#G.R. No. 19671

[casedigestdump-blog]

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate (G.R. No. 19671) October 18, 2011

FACTS: 2 years after the effectivity of the constitution, a law was enacted synchronising the ARMM elections to the local elections. On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8thof August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

-Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

ISSUES:

I.    Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II.   Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A.   Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B.   Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C.   Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

I. YES. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate.

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. 

II. No. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054.

RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws  RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.

Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

Conclusion: 

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91]Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

[rdpunzalan]

Article 72 of the Family Code

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)

CASE DIGEST:

G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Before a Catholic chaplain, the pastor and Vicenta got married in secret. When Mamerto and Mena learned of their daughter's marriage, they sought counsel from a priest, who advised that the union be re-celebrated. The reception, though, never happened, and the newlyweds ultimately grew apart. Later, Vicenta traveled to America without Pastor's knowledge. A complete divorce was granted by the Court of Nevada after she filed a complaint for divorce there citing extreme mental mistreatment. Later, she asked the Archbishop of Cebu to declare her marriage null and void. Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada and got American citizenship.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.

RULING:

1.)��No. The court ruled that despite the wife's request for and subsequent receipt of an absolute divorce decree in Nevada, Tenchavez and Escao's legal marriage remained in existence and undissolved under Philippine law. Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce decree was issued, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which was in effect at the time, expressly stated that "Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." She was still bound by Philippine law at the time, which forbids an absolute divorce. The divorce was thus illegal in accordance with Philippine law.

2.) Yes. The Court concluded that Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation on the grounds of adultery as authorized by Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code based on what can be inferred from the facts and factors. Vicenta's marriage and cohabitation with the American are theoretically considered to be "intercourse with a person not her husband" under Philippine law because our country does not recognize her divorce and second marriage as legally lawful. Her failure to carry out her wifely obligations, her rejection of their marriage's consortium, and her abandonment of her husband all amount to legal wrongs for which the husband is entitled to the equivalent indemnification. Thus, the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law.

The Court determined that Tenchavez's claim for moral damages in the amount of one million pesos was irrational after taking a number of factors into account. First of all, the union was private and its dissolution was not marked by publicity or excessive shame on his behalf. Second, the parties did not ever cohabitate. Third, there is proof that Tenchavez first consented to the dissolution of the marriage, despite the fact that such a commitment was illegal and against state policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez is prohibited from getting remarried by our law is a result of the union's indissoluble nature, which he entered into voluntarily and with full knowledge. Therefore, he should get P25,000 only by means of moral damages and attorney’s expenses.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

[avocado-reganalee]

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)

Case:

 G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

 PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

 FACTS:

On Feb 24 1948, Tenchaves and Escano secretly married in the house of one Jose Alburo. Their marriage was never supported by Vicenta’s parents because they have lived in a traditional catholic manner. On June 1948, the marriage had already estranged. Vicenta left the dwelling to escape the scandal of her marriage and on June 1950, she applied for her passport stating that she is single. On Aug 1950, she went to US and filed for Divorce of her marriage with Pastor. The petition was granted and thereafter, Vicenta married one Russell Leo Moran, an American. On Aug 1958, Vicenta acquired her American Citizenship. On July 1955, Pastor sought for Legal Separation and Damages of One Million against Vicenta and her parents. Vicenta claimed a valid Decree of divorce and equally valid marriage with Moran. Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Vicenta so Pastor sought for this appeal.

 ISSUE:

           Whether the validity of marriage of Pastor and Vicenta was affected by the Decree of Divorce.

 RULING:

           No. Under Art 15 of NCC, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. It is well established that during the time Vicenta was issued the Decree of Divorce, she was still a Filipino who is bound by the Philippine Laws. Applying

Art. 15, even though Vicenta lives in the US, since she hasn’t at that time have the status

of an American, she is bound by the Laws of the Philippines. Also, her bigamous marriage with Moran shall constitute a valid ground for Legal Separation and Damages for the afflicted Party.