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beardedmrbean · 10 months

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India says it has lodged a "strong protest" with China over a new map that lays claim to its territory.

Indian media have reported that the map shows the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as China's territory.

It was released by China's ministry of natural resources on Monday.

"We reject these claims as they have no basis," India's foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said.

He added that such steps by China "only complicate the resolution of the boundary question".

Beijing has not officially responded yet.

India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar also called China's claim "absurd".

"China has even in the past put out maps which claim the territories which are not China's, which belong to other countries. This is an old habit of theirs," he told TV channel NDTV on Tuesday.

India's protest comes days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the sidelines of the Brics summit in South Africa. An Indian official said afterwards that the two countries had agreed to "intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation" along the disputed border.

Shadow of 60-year-old war at India-China flashpoint

The Indian monastery town coveted by China

India has often reacted angrily to China's attempts to stake claim to its territory.

The source of the tension between the neighbours is a disputed 3,440km (2,100 mile)-long de facto border along the Himalayas - called the Line of Actual Control, or LAC - which is poorly demarcated. The presence of rivers, lakes and snowcaps means the line can shift in places.

Soldiers on either side come face to face at many points, which can spark tensions - the last time being in December when Indian and Chinese troops clashed along the border in the town of Tawang.

China says it considers the whole of Arunachal Pradesh its territory, calling it "South Tibet" - a claim India firmly rejects. India claims the Aksai Chin plateau in the Himalayas, which is controlled by China.

In April, Delhi reacted sharply to China's attempts to rename 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the state would always be "an "integral and inalienable part of India".

Relations between India and China have worsened since 2020, when their troops were involved in a deadly clash at the Galwan valley in Ladakh - it was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.

#nunyas news #give the terrirory to burma instead #everyone wins

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mariacallous · 2 years

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During the recent G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi got up from the banquet table to shake hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and have a brief conversation—their first in-person exchange in three years. Although both sides remain tight-lipped about the interaction, it nonetheless raised hopes among observers of a breakthrough in their 30-month border crisis, which began with a deadly clash in Ladakh in 2020. But any resolution that might emerge will not dispel the challenge posed by massive changes at the border undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This marks the third straight winter that around 50,000 Indian reinforcements will spend in Ladakh’s inhospitable terrain in the northern Himalayas, warding off an equal number of Chinese troops stationed a few miles away. Despite intermittent dialogue between the two militaries, Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Pande recently confirmed that China has not reduced its forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese infrastructure construction along the border is “going on unabated,” he said—confirmed by independent satellite imagery and echoed by the latest U.S. Defense Department report on China. Pande said the situation is “stable but unpredictable.” That unpredictability has become structural.

India and China have so far held 16 rounds of border talks between senior military commanders as well as numerous diplomatic and political engagements, but an agreement on actions to reduce the tensions in Ladakh has been slow to materialize. Of the seven areas in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese soldiers have faced one another since 2020, two have seen no change while the rest have seen each side take a limited step back. The challenge for India is becoming more concerning on the eastern part of the LAC—between the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet—where China has an infrastructure and military advantage, putting New Delhi on the defensive.

The widening power gap between India and China—military, technological, economic, and diplomatic—now constrains New Delhi’s options on the border. It also raises tough questions for India’s geopolitical partnerships, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), and its aggressive approach toward Pakistan. The border crisis will hang over India’s decision-making for the foreseeable future.

In October, the Chinese Communist Party held its 20th National Congress, and Xi assumed an unprecedented third term as leader. Among the images broadcasted at the Great Hall of the People minutes before Xi ascended the stage was a video from the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where at least 20 Indian soldiers and 4 PLA soldiers died in a clash in June 2020. The videos showed PLA regiment commander Qi Fabao standing with his arms outstretched to stop Indian soldiers from advancing. Qi was selected to be a delegate to the Party Congress, underlining the importance of the border crisis to the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative. Harnessing nationalism, the party wants to convey that it will protect what it considers Chinese territory at all costs.

