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[craftercat]

A bit of a special episode, but here we are. Next article is more standard, focusing on the problems that Tuoba Si had to deal with in 415, namely a famine and a major rebellion. Also, we'll be introducing Cui Hao in more detail next time.

[craftercat]

Northern Wei Part 13: The Conflict Between The Emperor and Aristocrats

My original first post on Tuoba Si's reign was going to be on general stability, but as I looked further into it, I found his reign actually had key developments in the relationship between the emperor and the aristocrats. So I rewrote this post to focus on that. I will have a general stability post, but it's not this one.

Note that the WS doesn't discuss the wubao and supervision system in a lot of detail. I therefore had to rely on studies, especially Li Ping's analysis of the supervision system, to understand this better.

BACKGROUND

Before Northern Wei became a thing, there was the Sixteen Kingdoms period. During this period, regimes were unstable and prone to internal turmoil, which allowed aristocrats to gain power. At the time, the people were also worried for their safety, so an arrangement was formed between the common people and the aristocrats.

Under this arrangement, an aristocratic family would shelter a number of common households [1] in a fortified village known as a wubi. This granted the aristocrats more regional power while sheltering the common people from the chaos of war and demands for taxes, corvee labour and military service. These households were later known as "hidden households" as they were not accounted for in census figures.

While this arrangement was originally formed out of protection, it was not conducive to either the people or the state. The common people were vulnerable to exploitation by the aristocrats due to being sheltered from regional government, which later became a major problem as the system progressed. It also had disadvantages for the government, as it meant they lost out on a lot of tax and corvee labour, census figures were often inaccurate, and they were unable to impose centralised control.

This meant that throughout the Sixteen Kingdoms, there were numerous attempts to reduce the power of the wubi, but none were successful. One common method was to relocate the aristocrats, which was often done in a conquered territory to centralise power, by weakening the wubi, but this was often limited in scale (this happened in various states, see relevant JS sections).

Former Yan attempted to end this practice under the advice of Yue Wan, and the reform was initially successful, removing 200,000 people from aristocratic supervision. Yue Wan faced much resistance from the aristocrats and even the regent Murong Ping himself, who benefitted from the wubi system (JS111). However, the conquest of Former Yan and then the battle of Fei River would likely have meant that many of these people later rejoined the wubi for protection.

As well, the Sixteen Kingdoms gave rise to local militias and garrisons, who also retained a portion of the population known as garrison households. Garrison households were legally recognised, and they functioned as a defensive military caste (can be inferred). They also didn't pay normal taxes. The system was eventually ended under Tuoba Tao, though Murong Bao tried to abolish it and failed.

NORTHERN WEI POLICIES

Since Dai was mostly inhabited by the Xianbei, who operated under a different local organisation system and were relatively sheltered from the conflict in the Central Plains, the wubi system did not take hold in Dai. Instead, Northern Wei received pre-existing wubi when they conquered Later Yan.

Tuoba Gui's attitude towards the wubi is unclear, but he did engage in the practice of relocating aristocrats like other Sixteen Kingdoms rulers (WS002). His relocation was small-scale however, being only 2,000 families, and including minor officials who were unlikely to have their own fortified villages (WS002).

When Tuoba Si came to power in 409, his anti-aristocratic supervision stance soon became clear, as one of the first things he did after providing immediate stability [2] was to have all of the aristocrats in Hebei relocated to the capital, believing that they were abusing the common people (WS024). While Tuoba Si was probably correct that they were abusing the common people, he failed to consider the growing power of the aristocrats.

Despite framing it as an edict recruiting them for their services, the aristocrats knew the real reason and didn't want to leave. The aristocratic youth formed gangs and engaged in rioting together, while the local officials were unable to contain them (WS024). Tuoba Si realised that there was a crisis, as the Hebei gentry were the most powerful group there, and if they rebelled, then Hebei could fall.

When it became clear that the local authorities could not quell the riots, Tuoba Si summoned his council for a meeting on the issue, suggesting that a general pardon be given to appease them (WS024). Tuoba Qu (father of Tuoba Mohun from last article) objected to this, suggesting they execute the leaders and pardon the followers. Cui Hong agreed with the proposition for a general pardon and Tuoba Si followed his advice (WS024). A general pardon was given and Tuoba Si sent his general Wuniuyu Lidi to campaign against those who continued to riot.

