Don't wanna be here? Send us removal request.
Statistics
We looked inside some of the posts by reductasango and here's what we found interesting.
Average Info
Notes Per Post
0
Likes Per Post
0
Reblog Per Post
0
Reply Per Post
0
Number of Posts By Type
Text
1
Last Seen Tumblr Blogs
Fun Fact
US Tumblr user growth rate is estimated to slow down to 4.1%.
Text
This philosophy of science conference focuses on the intricate foundational relationship between statistical physics and thermodynamics, and in general on reduction and inter-theoretical relationships in physics. The first day of the conference puts Patricia Palaciosā recent bookĀ Emergence and Reduction in Physics (Cambridge University Press, 2022) in the limelight, while the second day features critical reflections on philosophical issues regarding Boltzmannian vs Gibbsian approaches to statistical mechanics, modeling macroscopic irreversibility on the microscopic level, reductionist approaches to the arrow of time, inter-theoretical relationships between different theories of physics, and ontological reduction in physics.
The conference will take place in Buenos Aires, Argentina between the 9th and 10th of February, 2023.
No registration is required to attend the talks.
Conference program
Day 1 (9th of February, 2023)
14:00 - 14:10 Conference opening
14:10 - 14:45 Patricia Palacios: Opening Remarks
14:45 - 18:00 Discussion ofĀ Emergence and Reduction in Physics
Approximately 40 minutes per chapter, with 15 minutes coffee breaks in between.
Discussion of Introduction and Chapter 2: section leader: Roman Frigg
Discussion of Chapter 3: section leader: Cristian LĆ³pez
Discussion of Chapter 4: section leader: Roman Frigg
Discussion of Chapter 5: section leader: Balazs Gyenis
19:00 - Dinner (TBA)
Day 2 (10th of February, 2020)
10:00 - 11:00 Roman Frigg: Taming Abundanceā¦ and Having the Best of Both Worlds
11:00 - 11:15 Coffee break
11:15 - 12:15 Giovanni Valente: Taking up Statistical Thermodynamics: Equilibrium Fluctuations and Irreversibility
12:15 - 14:00 Lunch break
14:00 - 15:00 Cristian LĆ³pez: Reductionism and Primitivism about the Arrow of Time in Physics
15:00 - 15:15 Ā Coffee break
15:15 - 16:15 BalƔzs Gyenis: Theory supervenience and future changes in physics
16:15 - 16:30 Coffee break
16:30 - 17:30 Olimpia Lombardi: Why I am not a reductionist.
19:00 - Dinner (TBA)
Abstracts of talks
Roman Frigg
London School of Economics, UK
Taming Abundanceā¦ and Having the Best of Both Worlds
Theoreticians working in statistical mechanics seem to be spoilt for choice. The theory offers two different theoretical approaches, one associated with Boltzmann and the other with Gibbs. These approaches are neither theoretically equivalent nor in any obvious way inter-translatable. This raises the question about the relation between them. We argue that Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM) is a fundamental theory while the Gibbisan approach is an effective theory, meaning that the former provides a true description of the systems within its scope while the latter offers an algorithm to calculate the values of physical quantities defined by the fundamental theory. This algorithm is often easier to handle than the fundamental theory and provides results where the fundamental theory is intractable. Being an effective theory, the Gibbsian approach works only within a certain domain of application. We provide a characterisation of the limits of the approach and argue that BSM provides correct results in cases in which the two theories disagree.
***
Giovanni Valente
Politecnico di Milano, Italy
Taking up Statistical Thermodynamics: Equilibrium Fluctuations and Irreversibility
The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is a much discussed case-study in philosophy of physics. Based on the Generalised Nagel-Schaffner model, it would be accomplished if one finds a corrected version of classical thermodynamics that can be strictly derived from statistical mechanics at the microscopic level. That is the sense in which, according to Callender (1999, 2001), one should not take thermodynamics too seriously. Arguably, the sought-after revision is given by statistical thermodynamics (cfr. Batterman 2001, Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010), intended as a macroscopic theory equipped with a probabilistic law of equilibrium fluctuations. In this talk I critically evaluate this proposal. The upshot is that, while statistical thermodynamics enables one to re-define equilibrium so as to agree with Boltzmann statistical-mechanical entropy, it does not provide a definitive solution to the problem of modeling macroscopic irreversibility at the microscopic level.
***
Cristian LĆ³pez
University of Lausanne, SNSF, Switzerland
Reductionism and Primitivism about the Arrow of Time in Physics
Though the directionality of time seems pervasive and evident, its physical foundations have been disputed for decades. From the probabilistic nature of the directionality of time to its relation to decays in weak interactions, the beaten track has greatly been reductionist: the directionality of time ultimately boils down to a de facto and/or de iure physical asymmetry, such as the increase of entropy in isolated system, the expansion of the universe, electromagnetic radiation, non-time-reversal invariance dynamics, gravitational dynamics, among many others. It seems to suggest that the arrow of time is real only in a derivative sense. In this paper I assess some of the philosophical assumptions that underlie a reductionist approach to the study of the arrow of time in physics. I also show why these assumptions may be conceptually problematic and unsatisfactory. Finally, I pave the way for an alternative approach, which takes the directionality of time as primitive rather than derivative.
***
BalƔzs Gyenis
Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungary
Theory supervenience and future changes in physics
I introduce a supervenience relation between theories and argue that it holds both diachronically (past physical theories supervene on future physical theories) and synchronically (classical thermodynamics supervenes on statistical mechanics, and in general non-physical theories supervene on physical theories). Theory supervenience yields a weak sense of knowledge accumulation during theory change, as well as a solution to philosophical puzzles relating to the proper formulation of a currentist thesis of physicalism and its defense against threats of future changes in physics (a.k.a Hempel's dilemma).
***
Olimpia Lombardi
CONICET, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Why I am not a reductionist
The aim of this talk is explicit in the title: why I do not advocate reductionism. For this purpose, the presentation will be divided into three parts. In the first introductory part, I will make some initial precisions: (i) I am primarily interested in ontological reduction and its associated notions, (ii) being anti-reductionist does not mean that reduction is impossible in any case, and (iii) the problem of intertheoretical reduction is different from the problem of elimination. In the second critical part, I will consider the problem of the reduction of molecular structure to quantum mechanics in its three aspects: the problem of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, the problem of symmetry, and the problem of isomerism. I will show that all three aspects challenge the idea of reduction in this case. Finally, in the third constructive part, I will briefly present my Kantian-rooted ontological pluralism as a positive alternative to reductionism.
Photos from the conference
https://photos.app.goo.gl/kqu88VkqJQcJFXKv5
Location
SADAF,Ā Bulnes 642, C1176ABL CABA, Argentina.
For questions, please contact the organizers:
BalƔzs Gyenis: hps.elte.hu/~gyepi
Olimpia Lombardi: conicet.gov.ar
reductasango.tumblr.com
0 notes