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allthebrazilianpolitics · 3 months

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Assessing Brazil’s Potential to Act as a Peace Enabler in the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

The result of the 2022 presidential elections in Brazil was celebrated domestically and overseas by those who were looking forward to Brazil’s return to the international stage after the country’s isolation under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. The narrow victory of the Workers’ Party candidate, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, and his January 2023 inauguration, coincided with a particularly auspicious moment for Brazil’s international engagement: the country was occupying a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (it left the Council at the end of December 2023) and the country was also due to occupy the presidency of the G-20 (for 2024) and serve as the host of the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP 30), to be held in the Amazonian city of Belém in 2025.

Brazil’s return to the global stage, its participation in groups such as the G-20, the G-77, IBSA (India Brazil, South Africa Dialogue), and BRICS, combined with the characteristic of being one of the few countries in the world with diplomatic relations with all United Nations member states also meant that Brazil could play a role regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For Brazil, the challenges in playing a more active role regarding the conflict include both domestic and international dimensions. At the domestic level, one of the biggest challenges is achieving economic development and reducing social inequalities in a country that, according to the World Inequality Lab, is one of the most socially unequal countries in the world. Given the magnitude of this challenge, Lula has been criticised for giving too much priority to presidential diplomacy in his first year in government and travelling abroad several times.

Internationally, the competing issues that hold back Brazil in developing a more active role in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are related to the need to address issues close to home. These include: 1) the rivalry between Venezuela and Guyana on the Brazilian border, as Brazilian mediation credentials could be more useful regarding neighboring countries, and 2) the need to balance the bilateral relationship with Argentina, as right-wing President Jair Milei has explicitly criticised President Lula and expressed an interest in obtaining global partner status with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, President Lula is working to persuade Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega, a historical ally of the Workers’ Party, to ease the repressive measures against the opposition. Meanwhile, the ongoing security challenge in Haiti, where Brazil held the command of the military component of the UN mission (MINUSTAH) for 14 years (2004-2017), also highlights regional demands for Brazil’s engagement.

Additionally, recent international events have also captured the attention of Brazilian authorities, with a potential for domestic repercussions. Brazil’s condemnation of Israel’s military actions in Gaza may become a focal point in domestic political debate, potentially undermining Lula, as Bolsonaro and other right-wing politicians in Brazil remain close allies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Looking ahead to the 2024 and 2025 domestic elections, conservative religious groups, particularly among the fast-growing neo-pentecostal communities, have explicitly endorsed Israeli policies, further complicating the situation.

Brazil may also face conflicting issues related to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For instance, as the host of the G-20, Brazil may welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to the high-level summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024. However, since Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, representatives of the Ukrainian-Brazilian community have urged Brazil’s Minister of Justice to arrest Putin if he enters the country. According to the media, Brazilian officials prepared a document which legally sustains the justification for not arresting Putin in his visit for the G-20 summit, based largely on the fact that Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016.

#brazil #brazilian politics #politics #ukraine #russia #foreign policy #mod nise da silveira #image description in alt

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mariacallous · 2 years

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Haiti is again embroiled in crisis. Gangs are fighting for territory in large swaths of the capital, Port-au-Prince, outgunning the hobbled Haitian police. Kidnappings and killings have spiked. Many refugees have fled only to be sent back unceremoniously by the United States. The probe into the 2021 assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse has stalled, while an unelected government led by acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry clings to power with no elections in sight.

The turmoil has prompted calls for foreign intervention. On Oct. 7, Henry’s administration requested the deployment of an international “specialized armed force” to quell the unrest. In a country with a long history of foreign intrusion, that request sparked large protests and a Haitian Senate resolution urging delay. Nevertheless, the United States and Mexico now seek U.N. Security Council authorization for a “non-U.N. mission” led by an unnamed “partner country” to help restore order. Past experience suggests how fraught that exercise is likely to be.

Haiti has long been a prototypical “fragile state,” lacking a government that can deliver adequate services and build public trust. The United States and United Nations have intervened on several occasions to help enforce law and order as well as strengthen Haitian institutions. Yet Haiti remains trapped in the same vortex, with dysfunctional domestic politics that are both the cause and the product of repeated international interventions.

In 1994, a U.S.-led intervention restored elected leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power three years after a military coup. U.S. and U.N. personnel helped maintain order while training the new Haitian National Police force. However, the police soon succumbed to corruption and factional rivalries linked to Haiti’s “predatory” politics, through which political elites have long used violence to secure power and extract the wealth that comes with it.