What this event does show is the conflict between the Tuoba Xianbei and the Hebei gentry at the time. Like most of the Sixteen Kingdoms, the Tuoba tribe felt as if the semi-independent wubi threatened their power and suppressed them to centralise authority, while the wubi showed resistance to the relocation. This may have influenced the later instability under Tuoba Gui.

Without the support of the Hebei gentry, Northern Wei could not consolidate its hold over Hebei. What Tuoba Si learned was that to keep Hebei, he had to work with the Hebei gentry, as he did not yet have the power to challenge them. This eventually led to Tuoba Si's reconciliation with the Hebei gentry, which should have taken place in 413 or earlier.

Around 413, Tuoba Si introduced new measures to recruit more Hebei gentry to serve in his government. The first took place in 413, when he directly called many of the Han gentry to become officials according to their talent (WS003). The second took place sometime before 414, and was the setting up of a new Imperial Academy which was specially to train Han gentry to become officials (WS084). This new Imperial Academy later become very powerful in Northern Wei politics as the role of the Han gentry grew.

THE CLAN LEADER SUPERVISION SYSTEM

Perhaps the biggest change to come out of the riots was the establishment of the clan leader supervision system as an official system of local governance. The system was not created by Tuoba Si, as I have just mentioned, and was unofficially a thing earlier in the Sixteen Kingdoms. However, it is generally believed that it was under Tuoba Si the system was formally recognised.

Under the clan leader supervision system, Northern Wei legally recognised the supervision of tenants by the leaders of wubi. However, in return, the wubi would be expected to collect taxes their dependents, of which there were nine different rates (WS110, the rates were clearly meant for wubi households). Many of the wubi households were not on the household register, and it was common for 30-50 families to form one wubi household (WS053). Therefore, it is likely that the wubi families split the burden of taxation.

The dependants of the clan leaders were not subject to corvee labour or military service (WS110). The clan leader also engaged in a local supervision role beyond the requisition of taxes, and they organised the economic activities within their wubi. This would have mostly been agriculture.

This compromise policy did yield short-term benefits for Northern Wei. It eased the conflict between the Tuoba Xianbei and the gentry families in Hebei, which in turn allowed Tuoba Si to consolidate his hold on Hebei. This led to social stability and economic growth under Tuoba Si and a decrease in rebellions (WS003 and WS110). The clan leaders were also incorporated into the system rather than existing outside of it, which theoretically would allow Northern Wei to exert greater control over them, but in reality the leaders still had considerable autonomy.

However, adverse effects of the system were also beginning to show as early as 435 (can be inferred from an edict of Tuoba Tao's in WS004). The clan leaders being in charge of tax collection allowed them to exploit their dependents (WS110), and it was still impossible for the Northern Wei government to conduct an accurate census or provide a fair taxation rate (the inequality of the tax system is mentioned in several volumes including WS110). This especially became a problem after the reunification of the north, when spoils of war became less common and Northern Wei became increasingly reliant on taxes from Hebei and Shandong for government finances.

I think that Tuoba Si probably intended for the clan leader supervision system to be a temporary transition system rather than a permanent one. Tuoba Tao continued to use the clan leader supervision system, recognising the clan leaders in former Xia and Northern Liang territory. While the problems with the system were becoming apparent under him, at the time there was not really a viable alternative, as Northern Wei hadn't consolidated their hold over the north yet.

This eventually led to the replacement of the clan leader supervision system by another system. But that's in the Taihe Reforms, which at the moment, is a long way away.

ENDNOTES

1. By 485, when the equal field system was introduced, the number was as high as 50, but it's implied that the number rose over time. The first arrangements may have only involved a few households.

2. The ZZTJ dates this to 410 based on the record that Wuniuyu Lidi was stationed at Pingyang after putting down the riots (an event the WS dates to 410), however others have dated this to 413 based on the recorded pardon given in that year.

[craftercat]

[craftercat]

We're starting to discuss Tuoba Si's actual reign. Also I have a special article coming out next that focuses specifically on the evolution of the system where the aristocrats directly retained a large portion of the population. After that I'll be discussing the era of 415-6 and the challenges Tuoba Si faced, also the rise of Cui Hao.

[craftercat]

Northern Wei Part 13: Tuoba Si's Early Years and Administration

In the last article, Tuoba Si won the throne after defeating and killing his brother Tuoba Shao. However, he still needed to stabilise his hold on power and Northern Wei at large. So how did he do this? I'm going to discuss early measures Tuoba Si took to ensure stability and his administration in general.

