros has changed: the slums are still slums and the poor are still the poor.

Where Tintin used to strive for The Good – however he defined it – he has evolved into a character that is no longer interested in imposing his own morals on others (with the notable exception of using armed force).

The most destructive aspect of human conduct is not war. It is the desire to do good in this world and equate that understanding of good with The Good. The problems associated with that equation are not a very new insight. It dates back to at least the sixteenth century theologies of Francesco Suárez and Francesco de Vitoria. This insight is the foundation of the just war in bello and ad bellum distinctions – which has strong, theological roots. It is therefore surprising that Christian theology still, in the 21st century, needs to be reminded of that. In the context of mission, no less!

I mean to say that it is surprising that a comic book author is able to make this shift and communicate it to his audience in the first and early second half of the twentieth century, while theology is, apparently, still struggling with it. Not only that: Rieger is talking about a problem without further specifying that problem. It is neo-colonialism, but what does he mean by this exactly? He mentions Latin America of the past, but is this entire continent today suffering from neo-colonialism? Or just some countries? And is this suffering indeed an effect of neo-colonialism, or perhaps of neoliberalism and capitalism? The free market, perhaps? Surely, they are not the same. And is it fair to reduce those problems to neo-colonialism? Aren’t the war on drugs and weapon’s production and trade part of the problem? And is that ‘war’ a neo-colonial policy?

Most of these nations have been independent for almost two centuries.That does not count for much of Africa or South-East Asia, but what then to say about Indonesia and India? These countries are faring fairly well economically, aren’t they? That is not to say that they do not have problems. But are they caused by neo-colonialism? 

He is talking about a problem in the concept of mission and provides an alternative approach, but in doing so he is discussing insights that I would consider historically self-evident, and in the alternative approach he does not give concrete examples. Other than that God is where you least expect him and that we should let him do the work. Whatever that may mean.

Well, that’s an easy way out.

[thomasspeaks-blog]

Agreeing with a Tea Partier: Framing, Fallacies (and a whiff of Feminism), and uncle Adolf

Yes, I am blunt. And I am thankful for that. Though I know that most will not take this kindly, I have the hope that people can read through this bluntness and listen to the point I am trying to make rather than frame me as an inconsiderate asshole. My hope in humanity has sort of crumbled in the face of recent elections. Then again: time to straighten our backs and go forward. Having opened the floodgates, there was a response. And here is my response to that response. Emy and I have, effectively, begun a dialogue.

The first thing Dr Annette Mosher said when she introduced feminism to the class during the Ethics of World Religions sessions was that feminism is not anti-men. However, I have, in my academic inquiries, continuously found that feminism makes use of the same gender dichotomies it seeks to abandon by turning the table one hundred and eighty degrees. That is my concern with feminism. That does not mean that therefore all feminists are anti-men. It only means that I am suspicious, and I think legitimately so, of people who call themselves a feminist. It does not mean that because I am suspicious of feminists (or rather: feminism), I am therefore also against gender equality. Or even worse: because I do not agree with certain positions that some feminists take, I am therefore worse than a rapist. 

Now the latter is a serious accusation and as such it requires serious evidence. Since I am being framed in a manner that is mind-wobbling, why should I be inclined to listen to what you are saying? But it is not so much the accusation itself that bothers me. It is the argument that is presented. It is not an argument. It is a fallacy.

In response to my friend Emy, I think that this is the issue that is at the core of our discussion. It is not about whether or not feminism is a valid or invalid position. It is about arguments being taken seriously if they are presented coherently. If we want to enter the debate, it is essential (for anyone) to discuss and evaluate the claims that are being made and the arguments presented to substantiate those claims. That means that what you do not do is to dismiss the claim by framing someone. Or, in my previous terms, to put them into a cupboard. 

It muddles the debate.

Recently, a friend of mine shared a short video on Facebook in which a journalist, Maria Hinojosa, attacks Steve Cortes on the use of the word ‘illegals’. In the description of the video, she is (suggestively) praised for schooling Cortes (a Trump advocate) after using ‘racist rhetoric’. Cortes’ position was that it is ‘most unfair to legal immigrants to allow illegals to hop in front of them to cheat the system.’ Hinojosa’s response was twofold:

- “Illegals is not a noun”. This constitutes linguistic ignorance. - Because a survivor of the Holocaust wrote that the first thing the national socialists did was to declare the Jews as illegals, you should therefore not use the term. Argumentum ad verecundiam (argument of authority) et reductio ad Hitlerum (Godwin).

