#g-20

[xtruss]

Analysis: The China-Russia Axis Takes Shape

The bond has been decades in the making, but Russia’s war in Ukraine has tightened their embrace.

— September 11, 2023 | By Bonny Lin | Foreign Policy

Alex Nabaum Illustration For Foreign Policy

In July, nearly a dozen Chinese and Russian warships conducted 20 combat exercises in the Sea of Japan before beginning a 2,300-nautical-mile joint patrol, including into the waters near Alaska. These two operations, according to the Chinese defense ministry, “reflect the level of the strategic mutual trust” between the two countries and their militaries.

The increasingly close relationship between China and Russia has been decades in the making, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has tightened their embrace. Both countries made a clear strategic choice to prioritize relations with each other, given what they perceive as a common threat from the U.S.-led West. The deepening of bilateral ties is accompanied by a joint push for global realignment as the two countries use non-Western multilateral institutions—such as the BRICS forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—to expand their influence in the developing world. Although neither Beijing nor Moscow currently has plans to establish a formal military alliance, major shocks, such as a Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan, could yet bring it about.

The cover of Foreign Policy's fall 2023 print magazine shows a jack made up of joined hands lifting up the world. Cover text reads: The Alliances That Matter Now: Multilateralism is at a dead end, but powerful blocs are getting things done."

China and Russia’s push for better relations began after the end of the Cold War. Moscow became frustrated with its loss of influence and status, and Beijing saw itself as the victim of Western sanctions after its forceful crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In the 1990s and 2000s, the two countries upgraded relations, settled their disputed borders, and deepened their arms sales. Russia became the dominant supplier of advanced weapons to China.

When Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, China was already Russia’s largest trading partner, and the two countries regularly engaged in military exercises. They advocated for each other in international forums; in parallel, they founded the SCO and BRICS grouping to deepen cooperation with neighbors and major developing countries.

When the two countries upgraded their relations again in 2019, the strategic drivers for much closer relations were already present. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 damaged its relations with the West and led to a first set of economic sanctions. Similarly, Washington identified Beijing as its most important long-term challenge, redirected military resources to the Pacific, and launched a trade war against Chinese companies. Moscow and Beijing were deeply suspicious of what they saw as Western support for the color revolutions in various countries and worried that they might be targets as well. Just as China refused to condemn Russian military actions in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, Russia fully backed Chinese positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. The Kremlin also demonstrated tacit support for Chinese territorial claims against its neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Since launching its war in Ukraine, Russia has become China’s fastest-growing trading partner. Visiting Moscow in March, Xi declared that deepening ties to Russia was a “strategic choice” that China had made. Even the mutiny in June by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin that took his mercenary army almost to the gates of Moscow did not change China’s overall position toward Russia, though Beijing has embraced tactical adjustments to “de-risk” its dependency on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Building on their strong relationship, Xi and Putin released a joint statement in February 2022 announcing a “No Limits” strategic partnership between the two countries. The statement expressed a litany of grievances against the United States, while Chinese state media hailed a “new era” of international relations not defined by Washington. Coming only a few weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, enhanced relations were likely calculated by Moscow to strengthen its overall geopolitical position before the attack.

It’s not clear how much prior detailed knowledge Xi had about Putin’s plans to launch a full-scale war, but their relationship endured the test. If anything, the Western response to Russia’s war reinforced China’s worst fears, further pushing it to align with Russia. Beijing viewed Russian security concerns about NATO expansion as legitimate and expected the West to address them as it sought a way to prevent or stop the war. Instead, the United States, the European Union, and their partners armed Ukraine and tried to paralyze Russia with unprecedented sanctions. Naturally, this has amplified concerns in Beijing that Washington and its allies could be similarly unaccommodating toward Chinese designs on Taiwan.

Against the background of increased mutual threat perceptions, both sides are boosting ties with like-minded countries. On one side, this includes a reenergized, expanded NATO and its growing linkages to the Indo-Pacific, as well as an invigoration of Washington’s bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral arrangements in Asia. Developed Western democracies—with the G-7 in the lead—are also exploring how their experience deterring and sanctioning Russia could be leveraged against China in potential future contingencies.