This was a relatively short article, but I think that it is important for the context of Tuoba Si's reign and the broader evaluation of him. Unfortunately not much is written on Tuoba Si's specific policies, and they often have to be inferred.

TUOBA SI'S POLICIES WITH MINISTERS

As I mentioned in the last article, Tuoba Si decided to recall all previously dismissed ministers back into office as a way to broadly appease different groups. But Tuoba Si needed to do more. He ordered his officials An Tong and Baba Song (both of whom featured last article) handle legal cases and employ the talented, and he also sent Daxi Jin to provide relief for the people's hardships (WS003). These measures provided immediate order to Northern Wei (WS111).

Within court, Tuoba Si appointed Tuoba Qu (the father of Tuoba Mohun from last article), An Tong, Daxi Jin, Cui Hong, Baba Song and three others as eight major ministers (ZZTJ115). Their main role was to provide advice to the emperor and to judge legal cases in a kind of evolved form of the tribal chiefs of the four divisions judging legal cases in the Dai era (WS113). However, these ministers formed a council of key advisors to the emperor in addition to this duty. The emperors after Tuoba Si would also call councils of advisors to discuss and make major policy decisions.

This system was essentially a political compromise between the different factions in Tuoba Si's court he was forced to compromise with. Prominent conservatives such as Baba Song were on the council, but so was the leader of the Han gentry faction Cui Hong and An Tong, a key supporter of Tuoba Si in his ascension. From this system, we can see that Tuoba Si needed to compromise more and couldn't rule in the same manner as his father.

A good example of how this leadership style worked is in 410 [1], when Tuoba Si, believing that the aristocrats were causing great harm to the common people, ordered they be relocated ot the capital (WS024). Tuoba Si was probably right, as in this era of Northern Wei, the common people were directly retained by the aristocrats, who were known for imposing heavy taxes onto the people.

However, being young and inexperienced, he failed to think through his idea enough. The aristocrats didn't want to leave their homelands and they had the power to resist. Their youth gathered together as bandits and the local governors could not deal with them (WS024). This issue reached Tuoba Si, and he called his council together to discuss, which was made up of at least four people: Tuoba Qu, An Tong, Yizhan Jian and Cui Hong (WS024).

Tuoba Qu suggested that Tuoba Si should execute the leaders and pardon their followers, but Cui Hong advocated for a full pardon, arguing against Tuoba Qu's idea (WS024). Tuoba Si took Cui Hong's advice and issued a full pardon, while sending one of his generals to campaign against those who continued to stir trouble (ZZTJ115). I will discuss this incident in more detail in the next article, as it was actually important for the future of Northern Wei.

The majority of Tuoba Si's ministers and generals were inherited from Tuoba Gui, but there were some new faces, such as Tuoba Qu. Daxi Jin, Cui Hong, An Tong and Baba Song enjoyed increased favour from the emperor under Tuoba Si. Tuoba Si also rewarded Tuoba Mohun, Yizhan Jun, Wang Luo'er and Chekun Lutou for their loyalty and contributions in his rise to power with titles and positions (several WS annals and ZZTJ115).

Tuoba Si made Tuoba Lie a prince for his contributions (WS003). Tuoba Si also gave his oldest younger brother Tuoba Xi military honours from a young age (WS016), showing that despite Tuoba Gui's suppression of the Tuoba clan in his final years, the Tuoba clan started to become prominent again. Tuoba Qu and Tuoba Mohun were distant members of the Tuoba clan. Tuoba Si also made his cousin Tuoba Su an official, probably due to their close relationship, but Tuoba Su did have genuine talent (WS015).

ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATE POLICIES

Tuoba Si had to deal with a number of rebellions in his early years due to floods, droughts and the remnants of Tuoba Gui's later years. He also adopted policies aimed towards both subduing and appeasing the Xiongnu and Dingling that lived in Hebei (WS003). He also sent a mission aimed at investigating corrupt officials, which appeared to be a successful one that reduced corruption in the empire (WS030). Another feature of his early reign is that he frequently bestowed gifts onto his subordinates, perhaps wanting to ensure loyalty (WS003).

Tuoba Si himself was noted to be sharp in his perceptions and strict in his punishment of the ministers (WS034). As Tuoba Si grew older and more experienced, he also became increasingly capable and personally proficient in state affairs (WS113). However, the officials were unable to keep up with his scrutiny and by the end of his reign they were using complex legal interpretations just to stay out of trouble, which led to administrative complexity (WS113).

