#Ele.me | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

raphaeki · 8 days ago

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Pensei que tu nem iria treinar ontem, por ser do dia dos namorados e pela Amanda falar que você iria se afastar um pouco. Você acabou indo, ficou com os dois fones, que me deixou bem puto durante a primeira metade do treino, sei la pq vc ficou nisso, se antes voce sempre oferecia um dos lados. Até pensei que fosse pelo dia dos namorados, você queria uma certa dietancia? Sei la, mas depois voce acabou me oferecendo um dos lados e continuamos a treinar, voce na sua preguiça de sempre, voce poderia mudar seu sobrenome inclusive.

Quando acabamos triceps e íamos começar ombro voce fala para deixar para amanha, mas seu pai ainda ia demorar, ai voce diz psra ficarmos sentados la de boa. E nao é que você tava super falante sobre o jogo? Querendo me ensinar isso e aquilo, dando risada, ficando bravo. Foi um momento bem legal, pelo menos pra mim. Ai voce até entrou para jogar valorant, coisa que você nao fazia desde domingo foram bons jogos, fomos até mais tarde que o esperado mas foi bem legal tambem, acabou que você foi meu "date" de dia dos namorados kkkkkkk.. e hoje que eu falei que trabalharia de casa, e por isso voce faltou? Ja que da outra vez que você ficou em casa, a gente jogou. Ai hoje tu começou a jogar, eu entrei e tu me chamou e jogamos uma partida, ate você ir pro estagio.

Você tava absurdamente fofo ontem sei la porque... mas tava mais que o normal, mesmo voce usando os dois fones eu nao tava totalmente bravo como normalmente eu fico, que eu ate fecho a cara.

Isso é ruim, vou acabar me apegando mais e isso é bem ruim, mas os momentos contigo estão muito gostosos... bom, por hora o que me resta é aproveitar esse tempo contigo. Interessante saber que na real você é bem fechado... o que eu ja desconfiava, mas é mais do que eu imaginei. Aquilo que eu falei de sobre as coisas que eu sentia por voce são pequenas perto do satoshi, hoje vejo que nao é mais, ele.me causava muita ansiedade, mesmo quando estava com ele. Apesar de ele ser mto fofo com algumas atitudes, outras ele era o oposto... você, mesmo que somente na amizade, me causa um conforto bem gostoso, aconchegante ate.

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greedyapron · 1 month ago

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19/6/2024 - Supper

📍 Some chuan chuan store, Guilin

Ordered in a bunch of stuff. Overall, it's not bad. We were lucky that someone in our group has ele.me

Mochi bun

Crab roe flavour sunflower seeds

Green muscat grapes (云南阳光玫瑰青提) - these are quite sweet.

#chinajune2024

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liulouxi · 9 months ago

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From "Charging Difficulties" to "Easy Battery Swapping": How Smart Battery Swap Cabinets Revolutionize Electric Vehicle User Experience?

In the wake of the digital and internet revolution, the instant delivery industry, featuring giants like Meituan, Ele.me, SF Express, and the "Four Tongs and Yida" (a colloquial term referring to several major express delivery companies in China), has soared to prominence, becoming an integral part of modern urban life. These enterprises have not only reshaped people's consumption habits but also spurred a pressing demand for efficient and convenient solutions to electric vehicle (EV) range anxiety. Confronted with the myriad inconveniences and challenges posed by traditional charging methods, smart battery swap cabinets are emerging as the "golden key" to solving EV range issues, profoundly transforming the user experience for EV riders.

The Predicaments and Challenges of Traditional Charging

In the instant delivery sector, electric bikes are indispensable tools for riders. However, as business volumes surge, the issue of EV range becomes increasingly acute. Traditional charging methods pose several drawbacks that significantly hinder riders' productivity and earning potential.

Long Charging Time, Inefficient Operations: Electric bike charging typically takes 6-8 hours or longer, imposing a significant time cost on riders who require continuous work. During peak delivery hours, a depleted battery can force riders to interrupt their work to return to charging stations or seek public charging points, leading to order delays and a diminished customer experience.

Numerous Safety Hazards, Complex Management: During charging, electric bikes are prone to safety incidents such as fires, caused by unauthorized wiring, use of unqualified chargers, and overloading issues in centralized charging areas. Moreover, riders' tendency to take batteries home for charging adds to management complexities and increases the risk of battery theft.

