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Female Viet Cong Fighter Tying Up a Captured ARVN Soldier, 1965. Source: Pinterest

The first half of 1965 was marked by a series of Viet Cong military victories over the South Vietnamese army. In late December 1964/January 1965, VC forces defeated ARVN troops holding Binh Gia and captured the town and its surrounding area, penetrating just 40 miles from Saigon. In May, a South Vietnamese task force launched a counter attack in Quang Nghai province but suffered major casualties in the resultant battle at Ba Gia with the VC effectively wiping out much of the ARVN force, including its 51st Infantry Division. This victory led directly to the Communist Summer Offensive, in which large PLAF forces, now organised in four infantry divisions, engaged in conventional attacks against the ARVN and its American advisers, taking large swathes of territory in the Mekong Delta, setting up well-organised and supported “liberated zones”. These military successes were also characterised by a South Vietnamese unwillingness to fight the VC. Many ARVN troops fled on contact with the enemy or surrendered in large numbers to the guerrillas without offering serious resistance.

On June 26th 1965, US Command in Vietnam reported that the Viet Cong had put five ARVN combat regiments and nine battalions out of action in the year to date. It seemed as though the NLF were on the brink of complete military victory in South Vietnam.

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Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, June 1965. Source: New York Times

On 11th June 1965, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, founder member of the Armed Forces Council, and head of the RVNAF, removed Quat from the Prime Ministership of the RVN and assumed the role, removing all pretence at civilian rule in South Vietnam. Ky was paired with General Nguyen Van Thieu, as Chief of State, a role with limited political power but who also, more significantly, assumed direct command of the military region surrounding the capital. Ky justified this further change on the basis of the deteriorating military position against the Viet Cong in the previous six months and the need for improved military leadership in the war.

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Lyndon B Johnson. Source: Wikipedia

While ordering increased bombing raids on North Vietnam, Johnson also obliquely offered Hanoi the opportunity to negotiate an end to the conflict. On 7th April 1965, in a speech at John Hopkins University entitled “Peace Without Conquest”, the US President offered Ho Chi Minh participation in a Southeast Asia economic development plan which, in return for the DRV ending its support for the Communist insurgency in the South, the Americans would cease their bombing campaigns and ensure North Vietnam also benefitted from any regional development programme. However, the following day, North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, rejected the proposal, saying instead that the cessation of the Vietnam War had to be on the basis of the NLF’s demands for social change and land reform in the South.

Despite American strategy towards Indochina being increasingly and directly militarised, Johnson’s overture did represent the first attempt by the US to negotiate with the Vietnamese Communists since 1954.

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US Marines Land at Da Nang, March 1965. Source: Boston Herald.

On 8th March 1965, Johnson deployed the first American combat troops to South Vietnam. Specifically, 3,500 marines of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang, a South Vietnamese airbase and port city. Their brief was to protect Da Nang against Viet Cong attack in the context of repeated and successful VC raids on bases housing US personnel and military equipment. However, these troops were not MACV advisers: they were combat-ready soldiers, marking a major escalation of direct US military involvement in sustaining the anti-Communist regime in Saigon.

There was irony in this deployment. Given recent guerrilla attacks, the marines arrived on the beaches of Da Nang in landing craft, reminiscent of D-Day or the Pacific War, and apparently many of the troops believed they would be hitting the beaches under enemy fire. In fact the men were greeted by groups of attractive young Vietnamese women, who placed garlands of flowers around the bemused soldiers’ necks in a gesture of welcome organised by the South Vietnamese government.

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Operation Rolling Thunder 1965-1968. Source: Wikipedia

On 24th February 1965, Johnson finally approved the commencement of Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing campaign which was a development of Flaming Dart and aimed at comprehensively degrading the ability of North Vietnam to prosecute war in the South. The bombing campaign was to last nearly four years. Its main objectives were to increase the morale and resilience of the new South Vietnamese government in its war against the Viet Cong; to pressure Hanoi to cease its military support for the National Liberation Front and to reduce the DRV’s ability to continue to supply the VC by targeting its industrial and military infrastructure. It would be the most heavy and sustained air assault on a foreign power by the USA since the Second World War.