In terms of how justice was carried out, I mentioned the usage of the eight-member council, but there was likely also a justice system in the provinces. In 420, Tuoba Si created a Commandant of Justice, which was a Han title for the chief of justice (WS037). There are members of Tuoba Si's justice team noted for being fair or capable such as Cui Hong, Zhang Pu and even former Eastern Jin criminal refugee Sima Wensi (various WS biographies). So except for the complexity of the legal code, the justice system was well-managed enough for people to trust the government enough to show their true thoughts in criminal cases by the end (WS037).

He also carried out several military drills during his early reign to train his cavalry force, and in 413 he carried a major military review which resulted in him organising the army into a vanguard and 12 cavalry units (the Xianbei military at the time was heavily cavalry-focused) (WS003). This ensured that Tuoba Si had an elite cavalry force to defend Northern Wei with.

While Tuoba Si didn't make major reforms to the law, his actions in the administration appear to have mostly been positive. By the end of his reign, people trusted the justice system, order had been restored, and society was stable, despite the complexity that had emerged. We know that corruption had risen again by 427 (WS004), but it's unclear if this happened under Tuoba Si or Tuoba Tao, as bureaucratic defensiveness isn't necessarily the same thing as corruption. Tuoba Tao evaluated Tuoba Si's legal affairs positively (WS035), and while he did have to praise Tuoba Si as his father, had Tuoba Si been a disaster legally he would have picked another area to praise.

THE EARLY REBELLIONS

So did Tuoba Si's policies work? The WS does indicate that these policies were effective, stating that under them, there was once again order in Northern Wei. As Tuoba Si's reign went on, the frequency of rebellions showed a clear decreasing trend.

However, all policies take time to work, and Tuoba Si's early years were not entirely stable. He had to face a Rouran invasion in 410, and multiple rebellions, mostly in Bing province, which was a rebellion hotspot in this era due to the intermixing of a Han and Xiongnu population with Xianbei generals and officials (WS003). Under Bing province was a mix of civil and military administration structures, as there were many garrisons for defensive and supervising purposes, but the rebellions in BIng province were not based around garrisons.

In 413, there were a series of uprisings and general unrest in Bing province (WS003). The uprisings seemed to be mostly small-scale and little more than bandit rebellions, but the unrest was bad enough that Tuoba Si issued a general pardon earlier that year. In the end, the uprisings were quelled one by one by government forces, but they also led to the downfall of major minister Tuoba Qu (WS003 and WS014).

Tuoba Qu had been tasked with leading a force to put down the uprisings. However, when he was putting down a rebellion at the border city of Tujing, the rebels brought in Helian Bobo's troops (Helian Bobo, had, in 407, broken off from Later Qin and started his own Xia state) in to aid them (WS014). The battle was a defeat for Tuoba Qu, and of the generals he was supervising, one (Dugu Jie) was captured, and the other died in battle (WS014).

Tuoba Si initially wanted to execute Tuoba Qu for his failure, but he pardoned him and ordered he manage Bing province after the previous governor was found out to be corrupt (WS014). Tuoba Qu indulged in alcohol and neglected his duties, so Tuoba Si finally executed Tuoba Qu for his failures (WS014). Tuoba Qu became arrogant in his high position, while the incident showed a more harsh and strict side to Tuoba Si's character and his willingness to hold his advisors accountable.

Helian Bobo held Tujing for a short amount of time, but the new governor of Bing province recruited a local force, which defeated Helian Bobo's stationed troops and recaptured Tujing (WS003). Also during this time, Helian Bobo launched a raid on Northern Wei, but he was defeated by a local militia in Bing province (WS003).

This sequence of events shows that while things hadn't fully stabilised by 414, they were still much better than they were in 409 when Tuoba Si originally came to the throne. Things seemed on the upside - until they weren't anymore.

In 415, Tuoba Si would face two major challenges to his reign: a major famine and a major Xiongnu rebellion. However, the end of his reign was described as being a peaceful one with a stable society and economic growth (WS003, WS110). So how did this happen?

We will take a brief pause to discuss the 410 aristocratic riots crisis and how it impacted Northern Wei policy, before we will discuss how Tuoba Si solved the challenges of 415. And in 415, a new advisor would become important: Cui Hao.

ENDNOTES

1 The WS does not give a specific date for this event, but the ZZTJ uses the date of 410, which is based on the record that Wuniuyu Lidi garrisoned Pingyang after quelling the riots, and the WS dates him being stationed at Pingyang to 410.