India’s military and political leaders now confront a reality at the border that should have jolted them into serious action: China has a distinct advantage over India, which it has consolidated since 2020. By investing in a long-term military presence in one of the most remote places on Earth, the PLA has considerably reduced the time it would need to launch a military operation against India. New military garrisons, roads, and bridges would allow for rapid deployment and make clear that Beijing is not considering a broader retreat. The Indian military has responded by diverting certain forces intended for the border with Pakistan toward its disputed border with China. It has deployed additional ground forces to prevent further PLA ingress in Ladakh and constructed supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s political leadership is conspicuous in its silence, projecting a sense of normalcy.

Beijing refuses to discuss two of the areas in Ladakh, where its forces have blocked Indian patrols since 2020. In five other areas, Chinese troops have stepped back by a few miles but asked India to do the same and create a no-patrolling zone. This move denies India its right to patrol areas as planned before the border crisis began. The PLA has flatly refused to discuss de-escalation, in which both armies would pull back by a substantive distance. The question of each side withdrawing its additional troops from Ladakh is not even on the agenda. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson rejected any demand to restore the situation along the LAC as it existed before May 2020. The PLA continues to downplay the severity of the situation, instead emphasizing stability in its ties with India.

If the situation in Ladakh is “stable but unpredictable,” Indian military leaders have told Foreign Policy that major stretches of the LAC’s eastern sector—2,500 kilometers (or 1,553 miles) away—are an even bigger cause of concern. In 1962, this area was the site of a humiliating defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the PLA. Today, massive Chinese infrastructure development and troop buildup closer to the LAC has placed India at a military disadvantage. In September, Pande said when it comes to infrastructure in the area, “there is lots to be desired to be done.” Recent reports suggest at least three additional PLA brigades remain deployed in the area even after the Party Congress, further worrying Indian military planners.

China officially claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, which includes the Tawang Monastery where the sixth Dalai Lama was born in 1683. Tawang was historically a part of Tibet; Chinese officials, such as Dai Bingguo, who served as China’s boundary negotiator with India from 2003 to 2013, have publicly stated that it would be nonnegotiable in a permanent settlement of the disputed border. As questions arise over the succession of the current Dalai Lama, who is 87 years old, Chinese sensitivities about Tawang will intensify—even more so when linked to its internal security problems in Tibet. In the coming years, it is likely to become a higher priority for China.

Still, it is in Ladakh that the Chinese have built up infrastructure at a frenetic pace, with only military operations in mind: roads, bridges, airfields, heliports, accommodations for troops, and storage and communication infrastructure. Pande noted that one of the biggest developments is the G695 highway, which runs parallel to the LAC and gives the PLA the ability to quickly move from one valley to another. Flatter terrain on the Chinese side already gives Beijing an advantage, now further bolstered by infrastructure—an extensive network of new roads, bridges, and heliports.

In the 1960s, the PLA needed one full summer season to mobilize and launch military operations in Ladakh for the next summer. Now, it would need a couple of weeks to undertake the same operation. Indian military planners must live with this scenario, even if the current border crisis is resolved.

Modi approaching Xi in Bali recalled a short exchange between the two leaders on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, in 2017. Then, their conversation sparked diplomatic communications between New Delhi and Beijing that aimed to resolve a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at Doklam in Bhutan, which China claims as its territory. The talks led to disengagement, but the Chinese only stepped back a few hundred yards. They have since consolidated their military deployment and undertaken massive infrastructure development in Doklam, such as roads, helipads, and a military garrison. Even if an immediate crisis was averted, the status quo was permanently altered in China’s favor in Doklam.

A similar resolution of the Ladakh border crisis would carry bigger risks for India. Unlike in Doklam, China has entered areas in Ladakh that Indian troops regularly patrolled until 2020. Reinforcing the LAC over the vast span of Ladakh would require enhanced deployment of Indian ground forces. This permanent instability would put the Indian military under further pressure. With an already limited defense budget—China’s is more than four times as large—shifting more troops to the border would also divert resources from the Indian Navy, where multilateral cooperation with Quad partners to contest China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region is an absolute imperative.

