#CASEDIGEST

[daphenominchief]

People v. Gutierrez [GR Nos. 147656-58 (09 May 2003)] 

A man appeals his conviction of three counts of rape, claiming consensual encounters, but the Supreme Court affirms the decision, emphasizing that the absence of physical injuries does not negate rape and that the victim's credibility and explanation for delay are sufficient evidence.

Facts:

Accused: Bernabe Gutierrez y Gutierrez

Victim: Gina V. Alcantara, his niece

Incidents: Occurred on July 24, 1999, July 30, 1999, and August 12, 1999

Location: Barangay Salaan, Mangaldan, Pangasinan

Circumstances: Gina and her sister Matet were living in Bernabe's house to care for their bedridden grandmother.

Allegations: Bernabe threatened Gina with a knife, forced her to undress, and raped her on three occasions.

Delay in Reporting: Gina did not report immediately due to fear for her life and her family's safety.

Disclosure: Gina confided in her uncle Boyet, who took her to her sister's house in Pasay City.

Formal Complaint: Filed on August 23, 1999; medical examination revealed hymenal lacerations.

Defense: Bernabe claimed the sexual encounters were consensual.

Trial Court: Found Gina's testimony credible, convicted Bernabe of three counts of rape, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered him to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

Appeal: Bernabe argued his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and cited several trial court errors.

Issue:

Jurisdiction: Did the trial court err in assuming jurisdiction over the three counts of rape despite alleged defects in the Informations?

Decision Clarity: Did the trial court fail to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which its decision was based?

Threat and Intimidation: Was the degree of threat, force, or intimidation sufficient to compel Gina to submit to Bernabe's advances?

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Did the prosecution fail to prove Bernabe's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Victim's Credibility: Did Gina's behavior after the alleged rapes undermine her credibility?

Medical Evidence: Was the trial court correct in concluding that the hymenal lacerations were consistent with Gina's allegations of rape?

Counsel's Diligence: Did Bernabe's counsel fail to exercise the required diligence in defending his client?

Ruling:

Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the Informations were sufficient and that the trial court had jurisdiction.

Decision Clarity: The Court found that the trial court's decision clearly and distinctly stated the facts and the law on which it was based.

Threat and Intimidation: The Court ruled that the degree of threat, force, or intimidation was sufficient to compel Gina to submit to Bernabe's advances.

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Court affirmed that the prosecution proved Bernabe's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Victim's Credibility: The Court held that Gina's behavior after the alleged rapes did not undermine her credibility.

Medical Evidence: The Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the hymenal lacerations were consistent with Gina's allegations of rape.

Counsel's Diligence: The Court found that Bernabe was bound by his counsel's conduct and that any alleged negligence did not warrant a different outcome.

Ratio:

Sufficiency of Information: The information was deemed sufficient as it contained necessary details, including the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense.

Decision Foundation: The trial court's decision was well-founded, clearly stating the facts and the applicable law.

Intimidation and Moral Ascendancy: The Court explained that intimidation and moral ascendancy, especially by a close kin, could compel submission without physical resistance.

Victim's Testimony: Gina's consistent and emotional testimony, despite rigorous cross-examination, was deemed credible.

Delay in Reporting: The Court noted that it is not uncommon for rape victims to delay reporting the crime due to fear and threats from the perpetrator.

Counsel's Conduct: The Court reiterated the principle that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct.

Sentencing: The Court upheld the trial court's imposition of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Damages: The awards for civil indemnity and moral damages were affirmed, but the award for exemplary damages was deleted due to the lack of an aggravating circumstance.

[hermosa-oblicon24]

Article 1410

The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.

The action for the declaration of inexistence or the defense on such is imprescriptible. The mere lapse of time does not validate a void contract, unlike in voidable contracts, which, if not assailed within the specific period provided by law, shall remain valid.

It is not necessary to go to the court to declare the nullity of a void contract if both parties agree that it is void and henceforth, on their own volition, change it. However, to avoid instances where one party refuses to restore what he has received out of a void contract, it is better to go to the court first to avoid inconvenience or to avoid taking the law into his own hands. Taking the law into one’s hands may lead to coercion which is a criminal offense.