The operation’s thinking remained based on a Cold War theory that the Democratic Republic directed all significant actions of the Viet Cong. Whereas the Politburo in Hanoi were without doubt aware of the VC attacks on Pleiku and the Binks Hotel before they happened, there is little evidence that the central leadership ordered them. Whereas the PLAF could not have functioned without North Vietnamese expertise and supplies, Communist decision-making in the South remained broadly local, resulting in a flawed assumption on the part of the Administration when it planned Rolling Thunder that attacks on North Vietnam would directly improve the military situation in the South.

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General Nguyen Khanh. Source: Alamy Stock Photos

In February 1965, simmering discontent amongst the senior ARVN military with General Nguyen Khanh’s rule, led to a coup attempt, led by General Tran Thien Khiem. Khanh was able to suppress the revolt, but the Americans had by now lost faith in his regime. Rostow and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy therefore signalled tacit support for the next coup attempt, this time led by General Nguyen Chanh Thi and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. Combined with continued street protests against his rule, this ouster made Khanh realise his time was up. After a failed attempt to rally support around the country, Khanh did not oppose the rebellion and left the country peacefully, officially as South Vietnam’s Ambassador-at-Large, a face-saving device to get the general to surrender power. Khanh headed for the United Nations in New York City.

Although real power was exercised by this new group of armed forces senior officers, which comprised an Armed Forces Council, the coup leaders installed Dr Phan Huy Quat, a medical doctor and anti-communist politician, as Prime Minister on 18th February 1965 to give the appearance of a return to civilian-led rule.

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Operation Flaming Dart. Source: Air Force Historical Foundation website.

On the night of 6th-7th February 1965, Viet Cong forces launched a highly successful attack on the RVNAF airbase at Pleiku, South Vietnam. The guerrillas targeted Camp Holloway, an American-run facility within the base which housed a fleet of helicopter gunships that USAAF personnel flew in support of ARVN ground operations against the Communists. In the attack, ten helicopters were destroyed, eight US servicemen were killed and 120 men wounded. It was the most audacious attack against the Americans stationed in Vietnam conducted by the NLF in the war to date.

Despite the presence of Soviet Foreign Minister Alexei Kosygin in Hanoi at the time, Johnson ordered retaliatory strikes. Codenamed Operation Flaming Dart, the US air force launched its first bombing raids on North Vietnam, targeting military installations. At the same time, air attacks took place against identified Viet Cong logistics bases close to the DMZ and in the environs of the US barracks at Qui Nohn, which had also been subject to VC attack. Although the raids did not have a significant military impact on either the DRV or the Viet Cong, they did represent a major escalation in direct American involvement in the Vietnam War.

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Aftermath of the Binks Hotel Explosion, December 1964. Source: Alamy Stock Photos

On 24th December 1964, Viet Cong operatives detonated a bomb in the Binks Hotel, central Saigon, at which many US military and diplomatic personnel were billeted. The specific target was the Christmas celebrations the American guests were attending. The explosion, which killed two Americans and injured over 100 more guests and staff, was the result of a car bomb, located in the basement garage of the hotel. This terrorist act, modelled on Viet Minh precedent from the First Indochina War, demonstrated the NLF’s ability to strike deep inside the RVN’s capital city, despite the South Vietnamese urban centres being viewed as largely free from Communist military activity. Again, there were calls for US retaliation against the DRV but Johnson once more rejected proposals for bombing raids on North Vietnam and instead security precautions for American personnel located in Vietnam were tightened up.

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Rioting Against the Khanh Regime, South Vietnam, November 1964. Source: Alamy Stock Photos.