By 2004, when U.S. forces ushered Aristide out of power amid a new crisis, the Haitian police had largely imploded. An interim president blessed a U.N. military intervention, and then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote undiplomatically that Haiti was clearly “unable to sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos.”

That led to a 13-year peacekeeping mission—formally called the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or Minustah for short. Minustah had some important salutary effects, including helping to restore order at key junctures and helping to rebuild the Haitian National Police. Many Haitians resented the presence of U.N. peacekeepers, however, seeing them as a force sent to advance U.S. and other foreign interests in Haitian politics. U.N. forces soon came under criticism for taking sides in partisan domestic feuds and for using excessive force, particularly while supporting President René Préval’s anti-gang campaign, branded “disarm or die.”

After the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake, U.S. forces returned briefly, as the Haitian National Police splintered again. In requesting assistance, Préval explained to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “I need you to be Haiti for Haiti, because right now we can’t do it.” U.S. forces provided limited but crucial services, such as securing the airport for aid deliveries, and returned home quickly.

Minustah remained but soon wore out its welcome. The spread of cholera by Nepali peacekeepers, a U.N. cover-up, and unaddressed sexual abuse by U.N. personnel eroded public support for the mission. U.S. support for Préval’s successor, the increasingly authoritarian Michel Martelly, also led to renewed allegations that Minustah was a lever for foreign influence. Many Haitians celebrated the mission’s exit in 2017.

Five years later, Haiti is back to the drawing board. Security has deteriorated since peacekeepers left, particularly since Moïse’s assassination, with a sharp rise in violence and no real progress toward a resolution of the country’s political impasse. The question is whether another round of armed international intervention would help.

As U.S. and Mexican officials press for an emergency force, there is no ideal candidate to lead the charge. Minustah left a bitter aftertaste, and new U.N. peacekeepers would face public ire, especially when invited by interim Haitian leaders with deeply contested authority. Sending regular military units to address domestic law enforcement issues is also problematic in a country that has long suffered from repressive armed forces.

U.N. police would also carry the baggage of past interventions. U.N.-formed police units—groups of roughly 140 officers dispatched from their home countries—are equipped to provide the crowd control and anti-gang functions that Haiti needs. However, international police typically have struggled in Haiti due to language barriers, public suspicion, and resistance from Haitian rank-and-file officers unwilling to share the badge. Recruiting effective units would be challenging. France earlier indicated its willingness to furnish police under U.N. auspices, but as a former colonial power, its officers may not receive a warm welcome.

The Biden administration has rightly been wary of committing U.S. forces given the United States’ history in Haiti and the danger of mission creep. The last time a Haitian president was assassinated, in 1915, U.S. troops intervened to stem mob violence and stayed to occupy the country for nearly two decades. This bred lasting resentment and helps explain why many Haitians associate foreign troops with a long history of racialized exploitation. U.S. backing for Haitian autocrats during the Cold War only added to local suspicion and disenchantment.

U.S. forces have played more positive roles in the recent past, helping to stem unrest in the 1990s and after the 2010 earthquake. In both instances, however, U.S. forces arrived with the blessing of an elected Haitian leader and withdrew relatively quickly as U.N. missions took up the mantle. In this case, U.S. personnel would be accepting the invitation of Henry, an unelected leader regarded by many Haitians as the U.S. government’s “man in Haiti.”

Moreover, another brief intervention is unlikely to produce lasting stability. An entree by a U.S., Canadian, or other national force is apt to lead to a longer multilateral peace operation. Haitians have little appetite for that, and same goes for the United Nations.

Haiti faces acute hardships and needs international assistance. Without a credible and locally owned political road map, however, another intervention will do little to strengthen Haiti’s sovereign institutions. At best, a rapid reaction force will provide a Band-Aid, not a lasting remedy. At worst, a new intervention would deepen domestic divisions in Haiti, as has so often occurred in the past, and could even inflict further abuses on a vulnerable population.

The only sustainable way to fill Haiti’s sovereignty gap is through domestic development. That requires supporting domestically rooted political processes. The most promising at present is the Montana Accord, devised by Haitian civil society leaders to guide a transition toward new national elections. An updated version of this plan could provide the necessary political foundation for an international security mission.

Without such a road map, many Haitians would see a foreign force as yet another international effort to buttress an illegitimate but compliant government in Port-au-Prince. By contrast, a force linked to an agreed road map is more likely to be welcomed and earn the public cooperation it will need to succeed.