High Costs, Eroding Earnings: Batteries are costly, and the demanding nature of the delivery industry accelerates their depletion, necessitating frequent replacements. Riders often carry multiple batteries and establish private charging stations to manage range issues, driving up personal costs and reducing overall profitability.

Smart Battery Swap Cabinets: A Revolutionary Solution

These innovative products, leveraging battery sharing and rapid swapping technology, have fundamentally transformed EV range management, offering riders unprecedented convenience and efficiency.

Instant Swapping, Boosted Efficiency: Smart battery swap cabinets house standardized batteries, enabling riders to exchange depleted batteries for fully charged ones in mere seconds. This drastic reduction in charging time enhances delivery efficiency, enabling riders to swiftly recharge during breaks and seamlessly continue their tasks, thereby increasing order volume and earnings.

Enhanced Battery Safety, Theft Prevention: Employing IoT technology, smart swap cabinets provide real-time monitoring and location tracking for each battery. Riders bind batteries to their unique account IDs, mitigating theft risks. Additionally, centralized charging and rigorous quality control ensure battery safety and stability, reducing fire hazards caused by unauthorized wiring.

Precise Management, Optimized Resource Allocation: Smart swap cabinet systems harness big data and cloud computing to monitor devices and batteries comprehensively. Operators can promptly assess site conditions, battery status, and rider needs, facilitating data-driven decisions to optimize battery distribution and site layouts. This approach minimizes waste, enhances operational efficiency, and reduces management costs. Riders benefit from the convenience of easily locating nearby swap stations.

Cost Reduction, Enhanced Earnings: By eliminating the need for riders to maintain multiple batteries and private charging stations, smart swap cabinets reduce personal expenses. Riders pay a nominal fee for swapping services, alleviating concerns about battery purchase, charging, and maintenance. This translates into increased earnings for riders and cost savings for enterprises, who can decrease battery procurement costs, enhance vehicle utilization, and optimize resource allocation.

In conclusion, smart battery swap cabinets have revolutionized EV user experience, transitioning from "charging difficulties" to "easy battery swapping." As technology advances and adoption deepens, these innovative products are poised to play an increasingly pivotal role, contributing to the sustainable development of the instant delivery industry and society at large

#battery swapping #innovation #electric vehicles #motorcycle #sustainablemobility #evrevolution #decarbonization

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boyuans · 11 months ago

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Jiang Dunhao for Ele.me

#jiang dunhao #trip new bee #aries' updates

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sultanaislammow · 1 year ago

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Tmall Youpin's WeChat "mini program" has suspended its service, and Internet giants' "wall-breaking" has caused another stir

The original Internet ecosystem was one in HE Tuber which everyone worked independently and did not welcome competitors. In recent years, there has been a loosening of the ecosystem: for example, the handshake between Alibaba and Tencent, the reconciliation between Dangdang and JD.com, and even Alibaba’s Tmall has settled in Applets. But recently this trend has been retracted - is it really because small programs are banned because they violate the corresponding rules?

China's Internet is changing, with giants frequently "tearing down walls" and App islands showing signs of loosening.

Since the entrance of Internet traffic has shifted from PCs to smartphones with large and small screens, typical apps led by WeChat, Alipay, and Baidu have become super and isolated based on the considerations of meeting consumers' diverse service needs and the ecological strategies of their respective platforms. It has two major characteristics: large, comprehensive and closed.

In the past two years, due to antitrust governance, the approaching ceiling of mobile Internet traffic, and the challenges from new app forces such as Douyin, Kuaishou, and Pinduoduo, traditional Internet platforms that used to be inseparable are now using the mini program as a super The ecological "filling" of Apps enables interoperability.

Taking the editor-in-chief as an example, since April 2022, he has used the Meituan power bank service 11 times through the Alipay mini program. In addition, if you go to shopping mall restaurants for daily consumption, you can now use Alipay to directly scan the QR code of the Meituan mini program to order food. During 618, the editor-in-chief discovered that “Tmall Premium” can be searched for on the WeChat mini program, and goods can be purchased directly on WeChat (only WeChat payment is supported).

Personally speaking, this is another "interoperability revolution" that has taken place in the mobile Internet world after the birth of "mini programs". The above are just interactions that can be intuitively experienced by consumers on the server side. In June last year, the WeChat Moments advertisement was launched, the first WeChat advertisement that can be redirected (second click) to the Tmall flagship store. In April this year, Tencent Video and Douyin Reach cooperation. In more vertical fields, the services of giants that used to be "distinct" are quietly opening up.

