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Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate (G.R. No. 19671) October 18, 2011

FACTS: 2 years after the effectivity of the constitution, a law was enacted synchronising the ARMM elections to the local elections. On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8thof August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

-Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

ISSUES:

I.    Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II.   Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A.   Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B.   Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C.   Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

I. YES. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate.

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. 

II. No. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054.

RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws  RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.

Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

Conclusion: 

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91]Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

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Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes (G.R. No. 180771) April 21, 2015

FACTS:

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX).   The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well.  The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals.  The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait.  In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased.  The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

ISSUE: 

Procedural issue: WON the case is moot. 

Issue #1 WON the Marine Mammals thru their steward has legal standing

Issue #2 WON the service contract violates the Constitution

HELD:

Procedural Issue: The Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.”  Id., p. 12.  Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. 

Legal Standing: NO. As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.”  Id., p. 15.  Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.”  Id., p. 16-17.

Unconstitutional: The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements.  Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress.  Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. 

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas.  In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34.  Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area.

source: https://www.elaw.org/ph.tanon.15