The United States and its partners should use the prospect of security assistance to push the Haitian government to engage earnestly with opposition groups and civil society leaders on a transitional framework and path to elections. With a credible plan in place, international forces can provide much-needed stopgap security functions. Until that point, even an intervention with the best of intentions may do more harm than good.

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casbooks · 3 months

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Books of 2023

Book 51 of 2023

Title: Chasing Chaos: My Decade in and Out of Humanitarian Aid Authors: Jessica Alexander ISBN: 9780770436919 Tags: AU African Union, AU AUMIS African Union Mission in the Sudan, BDI Burundi, COG Congo-Brazzaville, Disaster - Cyclone Nargis (2008), Disaster - Hatian Earthquake (2010), Disaster - Hurricane Mitch (1998), Disaster - Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami (2004), GBR BA British Army, GBR United Kingdom, HND Honduras, HND Teguchigalpa, HTI Delmas 31 Camp, HTI Gaston Margon Camp, HTI Haiti, HTI Jacmel, HTI MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, HTI Port-au-Prince, Humanitarian Aid, ICC International Criminal Court - Hague, IDN Banda Aceh, IDN Indonesia, KEN Kenya, KEN Nairobi, LBR Liberia, LBR National Patriotic Front of Liberia, LBR President Charles Taylor, LKA Sri Lanka, LKA Tamil Tigers, MOZ Mozambique, RWA Hutu Tribe, RWA ICTR International Criminal Trial for Rwanda (Rwandan Civil War), RWA KGL Kigali International Airport, RWA Kibuye, RWA Kigali, RWA Kinbungo, RWA Kiziba, RWA President Juvenal Habyarimana, RWA Rwanda, RWA Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), RWA Rwandan Genocide (1994) (Rwandan Civil War), RWA Tutsi Tribe, SDN Abu Shouk Refugee Camp, SDN Al Salam Refugee camp, SDN Dar Zagawa, SDN Darfur, SDN Darfur - Abu Shouk Refugee Camp, SDN Darfur - Al Salam Refugee Camp, SDN Darfur - Zam Zam Refugee Camp, SDN Hamadyia Refugee Camp, SDN Hassa Hissa Refugee Camp, SDN Janjaweed Militia, SDN Jebel Marra, SDN Jebel Si, SDN JEM Justice and Equality Movement Army, SDN Juba, SDN Kalma Refugee Camp, SDN Khartoum, SDN Korma, SDN Mukjar, SDN North Darfur, SDN North Darfur - El Fasher, SDN Nuba Mountains, SDN Nyala, SDN President Omar Al-Bashir, SDN Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), SDN SLA Sudanese Liberation Army, SDN South Darfur, SDN Sudan, SDN Tawila, SDN Zalingei, SDN Zam Zam Refugee Camp, SLE Bo, SLE Child Soldiers (Sierra Leone Civil War), SLE Freetown, SLE IMATT International Military Advisory and Training Team, SLE Kailahun, SLE Makeni, SLE RUF Revolutionary United Front, SLE SCSL Special Court (Sierra Leone Civil War), SLE Sierra Leone, SLE Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002), TCD Chad, TMP East Timor, TMP Free Aceh Movement, TZA Tanzania, UN UNDP United Nations Development Programme, UN UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund, UN United Nations, US NY JFK International Airport, US NY New York, USAID Rating: ★★★★ (4 stars) Subject: Disasters

Description: An eye-opening and intimate memoir about life as an international humanitarian aid worker in the field in Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. Jessica Alexander arrived in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide as an idealist intern, excited to be a part of the international humanitarian aid community. But the world that she encountered in the field was dramatically different than anything she could have imagined. In this honest and irreverent memoir, she introduces readers to the reality of the life of an aid worker. We watch as she helps to resettle refugees in Rwanda, manages a 24,000-person camp in Darfur, and helps a former child soldier in Sierra Leone get rid of a tattoo that was carved into his skin by a rebel group. But we also see the alcoholic parties and fleeting romances, the burnouts and cyncism, the plans and priorities that constantly shift and change. Tracing her personal journey from idealistic and naïve newcomer to hardened cynic to hopeful but critical realist, Alexander transports readers to some of the most troubled locations and shows us not only the impossible challenges, but also the moments of hope and recovery. Review: It was a pretty decent book that gave the reader some insight into the situations in Darfur, Haiti, and Sierra Leone from the perspective of a humanitarian aid worker. You'll understand why the help offered is rarely helpful at all, and good intentions is really a double edged sword. There's some good, a lot of bad, a lot of stress, confusion, and a system rigged to fail for the most part. But there's also the human element, and the people that are affected at every level make this a story worth reading.