On the other side, Xi envisions the China-Russia partnership as the foundation for shaping “the global landscape and the future of humanity.” Both countries recognize that while the leading democracies are relatively united, many countries in the global south remain reluctant to align with either the West or China and Russia. In Xi and Putin’s view, winning support in the global south is key to pushing back against what they consider U.S. hegemony.

Alex Nabaum Illustration For Foreign Policy

In the global multilateral institutions, China and Russia are coordinating with each other to block the United States from advancing agendas that do not align with their interests. The U.N. Security Council is often paralyzed by their veto powers, while other institutions have turned into battlegrounds for seeking influence. Beijing and Moscow view the G-20, where their joint weight is relatively greater, as a key forum for cooperation.

But the most promising venues are BRICS and the SCO, established to exclude the developed West and anchor joint Chinese-Russian efforts to reshape the international system. Both are set up for expansion—in terms of scope, membership, and other partnerships. They are the primary means for China and Russia to create a web of influence that increasingly ties strategically important countries to both powers.

The BRICS grouping—initially made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—is at the heart of Moscow and Beijing’s efforts to build a bloc of economically powerful countries to resist what they call Western “Unilateralism.” In late August, another six states, including Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, were invited to join the group. With their growing economic power, the BRICS countries are pushing for cooperation on a range of issues, including ways to reduce the dominance of the U.S. dollar and stabilize global supply chains against Western calls for “Decoupling” and “De-risking.” Dozens of other countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS.

The SCO, in contrast, is a Eurasian grouping of Russia, China, and their friends. With the exception of India, all are members of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The accession of Iran in July and Belarus’s membership application put the SCO on course to bring China’s and Russia’s closest and strongest military partners under one umbrella. If the SCO substantially deepens security cooperation, it could grow into a counterweight against U.S.-led Coalitions.

Both BRICS and the SCO, however, operate by consensus, and it will take time to transform both groups into cohesive, powerful geopolitical actors that can function like the G-7 or NATO. The presence of India in both groups will make it difficult for China and Russia to turn either into a staunchly anti-Western outfit. The diversity of members—which include democracies and autocracies with vastly different cultures—means that China and Russia will have to work hard to ensure significant influence over each organization and its individual members.

What’s next? Continued Sino-Russian convergence is the most likely course. But that is not set in stone—and progress can be accelerated, slowed, or reversed. Absent external shocks, Beijing and Moscow may not need to significantly upgrade their relationship from its current trajectory. Xi and Putin share similar views of a hostile West and recognize the strategic advantages of closer alignment. But they remain wary of each other, with neither wanting to be responsible for or subordinate to the other.

Major changes or shocks, however, could drive them closer at a faster pace. Should Russia suffer a devastating military setback in Ukraine that risks the collapse of Putin’s regime, China might reconsider the question of substantial military aid. If China, in turn, finds itself in a major Taiwan crisis or conflict against the United States, Beijing could lean more on Moscow. During a conflict over Taiwan, Russia could also engage in opportunistic aggression elsewhere that would tie China and Russia together in the eyes of the international community, even if Moscow’s actions were not coordinated with Beijing.

A change in the trajectory toward ever closer Chinese-Russian ties may also be possible, though it is far less likely. Some Chinese experts worry that Russia will always prioritize its own interests over any consideration of bilateral ties. If, for instance, former U.S. President Donald Trump wins another term, he could decrease U.S. support for Ukraine and offer Putin improved relations. This, in turn, could dim the Kremlin’s willingness to support China against the United States. It’s not clear if this worry is shared by top Chinese or Russian leaders, but mutual distrust and skepticism of the other remain in both countries.

— This article appears in the Fall 2023 issue of Foreign Policy. | Bonny Lin, the Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[apas-95]

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[blogoslibertarios]

Brasil tem a 7ª maior inflação do G20 em 12 meses

Foto: Sérgio Lima/Poder360 O Brasil tem a 7ª maior inflação acumulada em 12 meses do G20. O IPCA (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo) para o período fechou em 3,9%. A Argentina, ainda com resquícios da gestão anterior, lidera o ranking entre as nações. Tem inflação acumulada na casa dos 3 dígitos, de 287,9%. A Turquia fica em 2º lugar com 68,5%. Os outros nomes da lista têm inflação a…

[newzquest]

India's Economy to Remain Fastest Growing Among G-20 Economies

In summary, Moody's optimistic outlook for India's economy underscores the country's resilience and potential for sustained growth amid evolving geopolitical and economic dynamics.