The right to have a contract declared void ab initio may be barred by laches although not barred by prescription. It is an application of equity, based upon the grounds of public policy which require for the peace of society, discouraging stale claims. It is however exercised on the discretion of the court, its application controlled by equitable consideration.

Related/Cited Case

Heirs of Ureta v Heirs of Ureta

FACTS: Alfonso Ureta had 14 children, including, Policronio. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition. On October 1969, in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale in favor of his children including Policronio. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. On October 11, 1972, Alfonso died and his children acted as the administrator of his father’s estate. on November 22, 1974, Policronio died. The subject land under the deed of sale was never taken possession of by Policronio nor his heirs. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

On July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995issue of the Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle but despite earnest efforts, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession over the subject land.

ISSUES:  Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

HELD: It is valid. The Deed of Sale entered between Alfonso and Policronio is void for being an absolutely simulated sale. No actual consideration or money was given and there was no actual intent to enter into a sale. It was merely to avoid tax purposes The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition did not need an SPA because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. Partition is not an act of strict dominion which requires an SPA. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved. In the case of Badillo v. Ferrer, the court held a deed of extrajudicial partition is not voidable by lack of parties to give consent but unenforceable as an unauthorized contract in 1403(1). However, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid, binding, and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio.  because of several circumstances which shows they gave their consent to Conrado to sign on their behalf such as that Extra-Judicial Partition was signed on 1989 but the siblings only came to know about it 1995, 5 years after, and Conrado didn’t inform his siblings during such span; Conrado retained possession of land under the Extra-Judicial Partition; 1 year after the sale, the Heirs of Policronio executed an SPA to have the land under the Extra-Judicial Partition be the subject of mortgage. Such acts shows the Heirs of Policronio were aware of the said Partition and the vitiation of consent is a mere afterthought

[inomniaparatus23]

People vs. Webb, G.R. No. 176864, 14 December 2010. 

A criminal trial is not about personal redress for the victims, but about determining the guilt and the just punishment of the accused.

The concept of “fair trial” is that the rights of the accused are protected, to the extent necessary to ensure fairness for him. Rights of the victims are not ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are consistent with the fairness of the trial for the accused.

Separate Concurring Opinion – J. Sereno

[jannie-notes]

ART 1365

If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper

exists, or a writing exists, but the parties do not intend it to express their

final  agreemeReformation is thus not available where no writing exists, or a writing exists, but the parties do not intend it to express their final agreement

Reformation is  that  remedy  by  means  of  which  a  written instrument is amended or rectified so as to express or conform to the real agreement or intention of the parties when by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident, the instrument fails to express such agreement or intention.

Reformation is  that  remedy  by  means  of  which  a  written

instrument is amended or rectified so as to express or conform to the

real agreement or intention of the parties when by reason of mistake,

fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident, the instrument fails to express

such agreement or intention.

FLORENCIA VELASQUES VS. JUSTO TEODORO (G.R. No. L-18666 February 17, 1923) Romualdez, J

In this case the heirs of Velasquez seek to recover title to, and possession of certain land.

There are 7 lands in total and the heirs of Velasquez said that they have in their possession 6 parcel of land owned by their parents as a conjugal property and 1 that is in possession of Justo Teodoro.

But Justo claimed that he bought the land from the heirs of a certain Leodegaria Valdes which also purched the land from Ramon Velasquez and by the terms of the document, the contract is one of sale

HOWEVER, in one of the clauses in the document, it appears that Velasquez did NOT reserve the right to repurchase the property, but bound himself to return the principal interest. Now, the contract is considered as a mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether the transfers of the subject lands are valid

HELD: the transfer of land is invalid. This aforementioned contract is a mortgage, thus upholding the judgment of the trial court that there was an assignment of error on the part of the respondents in considering the contract is one of sale. Ramon Velazquez did not acquire title to the property by virtue of the contract mentioned. He had no right to transfer it, as he did to Leodegaria Valdez.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Nullity of Marriage

Article 40 

G.R. No. 183805     July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Et. Al., Respondents

FACTS:

 On June 28, 2004, petitioner, James Walter P. Capili, was charged with the crime of bigamy in information as follows: 

On or about December 8, 1999, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Kar;a Y. Medina Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner, thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as prejudicial question in that instant criminal case.