It is not really clear to me whether Hinojosa really distinguishes these two positions. But both are an irrelevant response to the claim of Cortes. First, the matter as to what constitutes a noun is settled quite clearly in linguistics. The word ‘illegals’ is a noun, because it refers to a group of people (or, more simple: you can put an article, adjective, or pronoun in front of it). Whether you like that noun really does not matter for defining it as such. To forbid, or the suggestion thereof, the use of such a word is (to suggest) a limitation of free speech.

Second, opposing the framing of a group of people as illegals is one thing. Taking the position that the people who use the term therefore suggest that illegals should systematically be eradicated by means of rational efficiency through forced labour under poor conditions in situations where those who are deemed weak will be immediately sent to destruction facilities while simultaneously arguing in favour of racial purity and Blut und Boden is quite another. Other than that, the response also implies that because the Germans did it, therefore we shouldn’t do it. That works quite well for racial and ethnic suppression. It works much less for child support and obligatory health insurance, for example. And founding your position on the authority of Elie Wiesel (the Holocaust survivor) is sound if we are talking about the Holocaust. But that is not what the debate is about.

And then this form of populist rhetoric – because even though it is left-winged, that does not make it any less populist – is shared and liked on Facebook. It is praised because Cortes is using racist rhetoric and Hinojosa corrects him. Whatever the frame in which you want to put the word ‘illegals’, it is not racist. But I have come to understand that North-Americans (or perhaps Anglo-Saxons in general?) have come to use that word every time when they actually mean ‘to discriminate against’, so I’ll drop it (for another time?). Language fluidity and all that.

Ultimately, Cortes makes a valid point. Why should you allow people who have not taken legal means to enter a country make use of that countries resources and facilities when others do follow legal procedures? Yes, that is unfair. The position itself is matter that is open for debate. But Hinojosa does not allow the debate to be opened. Instead, she frames her opponent by putting him in the same corner as the Germans under Adolf Hitler. Reductio ad Hitlerum. Or, in Internet words: a Godwin.

Because the fragment on Facebook was only about a minute or so, I looked the fragment up on YouTube. It is slightly longer, but the gist of the message on Facebook is really the same – though Cortes’ position becomes more nuanced. The fragment I found was posted by the channel Tea Partier. His (or her) concern was similar to mine: 

“Notice that by freaking out about nouns and adjectives that should somehow be banned from the English language, and imply Trump was for some kind of new Holocaust, Hinojosa ignored the point about the unfairness of illegal immigration to the legal immigrants.”

By not entering the issue that was at hand (illegal immigration) but instead framing her opponent Hinojosa did nothing to strengthen her position. On the contrary: she weakened it by not providing a valid counterargument and instead cornering, or framing, Cortes, and by extension those who share his views, in the frame of national socialist ideology. It is also quite destructive: why would anyone listen to someone who is deemed an adherent to national socialist ideology?

There are two things that I find surprising about this. First, the praise she receives for ‘schooling’ Cortes: the video has 35.000 likes. Or perhaps not so much surprised as that I am saddened. Second, that I find myself in the position to agree with a Tea Partier. If this is the manner in which the political left prefers debate to be conducted, it no longer needs any enemies. In other words:

Then again, the second observation is indicative of my point. It are not the ideological positions that we put ourselves or others in that are of primary relevance in the debate. I say ‘ideological’ but you can replace this with any other form of framing. I used the word ‘cupboard’ before. What matters is that a.) you have a position and that is fine if b.) you are able to substantiate that position by arguments (rather than fallacies) and c.) allow for those claims to be scrutinised by those who might not agree with you.

My own predispositions are relevant in so far as that they guide me in my expectations in the debate. But I must not allow myself to be determined by those predispositions. My suspicion of feminism is one thing. To refuse to enter the debate with feminists because of that is quite another. Similarly, my suspicion of right-wing politics is one thing. But that does not mean that, occasionally, right-wing arguments can make much more sense. Especially when they are debunked by means of framing or cupboard-sorting of so-called social justice warriors. In other words: by fallacies. It allows me, who is on ideologically on the same plain (considering myself to be politically left-winged), to agree with a Tea Partier.