#books #booklr #bookblr #nonfiction #humanitarian aid #haiti #darfur #sudan #sierra leone

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ferrolano-blog · 6 months

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Gangsterización e intervención imperialista en Haití... La crisis refleja tanto la lumpenización de la burguesía haitiana como el fracaso de décadas de intervención militar y política imperialista... La ONU admite en informes recientes que las bandas gangsteriles controlan el 80% de Puerto Príncipe, incluyendo la mayor parte del sistema de suministro de agua, las principales carreteras y en distintos momentos edificaciones estatales, terminales de suministro de combustible y zonas de producción agrícola. Son alrededor de doscientas pandillas, algunas con un origen vinculado a funciones paramilitares al servicio de sectores empresariales y políticos a cambio de impunidad, armas y dinero... Dos décadas después del inicio de la ocupación por parte de la MINUSTAH, con apoyo estadounidense, el resultado es un aumento de la pobreza y del control gangsteril. Una burguesía haitiana descompuesta se encuentra en un callejón sin salida político... Haití es uno de los pocos países del mundo con un PIB per cápita similar al de hace seis décadas

#narcoestados #narcoestadoshaiti #haiti #narcoestadosefectos

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tvbrasilnoticias · 6 months

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Intervenção Internacional no Haiti: História de Violência e Reparação Necessária

Duas décadas após a implantação da Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização do Haiti (Minustah), o país caribenho enfrenta a iminência de uma nova intervenção estrangeira, liderada desta vez pelo Quênia. A justificativa para essa ação é o combate aos grupos criminosos que têm exercido controle sobre partes significativas do território haitiano, culminando em um recente aumento da…

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archivio-disattivato · 9 months

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LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ DELLE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI ALLA PROVA DEI FATTI. IL CASO DELLA DIFFUSIONE DEL COLERA A HAITI [PDF]

È ormai certo che la fonte dell’epidemia di colera diffusasi a Haiti nell’ottobre del 2010 sia riconducibile alla Missione di stabilizzazione delle Nazioni Unite (MINUSTAH), operante sull’isola dal 2004, e in particolare al contingente nepalese ivi impiegato. Secondo diverse ricostruzioni, l’impresa incaricata dalle Nazioni Unite di smaltire gli scarti igienico-sanitari delle truppe dislocate a Haiti ha riversato nel fiume principale dell’isola i rifiuti di oltre quattrocento peacekeepers nepalesi, i quali, poco prima di arrivare sull’isola, avevano contratto il virus del colera durante un periodo di addestramento a Kathmandu. L’infezione si è così propagata prima nelle comunità adiacenti alle acque contaminate, in prossimità della struttura dove erano collocati i servizi sanitari dei peacekeepers, per poi diffondersi rapidamente in tutto il Paese, causando oltre novemila morti e più di settecentomila casi di infezione. [...]

#archivio #haiti #nazioni unite

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lucsayimann-12-63 · 9 months

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L'ONU: neuf mille soldats pour la stabilité d'Haïti, sans résultat durable.

La Mission des Nations Unis pour la stabilité en Haïti ( MINUSTAH), nantie d’une composante militaire de 7,200 soldats. Cette mission qui comprenait également 1800 policiers, donc un total de 9,000 membres, était aussi appuyée par un personnel civil international. Cependant, la suggestion faite dans le rapport du comité de Réflexion français n’a pas été retenue. La formation et l’encadrement…

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voxtrotteur · 1 year

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Le Kenya a annoncé qu’il était prêt à diriger une mission de 1 000 policiers en Haïti pour faire face à la violence et aux crises qui affectent le pays des Caraïbes. Cette proposition fait suite à l’appel du Premier ministre haïtien Ariel Henry pour une force multinationale qui pourrait aider à stabiliser la situation. Le Kenya attend l’approbation du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU et de ses propres autorités constitutionnelles pour déployer ses agents. Une mission controversée qui rappelle le passé La perspective d’une nouvelle intervention internationale en Haïti suscite des sentiments mitigés parmi la population haïtienne. Certains y voient une opportunité de mettre fin à l’impunité des gangs armés qui sèment la terreur et le chaos. D’autres y voient une ingérence étrangère qui pourrait aggraver les problèmes. La mission rappelle la MINUSTAH, une opération de l’ONU qui s’est terminée en 2017 après avoir été accusée d’avoir provoqué une épidémie de choléra et des abus sexuels. Une initiative qui soulève des questions sur la capacité du Kenya Le Kenya est un pays africain qui n’a pas beaucoup d’expérience dans les opérations de maintien de la paix en Haïti. Certains observateurs se demandent si le Kenya est capable de gérer une telle mission tout en faisant face à ses propres défis internes. D’autres suggèrent que la ressemblance physique entre les Kényans et les Haïtiens pourrait faciliter l’acceptation de la mission. Le gouvernement haïtien a exprimé sa gratitude pour la solidarité africaine, mais l’ancien Premier ministre Claude Joseph a exprimé son scepticisme.