In Order, the petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss were granted.

In the opposition filed the private prosecutor to the motion among others, was that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this case and that the resolution of the issues in the said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

After a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, the Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the motion to dismiss filed case since the 2nd marriage was already nullified.

The private respondent filed an appeal to CA and in the Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

The petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said decision but he same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy.

HELD: 

No. As defined in Art 349, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the information was filed.

It was undisputed that a second marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between the petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili. Notably, the RTC itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between the petitioner and private respondent.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. 

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are Affirmed.

[coyremetre]

Last #casedigest #crimrev 🤓🤓 Move on na sa readings... Aja aja 🎉🎉 https://www.instagram.com/p/CIJR3P1hYqR/?igshid=1qjsgcpjuvdp1

[call-me-catalysis]

ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, Petitioners, vs. PATERNO C. BELL, SR., et.al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 186322               July 8, 2015

SERENO, CJ:

FACTS:

The respondents Bell siblings were the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell. In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a complaint at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio.

The complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. The RTC granted respondents’ prayers and ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas City to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the defendants and to reconstitute the TCT as “family home” of the plaintiffs Bell siblings and Spouses Bell. However, the RTC declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum.

Spouses Bell later brought the case to the Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus interest. On June 9, 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution as a result of which respondents’ property covered by the newly reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title. Upon motion of the respondents, the trial court ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posted that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.

The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executor, only declared respondents’ house and lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no res judicata.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

 HELD: Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead – the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

[aspiringlawyerforthedeen]

Central Shipping Company, Inc vs Insurance Company of North America (digest)

G.R. No. 150751; September 20, 2004

FACTS: 

·      On July 25, 1990 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Central Shipping Company received on board its vessel, the M/V ‘Central Bohol’, 376 pieces [of] Philippine Apitong Round Logs and undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber Co., Inc. 

·      The cargo was insured for P3,000,000.00 against total loss under Insurance Company of North America’s Marine Cargo Policy No. MCPB- 00170.

·      The vessel completely sank. Due to the sinking of the vessel, the cargo was totally lost.

·      The consignee, Alaska Lumber Co. Inc., presented a claim for the value of the shipment to Central Shipping but the latter failed and refused to settle the claim, hence Insurance company, being the insurer, paid said claim and now seeks to be subrogated to all the rights and actions of the consignee as against Central Shipping.

·      Central Shipping raised as its main defense that the proximate and only cause of the sinking of its vessel and the loss of its cargo was a natural disaster, a tropical storm which neither Central Shipping nor the captain of its vessel could have foreseen.

·      RTC’s Decision: Central Shipping Liable. RTC was unconvinced that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the weather or any other caso fortuito. It noted that monsoons, which were common occurrences during the months of July to December, could have been foreseen and provided for by an ocean-going vessel. 

·      CA’s Decision: affirmed RTC. Given the season of rains and monsoons, the ship captain and his crew should have anticipated the perils of the sea. The CA found no merit in petitioner’s assertion of the vessel’s seaworthiness. It held that the Certificates of Inspection and Drydocking were not conclusive proofs thereof. In order to consider a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be fit to meet the perils of the sea. 

ISSUES:

1.     WON the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo?

2.     WON the doctrine of limited liability is applicable? 

 RULING & RATIO:

1.     Yes. A common carrier is presumed to be at fault or negligent. It shall be liable for the loss, destruction or deterioration of its cargo, unless it can prove that the sole and proximate cause of such event is one of the causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, or that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent or minimize the loss.

 In the present case, the weather condition encountered by petitioner’s vessel was not a “storm” or a natural disaster comprehended in the law. Given the known weather condition prevailing during the voyage, the manner of stowage employed by the carrier was insufficient to secure the cargo from the rolling action of the sea. The carrier took a calculated risk in improperly securing the cargo. Having lost that risk, it cannot now disclaim any liability for the loss. 