Fearing escalation, India is forsaking even limited offensive options, such as launching a quid pro quo military operation to capture some territory in Tibet to arrive at the negotiating table with a strong hand. New Delhi’s defensive position instead seems to acknowledge its widening gap with Beijing; due to this power differential, it is unable to even use economic or diplomatic instruments to target China. After all, India’s bilateral trade with China—its biggest trading partner—reached record levels this year, with an all-time high trade deficit in Beijing’s favor. The U.S. Defense Department report on China reveals that Beijing has warned U.S. officials not to interfere with its relationship with New Delhi; Kenneth Juster, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said New Delhi doesn’t want Washington to mention Beijing’s border aggression.

India’s defensive posture plays out in its approach to diplomatic engagement and security cooperation. Unlike its Quad partners, India abstained from voting against China on the Xinjiang issue at the United Nations Human Rights Council meeting in October, and its comments on China’s crackdown in Hong Kong or aggression toward Taiwan have been guarded. Modi participated in both the BRICS summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit this year, along with Xi; Chinese delegations are still regularly invited to New Delhi for multilateral events. And an Indian military contingent participated with a PLA contingent in a military exercise in Russia this year.

The current situation along the LAC, both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, as well as China’s refusal to discuss issues on India’s agenda for resolving the crisis have added to the structural instability in their relationship. Chinese infrastructure development and the widening gap in power means that this instability will become permanent, even with a solution to the immediate crisis. India’s military will remain under pressure and on guard. Pande made this implicit when discussing future Indian plans on the border in November. “We need to very carefully calibrate our actions on the LAC [so as] to be able to safeguard both our interests and sensitivities … and be prepared to deal with all types of contingencies,” he said.

The risk of an accidental military escalation between Asia’s most populous countries—both nuclear powers—has increased significantly since 2020. This will continue unless Modi and Xi find a new modus vivendi. Establishing guardrails in the relationship will require political imagination and an honest appraisal of relative strengths; failing that, New Delhi faces tough geopolitical choices. It has so far eschewed any security-centric step with the Quad that could provoke Beijing, but murmurs from its partners about reticent Indian policy are bound to get louder. Meanwhile, India’s reliance on Russia for military equipment and ammunition now falls under a cloud of suspicion. And an unstable border with China prevents India from targeting Pakistan, a tactic that has proved politically rewarding for Modi.

The fundamentals of Indian foreign policy that have held steady since the years of former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—namely, strategic autonomy and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty—will come under greater stress as the border crisis looms over New Delhi. Modi boasts of great ambitions for India as a “Vishwa Guru,” or master to the world—a euphemism for a global superpower. But questions raised by the situation at the border with China continue to limit him.

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shahananasrin-blog · 10 months