[craftercat]

All but a whim

Wang Ziyou [Huizhi] lived in Shanyin. One night, heavy snow fell. When he woke up, he opened his windows and ordered to have some liquor. … Suddenly, he thought of [his friend] Dai Andao, who was then in Shan. Without hesitation, he boarded a small boat to visit him. After travelling all night, he arrived at Dai's residence but did not enter. Instead, he turned back. When someone asked, Wang replied, 'I embarked on this journey purely on a momentary whim, and when my whim passed, I returned; why should I insist on meeting Dai?'

-- Shishuo Xinyu (A New Account of the Tales of the World), Rendan (The Free and Unrestrained)  

王子猷居山陰，夜大雪，眠覺，開室，命酌酒。……忽憶戴安道，時戴在剡，即便夜乘小船就之。經宿方至，造門不前而返。人問其故，王曰：「吾本乘興而行，興盡而返，何必見戴？」

-- 《世說新語·任誕》

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[craftercat]

To sweat or not to sweat

Zhong Yu and Zhong Hui were renowned for their intelligence and virtuous reputations from a young age. At thirteen, Emperor Wen of Wei heard of them and said to their father, Zhong Yao, 'Let your two sons come.' Thus, he summoned them for an audience.

When Zhong Yu appeared before the emperor, his face was covered with sweat. The emperor asked, 'Why is your face sweating?' Zhong Yu replied, 'Trembling with fear and reverence, my sweat flows like a stream.'

The emperor then asked Zhong Hui, 'Why are you not sweating?' Zhong Hui replied, 'Trembling with fear and reverence, the sweat dare not come out.'

-- Shishuo Xinyu (A New Account of the Tales of the World), Yanyu (Speech and Conversation)

鍾毓、鍾會少有令譽。年十三，魏文帝聞之，語其父���繇曰：「可令二子來。」於是敕見。毓面有汗，帝曰：「卿面何以汗？」毓對曰：「戰戰惶惶，汗出如漿。」復問會：「卿何以不汗？」對曰：「戰戰慄慄，汗不敢出。」

-- 《世說新語·言語》

[craftercat]

"The story of Tuoba Si's mother's death made him look good, so it is fabricated" is not a good enough argument to dismiss the Weishu. If you are going to argue that way, please find actual contradictions in the Weishu account. It reminds me a lot of "The official version of the Xuanwu Gate Incident makes Li Shimin look like he's on the defensive, so it must be fake", but there is more evidence to suggest that Li Shimin altered records than there is to suggest Tuoba Si did. I, at least, think that if Tuoba Si was so interested in affirming his legitimacy by fabricating events, he would be more interested in a state-sponsored national history project.

Edit: The "evidence" to "prove" this is that Tuoba Gui was mentally unstable and often killed ministers, so Consort Liu must have died due to angering Tuoba Gui rather than any political reason. Never mind that many of Tuoba Gui's executions in his final years did actually have political motives, or that perhaps a hyper-paranoid emperor might actually be worried about his heir's mother getting too powerful if she lived.

[craftercat]

My bad takes poll has ended! The winner of bad takes is "Murong Chong pursued a relationship with Fu Jian out of curiosity" but shout out to "Tuoba Tao rebelled and killed Tuoba Si", "Princess Dowager Helan did not exist and she was the same person as her sister" and "The Northern Wei emperors were all cruel until Yuan Hong came along and Sinicise" for also winning votes.

[craftercat]

The unrelenting passage of time

When Huan Wen went on a northern campaign and passed through Jincheng, he saw that the willows he had planted earlier during his posting in Langya had all grown to a circumference of ten spans. Deeply moved, he exclaimed: 'If mere trees have changed like this, how can a man endure?' Stroking the branches, he wept with tears streaming down his face.

-- Shishuo Xinyu (A New Account of the Tales of the World), Yanyu (Speech and Conversation)  

桓公北征經金城，見前為琅邪時種柳，皆已十圍，慨然曰：「木猶如此，人何以堪！」攀枝執條，泫然流淚。

-- 《世說新語·言語》

[craftercat]

pretty much the only good thing about the paper of record anymore, the crossword

[craftercat]

What does Tuoba Si's ascension to the throne have to do with Romance and BL?

[craftercat]

Part 12 is out. We're officially saying hello to Tuoba Si now. I find Tuoba Si rather underappreciated, so I'm really looking forward to discussing his reign.