So, to respond directly to my dearest friend: the fact that I put you into my ‘damn cupboard’ does not mean that I am not willing to take you out of it again. I have not suggested that. I have acknowledged my own predispositions and explained where they come from. I did say that there is a narrative problem in feminism (a collective noun), but from that does not follow that therefore anyone who says that they are feminists are therefore adherents to the claim that all men are rapists. I have admitted that the problem of gender inequality exists. I understand your concern that you are by others framed as a feminist and therefore a whiner, but that is not my fault, nor can I be held accountable for that.

As you put it: it is my responsibility to deal with the stereotypes in my own head. In other words: an individual responsibility (and this opens a whole new discussion –so let’s stop here). And it is your responsibility to listen to the nuances. (But you are forgiven, because the hoover would have made a bit too much noice at the time).

[thomasspeaks-blog]

Grounding my suspicion of feminism

There is no such thing as sexism against men. - Anita Sarkeesian.

Last week, I wrote a blog in which I criticised feminism. Later that day, I was called by a friend of mine who pointed out an error in my reasoning. According to her, I said that I am suspicious of feminism because I do not take kindly to be accused of things that I am innocent of: ‘to call me a terrorist solely because of my gender is insulting.’ Though my friend agreed on it that such a remark is uncalled for, she also pointed out that, because I am suspicious of people who call themselves feminists, I am thereby doing the exact same thing as what I accuse feminism of doing: generalising an entire group of people. 

I think we agreed that she would write a response, but that is yet to happen. It might have not been a definite agreement. But since this has been on my mind now, I decided to reread the blog entry. I have come to the conclusion that my friend’s analysis is flawed. 

I have, indeed, written that I am suspicious of people calling themselves feminists and equally suspicious of research done by feminists. But this is a suspicion: it is not an accusation, nor is it a generalisation. It simply means that whenever I meet someone who calls him- or herself a feminist, I am suspicious of the manner in which they perceive reality. I have never claimed, nor will I ever claim, that all feminists are wrong in their observations and the conclusions they draw from those observations. But I have witnessed simply too many instances in which a feminist approach or a feminist argument is based more on faith and beliefs than that they are based on actual fact. 

Some examples to elucidate my position. I need to dig a bit, but the general idea is as follows:

1. Karen Warren’s 2001 Ecofeminist Philosophy. In this book, one of its chapters is about feminist mythology. Though the particularities vary, the overall tendency by some feminists is this: in the distant past, Europe was inhabited by a people whose ethics was characterised by cooperation and peaceful coexistence. This situation was maintained until an invasive group invaded Europe. These people were the Indo-Europeans and they brought with them patriarchy, and an ethic of competition and warfare. As Warren indicates, there is no evidence for this mythological European, matriarchal past. This prehistoric reading of pre-Indo-European society is similar to that of Susan Brownmiller’s unsubstantiated hypothesis that men discovered their genitalia to function as a weapon. There is no evidence, nor is it likely that such evidence ever arises. 

2. Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies’ Ecofeminism. In one of these chapters the argument is made that knowledge acquired through scientific inquiry is given precedence over knowledge that is acquired through tradition. Knowledge is reduced to objective knowledge, which has the presumption to be universal and free of value [Shiva, p. 22]. Admittedly, it is questionable that scientific inquiry is entirely free of value and bias. But the point of science is that its principles are universally applicable. One would expect that Shiva, a physicist, would know that Newton’s law of gravity works as well on Earth as it does on Pluto. Or Kepler-186. That’s sort of the point of what began with the Copernican Revolution. More pointedly, however, is that traditional knowledge may work very well, but then again, it may not. We do not know. We can only know if we test it. Our means of testing are those of scientific inquiry. To make the case here: I hypothesise that medical knowledge and application of that knowledge by midwives, achieved through scientific investigation, results in a lower death rate in births than when midwives rely solely on traditional knowledge. 