Compared with the "island" thinking of traditional mobile Internet giants, mobile Internet newcomers such as Douyin and Kuaishou have been more "cooperative" thinking since their birth, potentially affecting the current and future mobile Internet ecosystem. For example, the cooperation between Kuaishou and Meituan (the mini program "Meituan"), the cooperation between Douyin and Ele.me (the mini program "Ele.me Takeout"), and Suning.com's entry into Meituan/Ele.me/Baidu and other platforms to sell products goods……

We must also admit that the interconnection of Internet services is only realized in certain businesses. For example, JD.com still does not support Alipay, and Taobao page sharing on WeChat still only supports the "Taobao password" method. Compared with users' needs for interconnection, the major Internet giants currently only support some or even a small number of levels (without direct benefits). conflicting business) to give satisfaction.

Screenshot source: WeChat App

However, before the deadline (June 26), the editor-in-chief opened the WeChat App and clicked on the "Tmall Premium" applet. The system prompt page showed that "Tmall Premium has suspended service due to violations."

Obviously, the road to "tearing down the wall" of the mobile Internet is full of ups and downs.

In the future, will the "tearing down the walls" between apps stop here or continue? To what extent will the interconnection between giants proceed? What is driving this interoperability? If you want to understand these, you must look for answers from the development context of the entire mobile Internet.

#HETuber #Music #Gaming #Entertainment #Science And Technology

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jahidur369 · 1 year ago

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Thirteen years of private sector

Black swan events also give opportunities to new He Tuber entrants in the private sector.

The contradiction between supply and demand during the epidemic has given community group buying a shot in the arm. The group buying market of Pinduoduo and Meituan has been further consolidated, and the main scene of their sales is precisely in the private sector. Countless team leaders, like ant soldiers, work tirelessly to help giants connect users and trading opportunities in the private domain.

Similarly, regional group buying companies that were once crippled by giants have once again used the group store model to become popular in the past two years and develop their own characteristics. Standardized private domain operations such as violently attracting followers in seven days and placing orders quickly in three days have also led to new exploration and innovation. In this track, like other private sector vertical tracks, scale has been formed from group batch companies and group batch platforms on the supply chain side, to team leader incubation and training, to industry service providers.

Due to the impact of the epidemic, instant retail in the same city has entered a rapid development lane. Whether mainstream players are Meituan, Ele.me, JD.com, or Douyin, whether they are offline physical merchants connected in an open mode or a self-operated model, their customers in addition to paying from the platform A considerable proportion of advertising also comes from the private domain pool of offline retail companies.

At the other end, the social group buying model represented by Kuai Tuan Tuan and Qun Solitaire began to rise rapidly.

In 2020, Kuai Tuan Tuan's transaction volume is still at the tens of billions level. This level only belongs to a medium position in the e-commerce industry. Many social e-commerce platforms are also of this size. However, due to the impact of the epidemic, a large number of community residents and group leaders were involved in group starting, and Kuai Tuantuan ushered in rapid growth.

Compared with the heavy operation of community group buying, community group buying is light enough and has a lower threshold for participation. It is a bit like Taoke. However, compared with Taoke, Kuai Tuan group leaders can control the supply chain and pricing power themselves, and users are also in control. On the hand, because of the positioning of the tool, it quickly won the favor of the group leaders.

During the epidemic in Shanghai alone, hundreds of thousands of people participated as group leaders. After the epidemic, the tide receded, and middle and tail group leaders gradually withdrew from the market, leaving a number of loyal channels for Kuai Tuantuan. Similar to the historical evolution of the Taobao Alliance, the traffic division with Kuai Tuan Tuan as the core has grown rapidly, and product selection service providers, industry activities, suppliers, and channels have all settled in. The 28th effect also appears here. Although the team leader has the power to price the supply chain, not all team leaders have the ability to integrate the supply chain.

And Alimama’s tangled mentality back then was also played out again on Kuai Tuan Tuan. On the one hand, Kuai Tuantuan is positioned as a tool, but on the other hand, it cannot restrain its desire to become a platform from time to time. It hopes to control the upstream of group leaders and reduce them to Pinduoduo’s distribution channels, just like the Taobao Alliance supported and attacked the Taoke channel in the past.