India’s Economy to Remain Fastest Growing Among G-20 Economies Introduction Moody’s recent Global Macroeconomic Outlook for 2024 paints an optimistic picture for India’s economy. The report forecasts that India will maintain its position as the fastest-growing economy among the G-20 nations. With stronger-than-expected performance in 2023, Moody’s has revised its growth estimate for 2024 to 6.8…

[inaimexico]

12/09/2023

Los datos se han convertido en un nuevo recurso económico para crear y capturar valor y poder transformarlos estratégicamente en inteligencia digital para el bienestar.

[eurekadiario]

Conclusiones de un G-20 que revela la pérdida de influencia de Occidente

"Pudimos neutralizar los esfuerzos occidentales de 'ucranizar' la agenda de la cumbre", presumió el ministro ruso de Exteriores, Serguei Lavrov

La India lleva todo el año capitaneando un gran festival diplomático: más de 200 reuniones de las delegaciones internacionales celebradas en 60 ciudades por todo el país para culminar con una cumbre final en una caótica capital que ha reunido durante tres días a jefes de Estado de más de 40 países. El G-20 concluyó este domingo en Nueva Delhi tratando de aparentar por escrito una imagen de unidad que no refleja una realidad global fragmentada por bloques cada vez más marcados.

En sus orígenes, el grupo de líderes empujó a la economía global a salir de una peligrosa crisis financiera asiática y prometió que un nuevo orden mundial estaría regido por la cooperación internacional. Pero la fotografía actual está dominada por una nueva guerra fría entre las dos superpotencias, Estados Unidos y China, y la confrontación entre Moscú y Occidente tras la invasión rusa de Ucrania.

Las grandes democracias pierden influencia en África, Oriente Medio y Latinoamérica frente a regímenes autoritarios como el de Pekín. Mientras, el Sur Global, donde están encuadrados los países en desarrollo, se mueve cada vez con más fuerza en varios frentes, demandando más atención y voz en los encajes de la gobernanza global.

Para el presidente Joe Biden, la ausencia en Delhi de su homólogo chino Xi Jinping ha sido una buena oportunidad para acaparar el protagonismo de la cumbre, o al menos compartirlo con el anfitrión Narendra Modi, primer ministro de India. Biden ha aprovechado para presentar una ambiciosa agenda con nuevos acuerdos de financiación para los países de bajos ingresos y un mega proyecto de infraestructuras (un corredor marítimo y ferroviario que conecte a la India con Oriente Medio) que busca contrarrestar la nueva Ruta de la Seda promovida por Pekín en un momento además en el que los socios árabes tradicionales de EEUU están profundizando sus vínculos con China.

La cumbre de líderes deja un sabor de boca agridulce. Hubo buenas palabras, defensa unánime del multilateralismo, pero pocos compromisos rompedores. Modi celebró como una victoria personal el haber logrado, como anfitrión y gran equilibrista en los juegos de poder, un consenso para que todos sus colegas pusieran su firma en una declaración final que ha sido criticada por su contenido vacío y recurrente en cuestiones de cambio climático.

Pero el documento ha hecho más ruido por el apartado en el que recoge la postura sobre la invasión rusa de Ucrania: aborda el impacto económico de la guerra y reitera el apoyo a la resolución de la ONU que se opone a la agresión de Rusia, pero no condena el ataque después de que el Kremlin, con el apoyo de Pekín, rechazara el lenguaje que culpaba a Rusia del conflicto.

Ante las amenazas de Moscú de bloquear por primera vez el documento final en una cumbre del G-20 si no se recogía su postura, las delegaciones están satisfechas con el acuerdo a pesar de que desvela una división mayor respecto a un apoyo incondicional a Kiev. También es un golpe a la influencia de los países occidentales, que han intentado sin éxito que el resto se sume a una condena más contundente contra Rusia.