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[ad_1] Ties between India and China nosedived significantly following the Galwan clash.New Delhi: Over 68,000 Army soldiers, around 90 tanks and other weapon systems were airlifted by the Indian Air Force to eastern Ladakh from across the country for rapid deployment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) after the deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley, top sources in defence and security establishment said.The IAF deployed its Su-30 MKI and Jaguar jets in the region for round-the-clock surveillance and intelligence gathering on the enemy build-up, apart from putting several squadrons of combat aircraft in "offensive posturing" in the wake of the clashes on June 15, 2020, that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades, they said.The troops and weapons were ferried by the transport fleet of the IAF within a "very short period of time" for quick deployment in various inhospitable areas along the LAC under a special operation, the sources said while highlighting how the force's strategic airlift capability has increased over the years.In view of the escalating tensions, the IAF had also deployed a sizeable number of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) in the region to keep a hawk-eye vigil on Chinese activities, they said.The IAF aircraft airlifted multiple divisions of the Indian Army, totalling over 68,000 troops, more than 90 tanks, nearly 330 BMP infantry combat vehicles, radar systems, artillery guns and many other equipments, they said.The total load carried by the transport fleet of the IAF, which included C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft, was 9,000 tonnes and displayed the IAF's increasing strategic airlift capabilities, they added.Following the clashes, a plethora of fighter jets, including Rafale and Mig-29 aircraft, were deployed for combat air patrol while various helicopters of the IAF were pressed into service for the transport of prefabricated structures, ammunition and spares of military equipment to mountainous bases.The sources said the range of surveillance by Su-30 MKI and Jaguar fighter jets was around 50 km and they ensured that the positions and movements of Chinese troops were accurately monitored.The IAF also quickly enhanced its air defence capabilities and combat readiness by installing various radars and bringing a range of surface-to-air guided weapons to frontline bases along the LAC in the region, they said.The strategy was to strengthen military posture, maintain credible forces and monitor the enemy build-up to effectively deal with any situation, the sources said, referring to India's overall approach.The IAF platforms operated in extremely difficult circumstances and accomplished all their mission goals, said a source without sharing further details.The overall operation demonstrated the IAF's growing airlift capability compared to what it was during 'Operation Parakram', said another source.Following the terrorist attack on Parliament in December 2001, India had launched the 'Operation Parakram' under which it mobilised a huge number of troops along the Line of Control.The government has been giving a major push to infrastructure development along the nearly 3,500 km long LAC following the eastern Ladakh faceoff.The Army has also taken a series of measures since the Galwan Valley clashes to enhance its combat capabilities. It has already deployed a significant number of easily transportable M-777 ultra-light howitzers in mountainous regions along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.The M-777 can be transported quickly in Chinook helicopters and the Army now has the flexibility of quickly moving them from one place to another based on operational requirements.The Army has also powered its units in Arunachal Pradesh with a sizeable number of US-manufactured all-terrain vehicles, 7.62MM Negev Light Machine Guns from Israel and various other lethal weapons.The Indian and Chinese troops are still locked in the over three-year confrontation in certain friction points in eastern Ladakh even as the two sides completed disengagement from several areas following extensive diplomatic and military talks.The ties between India and China nosedived significantly following the fierce confrontation in the Galwan Valley.Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the region.A fresh round of high-level military talks between the two sides is scheduled to take place on Monday.In the dialogue, India is set to press for early disengagement of troops from the remaining friction points.On July 24, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi on the sidelines of a meeting of the five-nation grouping BRICS in Johannesburg.The eastern Ladakh border standoff erupted on May 5, 2020, following a violent clash in the Pangong Lake area.(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)Featured Video Of The DayChatGPT Maker May Go Bankrupt In 2024: Report [ad_2]

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ias-next-lucknow · 1 year

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Hot Springs and Gogra Post

After Chinese troops’ incursion in eastern Ladakh in 2020, Patrolling Point 15 (PP15) in Hot Springs and PP17A near Gogra Post were among the four friction points between the two armies, the other two being PP14 in Galwan Valley and the north bank of Pangong Tso.

In a major breakthrough, the Indian and Chinese sides have started disengaging at Patrolling Point (PP15) in the Gogra-Hot spring region of eastern Ladakh. This comes after the armies reached a consensus in the 16th round of the India-China Corps Commander level meet.

Location:

Gogra Post is east of the point where the Chang Chenmo river takes a hairpin bend coming southeast from Galwan Valley and turning southwest.

The area is north of the Karakoram Range of mountains, which lies north of the Pangong Tso lake, and south east of Galwan Valley.

Significance of Hot Springs and the Gogra Post:

The area is adjacent to Kongka Pass, one of the main passes that China claims marks the boundary between India and China.

India’s claim to the international boundary lies significantly east, covering the whole Aksai Chin region.

Hot Springs and Gogra Post are located at the boundary between two of China’s most historically troubled provinces (Xinjiang and Tibet).

What is the importance of Disengagement on Hot Springs and the Gogra Post?