These vacillating moves of Kuai Tuantuan also quickly attracted a group of new market sharers. Meituan, Tencent, JD.com, Youzan, Fenxiang, Yunji, Weidian, Jingling, etc. have all entered the market with their own differentiated products.

History doesn't repeat itself, but it always rhymes.

Whoever is user-centered, who can truly help the private sector retail industry improve efficiency and reduce costs, whoever is open enough to insist on decentralization, will be supported by users and the private sector channel army.

In decentralized private sector retail, it is not feasible to build a centralized empire.

What Tencent can’t do, no one can do.

In 2023, the e-commerce industry will be shocked.

On November 29, Pinduoduo’s market value surpassed Alibaba for the first time.

This is the beginning of the return of decentralization and the inevitable cyclical contraction of centralized business models.

In the new economic cycle, new players have a place, which means that they cannot stand without breaking.

Break, start with decentralization.

In the retail sector over the past ten years. The centralized e-commerce empire giant adopts a discriminatory and suppressive strategy against small and medium-sized sellers on the supply chain side, and adopts a method of both utilizing and suppressing on the traffic side. This is all to safeguard their own security and interests, and they do not intend to use the spirit of Internet platform to make the entire private sector retail industry chain bigger and stronger.

There is a huge difference between what they can do and what they actually do.

That’s why Munger said before his death: I discovered that Alibaba turned out to be a damn retailer.

Then the old man decisively sold his stocks and fled.

Looking back at Taobao in 2003, Alibaba and Jack Ma were so high-spirited at that time.

eBay wants to build an empire, like a shark, buying up advertising in an attempt to strangle Alibaba.

Jack Ma, with his alligator spirit, cooperated with many decentralized website alliances and led a group of ant soldiers to defeat the empire.

At that time, Ali, a young man, regarded himself as a hero of the open Internet. He talked about swordsmanship in the West Lake and led a group of grassroots to conquer the world. The ten characters of "Make it easy to do business in the world" were clearly written on the banner of the rebel army.

This is the simplest spirit of Jack Ma’s generation of Internet entrepreneurs, the original ecology of the Internet spirit, and the essence of the Internet economic model.

However, as the country grows bigger and bigger, Alibaba becomes further and further away from making it easy to do business in the world.

Back then, the dragon-slaying boy was surrounded by centralized retail empires both online and offline. He could only rely on a decentralized business model to break through the blockade. Now, the young dragon-slaying boy has an empire, but he is once again facing challenges from new decentralized opponents.

The reason is that with the expansion of scale and the consolidation of status, bottlenecks in the centralized e-commerce model will inevitably appear. When things are scarce and expensive, Alibaba can only adopt a bidding advertising model, and small and medium-sized merchants are forced to leave. On the traffic side, the bigger the company is, the more uneasy Alibaba feels, and support and support for the traffic side appear periodically.

After the siege of the city in October of that year, Ali had already made his choice.

Today's Alibaba is not surpassed by Pinduoduo, but tripped by its own imperial model. The root cause is not the mentality of Alibaba’s top management, but the self-locking of the business model.

Can Alibaba defeat the decentralized model with its centralized model?

If it can, why can’t it do the centralized opponents it defeated back then?

Just like in 2011, if Tencent had not decisively adopted a thorough open platform strategy, what would Tencent be like today?

It’s hard to imagine, but certainly not optimistic.

Openness is the gene of the Internet business model and the most economical path for the Internet. Decentralization allows nodes to be more fully connected. More open connections will bring more trading opportunities and create more value. Centralized platforms need to resist the urge to make huge profits from this connection.

The bidding advertising model has created a centralized profit empire, but also tied its hands and feet, just like Baidu's predicament in previous years.

Private sector retail naturally has the gene of decentralization and is destined to be a market where a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend. There is no possibility of a centralized empire. Whoever tries to build an empire will be ruined.

There may be the city-state of Athens here, but there certainly will not be Qin Shihuang.

Those who follow the crowd will gain big profits

Get small profits from those who desire

Looking back at the history of private sector retail development over the past thirteen years, it is a heroic epic of mass decentralized entrepreneurship.

Fortunately, Lao Zhang has been involved in the industry and personally participated in many key nodes in the rapid change cycle of the industry. It spans multiple industry cycles of CPS, social e-commerce, and group buying, so I can share a little bit about history and the future.