Pero de cara a la galería, países como Estados Unidos han elogiado una declaración que "hace un muy buen trabajo al defender el principio de que los estados no pueden usar la fuerza para buscar adquisiciones territoriales o violar la integridad territorial de otros estados", dijo el asesor de seguridad nacional de la Casa Blanca, Jake Sullivan.

El ministro Exteriores ruso, Serguei Lavrov, también calificó la cumbre de la India como un éxito y dijo que, debido a la posición consolidada de los países del Sur Global, Rusia logró garantizar que la agenda del G-20 no se viera eclipsada por el conflicto en Ucrania.

"Pudimos neutralizar los esfuerzos de Occidente de ucranizar la agenda de la cumbre", presumió Lavrov. En Kiev, en cambio, no estaban tan contentos. El Gobierno de Volodímir Zelenski manifestó que el "G-20 no tiene nada de lo que enorgullecerse".

La presencia de China en Delhi, a pesar de su gran peso geopolítico, pasó desapercibida por la ausencia de Xi Jinping. Pero fuentes diplomáticas de las delegaciones europeas cuentan que están sorprendidas por lo "participativo" que ha estado el enviado de Pekín, el primer ministro Li Qiang, quien "ha remado en la misma dirección que Occidente" en las propuestas para luchar contra el cambio climático y apoyar más a los países en desarrollo. Incluso la delegación china, aseguran fuentes europeas, después de presionar junto a Moscú para rebajar el tono sobre la guerra en Ucrania en la declaración final, habría mediado con su aliado ruso para que este acabara cediendo y estampando su firma.

Durante el receso del domingo para los intercambios bilaterales, Li mantuvo un breve encuentro con Joe Biden. "No hubo confrontación. Discutimos sobre la estabilidad y el hemisferio sur", reveló el presidente estadounidense desde Vietnam, donde aterrizó tras concluir las reuniones en Delhi.

La cumbre culminó con Modi pasando el testigo al brasileño Lula da Silva, quien será el anfitrión de la cumbre del G-20 el año que viene en Río de Janeiro. Lula hizo un guiño inesperado a Putin, ausente en Delhi, asegurando que no será arrestado si decide viajar a Brasil. La Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) emitió una orden de detención contra Putin en marzo, acusándolo de crímenes de guerra. El CPI salió de una hoja de ruta adoptada en 1998 en el Estatuto de Roma, del que Brasil es signatario

[newswatchindia]

Amid preparations for the G-20, Khalistan supporters have written anti-India slogans on the walls of metro stations, targeting 8 metro stations in Delhi. On one hand, preparations for G-20 are going on in full swing in Delhi, on the other hand, another anti-national activity of Khalistani organization SFJ i.e. Sikh for Justice has come to the fore. In fact, people associated with SFJ have written anti-India slogans on the walls of many metro stations in Delhi.

[akshaymore]

G-20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting Begins in Jaipur Read More - t.ly/oo7Fc The G-20 Trade and Investment Working Group (TIWG) convenes for its fourth and final meeting in Jaipur, Rajasthan, commencing on August 21, 2023. This significant gathering follows the preceding three meetings of TIWG held in Mumbai, Bangalore, and Kevadia, respectively.

[n7india]

हैदराबाद में G-20 कृषि मंत्रिस्तरीय बैठक: कृषि क्षेत्र में डिजिटल टेक्नोलॉजी से लेकर खाद्य सुरक्षा पर मंथन

Hyderabad: हैदराबाद में गुरुवार से कृषि कार्य समूह (AWG) की मंत्रिस्तरीय बैठक की शुरुआत हुई। इस तीन दिवसीय कार्यक्रम में G20 सदस्य देशों, आमंत्रित देशों और 10 अंतरराष्ट्रीय संगठनों के 200 से अधिक प्रतिनिधियों ने हिस्सा लिया। इस कार्यक्रम में विभिन्न देशों के कृषि मंत्री और अंतरराष्ट्रीय संगठनों के महानिदेशक शामिल हुए। बैठक के पहले दिन कृषि एवं परिवार कल्याण राज्य मंत्री कैलाश चौधरी ने हैदराबाद के…