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guiadoinvestidoroficial · 1 year

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Brasil estuda formas de auxiliar o Haiti no combate à violência Em agosto de 2017, militares brasileiros deixaram o Haiti após 13 anos liderando a Missão de Estabilização no Haiti (Minustah) das Nações Unidas. Agora, quase seis anos depois, o Brasil estuda novas formas de auxiliar o governo do Haiti no combate à violência que assola o país caribenho. Após reunião com a chanceler do Canadá, Mélanie Joly, durante a semana, o ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Mauro Vieira, informou que foram discutidas “modalidades de fortalecimento da Polícia Nacional Haitiana para enfrentar os graves problemas de segurança pública que afetam a vida naquele país”. Foram diálogos exploratórios que podem resultar em medidas de apoio a segurança pública haitiana. Segundo Viera, o “Haiti atravessa uma grave crise multidimensional que requer muita atenção por parte da comunidade internacional”. Com a guerra na Ucrânia, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, que teria legitimidade de decidir sobre intervenções em países soberanos, está paralisado. Com isso, alguns países, em especial o Canadá, têm liderado esforços para tentar combater a violência no Haiti. O Canadá tem aplicado sanções econômicas contra indivíduos que julga ter ligações com os grupos armados e anunciou a doação de US$ 100 milhões para o setor de segurança do país antilhano. Em nota, a embaixada do Canadá no Brasil informou que a reunião com o governo brasileiro serviu para discutir “sobre como cooperar para apoiar os esforços regionais no restabelecimento da segurança e fortalecimento das instituições no Haiti”. A embaixada acrescentou que estão “trabalhando ativamente para mobilizar países da região” e que o Canadá apoia “soluções lideradas pelos haitianos” para resolver a atual crise. Crise permanente O Haiti segue mergulhado numa grave crise social, econômica e de segurança com grupos armados não estatais controlando extensos territórios da capital, Porto Principe. Segundo as Nações Unidas, mais da metade do território da região metropolitana da capital apresenta “restrições de movimento”. Além disso, 47,2% da população está subnutrida, segundo dados da Organização das Nações Unidas para Agricultura e Alimentação (FAO). A FAO aponta para “níveis catastróficos” de fome. A situação, que nunca foi estabilizada, se agravou após o assassinato do presidente Jovenel Moise, em julho de 2021. Desde então, o primeiro-ministro que assumiu o governo, Ariel Henry, pede ajuda à comunidade internacional para que intervenha no país, medida que tem sido defendida pelo secretário-geral das Nações Unidas, António Guterres. Soluções O brasileiro Ricardo Seitenfus, um dos principais especialistas em Haiti no mundo, atuou como representante da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) no país caribenho durante a ocupação liderada pelo Brasil, tendo sido afastado do cargo por críticas à operação. Ele é professor aposentado de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM). Seitenfus opina que sem desenvolvimento social-econômico não há como estabilizar o Haiti. Porém, diante da situação de violência, é necessário, em caráter emergencial, combater as cerca de 150 gangues que atuam no país. “O objetivo é melhorar minimamente a questão da segurança pública e depois organizar as eleições”, defendeu. O professor destaca que a polícia é mal equipada e não tem recursos, possuindo apenas 10 mil agentes para fazer a segurança de 12 milhões de pessoas, o que representa uma proporção de policial por habitante de cerca de 40% da média mundial. A solução emergencial de fortalecer a Polícia Nacional Haitiana pode ser contraproducente na visão do pesquisador do Grupo de Estudos em Conflitos Internacionais da PUC de São Paulo, João Fernando Finazzi. Ele fez doutorado em história contemporânea do Haiti e estuda o país há 10 anos. “Um Estado frágil, com as instituições do judiciário frágeis, essas armas, esses equipamentos, a gente tem a certeza de que eles vão ficar na mão das polícias? De que não vão ser desviados? É quase como enxugar gelo”, avalia. Ainda assim, Finazzi diz acreditar que não há muitas alternativas para além do que está sendo proposto. O doutor em relações internacionais explica que as chamadas gangues do Haiti são grupos próximos de lideranças do país e funcionam, muitas vezes, como braços armados de atores políticos que