Through the development of private sector retail for thirteen years and four stages, we can see that the blueprint of the private sector retail industry has gradually become clearer, the supply chain side is constantly being optimized, users’ business awareness is constantly being improved, and infrastructure builders and industrial chain service providers are constantly improving. , doing construction work one after another. On the user side, consumers’ consumption experience in private retail scenarios is gradually improving, and cost-effectiveness, convenience, and efficiency in matching supply and demand are gradually improving.

A closed-loop private retail market has been formed.

Private retail is no longer just a distribution channel, but a main retail scene that requires careful management.

This is a rapidly evolving industry and the most active entrepreneurial stage.

Thirteen years of private sector retail development, gold and troughs

Enough experience and lessons have been accumulated, and enough inspiration has been given to the future.

#HE Tuber Music Gaming Entertainment #Sports #Science And Technology

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zannatykhatun · 1 year ago

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Can Meituan defeat magic with magic?

On the highway of local life, Meituan is running all the way with takeaways, restaurants, wine and hotels, etc. When it comes to the turning point of "live broadcast", it runs into Douyin, which has changed its direction from short video and e-commerce.

In the ancient business of catering, a new revolution is taking place.

Wang Xing and Zhang Yiming are the initiators of this change. One of them advocates "long-term patience" and the other claims "vigor can produce miracles." Live broadcast + local life is their new battlefield.

As Wang Xing said many years ago, this HE Tuber is an era of never-ending peace. Some investors once asserted, "We must fight the war at other people's homes. Even if we lose, we will not lose. What we will break are other people's bottles and cans."

The intersection between the two business tycoons is no stranger to the outside world. Although the current situation is not the first time this pair of old acquaintances have crossed paths, it is the most "sparky" one.

According to "LatePost" previous reports, in 2022, Douyin's catering transaction volume has been close to half of Meituan's; in early February 2023, Douyin's local life's transaction volume contributed by the catering business has been higher than that of the hotel, tourism and comprehensive business Sum.

The latest data from QuestMobile shows that the number of overlapping users of Meituan and Douyin exceeds 300 million, accounting for 81.0% of Meituan’s users. As an old rival of Meituan’s food delivery business, Ele.me’s overlapping users account for less than 20% of Meituan’s users.

Douyin's magic to quickly seize the market is "live broadcasting". Although the entry of opponents will help make the pie bigger, who is the winner under the 28-20 rule is crucial. Meituan finally took up arms. Its live broadcast business has grown from two years ago. Start testing the waters and accelerate after building a live broadcast center this year.

And savvy catering businesses are also voting with their feet. Take Wallace, which has nearly 20,000 stores, as an example. During this year’s 618 period, it gained highlights in both Meituan and Douyin. At Meituan’s “618 Group Coupon Festival”, its sales of value-for-money packages exceeded 150 million yuan; while Douyin’s “618 Group Coupon Festival” ranked fifth on the best-selling brand list.

What’s interesting is that Wallace walked into Meituan’s takeout live broadcast room, while the one on Douyin was an in-store live broadcast with online group coupons and offline verification. To a certain extent, the choice of chain merchants also reflects the differences between Meituan and Douyin in local life live broadcasting.

Meituan, standing at the center of the whirlpool, can it use the magic of Douyin to fight back against Douyin this time?

1. How much patience does Meituan have during live streaming?

Meituan Runtong’s first live broadcast product is home delivery (takeaway).

The "Shenshou" live broadcast room is the first official live broadcast room of Meituan to break out of the circle. It focuses on "magic low prices and instant grabs." In fact, its earliest live broadcast attempt was in September 2022, and it did not start daily broadcast until March this year. Meituan’s attempts at live broadcasting date back to earlier, and food delivery is not the vanguard.

In December 2020, Meituan launched the "Meituan Mlive" mini program on WeChat, which was limited to medical beauty and education merchants and has not yet covered the huge takeout merchants. In April 2022, Meituan launched the "Meituan Live Assistant" APP and launched the "Food Live" channel in an attempt to open new sales channels for catering merchants.

In the past two years or so, multiple businesses within Meituan have tried live broadcasting, but they have all stopped. According to "Blue Hole Business", it was not until the first half of this year that Meituan's live broadcast business established an independent team and set up a live broadcast center at the technical level. Each business unit can use this capability.

The popular live broadcast room of Meituan’s food delivery god

A person related to Meituan told "Blue Hole Business": "Shenshou" can be said to be an officially built "model room". In order to set an example for catering merchants, subsequent merchant self-broadcasts will be the main body of Meituan's live broadcast. At the same time, the most popular live broadcast rooms are currently the platform’s traffic and subsidies, and merchants subsidize the cost of goods, which does not involve charging traffic fees for the time being.