3. Vandana Shiva and GMOs. Being an environmentalist, Shiva opposes the use of genetically modified organisms. She has been accused by journalist Michael Specter of questionable conduct in the wake of a natural disaster in India. In the wake of a cyclone in 1999, the U.S. dispatched grain and so to help feed the victims, but Shiva allegedly claimed during a press conference that the victims were being used as guinea pigs for the genetically modified staple foods– regardless that these products were already consumed in the US. In her response, Shiva does not deny this press conference. Also, portrayed as an advocate for the poor, she is said to charge $40.000 dollars per speaking lecture including a business class air ticket. Which brings me to:

4. Anita Sarkeesian. This social justice warrior focuses her ‘research’ on tropes in games – or something like that – from a feminist perspective. She analyses how sexism is evident in games, but her methodology is, at best, questionable. At worst, her conclusions are testimonies of either ignorance or outright conscious manipulations. This executive director of the Feminist Frequency non-profit organisation, which has only female employees, had, in 2014, expenses of $64 000 dollars. The organisation’s assets were $384 000 at the end of 2014. Noting that funds are raised by the claim that research is being done so that videos can be made, Feminist Frequency published four (4!) FOUR videos totalling less than 120 minutes in the same year. Also note that commentaries are disabled for her videos, because she is being harassed online.

5. Jonathan McIntosh. Though I am not very much familiar with this guy, he is involved, apparently, in similar projects as Sarkeesian and at a certain point they collaborated. Both raise funds through fundraising on Patreon. However, Sarkeesian’s fund raisingresults exceed McIntosh’ by far. And it is not as if McIntosh is less known. Their object of research is the same, though McIntosh focuses on men. Surely, sexism is not involved here, because women can’t be sexist.

6. The general stupidity of the online feminist community. Rebecca Watson, incidentally considering liberal guys with an interest in science and scepticism but who find feminism distasteful worse than rapists, celebrated the expulsion of Richard Dawkins from a conference for sharing a video. Though the video is childish, sure, it depicts Chanty Binx quite well, who is so taken up in her own activism that she turns a blind eye to her own bigotry. And then there is Julie Bindel, who not only argues that feminism is not for men, but, in the same article, seriously suggests that a specific academic study should be for women only, because they might otherwise not feel safe. 

These examples indicate that there is a narrative in feminism that allows for a hierarchical gender dichotomy whilst the ideology simultaneously argues in favour of gender equality. It portrays women as victims, not as participants in a system of oppression. That system of oppression is called ‘patriarchy’ and is traced back to prehistoric times without there being substantial evidence for it; it is a mythology. It clothes symbols (patriarchy, misogyny, rape culture, et cetera) with such an aura of factuality that the ideology’s moods and motivations, established and communicated by those symbols, seem uniquely realistic. That sense of realism is substantiated by equating general and understandable critique to feminist theory with ‘harassment.’ It uses platforms of free speech to generate, communicate, and substantiate untested, or poorly tested, claims about the social world in which we live, whilst simultaneously oppressing free speech by, for example, blocking the possibility to comment or rallying to create ‘safe spaces’ in academic studies, or to lobby to withdraw an invitation at a sceptic’s convention (the irony!) of one of the speakers because he said something offensive. Feminism, in this sense, is inconsistent and maintains double standards at best, and is offensive and oppressive at worst– the latter an testimony of a lack of self-reflexivity. 

Having said all this, I must also point out that I am not a blind man. There are gender inequalities in our society. But they work both ways. Some of these inequalities might be biologically determined. But whether or not there is a biological explanation for that men more often achieve high-ranking positions because they are more likely to take risks, that should not mean that therefore one should pay a woman less when she has reached a similar position. It may be that women more often work in day care than men because of their biology, but that does not make such work  a women’s only job, nor should it mean that a man working in children’s day care should therefore be thought of as being a paedophile. The concepts of maternity and paternity leave require revision, as well as issues related to child custody. 

There are many things I do not know in these discussions. I do estimate that contemporary feminism will not contribute to their solutions. Feminism has historically achieved quite a bit: universal suffrage, awareness of gender equality, and so more. But today, it has been poisoned by radicals and thereby lost its credibility. That is not a reason not to listen to someone who posits himself a feminist. But the above does indicate that suspicion is only understandable. If the argument is sound, I will listen. 

Then again, that someone puts himself away in a cupboard. One can hardly expect the other not to put said person away in a cupboard. But that’s a story for another time.