Established is the fact that between 10:00 p.m. on July 25, 1990 and 1:25 a.m. on July 26, 1990, M/V Central Bohol encountered a southwestern monsoon in the course of its voyage. Having made such factual representation in its Note of Marine Protest, petitioner cannot now be allowed to retreat and claim that the southwestern monsoon was a “storm.” Normally expected on sea voyages, however, were such monsoons, during which strong winds were not unusual.

 According to PAGASA, a storm has a wind force of 48 to 55 knots, equivalent to 55 to 63 miles per hour or 10 to 11 in the Beaufort Scale. The second mate of the vessel stated that the wind was blowing around force 7 to 8 on the Beaufort Scale. Consequently, the strong winds accompanying the southwestern monsoon could not be classified as a “storm.” Such winds are the ordinary vicissitudes of a sea voyage. Also, even if it were a storm, it was not the proximate and only cause of the loss. The loss of the vessel was caused not only by the southwestern monsoon, but also by the shifting of the logs in the hold. Such shifting could been due only to improper stowage. 

 2.     No. The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is not applicable to the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. 

[mandirigmanglawschool-blog]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING" et al. G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011

Doctrine:

Such identification, to be positive, need not always be by direct evidence from an eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.

Facts:

Haide Cagagtan was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family’s residence. The kitchen, had a wall which was made of three-feet high bamboo slats arranged like a chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door. She was noticed by one of the accused and pointed the gun at her. At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots. The father of Haide, Francisco, also heard the gunshots making him instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize the accused who were then standing by the kitchen door. Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying:  I was shot by Berting.  He succumbed shortly, at the hospital due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood.

Issue:

Whether or not identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually saw the assailants

Held:

No. The established circumstances unerringly show that the four accused were the perpetrators of the fatal shooting of Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and Francisco was definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting – uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – is a part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

[angela-bautista]

#CaseDigests

Republic v. TAN Properties

Facts:

In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of 56.4007 hectares. To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.

 Issue: Whether or the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable.

 Ruling: No.

It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.

In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed proof. For the documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO No. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAO’s that the documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

[daphenominchief]

De Guzman v. People; Pastor V. Pastor; People V. Pastor and De Guzman, G.R. No. 255100, 255229, 255503. February 26, 2024

FACTS

Three related cases have been consolidated and brought before the court. 

Domingo V. De Guzman III was charged with murder. Tomas Pastor, Enzo's father, filed a separate petition for certiorari against Dalia Guerrero Pastor, Enzo's wife.

The Prosecution's Version of Events

On June 12, 2014, Enzo was employed as a race car driver. He was using a yellow truck to transport his race car. At 7:00 p.m., Enzo, along with his helper and mechanic, Salazar, left Enzo's home to drive to Batangas for a race. Dalia, Enzo's wife, and Enzo's mother were also present. After dropping off the race car, Enzo, Salazar, and the driver returned to Enzo's home around 9:45 p.m. Enzo and the driver left again, heading to Clark, Pampanga, to drop off the driver. Dalia called Enzo around five times as they made their way to Clark.

On the way to Clark, as the truck approached the intersection of Visayas Avenue and Congressional Avenue, a man wearing black clothes on a motorcycle approached them. The man instructed the driver to lay on the floor of the truck and fired at Enzo. Salazar, who was able to see the gunman, observed that one of his eyes was “kirať” and that Enzo was shot on his left side. Enzo died from his injuries.

Police Officer II Edgar Angel Ybañez (PO2 Angel) confessed to the killing of Enzo, saying that he came clean due to his conscience. PO2 Angel said that he feared he would be killed. PO2 Angel said De Guzman hired him to kill Enzo and named Dalia, Enzo's wife, as the mastermind.

De Guzman and Dalia were in an illicit relationship, and Dalia’s father had threatened to disinherit her because of it. De Guzman first met with PO2 Angel in November 2013, and asked him to beat up

Enzo. They met several times to plan, but PO2 Angel did not agree to convince him to carry out the plan. Dalia was having an affair with Enzo's wife, which De Guzman inquired about in February 2014. In June 2014, De Guzman asked PO2 Angel for proof that Enzo was hurting his wife. De Guzman showed him a photo of a woman, later identified as Dalia, whose face and arm were bruised. De Guzman then handed PO2 Angel PHP 50,000.00 cash as down payment.