Obviously, in the past period of time, Douyin’s local life pressure on Meituan has fallen more on the store rather than the home.

Meituan disclosed in its earnings call that it is currently piloting a new marketing model for its takeout and in-store hotel and travel businesses. For example, live broadcasts, short videos and limited-time sales have been launched to guide user traffic to the products that merchants want to promote and help merchants create popular products. This kind of exploration is defined as shelf + hot style.

Judging from the data in the official live broadcast room of Meituan Waimai, it has given the outside world a signal: Meituan may be able to do live broadcasts.

During Meituan’s two Coupon Festival live broadcasts in April and May, Wallace store sales increased by 4% to 10% month-on-month, and the commodity coupons directly brought more than 100,000 new customers to it.

From the perspective of Meituan’s external caliber, high sales and high conversion are their main promotion of live streaming. According to previously disclosed data, the write-off rate of some single products in Meituan’s takeaway live broadcast room can reach 75%. At the same time, the write-off of one commodity coupon will drive a 1.5-fold increase in order transaction volume. Data from Jiuqian Zhongtai estimates that the write-off rate of Douyin’s takeaway group purchases is only 61%.

From a merchant's perspective, the key factor in choosing to cooperate with Meituan Waimai for live streaming is not only high conversion, but also the ability to fulfill contracts.

As Wang Xing said at the financial report meeting in March this year: "Meituan is very confident in the quality of its riders, operating network and merchants. Some other platforms currently mainly provide scheduled delivery for the next day. This model The impact on us is limited, and consumers’ expectations are also different.”

Douyin, which launched Xindong takeout as early as 2021, has not expanded beyond the three cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu until the first half of this year. It currently sells group meals with weak timeliness and high unit price per customer. The unit price per customer is 110 yuan - 130 yuan. The reason is that Douyin does not build its own logistics, but relies on third-party instant delivery platforms such as SF Express and Dada.

There is also no self-built logistics. Why is Douyin e-commerce successful but local life is so difficult?

On the one hand, takeout delivery requires higher timeliness, multiple concurrency, and greater randomness; on the other hand, third-party logistics costs are higher, and it is difficult to improve efficiency through system deployment, and delivery personnel will give priority to orders from their own platforms. CITIC Securities predicts that the average delivery cost of Meituan’s food delivery orders in 2022 will be 7.1 yuan, which is lower than SF Express’s 10.2 yuan in the same city.

According to "Blue Hole Business", starting in July, Douyin Life Service has introduced "group purchase and distribution agents" in five cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha to help willing merchants in the service area open group purchase and distribution services, and 33 selected agents have been announced. Just last month, according to a report by "LatePost", Douyin Waimai had given up its GMV target of 100 billion yuan this year.

It is not difficult to see that Douyin still intends to develop the food delivery business, but it has no intention to build its own fulfillment system in the short term.

In addition to the ability to fulfill contracts, another reason that has hindered the development of Douyin's takeout is that compared to in-store dining, takeout does not rely on traffic and is more biased towards search. This is the logic of "people looking for goods", while Douyin still prefers " The flow logic of "finding people for goods". Many merchants started group buying on Douyin and also opened takeout services. But when they found that it was not cost-effective, they closed them down.

"For catering merchants, both home delivery and in-store delivery are necessary products. In the short term, both platforms will be considered. In the future, the focus will still be on one platform for refined operations. If Douyin takeout cannot be implemented, merchants will It will flow back to Meituan." An industry insider said.

Zhang Yiming must fight in the takeout battle, but it is difficult to win by bypassing contract fulfillment. Wang Xing once said in 2019: "The failure of most companies is not that they fail to master difficult movements, but that there is a problem with the basic skills." "If we practice the basic skills solidly, we can win 99% of things."

2. When you go to the store, will Douyin do a miracle?

Completely opposite to Meituan. Douyin's first success in local life is to go to the store.

36Kr reports that Douyin’s local life services will complete approximately 77 billion yuan in GMV in 2022, equivalent to 48% of Meituan’s. According to a recent report by LatePost, the transaction volume of Douyin’s in-store and hotel and travel business before write-off remained at about 40% of Meituan’s. Six months ago, this number was close to 45%.