[thomasspeaks-blog]

Tylko Pod Krzyrzem* - Only Under This Cross

Recently, I have been struggling with many things, one of which is the focus of my research for my master. Being enrolled as a student in the master specialization Peace, Trauma, and Religion, I should focus on something religious that is related to peace and trauma. Obviously. The challenge is, at the VU University’s Faculty of Theology, to go beyond the realm of theology and instead take a religious-scientific approach. A shift has occurred since I enrolled in the Religion and Trauma course, which is further strengthened by the course Sunday the Most Segregated Hour, the latter focusing on matters of identity, identity formation, and conflict, having the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a case study (of sorts). 

Questions pertaining to identity and conflict can often be linked to questions relating to national identity. Many years ago, I wrote a paper on nationalism, focusing on how national socialism understands the term ‘nation.’ I have lost that paper, but should be stored digitally somewhere, so I intend to look at it. In any case, national socialism considers non-German peoples to be inferior and primarily targets Jews. But another very important target were the Slavic peoples, and in Poland this idea of racial inferiority targeted not only the Jewish Poles but also Christian Poles during the German occupation. In statistics, the occupation of Poland led to the death of 2.8 million Christian and 2.9 million Jewish Poles. And by executive order of the Führer himself, Warsaw, nicknamed the ‘Paris of the east’, was reduced to rubble after a Polish uprising. During and in the aftermath of the war, the Allies ‘betrayed’ the Polish nation during the Yalta conference, de facto making Poland, while recognising it as a state, a satellite state of the USSR. And if the atrocities committed by the Germans were not enough, the Russians committed atrocities as well, such as the Katyn Massacre. While the liberated nations in Western Europe welcomed very much the Allied troops, Polish narratives tell quite a different story: of women who besmirched themselves with faeces so that they would not be raped by the Russian liberators. Combined with the domination of communist and soviet ideology and state terror, the history of twentieth century Poland is one filled with traumatic experiences. 

These traumatic experiences help to create narratives. The question is how those narratives influence the self-understanding of the Poles. An important aspect in this self-understanding is, I think, the religious factor. Poland is a predominantly catholic nation. Ideas of national identity are strongly linked to Catholicism, if not consciously then subconsciously. The nation’s national epic, Pan Tadeusz, written by Adam Mickiewicz in the nineteenth century, is obligatory reading material in schools. It has a verse that describes the Polish nation as the Christ of Europe. This image of identity is also communicated in nationalistic oriented media, such as the newspaper Nasz Dziennik, invoking a phrase attributed to Mickiewicz: 

Tylko pod krzyżem, tylko pod tym znakiem Polska jest Polską, a Polak Polakiem

,,Only under this Cross, under this sign Poland is Poland, and a Pole is a Pole”

In other words: a good Pole is a Catholic Pole. That sort of excludes a vast amount of people: Jews, Orthodox Christians, the Polish Muslim minority, et cetera.

Whether this idea of identity and nationalist rhetoric is common in Poland is a matter worth investigating. In any case, recent political developments in Poland tentatively point out that Christianity and Polish national identity are strongly linked. My first question would be how narratives developed out of traumatic experiences construct or influence the sense of national identity. That’s a broad question – too broad for a single paper – but, hey, I’m just brainstorming at this stage. 

---

* The chosen headline font does not accept the [ż], nor its variant [Ƶ] . For aesthetic reasons, I replaced it with [rz], which is pronounced the same.

[thomasspeaks-blog]

Critique to a feminist approach to the study of trauma

“A forgotten history”

In Trauma and Recovery, Judith Lewis Herman opens the first chapter with an historic overview of the study of trauma, which is said to have begun in the nineteenth century and the phenomenon of hysteria. Over the course of the next hundred years, this medical condition came to be understood not as a specifically female condition (as was initially thought), but as a condition that is related to traumatic experiences. This is substantiated by the realisation that the symptoms associated with hysteria are similar, if not equal, to symptoms associated with shell shock or war neurosis. After the Vietnam war, these conditions became collectively known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The author concludes that ‘[h]ysteria is the combat neurosis of the sex war.’ (Herman, p. 32). [1]

The author raises the point that ‘the systematic study of psychological trauma […] depends on the support of a political movement,’(Herman, p. 9.) noting that the history of trauma-related studies is indicative of this. I am not sure what to make of this claim. Of course, any study that involves the larger society would require overall popular support. Yet the danger here is that research then becomes ideologically oriented, and this is where my problems with the chapter begin.