De Guzman’s Counter-Affidavit

On October 24, 2014, De Guzman submitted his counter-affidavit, denying that an entrapment operation on him took place. He said on August 26, 2014, he was repositioning his car at the open space parking across Unique Hotel when four (4) men, whom he later identified as PO2 Angel, PO3 Alvin Quisimbing, a person named Salazar, and a person named Moreno, approached him at gunpoint and forcibly tried to open the door of his car. Unable to open the car door, the four (4) men identified themselves as police officers from the PNP-CIDU, arrested and threatened De Guzman. De Guzman was brought inside the Toyota Vios for about 14 seconds, handcuffed, and given a bundle of money. PO2 Angel’s extrajudicial confession should not be indicted for the crimes complained of.

Dalia’s Defense

On January 21, 2015, Dalia filed a manifestation with motion to dismiss invoking the illegality of her arrest and the inadmissibility of all evidence seized pursuant to People v. Dela Rosa. She contends that since PO2 Angel retracted his extrajudicial confession, it follows that her implication emanating from the inadmissible extrajudicial confession is consequently inadmissible evidence as well.

PO2 Angel’s Testimony at Trial

At trial, PO2 Angel testified that he was arrested on August 23, 2014. He insisted that his arrest was illegal as no shabu or other illegal drug was confiscated from him and he was shocked to find out that he was charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. PO2 Angel claims he was detained by the QCPD-CIDU, which forced him to sign an extrajudicial confession where he supposedly admitted to the killing of Enzo. He denied knowing De Guzman.

Trial Court’s Ruling

On February 27, 2015, De Guzman filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. The Court denied De Guzman’s motion for judicial determination of probable cause, which should have recommended his indictment for murder. Dalia filed a motion to dismiss the case against her on March 3, 2015.

Subsequent Motions and Orders

On March 15, 2015, the prosecution filed a motion to consolidate the parricide case against Dalia with the murder case against De Guzman and PO2 Angel. On August 5, 2015, Branch 85 issued an Omnibus Order that granted the withdrawal of the two Informations, granted Dalia’s motion for leave, denied De Guzman’s motions, granted Dalia’s motion for omnibus lack of merit, granted the urgent ex parte motion, and ordered the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to issue hold-departure orders. On August 12, 2015, De Guzman was apprehended by officers of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals found that PO2 Angel did not definitively identify Dalia as the mastermind. Dalia was privy to the transaction between PO2 Angel and De Guzman, in that the meeting between De Guzman and PO2 Angel to kill Enzo was scheduled to take place at 11:00 a.m. Dalia supplied information on Enzo’s whereabouts on the night Enzo was killed as De Guzman and Dalia had been talking on the phone that night. The Court of Appeals dismissed the criminal case against her for alleged lack of probable cause.

With regard to De Guzman's petition, the appellate court found that probable cause existed against him for the murder of Enzo. Nidia's job as a gun-for-hire was precisely what boosted his

credibility as a witness. De Guzman’s execution theory that the police merely coerced him into signing the confession which he did not even have the opportunity to read, signing interviews with the media which have already been prepared by the police, and even falsely implicate De Guzman as the mastermind in the killing of Enzo.

By its Consolidated Resolution dated January 11, 2021, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of De Guzman and the separate partial motions for reconsideration filed by the OSG and Tomas.

Tomas Pastor’s Arguments to the Supreme Court

Tomas asserts that the evidence taken together is sufficient for an average person, using common sense, to reasonably infer that Dalia conspired with De Guzman and PO2 Angel to kill Enzo. He claims the Court of Appeals applied a “honeyed double standard” against Dalia but at the same time upholds the sufficiency of circumstantial case evidence against De Guzman. Tomas also asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting Dalia’s petition for certiorari despite its finding that Branch 91 did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it found probable cause for her arrest.

ISSUES

G.R. No. 255100 (De Guzman v. People of the Philippines):

May the Court review the uniform factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court on the sufficiency of the evidence against De Guzman vis-à-vis the warrant of arrest issued on him and the denial of his application for bail?