#HETuber #Music #Gaming #Entertainment #Sports #Science And Technology

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news-locus · 1 year ago

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ByteDance in Talks to Acquire Ele.me, Acquisition Denied by Ele.me

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guanshanbabyfox · 5 years ago

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"Qixi Festival is approaching, couples in pairs on the street, a small sad cat squatting on the corner."

- "Don't be sad, I will deliver food to earn money to support you."

- "Well, what I lack is not money, but a partner."

By Old先

#old xian #qixi festival #art #mosspaca advertising department #ele.me

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yibo-best · 3 years ago

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#wang yibo #yibo #wyb #ad #ele.me

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inventivaindia · 5 years ago

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Viral article puts the brakes on China’s food delivery frenzy

For China’s food delivery workers, life can feel like a constant battle with algorithms, traffic police, and disgruntled customers.

An essay detailing the hazardous work conditions of China’s food delivery drivers went viral on the internet on Tuesday, causing a moment of national reckonings on algorithmic harms to people.

In China’s populated urban hubs, one won’t miss the army of express…

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#Asia #China #Ele.me #food delivery #Meituan #Transportation

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sultanaislammow · 1 year ago

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Food delivery capacity that has not yet been fully utilized

However, the bone of takeout is probably even harder.

The first and most intuitive challenge is naturally transportation HE Tuber capacity. Leveraging the power of more local life service providers for delivery is one of the focuses of Douyin Takeout's future efforts as reported by "Late".

This adjustment actually implies two prerequisites:

First, Douyin Local Life has no plans to build its own transportation capacity in the short term. Not to mention that the demise of "Xindong Waimai" proved that this road looks easy but is difficult to run. Judging from the heavy social responsibilities that Meituan bears in terms of transportation capacity today, Douyin's self-built transportation capacity is actually a difficult task. something to please;

Secondly, Douyin Local Life currently does not have access to third-party shipping capacity. Although it has successively reached cooperation with Ele.me, Dada, Flash Express, SF Express, etc.

According to the observation of "Zui Hua", the merchants currently offering takeout on Douyin are basically group purchase merchants, focusing on special areas with higher customer prices, especially crayfish, which is currently in season. Many stores are Takeout service is available.

When "Suihua" entered Douyin's takeout scene, the interface was basically divided into two categories. The first one was to jump to the Ele.me interface. It is worth noting that this Ele.me delivery scenario is currently not unified within Douyin Takeaway.

(*Two different "Ele.me" cooperation methods for Douyin takeout merchants)

In the live broadcast room of a crayfish shop, when "Zi Hua" clicked on the takeout link on the shelf, he directly entered the interface of the store's Ele.me Douyin mini program, which was no different from the interface of ordering directly on Ele.me. .

But in another delivery scenario of Ele.me, the cost of consumers jumping out is actually very high. In this store, we need to click "Buy Now" under the link first, then bind the Ele.me account, and then confirm and submit the order.

And this is just the first step. Next, we need to click "Pending Delivery/Use" in "My Orders" on the sidebar of Douyin, and under the store "Ele.me Local Life Takeaway Store", select Appointment Delivery - Select the store, and again Submit the confirmed order.

This kind of disunity actually shows that Douyin Takeout is still in preliminary testing and exploration in terms of transportation capacity, and is far from a complete stage.

The other delivery method is to directly place an order on Meituan Takeaway. After the consumer places the order through the yellow cart, he enters the Douyin interface for immediate delivery - select the specific delivery time, or stock up first and then Appointment order interface.

Of course, whether this type of merchants deliver goods by themselves, or Douyin has embedded third-party shipping capacity into the platform, or what the proportions of these two situations are, I am afraid only Douyin knows the specific data.

But what is clear is that Douyin’s current food delivery business is indeed not fully operational in terms of third-party shipping capacity.

On the one hand, some merchants still retain the option of self-delivery rather than platform delivery. For example, the Douyin takeout scenario supported by Pizza Hut is that after purchasing a coupon on Douyin, it can be canceled on the Pizza Hut app and delivered via Pizza Hut Home Delivery.

For merchants who accept platform delivery solutions, they are currently facing the problems of high delivery costs and low contract fulfillment capabilities.

According to the "Douyin Food Delivery Special Analysis" report released by GF Securities, the contract fulfillment fee (rider delivery fee) is the agreed price reached between Douyin and the third-party delivery platform. Although it is lower than the price for merchants to directly use instant delivery services, in fact The delivery price is higher than that of Meituan.