The disengagement in the Hot springs-Gogra region will de-escalate the border tension with China as it officially ends the eye-to-eye confrontation at all new friction points created by the PLA in 2020.

The regions, PP15 and PP17A, are located in an area where India and China largely agree on the LAC alignment.

After the 2020 ingress, there was a significant build-up of the Chinese troops and deployment of heavy weapons in Hot springs-Gogra region

Kongka Pass Location:

Kongka Pass, also known as the Kongka La, is a low mountain pass that cuts through the Chang Chenmo Valley. It is located in Ladakh, on the disputed India-China border.

Galwan Valley Location:

The valley is strategically placed between Ladakh in the west and Aksai Chin in the east, both of which are currently under China’s control as part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Read more :... https://iasnext.com/hot-springs-and-gogra-post-upsc-current-affairs/

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jsbmarketresearch01 · 1 year

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Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister to Meet Qin Gang the Chinese Foreign Minister, and Antony Blinken the U.S. Secretary of the State

S Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India will be in back-to-back bilateral meetings with Qin Gang (Chinese foreign minister) and Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of the state) on the note of the G20 meeting between foreign ministers on Thursday. After visiting the Central Asian states at Rashtrapati Bhavan Cultural Centre (G20 meeting venue) at 11:30 AM, Blinken reached New Delhi on Wednesday late at night. Jaishankar will thus meet Blinken first and then follow up with other meetings.

In the noon, Jaishankar will meet with Qin immediately with Blinken. Qin is on his first visit to India and is a close aide to President Xi Jinping. He is the foreign minister and replaced Wang Yi last year. With continued tensions between U.S. and China, these meetings are important to lessen the chances of a military standoff between the Chinese and Indian troops on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Ladakh sector.

Considering the last 6 decades, relations between India and China are at the lowest given the clashes in June 2020 at the Galwan valley that caused the death of 20 Indian soldiers brutally, and 4 from the Chinese troops. Blinken has clarified that there are no plans for any meetings on the margins of the G20 meeting between him and his counterparts from China and Russia.

However, Jaishankar and Blinken’s meeting will probably help to review the progress on discussions and bilateral relations regarding international and regional issues such as that prevalent in the Indo-Pacific and Ukraine. In the recent few weeks, several visits have taken place from high-level contacts between the two nations. These include Ajit Doval, the National Security Adviser visiting the U.S. to launch the iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies).

Considering jaishankar’s meeting with Qin will perhaps focus on normalizing bilateral relations with the country and people by standing firm on India’s position on the withdrawal of frontline troops of China on the LAC. While China and India are considering relations for trade, the Chinese side has also stressed on putting the border tensions in an appropriate place. After several military and diplomatic talks, China and India withdrew troops from the invaded and disputed two banks – Gogra and Hot Springs of Pangong Lake.

But China has prepared military infrastructure, bridges, and roads on its LAC, causing friction for any progress in areas such as Demchok and Depsang. Jaishankar will also oversee other bilateral meetings with 9 guest countries set to attend the meeting for G20 foreign ministers and counterparts from G20 countries on Thursday. There will be meetings that the External Affairs Minister will attend with his counterparts from Germany and France.

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arun-pratap-singh · 1 year

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Explained | The escalation on the India-China border

The story so far: On December 9, 2022, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Yangtse area in the Tawang region along the India-China border. The confrontation in Tawang was the most serious skirmish between the two sides since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has found that the skirmish that took place in December was aided by new road…

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poliphoon · 2 years

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Galwan-Tawang and the Way Forward

The latest on poliphoon.com: "Galwan-Tawang and the Way Forward." Galwan was a pathetic provocation. Tawang is no less. As China gets desperate for Indian territory, a repeat of 1962 looks likely. What should be India’s strategy now? https://poliphoon.com/galwan-tawang-and-the-way-forward/