G.R. Nos. 255229 and 255503 (Tomas Pastor v. Dalia Guerrero Pastor and People of the Philippines v. Dalia Guerrero Pastor and Domingo V. De Guzman III):

May the Court review the conflicting factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court on the existence of probable cause against Dalia vis-à-vis the indictment for parricide and the consequent issuance of a warrant of arrest on her?

RULING

G.R. No. 255100 (De Guzman v. People of the Philippines):

Yes, the Court reviewed the uniform factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court on the sufficiency of the evidence against De Guzman vis-à-vis the warrant of arrest issued on him and the denial of his application for bail.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not an appeal but a special civil action distinctly different from an ordinary appeal. The Supreme Court is not precluded from scrutinizing the evidence if the case falls under any of the exceptions to the general rule barring a review of factual findings.

Here, the Court found that this case presents exceptional circumstances warranting a review of the factual findings. The Court considered the existence of strong circumstantial evidence, including De Guzman's extrajudicial confession and the testimonies of several witnesses, that contradicted the appellate court's findings.

Therefore, the Court found the evidence sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against De Guzman and to deny his application for bail.

G.R. Nos. 255229 and 255503 (Tomas Pastor v. Dalia Guerrero Pastor and People of the Philippines v. Dalia Guerrero Pastor and Domingo V. De Guzman III):

Yes, the Court review the conflicting factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court on the existence of probable cause against Dalia vis-à-vis the indictment for parricide and the consequent issuance of a warrant of arrest on her.

The Court has the power to review factual findings in a petition for certiorari when there are conflicting findings of fact between the trial court and the appellate court. Furthermore, a finding of probable cause merely requires evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

In the case at bar, the Court found that the appellate court erred in dismissing the parricide case against Dalia. The Court held that there was ample evidence on record clearly identifying Dalia as a co-conspirator and detailing her participation in the crime. This evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Therefore, the Court ruled that there was probable cause against Dalia, and reinstated the warrant of arrest and hold departure order against her.

[hermosa-oblicon24]

Article 1356

Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised. (1278a)

Contracts are binding upon the contracting parties in whatever form they may have been entered into as long as all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when can we consider form as essential requisite of a contract?

The form of a contract is essential:

When the law requires that a contract be in certain form for its validity; (refers to solemn or formal contracts).

When the law requires that a contract be in certain form for its enforceability. (refers to the agreements covered by the Statute of Frauds. (Art. 1403, par 2.)

Case Related/Cited

Far Eastern Bank v PDIC

On July 5, 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines placed Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) under receivership through Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 699.

On October 28, 1985, the Central Bank invited banks to submit proposals for the purchase of PBC's assets and franchise.

FEBTC submitted its bid on November 14, 1985, which included the purchase of both non-fixed and fixed assets of PBC, as described in the Asian Appraisal Report of August 1984.

The Central Bank accepted FEBTC's bid through MB Resolution No. 1234 on November 22, 1985.

On April 16, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed among FEBTC, PBC, and the Central Bank, with PBC represented by Liquidator Renan V. Santos.

The MOA specified that the parties would execute an absolute purchase agreement covering all PBC assets, including non-fixed and fixed assets.

The Purchase Agreement (PA) executed on October 24, 1986, covered only the non-fixed assets.

FEBTC took possession of the fixed assets and sought the execution of deeds of sale, which Liquidator Santos initially supported but failed to finalize.

PDIC, as the new liquidator, contended that the fixed assets should be purchased at their present appraisal value, higher than the sound value.

FEBTC filed a motion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to compel the execution of deeds of sale for the fixed assets.

The RTC ruled in favor of FEBTC, directing PDIC to execute the deeds of sale at the sound values stated in the Asian Appraisal Report.

PDIC appealed, and the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, leading FEBTC to seek a review from the Supreme Court.

Issue:

WON the FEBTC can validly compel the PDIC to execute the deed of sale over the fixed assets?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale over the disputed fixed assets.

The Supreme Court found that the fixed assets were not submitted as collaterals to the Central Ban...(Unlock)

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized that a contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties on the essential elements of the contract, i.e., consent, object, and consideration.