[sarhadkasakshi]

G-20 एंटी करप्शन वर्किंग ग्रुप मीटिंग के एक चर्चा कार्यक्रम के तहत जेंडर एंड करप्शन विषय पर हुआ विचार विमर्श

G-20 एंटी करप्शन वर्किंग ग्रुप मीटिंग के एक चर्चा कार्यक्रम के तहत जेंडर एंड करप्शन विषय पर हुआ विचार विमर्श महिलाओं को नि:शुल्क सार्वजनिक सेवाएं, स्वास्थ्य, शिक्षा, वित्तीय सहयोग तथा बच्चों की देखभाल हेतु सुविधाएं मिलनी चाहिए: केंद्रीय विदेश एवं संस्कृति राज्यमंत्री श्रीमती मीनाक्षी लेखी नरेंद्रनगर में दूसरी G-20 एंटी करप्शन वर्किंग ग्रुप मीटिंग के एक चर्चा कार्यक्रम के तहत जेंडर एंड करप्शन विषय…

[edinijam]

హిండెన్ బర్గ్ హిడెన్ ఎజెండా అదేనా?

ఒకరు దేశ అత్యున్నత పదవిలో ఉన్న వ్యక్తి,మరొకరు దేశంలోనే అత్యంత సంపన్నుడు. ఇద్దరూ ఒకేసారి రెండు విదేశీ సంస్థలకు టార్గెట్ అయ్యారు. అది కూడా పార్లమెంటు సమావేశాలకు కొద్ది రోజుల ముందు. ప్రధాని మోడిపై బీబీసీ డాక్యుమెంటరీ, పారిశ్రామికవేత్త ఆదానీపై హిండన్ బర్గ్ రిపోర్ట్ దాదాపు ఒకే సమయంలో రావడంపై పలు అనుమానాలు వ్యక్తమవుతున్నాయి.ఇది యాదృచ్చికంగా జరిగిందా, లేక వీరిని అప్రతిష్ఠపాలు చేయడానికి ఎవరైనా…

[blogoslibertarios]

Falas estupidas de Lula sobre Israel, Ucrânia e Venezuela podem esvaziar G-20 no Rio

  O comportamento de Lula (PT) comprometido com ditadores condenados em todo o mundo e até com o terrorismo do Hamas, acionou o alerta para diplomatas que participam da organização do encontro dos países do G-20, previsto para novembro, no Rio de Janeiro. Chefes de Estado e de Governo, que em geral participam dessas reuniões, dão sinais de que podem designar prepostos para que os representem,…

[telugutimesdigimedia]

Budget meetings in February itself..! Jagan Sarkar's key decision

Andhra Pradesh government is preparing for this year's budget meeting. It seems that the Jagan government is thinking of holding the budget meetings usually in March this year in February and that too for 20 days. The prestigious Global Investment Summit will be held in Visakhapatnam on 3rd and 4th March this year, followed by the G-20 Working Group Conference on 28th and 29th.

[bharatlivenewsmedia]

मुंबईकरांनो लक्ष द्या! G-20 शिखर संमेलनासाठी वाहतुकीत बदल, 'हे' रस्ते बंद

मुंबईकरांनो लक्ष द्या! G-20 शिखर संमेलनासाठी वाहतुकीत बदल, ‘हे’ रस्ते बंद

मुंबईकरांनो लक्ष द्या! G-20 शिखर संमेलनासाठी वाहतुकीत बदल, ‘हे’ रस्ते बंद G20 परिषदेच्या (G-20 summit meet) पार्श्वभूमीवर मुंबई वाहतूक पोलिसांनी (Mumbai Traffic police) दक्षिण मुंबई (South mumbai) आणि पश्चिम उपनगरातील (western suburbs) अनेक मार्गांवर नवीन वाहतूक निर्बंध जाहीर केले आहेत. आजपासून (सोमवार) 16 डिसेंबरपर्यंत वाहतुकीत बदल करण्यात आले आहेत. कारण या कालावधीत G20 सदस्य भेट देणार आहेत,…