[craftercat]

Northern Wei Part 12: Tuoba Si's Rise To Power

In the last article, Tuoba Gui met his end at the hands of his son Tuoba Shao. But only two weeks later [1], Tuoba Shao would also meet his end at the hands of his brother Tuoba Si, who returned from hiding to become the second emperor of Northern Wei. But how did this happen?

THE AFTERMATH OF TUOBA GUI'S DEATH

While he may have been made the heir, Tuoba Shao still needed to consolidate support from the major players at court and confirm Tuoba Gui's death before he could become emperor himself. At midday, he called all of the officials together to gather support (WS016).

When they arrived, Tuoba Shao started out by declaring: "I have a father (or uncle) [2], and I also have a brother. Who will you support?" (WS016). The officials didn't yet know that Tuoba Gui was dead, and they perhaps believed that Tuoba Si had secretly returned to Pingcheng to launch a coup. So Tuoba Shao was asking the officials to choose between Tuoba Gui, Tuoba Si and him. The officials perhaps believed that Tuoba Shao already had the situation under his control, so Baba Song declared his support for him.

The officials soon realised that Tuoba Gui was, in fact, dead, but they did not know that Tuoba Shao had killed him. Only Tuoba Lie expressed objection, as he cried and left (WS016). Tuoba Shao's meeting at the gate may not have been suspicious; the old method of succession often relied on the Xianbei tribes choosing a leader, and as a representative of conservative interests, Tuoba Shao may have wanted to be elected into power that way.

TUOBA SI'S RISE TO POWER

However, Tuoba Shao's triumph did not last long. Tuoba Si, hearing of the chaos in Pingcheng, returned to the capital (WS016). Wang Luo'er (one of Tuoba Si's attendants from Article 10) worked tirelessly to get Tuoba Si support from the ministers, which led to many ministers defecting to his side (WS034).

The minister An Tong was in communication with Tuoba Si, and Tuoba Si had ordered him to gather together a support base from within Pingcheng (WS030). An Tong gathered together the skilled workers of Pingcheng, and the common people went to support Tuoba Si (WS030, WS034). This suggests that the power struggle between Tuoba Si and Tuoba Shao was not limited to the ruling class.

A group of officials led by Tuoba Mohun, Yizhan Jun and Baba Han plotted against Tuoba Shao. Tuoba Mohun and Yizhan Jun claimed to know Tuoba Si's whereabouts, so Tuoba Shao ordered them to escort two assassins to kill him (WS014). On the way, Tuoba Mohun and Yizhan Jun arrested the assassins, went to Tuoba Si, and killed them (WS014). Tuoba Si had been saved. Tuoba Si's sister Princess Huayin also had merits in protecting him during the succession crisis, but it's unclear exactly what she did to help him (WS108).

According to the old Dai succession, Tuoba Lie should have succession rights himself, as Tuoba Yi's younger brother and having a strong and intelligent character. However, Tuoba Lie chose not to exercise his own succession rights, but rather to play within the framework of father-son succession rights that Tuoba Gui had pushed for. Tuoba Lie pretended to submit to Tuoba Shao, and he asked to be sent out to arrest Tuoba Si, who had returned after hearing of Tuoba Gui's death (WS015). Tuoba Lie set out, but when he arrived, instead of arresting Tuoba Si, he received him and declared him as his emperor (WS015).

Meanwhile, Tuoba Shao tried to win over support by gifting people cloth and silk (WS016), which appeared unsuccessful at giving him a loyal support base. The Han minister Cui Hong refused the gifts, showing his indirect approval of Tuoba Si (WS024). Due to this, Cui Hong became even more trusted by Tuoba Si, and his son, Cui Hao, would also be able to gain the emperor's trust, and it was from Tuoba Si's reign that Cui Hao played a major role in Northern Wei politics (WS035), but that's for another article.

Helan Ni [3], a member of the Helan tribe, lit a beacon fire at Anyang city to gather together the Helan tribe and the other old tribes, presumably to support Tuoba Shao [4] (WS016). This, along with Baba Song leading the officials in showing support for Tuoba Shao, shows that Tuoba Shao's supporters lied mostly in the conservative Xianbei aristocrats.

Eventually, the imperial guard launched a coup, and they arrested Tuoba Shao (WS016). This was triggered by Tuoba Si moving to the west of Pingcheng, probably to gather further support for his claim to power. Their motives for acting are unclear; I find it unlikely that they acted alone. The military were perhaps influenced by the civilian and ministerial support for Tuoba Si, and so also switched to support Tuoba Si, leading to the imperial guards ousting Tuoba Shao.