As indicated by the author herself, the book owes its existence to the woman’s liberation movement. This already makes me suspicious, because contemporary feminism is very much ideological rather than that it is objective. There are various sources that substantiate this claim; I will note some below. For our purposes here, the author notes (in this chapter) that thanks to this liberation movement, rape reform legislation was initiated in the U.S. (Herman, p. 29.).

That is of course quite an achievement, and a praiseworthy one if only the legislators, and thus also the activists, had taken into account that the object of rape exceeds a single gender. Though women are, surely, more often the victim of rape, they are not the sole victims of rape.[2] But legislation in the United States, specifically California, refers to rape as intercourse without consent; intercourse, by definition, involves the penetration of the vagina by the penis. It is argued that Brock Turner was only sentenced for six months imprisonment because he was only charged for sexual assault, and not rape. And his actions were not considered to be an act of rape because he did not penetrate the victim with his penis. Hence there was no intercourse, hence no rape. For the law, anyway. The point here is that this feminist victory, proudly (I think) presented in the chapter, is a Pyrrhus victory.

Foregoing the specifics of this particular case, there is a greater concern that is indicative of the feminist perception of reality. It renders women as victims, and men as perpetrators. Again, said legislation can be taken as an example: rape is considered rape when it involves intercourse; intercourse is the penetration of the vagina by the penis. Effectively, men can never be the victim of rape by the legislation initiated by feminists in the 1970s (in the state of California, anyway).

One could argue that this perception of reality is not present in Herman’s writing, but one would be wrong. She quotes Susan Brownmiller:

,,Man’s discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric times, along with the use of fire and the first crude stone axe. From prehistoric times to the present, I believe, rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.” (Herman, p. 30, emphasis added)

That is an extraordinary claim and as such it requires extraordinary evidence. I consider it an extraordinary claim because the claim is collective: it states that all men consciously keep women in a state of fear through the threat of rape. It is also easily debunked: noting that I do not feel sexually attracted towards women, I can hardly be accused of consciously keeping women in a state of fear.

But my greatest concern is that the author refers to a study done by Diana Russell in the early 1980s. This study interviewed 900 women about their experiences of domestic violence and sexual exploitation, and found that one in four women had been raped, while one in three women had been sexually assaulted. Herman rightly states that these results are horrifying.(Herman, p. 30) But they are only so if they are true. I tried to find reviews on that particular study, but was unable to find them. And since this is, again, an extraordinary claim, it would have been sound to expend a bit on the matter, especially considering that she uses this study to make related claims in other chapters.[3] What was the socio-economic background of the interviewees? How were the interviewees selected? Is the sample group representative of society as a whole? Have there been done further studies that substantiate the findings of this research? And why were only women interviewed?

More importantly, are the interviewees telling the truth? The problem with cases such as these, as proven by the more recent accusations of sexual abuse in church institutions, is that they are very hard to prove. And as testified by the commotion following a 2014 Rolling Stone article, they are easily taken for granted and perpetuated regardless of the validity of their claim by feminists. Because the person who told this false story is a victim of patriarchy, and as such she must be telling the truth.

I do not take kindly to be accused of things that I am innocent of, and I think that this goes for anyone. To call me a terrorist solely because of my gender is insulting. It is a form of bigotry that is typically found in feminism. It effectively influences research done through that ideological lens: it does not seek facts to build theory, but it already has a theory and only look for facts that substantiate that ‘theory’.[4]

This is why I am suspicious of people calling themselves feminists, and equally suspicious of research done by feminists, especially when the author of such research claims that there is a war between the sexes. (Herman, p. 32).

Seriously.

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Sources (other than already indicated)

Herman, Judith Lewis, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, London, 2001.

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Comments

[1] Understanding hysteria as combat neurosis seems a rhetorical trick rather than a substantiated claim. Equating ‘war,’ i.e., the situation in which at least two parties pick up arms in order to kill each other off for some political aim, to ‘sex war’, whatever the phrase may mean, is a false analogy.