In November 1964, rioting, led by Bhuddist and student groups, erupted across South Vietnam, centred on the cities of Saigon, Hué and Da Lat. The grievances of the protestors were driven by anger at continued restrictions on personal freedom, press censorship and the perceived corruption and discriminatory practices of the military elite surrounding Nguyen Khanh. Government buildings were attacked, along with at least one radio station and, most significantly, a large explosion rocked the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon. The Americans became concerned at the continued sustainability of the Khanh regime. Rostow Taylor had become US ambassador to the RVN in the wake of President Johnson’s re-election, and although in public he stated that American support for General Khanh remained in place, in private he urged Khanh to surrender power and leave the country.

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The Aftermath of the Attack on Bien Hoa Airbase, November 1964. Source: Vietnam War Commemoration website.

On 30th October 1964, the Viet Cong launched a large scale mortar attack on Bien Hoa Airbase in South Vietnam. Bien Hoa was one of the main bases of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) at which many US aircraft were based along with American logistics and maintenance support. The attack caught the RVNAF and US air force personnel at the base entirely by surprise. In just thirty minutes, the VC had succeeded in destroying over thirty B-57 airplanes, and killed four American airmen, and wounded 72 more. The Viet Cong commandos had melted into the jungle before any South Vietnamese or US response could be mounted.

The attack demonstrated the reach of the NLF and its growing confidence in its insurgent war against the RVN. It remains unclear if Hanoi was involved in the planning of the Bien Hoa raid, but it is highly possible it was an entirely local initiative by the decentralised guerrillas, particularly as, following the Tonkin Gulf Incident, the DRV was anxious not to provoke the Americans further. This was not how the action was interpreted in Washington however, although Johnson resisted immediate calls to bomb North Vietnam in retaliation.

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Robert McNamara Presenting the Tonkin Gulf Incidents at a Press Conference, August 1964. Source: Zinn Education Project

On 7th August 1964, in response to the Tonkin Gulf incidents, Congress passed the Southeast Asia Resolution, also known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which authorised President Johnson ‘to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.’ The last clause was crucial as it effectively gave the President carte blanche to take whatever military action he saw fit to combat Communism, not just in Vietnam, but in wider Southeast Asia.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution provided the legal basis for all subsequent American military action in the Vietnam War.

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North Vietnamese Torpedo Boat Photographed from the USS Maddox, August 1964. Source: Britannica.

On 2nd August 1964, the USS Maddox, an American navy destroyer patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast, was approached by three DRV naval torpedo boats and fired on, sustaining minor damage. The Maddox returned fire, sinking one of the North Vietnamese vessels. At the time, the so-called “Tonkin Gulf Incident” was presented by the US Navy as an unprovoked attack, although it is likely that the Maddox was in the area to provide close support to the South Vietnamese amphibious raids that had been taking place the previous month.

Two days later a second incident took place in which the Maddox and its fellow destroyer, USS Turner Joy, reported a further attack by the North Vietnamese navy. This incident is now viewed as of very doubtful provenance and the reports probably arose from misinterpretation of radar and sonic data that mistook North Vietnamese observation and salvage operations as preparation for military action. At the time however the US government was convinced that two attacks had indeed occurred.

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Operation Barrell Roll, Summer 1964. Source: WorldAtlas

In June 1964, the US Air Force launched Operation Barrel Roll, a covert bombing campaign of eastern Laos that was to last eleven years. The campaign, carried out with the agreement of the Royal Lao government, but hidden from Congress and the American public due to Laos’ official neutral status, was aimed at disrupting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The operation also provided air support for the Royal Lao Army in its war with the Pathet Lao and to Vang Pao’s Hmong irregulars. Over the period of its operation, Barrel Roll was a major contributor to Laos’ unwelcome status as the most bombed country in the world, per capita.

In July 1964, the Laotian government launched Operation Triangle against Pathet Lao forces based in and around the Plain of Jars, supported by US military planners and air support and by Thai artillery. The offensive was a success, surprising a large Pathet Lao concentration between Routes 7 and 13, forcing its withdrawal from the Plain and the abandonment of considerable military supplies. Following Vang Pao’s victory at Sam Neua the previous year, this success consolidated RLA and Neutralist control of the Plain of Jars, and represented a major setback for the Communist war effort in Laos.