Due to the way that the events are laid out in the WS, it's hard to establish a clear timeline for Tuoba Si's rise to power. The main summary is that Tuoba Si returned to the capital after hearing of Tuoba Gui's death, and he communicated with An Tong and sent Wang Luo'er to rally other ministers. This triggered a wave of defections, which culminated when Tuoba Si moved to gather more support, leading to the loss of military support for Tuoba Shao.

EVALUATION

But then this leads to a question: why did so many people switch sides? Tuoba Shao was made heir, and he had tried to avoid connecting himself to Tuoba Gui's death, which gave him initial support from the ministers. So why was it that when Tuoba Si arrived, there was a wave of defections?

I think that at some point, it became widely known that Tuoba Shao killed his father. Either the ministers started to suspect it or a defector outright stated that Tuoba Shao killed Tuoba Gui. This then led to a lot of people losing faith in Tuoba Shao due to his crime and the fact that he then lied about the circumstances of his father's death, which led them to distrust him and defect.

The second reason is that I think there was Helan tribe involvement in Tuoba Shao's coup. Consort Helan's execution suggests that she was a major player in the coup, and it was Helan Ni who led the old tribes to assemble. The Helan tribe had been rebellious against the Tuobas, which would have meant that many would have distrusted them. Nobody would want a Helan-backed patricide as emperor, so they defected to Tuoba Si rather than letting that happen.

So why did Tuoba Si win? I think it's because he played the political game right, and Tuoba Shao didn't. Tuoba Shao underestimated the support that would be shown for Tuoba Si, believed he could buy support with gifts, trusted the wrong people, and concentrated himself to the Helan tribe and other conservative factions. Meanwhile, Tuoba Si appealed to a broad support base, secured the support of key figures such as An Tong and Tuoba Lie, remained hidden and trusted the right people.

But I also think that the end result was also because Tuoba Shao and his reactionary faction were on the wrong side. The trend at the time was towards Sinicisation, and they were trying to resist. This already put them at a disadvantage, and coupled with Tuoba Shao's lack of political acumen, it was easy for the pro-Sinicisation parts of the court and population to switch sides.

AFTERMATH

Two weeks after Tuoba Gui's death, Tuoba Si ascended to the throne, starting a new era for Northern Wei. Rather than following the Chinese custom of waiting for the New Year to change the era name, Tuoba Si immediately changed the era name (WS003). This may be because the Tuobas were slow to pick up on that particular custom, or Tuoba Si wanted to put the chaos behind him and start fresh.

Tuoba Si had Tuoba Shao, Consort Helan and a dozen of their associates in the palace executed, but he spared everyone else (WS016). Baba Song was trusted by Tuoba Si (WS025), while Helan Ni disbanded the beacon fire and submitted to Tuoba Si (WS083). This showed that Tuoba Si was not overly harsh but also not too soft when he came into power.

Tuoba Si's pardon of Baba Song and the other conservatives was likely due to political reasons. He had only just ascended the throne, and his ascension was irregular. He knew that if he acted against the conservatives, then he could risk the conservatives launching a coup against him as well. He didn't have the power to completely ignore the conservative parts of the court who previously supported Tuoba Shao, so he had to appease them.

To quell the direct political chaos, Tuoba Si ordered that everyone who had previously been demoted would be reinstated to their positions (WS003). This appeased a large number of factions, including the meritorious officials suppressed by Tuoba Gui, conservatives who lost their positions during reform, and perhaps some reformists who may have lost their positions under Tuoba Shao's two-week control. This secured Tuoba Si with enough support to keep the throne and restored order to the political scene.

Tuoba Gui's attempt to assert Han ideas of father-son succession had failed. Not only was Tuoba Lie, a clan elder and possibly Tuoba Gui's brother, a key figure in deciding the ruler, but Tuoba Si's ascension had been decided by consensus between the military, officials and citizens rather than legitimacy as the eldest son. Northern Wei were unable to make the transition yet. And I think this was probably because Tuoba Gui was too aggressive and utilised overly harsh methods to try and push it through, which led to resistance.

Tuoba Si was young, aged 17, and while he was intelligent, determined, and respectful with a harsh streak, he lacked the same martial talent and commanding quality that his father had. This, coupled with his poor health and irregular ascension to the throne, meant that he was less powerful than his father Tuoba Gui or son Tuoba Tao was. This lack of power forced him to compromise with conservative elements of his court such as Baba Song, even though he was originally representative of reformist interests.