usam da violência para interferir no jogo político local. Por outro lado, a Rede Nacional de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos do Haiti tem denunciado abusos, execuções e casos de corrupção da polícia local, alegando que a instituição estaria corrompida. Sem eleições Outro elemento que agrava a crise haitiana, segundo especialistas, é a ausência de eleições. No Conselho de Segurança da ONU, o Brasil tem defendido a realização de pleitos para escolher novos representantes. “O país está atualmente sem um único funcionário do governo eleito democraticamente. O Brasil teme que esse vácuo de legitimidade, se não for resolvido, desencadeie uma crise ainda mais profunda.”, destacou Ronaldo Costa Filho, embaixador que representa o Brasil no Conselho. Mesmo assim, o Brasil reconhece a falta de condições para realizar o pleito. “O controle das atividades das gangues é necessário para criar condições que permitam a organização de eleições credíveis”, acrescentou. O professor Ricardo Seitenfus diz acreditar que há um vazio de legalidade, mas não de legitimidade “porque de fato ele foi indicado pelo presidente assassinado. Portanto, ele tem uma certa legitimidade, mas há uma ilegalidade porque ele não foi eleito e não foi designado pelo Parlamento, mas a Comunidade Internacional o reconhece como a liderança porque não há outra”. João Finazzi destaca que o atual primeiro-ministro Henry não é reconhecido por muitos grupos políticos internos e, por isso, uma eleição poderia conter a violência já que há uma relação direta entre a violência e dinâmica política. Porém, “o cenário de violência impede a realização da eleição”, analisa. Origens da crise Questionado sobre as origens da situação haitiana, o pesquisador Finazzi aponta que o problema é de economia política. “Está no fato de uma intromissão, por exemplo dos Estados Unidos na política haitiana, selecionando quem entra no governo, apoiando golpes, pressionando para que não aumentasse o salário mínimo”, opinou. Para ele, a miséria haitiana não é fruto simplesmente da violência ou das decisões dos haitianos. “Claro que uma coisa fortalece a outra, mas a gente tem que olhar para forma como o Haiti se inseriu na economia política internacional”, explicou. O professor Ricardo Seitenfus opina que a situação do Haiti é resultado de toda uma história de colonização que culminou no primeiro país independente na América Latina e Caribe, independência conquistada em 1804 por meio de uma violenta revolução de escravos. Em sequência, o país acabou invadido pelo exército francês de Napoleão. “Para conseguir derrotar o exército de Napoleão os escravos colocaram fogo em todas as plantações. O Haiti se transformou numa montanha de cinzas. Ficou muito empobrecido. Teve que pagar o equivalente a U$S 22 Bilhões para França ao longo de mais de um século para ser reconhecido”, explicou. O professor ainda acrescentou que, por pressão do Banco Mundial, houve uma invasão do arroz dos Estados Unidos no Haiti na década de 1970 que causou o colapso da agricultura haitiana que ficou sem proteção, promovendo a urbanização desordenada. “Os países que têm responsabilidade histórica com a Haiti, a França, o Canadá e os Estados Unidos têm que ajudar o desenvolvimento socioeconômico do Haiti. Eu propus um mini Plano Marshall para o Haiti. Sem isso, o Haiti não vai se estabilizar”, concluiu. O Plano Marshall foi a ajuda financeira dada pelos Estados Unidos para reconstrução da Europa após a 2ª Guerra Mundial. Fonte: Agência Brasil

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allthebrazilianpolitics · 2 years

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Brazil's Incoming Gov't Unlikely to Provide Military Assistance to Haiti, Officials Say

Brazil's incoming government is unlikely to provide military assistance to Haiti despite calls for an international force to confront gangs, two officials said, noting that a prior military intervention did not yield lasting improvements.

The United Nations last month discussed sending a strike force to Haiti to reopen a fuel terminal that had been blockaded by gangs. Police took back control of the terminal this month and fuel distribution has resumed, but kidnappings are again on the rise and gangs continue to expand their territory.

"Any Brazilian participation would be difficult, overall in a multinational force," said Celso Amorim, a foreign policy advisor to President-elect Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who takes office on Jan. 1.