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South Vietnamese Naval Rating at Nha Trang, 1964. Source: Alamy Stock Photos.

Over the summer of 1964, the Saigon government and the CIA developed a naval-based plan to bring the war to North Vietnam by launching maritime commando raids against DRV military and surveillance infrastructure. In July 1964, a series of amphibious attacks were made by the RVN Navy on the North Vietnamese coast and offshore islands. The raids were entitled collectively “Operation 34A” by the Americans and Saigon, and they targeted radar installations and military outposts, the most successful being attacks on the islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu. Although not directly involved in the raids, the Americans provided logistic support and protection to the South Vietnamese navy through US Navy destroyers patrolling nearby.

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Johnson’s Advisers in Honolulu, June 1964. Source: Alamy Stock Photos

On 1st-2nd June 1964, President Johnson’s senior foreign policy officials, including Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, met in Honolulu to develop a clear strategy towards Southeast Asia for the new administration. The meeting focused on how best to maintain support for South Vietnam and agreed the Saigon regime, now believed to be stable under General Khanh, should be viewed as the main bulwark against the spread of Communism in the region. Discussion included the provision of increased military supplies and training to the ARVN as well as general economic aid to the South Vietnamese government. It was at Honolulu that options for US military intervention in Vietnam were first seriously discussed including the bombing of the Democratic Republic.

Laos was also discussed, concluding that US military support for the Nosovan regime and Rightist military factions should continue with the intention of securing a permanent ceasefire and an end to the Civil War while avoiding a Pathet Lao takeover.

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General Nguyen Van Khanh. Source: Vietnam the Art of War website

On 30th January 1964, General Nguyen Van Khanh, one of the South Vietnamese army’s most able field commanders, unexpectedly seized power in a bloodless coup, overthrowing the Minh regime after just over two months in power. Minh was retained as a ceremonial head of state but all true executive power lay with Khanh as chair of Joint Military Council. Cabot Lodge and the Americans had supported Khanh’s coup, believing he would reform the ARVN and improve its military capability. President Johnson’s Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, visited Saigon in March, pledging US support for the Khanh regime.

Khanh’s motivation for deposing the Minh junta, along with the coterie of disaffected officers who followed him, appears to have been a desire for advancement and a stated belief that Minh’s clique were planning to seek an accord with North Vietnam, for which Khanh presented no evidence.

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The Assassination of President Kennedy as Announced by the Chicago Tribune, 23rd November 1963. Source: Britannica

On 22nd November 1963, President Kennedy was killed by an assassin’s bullet when visiting Dallas, Texas. Vice President Lyndon B Johnson was immediately sworn in as his successor. When it came to Indochina, Kennedy left a confused inheritance for Johnson. His administration had invested heavily in the defence of South Vietnam: at the time of Kennedy’s death, there were 15,000 US military advisers working with the ARVN, and Saigon had received $500 million of aid in 1963 alone. However, Kennedy had been complicit in the overthrow of their favoured strongman Ngo Dinh Diem, the Viet Cong continued to make military gains and South Vietnam had descended into governmental chaos. Kennedy was rumoured to have considered cutting his losses in Vietnam and withdrawing the MACV.

In Laos, the country Eisenhower had considered the most likely of the Indochinese dominoes to succumb to a Communist takeover, the US had helped stabilise a Rightist/Royalist government in Vientiane and was deeply involved in its “Secret War”, strengthening both the Royal Lao Air Force and the Hmong irregulars under Vang Pao. Cambodia was of least concern to the Americans from the perspective of the Cold War and their tense relationship with Sihanouk had been eased by the Prince’s turn against domestic communists and a commitment to oppose any North Vietnamese attempt to extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail into Cambodia.

In effect, Kennedy had left Johnson with options in Indochina. In North Vietnam, the DRV took the view that, with the deaths of both Diem and Kennedy, 1964 would be the year to accelerate the revolution in the South.