[2] One research indicated that in same-sex relationships, lesbian relationships have more occurrences of domestic violence than gay relationships. Though this is only one source and only one research, and refers to domestic violence in general rather than sexual violence specifically, it is nonetheless indicative that such violence is not restricted to men. [3] For example, implicitly in the first page of chapter 2 (p. 34.).

[4] One example of this is Anita Sarkeesian’s feminist research on games. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WuRSaLZidWI&index=52&list=WL, retrieved 1 November 2016.

[thomasspeaks-blog]

Sylvana en de boze zwartmens. En boze witmens

In Nederland hebben we de uitdrukking ‘zo trots als een pauw zijn’; een variant op deze uitspraak is zo trots als een aap zijn. Beide uitspraken betekenen hetzelfde: iemand is buitengewoon trots op een behaalde prestatie. Er zijn raciale of seksistische verbanden aan te brengen in deze uitspraak tenzij men deze verbanden moedwillig toepast. Nu heeft Johan Derksen op 24 oktober het vermoeden geuit dat Sylvana Simons wel zo trots als een aap moet zijn omdat RTL de roetpiet in heeft gevoerd. Dat is het enige dat Derksen betreurt aan het besluit van RTL. Of dat helemaal juist is, kan ik niet zeggen. Derksen wordt volgens mij betaald door RTL.

Maar dat staat hier verder los van.

Derksen noemde Simons verder een ‘hysterisch juffrouwtje’ dat nu ‘trots door het land rent.’ Een van de andere sprekers in het programma Voetbal Inside (ik ken het programma verder niet; voetbal interesseert me niet) ziet de discriminatiebeschuldigende bui al hangen en corrigeerde Derksen met het woord pauw. En terecht. Want Simons heeft met een open brief inderdaad laten zien dat zij op haar minst licht hysterisch is.

Licht hysterisch, want hoewel Simons over het algemeen genomen inhoudelijk gelijk heeft, gaat zij te ver door in haar analyse door te impliceren dat ook deze uitspraak valt binnen Derksens discriminerende gedrag. En bovendien seksistisch.

Het was zeker denigrerend, maar dat mag niet verbazen: Derksen is het duidelijk niet eens met Simons. Vraag is of het daarom seksistisch was. Als Simons een man was geweest, had Derksen wellicht gesproken over een hysterisch mannetje. En als Simons een blanke man was geweest, dan had er geen haai gekraaid over racisme en/of seksisme. Al waren er dan natuurlijk wel heel veel bozewitmens-Nederlanders gevallen over het feit dat een blanke een traditie van zijn volk (whatever that may mean) afvallig is. Zoals diezelfde bozewitmens-Nederlander nu boos is op RTL.

Maar laten we eens breder kijken dan louter dit geval. Elders suggereert een nieuwsbron dat Simons boos is omdat banketbakkers uit ergernis jegens haar bruine S-chocoletters in de schappen hebben liggen. Het nieuwsgehalte van dit bericht is nihil: Simons wordt nergens aan het woord gelaten; in plaats daarvan alleen de stichting ‘Piet Niet’, die bovenal verkeerd genoemd is omdat de formele naam ‘Zwarte Piet Niet’ is.

Simons heeft een reputatie opgebouwd en staat nu voor eens en altijd te boek als díe vrouw die kinderen een kinderfeest af wil nemen en Nederlandse tradities wil afschaffen. Of dat allemaal waar is doet verder niet ter zake. En uit de reacties die hier en daar op internet te lezen zijn blijkt dat er een heleboel Nederlanders zijn die vinden dat buitenlanders maar op moeten tieffen als ze het niet eens zijn met onze Nederlandse tradities. Of liever: hun Nederlandse tradities. Want de rest tieft dus maar een eind op. 

Er is geen Nederlands discriminatieprobleem. Het zijn er twee. Enerzijds de boze witmens die niet doorheeft dat hij discrimineert, of dat wel doorheeft en er geen moeite mee heeft. Die kenden we al. Anderzijds is er de boze zwartmens die overal discriminatie ziet. Zelfs in een nelsonmandelapop en het woord picnic (gebaseerd op een broodjeaapverhaal. Pun intended).