While immediate political stability had been restored, Tuoba Si's ascension couldn't solve everything. There was still uncertainty within court and in Northern Wei, and Northern Wei needed years to stabilise. So how would Tuoba Si deal with the chaotic hand that had been given to him? That's for the next article.

ENDNOTES

Unfortunately, the events surrounding Tuoba Si's rise to power are rather vague in WS descriptions, which means that we don't have much to go on. Therefore, this article is more speculative than most of the articles of this series simply because there are gaps in the WS account that have to be filled in. The account presented in this article therefore involves an amount of speculation, and so it only represents one version of what could have happened. I have used historical evidence to construct a version of how I think that Tuoba Si's rise to power might have happened, but due to lack of evidence, I cannot say that my speculation is correct. Speculative statements are in italics.

Tuoba Si's reign somewhat suffers from a lack of records throughout, not just in his rise to power. Tuoba Si's original WS annal has been lost for unclear reasons, and our current biography of him is a supplementation of the original. Therefore, there are likely parts of his original WS biography that are still missing, though the BS does supplant some of them. But his biography is full enough to give a decent picture of his reign.

1 The WS records Tuoba Si as ascending to the throne four days after his father's death, but the BS records this as being 14 days after. I follow the BS records, as four days seems like too strained a timeline for Tuoba Si to come back from his hiding place, gather supporters and declare himself emperor.

2. The ZZTJ states that Tuoba Shao said he had an "uncle" rather than a "father", and there is further academic speculation that this uncle refers to Tuoba Lie. There is an explanation for the WS quote, that Tuoba Shao was hiding his father's death to try and make it look as if he had quelled chaos from within the palace, is from another study, and it also works (though to incriminate Tuoba Si, it would have to be implied the officials believed him to have returned from hiding, or Tuoba Shao was trying to emphasise Tuoba Si's traitorous status).

3. Helan Ni is also referred to as Helan Hu in Tuoba Shao and An Tong's biographies, which is likely a mistransliteration of a Xianbei name. I follow the name given to him in his own biography.

4. Helan Ni's allegiance in the succession crisis is debated. Some believe that he was supporting Tuoba Shao, others that he was supporting Tuoba Si, and others that he was just trying to protect himself. Given the link between Tuoba Shao and the Helan tribe, I speculate that Helan Ni initially gathered the old tribes to support Tuoba Shao, but when Tuoba Si came to power, he led the Xianbei aristocrats to surrender to him, which is why Tuoba Si continued to trust him.

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Across many pop article websites, there is a claim that Fú Jiān wanted to create a harmonious society where all of the different ethnic groups lived together. How much of that is true? I know that he spared alot of his enemies that are of a different minority than his but they could not just have been born out of a desire to create ethnic harmony.

Also even if such a dream existed before, it definitely had died at Fei River, as political realities closed in on his final years.

To be honest, I think that a lot of Sixteen Kingdoms rulers at least wanted ethnic cooperation, even if they wanted some ethnic groups to carry a higher status than others (for example, I think all of the early Tuobas wanted the Xiongnu to settle down and cooperate with the Xianbei, but they still wanted the Xianbei to carry a higher status). Maybe what they meant is that Fu Jian wanted all of the different ethnic groups to live together with equal status?

In the society he lived in it would be very difficult to do. There was a lot of ethnic rivalry and conflict, and this only really started to improve after the fall of Northern Wei under Yuwen Tai and Yang Jian. Even Yuan Hong's reforms didn't seem to significantly help matters as ethnic conflict was a major issue in Northern Qi afterwards. So I think even if he did want this, he wouldn't have been able to actually achieve it even without Fei River.

I think Fu Jian was probably over-ambitious with Fei River and ignored political realities. Tuoba Tao made the same mistake with his 450-1 southern campaign. I think Fu Jian was a talented ruler but the people saying he was as great as Li Shimin before Fei River are over-exaggerating. He was more talented and benevolent than many of his contemporaries, but Former Qin was clearly internally unstable like many of the other Sixteen Kingdoms.

If Former Qin was as stable as Tang was under Li Shimin or even Northern Wei under Tuoba Tao, it would not have collapsed after a single defeat. The Fei River situation is like if Northern Wei disintegrated after Tuoba Tao's 450-1 failed campaign or Tuoba Si's 417 defeat. I think what draws people to him is the "what-if" potential he seems to have if Fei River didn't happen, but I think that even if Fei River didn't happen, something else would. Another reason could be his supposed "relationship" with Murong Chong which draws people in who don't know the power dynamics are messed up.