China’s military showdowns on Indian border are not new. The last one was in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley in June 2020. Now, in Yangtse area of Tawang sector in India’s Arunachal Pradesh on 9 December. This is a wakeup call, too loud to ignore. China’s repeated military adventurism does not portend well for dragon-tiger ties and peace in the region. Continual standoffs between Chinese and Indian forces…

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znewstech · 2 years

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India-China troops clash in Arunachal: Rajnath Singh holds high-level meet | India News - Times of India

India-China troops clash in Arunachal: Rajnath Singh holds high-level meet | India News – Times of India

NEW DELHI: Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh last week, the first such encounter between the neighbours since the deadly Galwan valley incident in June 2020. At least six Indian soldiers are believed to have sustained injuries, according to unofficial sources. The incident took place on December 9 after 300-400 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army…

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newslobster · 2 years

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German Foreign Minister To Discuss India's Relations With China, Russia

German Foreign Minister To Discuss India’s Relations With China, Russia

India and Germany have completed the inter-governmental talks on development cooperation. New Delhi: Visiting Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock will discuss India’s relations with China, which have been strained since the Galwan valley incident and the Russia-Ukraine war, amid the global consequences of the Moscow-Kyiv conflict. According to the press statement released by German…

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squarwell-breakingnews · 2 years

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German Foreign Minister To Discuss India's Relations With China, Russia

German Foreign Minister To Discuss India’s Relations With China, Russia

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werindialive · 2 years

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India will “properly handle issues related to China’s core interests”, China’s ambassador to India

China’s ambassador to India, Sun Weidong recently in a press conference said that the “phase of emergency response since the Galwan Valley incident” has “basically come to an end” and the border situation is now switching to “normalised management and control”.

He also talked about the Taiwan equation and Tibet-related issues while expressing his thoughts that India will “properly handle issues related to China’s core interests”.

Sun was attending a virtual press conference organized to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China wherein Sun was recorded saying on Tuesday by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. His speech was made public on Wednesday wherein Sun was recorded saying “The current border situation is overall stable. The phase of emergency response since the Galwan Valley incident has basically come to an end, and the border situation is now switching to normalised management and control.”

“The Chinese side is willing to maintain dialogues via diplomatic and military channels with the Indian side, and together seek solution to the border issues in a peaceful manner through dialogue and consultation,” he said. “It is hoped that the Indian side can properly handle issues related to China’s core interests, including [the] Taiwan question and Xizang-related issues,” he added.

Sun also said, “According to the consensus reached in the 16th Round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting, the Chinese and Indian troops in the area of Jianan Daban have completed disengagement.”

For more political news India in Hindi, subscribe to our newsletter.

#india #china #werindia #leading india news source #top news today #top news headlines #top news of the day #top news stories

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mariacallous · 1 year

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The world’s two most populous countries don’t have space for each other’s journalists—at least for now.

Over the past few months, India and China revoked the credentials of each other’s journalists in a tit-for-tat measure, leaving almost no reporters on the ground from both sides. A relationship already fractured by border clashes, India’s ban on Chinese tech, and most recently China renaming places in India that the former claims as its own, have become even more volatile. On Monday, Bloomberg reported that China has asked the last Indian journalist, from the Press Trust of India, to leave the country this month, though the Foreign Ministry said the remaining correspondent was “still working and living normally in China.” The Chinese authorities had already revoked the credentials of three Indian correspondents this year after India rejected visa renewals for two of China’s state media journalists.

“China is responding to what India is doing, and framing this as an issue of reciprocity, while the Indian side hasn’t said much,” Manoj Kewalramani, the chairperson of the Indo-Pacific research program at the Takshashila Institution in India, told Foreign Policy. “Unless India is to clarify why they did this, it’s just a case of using another label to send a message to Beijing that the relationship isn’t normal.”

China has labeled India’s actions against its journalists as “unfair and discriminatory,” with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning saying on May 31that her country took “appropriate countermeasures” to safeguard the rights and interests of Chinese media organizations. Two days later, her Indian counterpart, Arindam Bagchi, said all foreign journalists in India, including Chinese reporters, were working “without any limitations or difficulties” and urged China to “facilitate the continued presence of Indian journalists.”