Het had Simons gesierd als zij louter en alleen had verwezen naar het impliciete compliment dat Derksen maakte, en de rest van de open brief geschrapt had. The image was originally published in Ad Valvas. See: http://www.advalvas.vu.nl/nieuws/weg-met-zwarte-piet

[thomasspeaks-blog]

A slave girl’s story

Imagine that, once upon a time, you are an Egyptian girl who is sold into slavery. You are sold to a tribe of semi-nomadic peoples, to the wife of the elder, who cannot bear children. So the wife gives you to her husband, so that he may sleep with you and that you may conceive for them (and not for yourself) a child. And the elder does this. He is, you learn, over eighty years old. And you conceive.

You feel disgusted.

Saddened and angered by this, you look up at your mistress with defiant contempt. And she does not take this kindly, so she treats you harshly. So you run away, into the desert. This must have been an impulsive idea, because soon you start to panic. Where should you go to? And then a voice! It tells you to return and submit to your mistress. It also tells you that you will bore a son who will have many, many offspring. And you return, and eventually give birth to your boy – who is not your boy.

Yet the wife eventually does get pregnant. And when she has given birth she urges her husband to ridden them of you and your child, because the wife does not want her son to have to share in the inheritance. You did not know this, but perhaps you expected it. In any case, it becomes clear when the elder comes to you with a water skin and some food. You already know. He sends you away. Into the desert, where foul creatures and thieves and highwaymen live, and enemy tribes and wild animals. He sends you into that almost other-worldly realm with your boy.

You run out of food and water, and because you do not want to see your son suffer, you hid him and create a good distance between the two of you. Perhaps you become delusional. But in any case, you hear the voice again, who promises you, again, that your boy will have a great many descendants, and that you shall not perish – and then you open your eyes and you find a well of water.

You survive, and both of you live.

Your name is Hagar, mother of Ishmael, slave girl of Sarai, later Sara, who was the wife of Abram, later Abraham.

Genesis 16:1-16 and 21:8-21

[thomasspeaks-blog]

An introduction

I have no idea how this works. I only recently discovered Tumblr and decided to make use of it. Mostly for personal reasons: since I am still studying, I am faced with the problem that my mind is constantly filled with new ideas that must be processed, consequently delaying the process of the study itself. In other words: my mind is preoccupied and unable to compartmentalise, hence I find myself focusing on the details rather than the project itself. Faced with this challenge I have come to find that it is best to simply write those things down so that other people are bothered with my thoughts – and not I.

You, of course, have the choice to be bothered with it.

This may sound, understandably, pretty vague, but my next post will (hopefully) make things much more clair et distinct. But a further introduction is required, so that you, reader, have a basic idea of the things that this blog – or whatever the word – is about.

My name is Thomas and I am becoming the prototype of the eternal student – de eeuwige student. I live in the fair city of Amsterdam and study at the VU University’s Faculty of Theology. I work at the world’s third largest private financial donor of non-government organisations, namely Novamedia, but don’t have any great expectations here. My position is in customer care and I process mail and e-mails. Further, I am the student assistant for the Chair of Peace Theology and Ethics, and within that capacity I work for the Amsterdam Centre for Religion and Peace & Justice Studies.

My bachelor was in religion studies, not theology. For the Dutch, I find it necessary to point out this important distinction. Religion studies is a social science; theology is an academic discipline (and not a science!). That is my personal distinction and some theologians may not agree. They are, of course, in the wrong.

I have often been asked why I began to study this subject. It is essentially a quest for meaning. First, meaning in the sense of ‘meaning of life’, but I have come to find that this is a relevant yet unanswerable quest – in absolute terms, anyway. Instead, I now focus on the meaning of concepts. And those who know me will find me tremendously annoying when I ask them to explain what they mean when they make a moral judgment – or even an empirical statement. The intent of me demanding that explanation is to discover the underlying assumptions, which points out the falseness of the claim made.

This gets in people’s hair.

Finally, this blog is called On the study of religion. It is a tentative title. I’ll probably change it, but for now it works – especially considering that I am at this point strongly involved in the subject of hermeneutics. I will try to upload something once a week. If I fail, there simply was nothing that preoccupied me.

Thomas

NB for an example of that deconstructive tendency see: What is deconstruction? on https://youtu.be/Cku46UJRlNo