Amorim noted that Brazil's military participation in the MINUSTAH U.N. peacekeeping force, which operated in Haiti from 2004 to 2017, was widely unpopular at home and that Haiti's security situation was worse after the mission than before.

#politics #brazil #haiti #brazilian politics #haitian politics #foreign policy #international politics #united nations #celso amorim #mod nise da silveira #image description in alt

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mariacallous · 2 years

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At the end of the first U.S. occupation of Haiti—a period of brutal domination from 1915 to 1934—a critic warned that U.S. forces would not be gone for long. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State Department had left Haiti in the hands of a man friendly to its core interests: the Haitian conservative Sténio Vincent, whose otherwise fervent nationalism was tempered by a deep affection for U.S.-centric capitalism.

The critic, the American journalist and orator William Pickens, wrote in the NAACP’s flagship magazine, The Crisis, in June 1935: “The marines are gone, but the American Financial Adviser is still there, collecting for American creditors, and if opposing Haitian factions start cutting each other’s throats with their machetes, [Vincent] may yell for the marines to come and help him protect the money bags.”

Now, another yell is coming from Port-au-Prince. In October, the government of Ariel Henry, Haiti’s de facto prime minister and president, called for a foreign military intervention—“the immediate deployment of a specialized armed force, in sufficient quantity” to stop the street gangs that are terrorizing the population and cutting off access to Haiti’s ports, most crucially the one that receives and stores Haiti’s imports of oil and gas. He did not specify which nation would oversee this armed force. But anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Haitian history—or access to a map—knew the only country he could be referring to.

Vincent never needed to call for the Marines, but in the main Pickens got it right: In the nearly 90 years since that first U.S. occupation ended, U.S. and U.S.-backed forces have remained the most constant factor in Haiti: training and arming Haitian militaries, meddling in elections, and alternately reinstalling and overthrowing Haiti’s leaders. In the last 30 years, U.S. troops have invaded or otherwise intervened in Haiti three times: in post-coup invasions in 1994 and 2004 and to quell feared unrest (which never materialized) after the 2010 earthquake.

In the intervening time, the United States explicitly outsourced its occupations to other countries’ troops: first, a U.N. mission from 1993 to 1997, and then under a mostly Brazilian-led multinational force that controlled Haiti’s streets and rural areas from 2004 to 2019. The latter force, known by its French initials as Minustah, left as its main gifts to Haiti an abandoned generation of children fathered by the U.N. troops and a catastrophic cholera epidemic started by a battalion from Nepal.

Two years after the last U.N. mission left, in July 2021, Haitian President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated at his home in a suburb of Port-au-Prince. Moïse was the hand-picked successor of Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly, a popular singer-turned-right-wing nationalist who became president thanks to the electoral interference of the Obama administration in the post-2010 earthquake election. (Martelly had been allowed to go through to the second round after then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused the sitting president of fraud to benefit his own protégé.) Though the plot that led to Moïse’s assassination remains unsolved, this much is clear: He was killed by a group of gunmen, mostly consisting of Colombians and claiming to be agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Indeed, at least two of them were in fact former DEA informants. A New York Times investigation found evidence that the men may have been looking for a list of drug traffickers Moïse was intending to expose. The Intercept reported that several had received U.S. military training.

By the time of his death, Moïse, with the tacit support of the Trump administration, had allowed Haiti’s already hollowed-out government to effectively collapse around him. There was no functioning parliament or plans to elect one. He had overstayed the end of his constitutional term and was ruling by decree. Gangsters, along with elements of the Haitian police and the reconstituted Haitian army, carried out a series of massacres; a Harvard Law School study detailed “a widespread and systematic pattern that further state and organizational policies to control and repress communities at the forefront of government opposition.”

The most notorious of those gangsters was and is Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, a former Haitian National Police officer and head of a gang consortium that calls itself the “G9 Family and Allies.” (His nickname is said to be an allusion to a penchant for burning his victims.) The Harvard study reported that, in November 2018, armed gangs led by Chérizier carried out a massacre of at least 71 people in the slum of La Saline, raping at least 11 women and destroying 150 homes. According to the study, “In the weeks before the attack, two senior officials from Moïse’s administration, Pierre Richard Duplan and Fednel Monchéry, met with then-police officer and gang leader Jimmy Chérizier alias Barbecue to plan and provide resources for the attack.” (Chérizier has denied any links to the Moïse government.) Further massacres followed.