But China’s latest move now entirely erases India’s press corps from Beijing. Four Indian journalists—Ananth Krishnan from the Hindu, Sutirtho Patranobis of the Hindustan Times, KJM Varma of the Press Trust of India, and Anshuman Mishra of the state broadcaster Prasar Bharati—were stationed in Beijing before the visa row. Meanwhile, Zhao Xu from state-run Xinhua News Agency is now the only Chinese journalist in India—he remains in the country even after his four-year placement ended in November 2021, which the outlet’s bureau chief claimed was due to India not facilitating his successor’s visa. During normal times, China had 14 accredited correspondents in India, according to the Foreign Ministry.

For years, both Indian and Chinese correspondents have provided insights from the ground to hundreds of millions of readers. Kewalramani says that while China’s state media “hasn’t necessarily been objective” considering the country’s media ecosystem, Indian journalists from privately owned outlets have provided nuanced reporting and analysis—including on social media—helping many Indians develop an informed understanding of the world’s second-largest economy. With astute knowledge about Chinese politics and society, the Indian correspondents have acted as a counterweight against the country’s media outlets that tend to respond to both governments’ nationalist rhetoric. Even before the border crisis, in 2015, Hu Xijin, then the editor-in-chief of China’s Global Times, had said that the “Indian media is more nationalistic than us.”

The animosity between India and China dates back decades, following a 1962 war over disputed Himalayan territories. The blurred lines of past empires have overlayed the Himalayas with multiple competing territorial claims. China has also been a reliable ally of Pakistan, India’s traditional rival.

But the deadly confrontation in June 2020 that killed 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley, near the de facto border in the high mountains known as the Line of Actual Control, widened the rift. The relationship between the two neighbors further fractured in April after China renamed 11 places in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese claim in its entirety.

Public perception of China in India is at a serious low. A Morning Consult survey conducted in October showed that 43 percent of the 1,000 Indian respondents perceived China as their “greatest military threat,” followed by the United States and Pakistan at 22 percent and 13 percent, respectively. And that message is often amplified by jingoistic, privately owned television channels, where anchors and talk show guests take jabs at China.

“In today’s Indian media discourse, China is the national security threat number one—it’s no longer Pakistan,” said Kewalramani, adding that the absence of reporters on the ground will only make it easier for nationalist media outlets to “pick up the worst narrative.” “And Beijing is facilitating that.”

Meanwhile, in China, views on India are mostly shaped by official narratives pushed by state media in a tightly controlled cyberspace. Newspapers like the Global Times, known for its flavorful nationalist commentaries, often counter attacks from Indian media by amplifying China’s superiority and portraying India as less of a national threat, with any conflict bound to harm the Indian economy.

Beijing-based journalist Mu Chunshan says that many Chinese on social media—which has become a tool to gauge public opinion—also view India as “underdeveloped” and don’t see it as a threat to many countries. He wrote in the Diplomat earlier this year that many Chinese feel superior and self-confident, and “have no malice toward India, with one glaring exception: the border dispute.”

Sometimes Bollywood movies, especially those released before the pandemic and imbued with social messages—particularly Dangal and Secret Superstar, both starring Amir Khan—have helped crack certain preconceptions, making young Chinese more curious about the country and its culture. But racist portrayals of the country and its people still exist in China. Last month a Bollywood-inspired road safety video featuring brown-faced men, posted on a government account and later deleted, was accused of mocking India and Indians. Xinhua released a similar video during the military standoff in Doklam in 2017, when Indian soldiers stopped Chinese troops from constructing a road through the disputed territory claimed by China and Bhutan.

Rajiv Ranjan, who teaches Chinese politics at Delhi University’s Department of East Asian Studies, , said the border issue has unmasked deep mistrust between the two countries. Since 2020, India has banned more than 200 Chinese apps, including TikTok and WeChat, citing security concerns. The South Asian country also barred Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE from its 5G trials in 2021.

