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Comrades, in the report of the Central Committee of the party at the 20th Congress, in a number of

speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU sessions,

quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences...

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every

manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker, Wilhelm Bloss,

Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the

existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my

merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their

authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything

making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute...

The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always

stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the

party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the central committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the workers' class in directing the revolutionary

liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at

the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably

combated the foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to

oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact

that behind the party follow the people - workers, peasants and intelligentsia. "Only lie will win and

retain the power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain

of the living creativeness of the people.". . .

During Lenin's life the central committee of the party- was a real expression of collective leadership

of the party and of the Nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of

principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his coworkers. He tried to convince; he

patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party

life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary

sessions of the central committee took place at the proper intervals.

In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and of the

working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific

communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this that lie detected in Stalin in time

those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate

of the party and of the Soviet nation, V.I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of

Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the

position of Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not

have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that lie is capricious, and abuses his power...

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our

midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one

holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades

consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another

man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality,

namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.".

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified; in the first period after Lenin's death

Stalin still paid attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice, but, later he began to disregard the serious

admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country,

when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's

fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were on1v

incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse o f power by Stalin,

which caused untold harm to our party...

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by

imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this

concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position was doomed to removal

from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially

true during the period following the 17th party congress, when many prominent party leaders and

rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's

despotism...

Stalin originated the concept enemy of the people. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary

that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made

possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against

anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile

intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept, enemy of the people, actually

eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this

or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt

used, against all norms of current legal science, was the confession of the accused himself, and,

as subsequent probing proved, confessions were acquired through physical pressures against the

accused...

Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were

still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was

decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the

revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting

classes were already liquidated, and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national

economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically

and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his

brutality, and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the

masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual

enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the

Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had

once so alarmed V.I Lenin...

Considering the question of the cult of an individual we must first of all show everyone what harm

this caused to the interests of our party...

In practice Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective

party leadership.

Stalin's willfulness vis-a-vis the party and its central committee became fully evident after the 17th

party congress, which took place in 1934...

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the 17th congress, 98 persons, that is, 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mostly

in 1937-38). [Indignation in the hall.] . . .

The same fate met not only the central committee members but also the majority of the delegates

to the 17th party congress. Of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons

were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This

very fact shows how absurd, wild, and contrary to commonsense were the charges of counter-

revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the 17th party

congress. [Indignation in the hall.] . . .

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the 17th

party congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and

above the nation that he ceased to consider either the central committee or the party. While he still

reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the 17th congress, after the complete political

liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and

Socialist victories the party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the

members of the party's central committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin

thought that now lie could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he treated

all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of Socialist

legality began. On the evening of December 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of

the Political Bureau - which was passed 2 days later, casually) the Secretary of the Presidium of

the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive:

I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or

execution of acts of terror.

II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes

of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the Central

Executive Committee, U.S.S.R, does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.

III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences

against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences.

This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against Socialist legality. During many of

the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with "the preparation" of terroristic acts; this

deprived them of any, possibility that their cases might be reexamined, even when they stated

before the court that their confessions were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner,

they disproved the accusations against them...

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and

Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on September 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov, and

other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows: "We deem it

absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's

Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking

the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is 4 years behind in this matter. This is noted by all party

workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD." Strictly speaking we should stress

that Stalin did not meet with and therefore could not know the opinion of party workers...

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites.

Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet

state? We should recall that in 1927, on the eve of the 15th party congress, only some 4,000 votes

were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724,000 for the party line.

During the 10 years which passed between the 15th party congress and the February-March

central committee plenum, Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear that in

the situation of Socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country ...

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th congress and

arrested in 1937-38 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal abuse of the party

statute, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at the Central Committee

plenum.

Now when the cases of some of these so-called spies and saboteurs were examined it was found

that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many- arrested and charged with enemy

activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures...

An example of vile provocation of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary

legality is the case of the former candidate for the central committee political bureau, one of the

most eminent workers of the party and of the Soviet Government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a party

member since 1905. [Commotion in the hall.]

Comrade Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938, on the basis of slanderous materials, without the

sanction of the prosecutor of the USSR, which was finally received 15 months after the arrest.

Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and

was accompanied by willfulness and falsification.

Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession prepared by the

investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent party workers were accused of anti-

Soviet activity.

On October 1, 1939, Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he categorically denied his guilt

and asked for an examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote:

"There is no more bitter misery than to sit In the jail of a government for which I have always

fought.". . .

On February 2, 1940, Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not confess any guilt and

said as follows:

"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not one letter written by me with the exception of

my signatures under the protocols which were forced from me. I have made my confession under

pressure from the investigative judge who from the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I

began to write all this nonsense. The most important thing for me is to tell the court, the party and

Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in the truth

of party policy as I have believed in it during my whole life."

On February 4 Eikhe was shot. [Indignation in the hall.] It has been definitely established now that

Eikhe's case was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated...

The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious "anti- Soviet centers"

and "blocs" with the help of provocatory methods is seen from the confession of Comrade

Rozenblum, party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Kornarov case Rozenblum revealed the following fact: when

Rozenblum was arrested in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture during which he was ordered

to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then brought to the

office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court a false

confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a

terroristic center in Leningrad." [Movement in the hall.] . . . "You, yourself," said Zakovskv, "will not need to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a

ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully and to remember well

all questions and answers which the court might ask. Pus case will be ready in 4-5 months, or

perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself so that you will not

compromise the investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its

results. If you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will

save your head and we will feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death."

This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced. [Movement in the hall.] . .

When we look at many of our novels, films, and historical scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the

patriotic war appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army,

on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called active

defense, i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and

Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned

to the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the

land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film, and scientific

study as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance, not only from

the historical but especially from the political, educational, and practical point of view...

During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation

experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the unexpected attack of the Germans

against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to

power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating communism. The Fascists were

saying this openly; they did not hide their plans. In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of

pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the

prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state

and that lie had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet

borders...

We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of

Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because

the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and

assessed with reservation...

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the

country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unaware.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes; we had the time and capabilities.

Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with

everything that it needed...

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the necessary

materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been,

however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army

was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks, and planes to throw the enemy

back...

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's

annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his

suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were

instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion

commander level and extending to the higher military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders

who had gained military experience in Spain and In the Far East was almost completely liquidated...

After the conclusion of the patriotic war the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent

victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period

of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more united; in the fire of the war party

cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of

the possibility of some plot in the party.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called Leningrad affair was born. As we have now

proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades

Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others...

Facts prove that the Leningrad affair is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against

party cadres...

We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even

more capricious, irritable, and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania

reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes.

After the war Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by

him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything.

This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the abject provocateur and vile

enemy, Beriya, who had murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people. The

elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beriya. As we have now proven, it had been

precisely Beriya who had suggested to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidants of

materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various rumors and

talks... The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only now, and why did we

not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was

because Stalin personally supervised the Leningrad affair, and the majority of the Political Bureau

members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not

therefore intervene...

The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the

country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of

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