The report explained in detail that whether it is a normal period or a special period, within the normal delivery range, Douyin’s group purchase delivery fulfillment service fee is higher than that of Meituan, and merchants’ fulfillment costs are higher. Taking the delivery distance as an example of 3 kilometers, Douyin’s fulfillment service The fee is 7.4 yuan, while Meituan is only 4.5 yuan. Only at ultra-long distances exceeding 14 kilometers, Douyin’s contract fulfillment service fee is lower than Meituan’s.

In addition, from the perspective of transportation capacity and delivery efficiency, when checking the delivery services of some merchants who have opened Douyin takeout in "Suihua", it was found that the delivery time is generally higher than 65 minutes. For example, two stores whose display distances are 1.6km and 3.2km respectively have the fastest delivery time of 65 minutes.

Precisely because of high delivery costs and low contract fulfillment efficiency, Douyin’s current food delivery is also concentrated on categories with high customer unit prices.

Therefore, when Douyin's transportation capacity has not yet been fully utilized, small and medium-sized merchants like Li Kai, who have no self-delivery capabilities, low customer prices, and account for the largest proportion of the entire catering industry, will naturally be unable to enter the market.

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jahidur369 · 1 year ago

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Facing a very complex situation

This is a problem that Hema must face He Tuber with its low-price strategy, but fortunately Hema does not seem to care about the "breakup" of the partnership. It is said that Hou Yi not only forwarded Professor Gu Guojian's article, but also revealed that because of selling a certain milk product at a discount, , Hema has been "banned across the entire network" by the dairy company, adding that this does not affect Hema's determination to promote discounts.

This also shows Hou Yi's determination in reform and his confidence in future victory.

However, the discount reform is just the beginning. Hema will continue to implement the low-price strategy in 2024. According to Sina reports, Hema’s goal is to streamline the number of Hema’s SKUs from the existing 8,000 to about 5,000. . This data means that Hema Fresh will be closer to the two major benchmark brands in the future - Sam's Club's SKUs are controlled at about 4,000 all year round, and Costco's is even less, about 3,700.

Hou Yi also said that in the future, Hema will implement the "753" price system, that is, KA products are 30% off the market price, private brands are 50% off the market price, and late-issue products are 30% off the market price.

A large number of SKUs were "eliminated", and the prices of branded products were discounted by 30%. This was too fast and too fierce. It is understandable that such a strong medicine would make it difficult for partners to resist in a short time.

For Hema, this may be a strategic shift decision, but what is involved behind it is the interests of the entire industry chain. It is difficult for many brand owners to respond to the new price system and supply requirements with a single order, so they can only "resist" by suspending or cutting off supply.

It can be speculated that if Hema cannot smooth out the cooperative relationships with many brand merchants in the supply chain in a timely manner, and does not even care whether they are willing to continue to cooperate with them in the future, it will have an adverse impact on its long-term development.

From another perspective, the discount reform currently implemented by Hema has become a standard feature in the consumer field, rather than an exclusive advantage.

First, Sam's, which is fighting against the "mountain-moving price", is also implementing discounts. Zhang Qing, chief purchasing officer of Sam's Club China, recently told the media that in the last 12 months, Sam's invested nearly 1 billion yuan in cost reinvestment in product prices, allowing dozens of products that members purchase daily to achieve long-term price reductions.

At the same time, other domestic supermarkets are also lowering their prices. Under this industry trend, it is difficult for the discount reform to bring any exclusive advantages to Hema.

Secondly, the sudden rise of real-time retail will also have a huge impact on the domestic supermarket industry. On December 1, 2023, Meituan Maicai quietly changed its name to "Little Elephant Supermarket" and launched a series of price reduction promotions; recently, platforms such as JD Daojia and Ele.me have also made frequent moves in the direction of instant retail.

For Hema, in the current discount reform, its competitors are not only supermarkets such as Sam, Yonghui, Carrefour, and Wal-Mart, but also Xiaoxiang Supermarket, JD Daojia, Tmall Supermarket, Duoduo Maicai, and Dingdong Maicai. and other online platforms.

Hema is currently facing a very complex situation, which is a great test of the strategic determination and execution ability of the helmsman. However, reform will inevitably have pains. What is the chance of Hema winning? It can only take a long time to see the results of the change. At this time, any It's too early to draw any conclusions.

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zannatykhatun · 1 year ago

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Can Meituan defeat magic with magic?