“Public opinion is extremely negative about the ‘other,’” Ranjan told Foreign Policy. “By limiting the information flow, public discourse will be further shaped by distorted facts, thereby exacerbating misperception and the tension. If depleting trust is not contained early, it would be difficult for both countries to revive the engagement in any meaningful way.”

Jingdong Yuan, an associate professor specializing in Asia-Pacific security at the University of Sydney, agrees. He said the latest developments will not only affect bilateral relations, but also that the distrust could amplify any actions taken by both countries and elevate them to serious threats.

“There are a lot of stereotypes, and at times unhelpful reporting, that only serves to reinforce negative views of each other,” he told Foreign Policy. “Sometimes effective diplomacy and pragmatism, rather than rhetoric for domestic consumption, may better serve one’s national interests.”

China-based Indian journalists whose credentials were revoked haven’t explicitly commented on their experience. But Xinhua published a first-person account by its New Delhi bureau chief, Hu Xiaoming, who said he was forced to leave after his visa wasn’t renewed. He borrowed some of the same words from the Foreign Ministry statements, echoing the idea that Chinese journalists faced difficulties due to India’s “persistent visa hassle.”

“The Indian government’s brutal treatment has put enormous psychological pressure on Chinese journalists in India,” Hu wrote. “I sincerely hope that these unfair and discriminatory treatments toward Chinese journalists can come to an end.”

And while Hu’s claims and concerns are legitimate, his account, however, avoids mentioning the fate of Western correspondents in China, where delays or outright refusals to renew visas are common. In 2020, Chinese authorities kicked out journalists from major U.S. outlets—the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post—after the United States limited the number of Chinese state media journalists permitted to work in the country. Soon after, China also expelled three Wall Street Journal journalists over an opinion piece calling China the “real sick man of Asia.”

A 2022 report by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China stated that geopolitical tensions were to blame for some visa delays, and few respondents in its survey said their annual resident permit—this is in addition to the press card—wouldn’t be renewed due to their critical reporting on China. The report said that though visa conditions had improved slightly, expulsions and delays in getting visas for new journalists were challenging last year.

“The Chinese government is controlling the narrative of what is being said about China,” Olivia Cheung, a research fellow at SOAS China Institute, London, told Foreign Policy. “It has been more difficult for foreigners to get information about China. … The expulsion of Indian journalists adds to this picture of difficulty for foreigners to access China.”

Meanwhile, press freedom in the world’s largest democracy hasn’t been promising, either. India slid to 161 out of 180 countries in the 2023 press freedom index from Reporters Without Borders. Local journalists have continued to face restrictions and harassment in recent years, and Indian tax authorities raided the BBC’s offices in February after the broadcaster aired a documentary critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

And while reporting from each country has become more challenging than before, analysts say the absence of journalists on the ground will create a void in India-China journalism. This would hurt the nuanced reporting that each country’s foreign correspondents can bring to the table and potentially create more space for misinformation. In September, for instance, rumors of a coup in China, just before the 20th Party Congress granted President Xi Jinping an unprecedented third term, spread like wildfire in some Indian media outlets and on Twitter.

Takshashila Institution’s Kewalramani, also a former journalist, said that the lack of understanding of China and Chinese politics, both by certain sections of the media and the public, usually contributes to amplifying such misinformation. Krishnan, the Hindu correspondent whose visa was frozen this year, then wrote that journalists on the ground would have “a better chance at getting the context right to separate rumour from news,” adding that having more Indian reporters would have given such rumors a “much shorter shelf life.”

“You’ve allowed antagonistic voices to have more space,” Kewalramani said, referring to Beijing. “There’s a loss to the Indian public, but the biggest loss is to Beijing. If it wants Indians to have independent views on China, not guided by [Western] outlets, it must allow access to Indian journalists and ensure those journalists function properly. You’re forcing us into views that are elsewhere. It’s foolhardy.”

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