The Court found that these elements were present in the MOA, which incorporated FEBTC's bid to purchase PBC's fixed and non-fixed assets.

The MOA and PA confirmed the essential terms, including the valuation and manner of payment for the fixed assets.

[inomniaparatus23]

Now Reading : Should the State have the Right to Appeal Adverse Judgments in Criminal Cases?

Author: Juanito C. Castaneda Jr.

[jannie-notes]

REPUBLIC VS. HON. BAUTISTA

FACTS:

From the moment of acquisition until his death, Apolonio, Sr. had been the single and exclusive possessor and occupant, and no one had contested his ownership or staked an adverse claim against him thereon. He passed away in 1987, and his children, including responder Apolonio Jr. and his siblings, succeeded him. The siblings of Apolonio, Jr. relinquished their rights in favor of him in an extrajudicial settlement of their father's inheritance that was implemented by Apolonio, Srchildren. .'s As a result, the property was listed in Apolonio Jr.'s name for tax purposes.

The Government did not interpose any timely objection to the testimony of Apolonia, Jr. It did not also object to the documentary evidence (i.e., the deeds of absolute sale and tax declarations) offered by him. Hence, the MTC admitted all the evidence presented by Apolonia, Jr. In due course, the MTC granted Apolonia, Jr.'s application, and declared him as the owner in fee simple of the land, and confirmed his ownership thereof.

ISSUE:

WON Apolonio Jr. established his lawful occupation of the land as owner in fee simple; that the Government did not timely object to his testimony, and did not also controvert his evidence

HELD:

The Government has correctly insisted that the requisite period of possession of the property should conform to that provided forin Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to citizens of the Philippines "who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of theapplication for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. x x x" The provision is reprised by Section14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), adopting the length of possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

[ayzhadelleruin]

Case Digest # 2

Article 26 of Title I of Family Code of the Philippines

G.R. 167109  FEBRUARY 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner

v.

Court of Appeals, Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza

 FACTS:

Felicitas Amor-Catalan and  Orlando B. Catalan were married, migrated to the United States of America, and allegedly became naturalized. After 38 years of marriage, they got divorced. Orlando then got Married to Merope Calasiao. The petitioner, contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and Merope. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Orlando then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case.

The petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review after her motion for reconsideration as denied raising that she has the required standing in court to question the nullity of the marriage between respondents.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondent on  the grounds of bigamy, However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

 ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

 RULING:

Both the  RTC and the court of Appeals found that the petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized America citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree. However, after careful review of the records, the said courts noted that other than the allegations in the complaint and testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

A divorce obtained abroad by alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleadings must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the case was REPRIMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition.

[call-me-catalysis]

ANTONIO RAGUDO and EUGENIA PAREDES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. EMELITA R. PASNO, represented by her Father, ENRIQUE R. PASNO as her guardian ad-litem, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. L-16642 April 18, 1962

BENGZON, C.J.:

 FACTS:

Spouses Antonio Ragudo and Eugenia Paderes filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to annual the order of the justice of the peace of Tayabas, Quezon, declaring Emelita Pasno, their adopted child, which order was already final.

The spouses alleged substantially that they had been induced by Emelita’s parents to believe that the adoption proceeding was merely for the purpose of transferring to 8-year old Emelita some guerilla educational benefits.

Plaintiffs further alleged that the adoption had been secured through fraud and misrepresentation used by defendant Enrique Pasno, father of Emelita, upon the plaintiffs, as the latter never intended to adopt Emelita as their child.

The defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint, arguing that as the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance to take cognizance of adoption cases, the latter has no jurisdiction to interfere or annul the order issued in said adoption proceeding.

The judge dismissed the case upholding the defendant’s contention. Hence, this appeal.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the defendants should be sustained.

 HELD:

No. there is no question that the Justice of the Peace Court and the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction over adoption cases. However, this was not an adoption case, but rather a civil action to annul an Order of a Justice of Peace Court, allegedly obtained through fraud. In such action, Justice of the Peace Courts cannot take cognizance. It falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Hence, the appealed order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.