Moïse’s death left an inescapable power vacuum. Institutionally, it was filled by then-71-year-old Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon who entered politics as part of the coalition that fomented the 2004 coup against the leftist Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Moïse had announced his intention to nominate Henry as his prime minister (the No. 2 role in the Haitian system), but given the lack of a parliament, that nomination was never confirmed. Instead, Henry was installed by press release: an announcement from the so-called Core Group (a consortium of ambassadors headed by the United States, France, and Canada that includes representatives of the United Nations, European Union, and Organization of American States), which called on Henry to form a government—despite his lack of a democratic mandate.

In the streets, the power vacuum has been filled by the gangs, particularly Chérizier’s G9 alliance, which among other things now controls access to the country’s main fuel port. Those gangs are, by necessity, allied with and financed by Haiti’s tiny clique of import-export oligarchs, who use them as muscle to grab territory and settle scores. The exact web of connections and alliances is opaque, for obvious reasons. But when something as profitable as a port is in play, it is not the nearby poor but people at the uppermost echelons of Haitian society who have the most to gain or lose from which areas the gangs control.

It was against that backdrop that Henry’s government requested the foreign force, in its words, “to avoid a complete asphyxiation of the national economy.” The United States responded with, ultimately, a pair of resolutions in the U.N. Security Council. The first, approved by the council last week, authorized a travel ban, asset freeze, and arms embargo against individuals it deems “as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti.” That could include some of Haiti’s oligarchs or politicians, but for now the only person explicitly named in the resolution is Chérizier. This prompted the spectacle of representatives of the world’s most powerful nations, including the United States, Russia, and China, taking a break from arguing over the war in Ukraine to talking about a gang leader named “Barbecue.” It was undoubtedly the highlight of the year for a man who has styled himself as a “revolutionary” and clearly dreams of even greater national power.

The second resolution, which has not yet been approved, proposes “a limited, carefully scoped non-UN mission led by a partner country with the deep, necessary experience required for such an effort to be effective, and whom the United States could find ways to support.” The “non-UN mission” part implies that this would not be a force directed by the U.N. Department of Peace Operations or outfitted in the trademark blue helmets, which have now been thoroughly discredited in Haiti thanks to Minustah’s malfeasance. (Ironically, a resurgence of the cholera epidemic that the U.N. caused, and has since entirely escaped accountability for, is one of the justifications for this new mission.)

The “partner country” is not specified. But it is likely Mexico, which co-sponsored the resolution along with the United States. Why would Mexico want to intervene in Haiti? Well, there has been a major surge in Haitians seeking refuge in or trying to enter the United States through Mexico. In 2021, Haitians became the largest group of asylum-seekers in Mexico, exceeding the number of people trying to flee violence in Honduras and nearly equaling all other sources of asylum-seekers combined.

Late last year, the Biden administration was chastened by a media storm surrounding the arrival of Haitian refugees crossing from the Mexican state of Coahuila to Del Rio, Texas. The Mexican army has been trained, financed, and equipped by the United States under the so-called Mérida Initiative, aimed at ending that country’s ongoing drug wars—which would fit the definition of “deep, necessary experience required for such an effort,” at least from the State Department’s point of view.

But as Michael Paarlberg has argued, the Mérida Initiative is a prime example “of dysfunctional U.S security cooperation arrangements with foreign governments” that foster corruption and violence instead of lessening them. In Mexico’s case, that is likely because it ignores the core U.S. involvement in narcotrafficking: providing a market for drugs headed north and a seemingly unlimited source for the weaponry heading south.

In Haiti—which has its own obvious problems with narcotrafficking—the U.S.-supported rot runs even deeper, to the democratic vacuum that a century of U.S. invasions, occupations, and interference has left in its wake. Sending an armed force to do battle with one Haitian gang and its sponsors may briefly win the de facto government (or Chérizier’s other rivals) access to the fuel port, but it will do nothing to make Haiti a safer or more stable place for its people to live in the medium or long term.

It is not clear when or if the resolution approving an armed force will be taken up by the Security Council. China and Russia have both signaled skepticism about the U.S.-backed mission. Asked for comment, a State Department spokesperson told me: “While we envision this mission would be authorized by the [Security Council], such a mission would rely on voluntary support from the international community, and our draft resolution explicitly asks for contributions of personnel, equipment, and other resources.” Already, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Northland has been dispatched to the Bay of Port-au-Prince, and the United States and Canada have jointly delivered tactical vehicles “and other supplies” to the Henry government.

This will, in effect, just bolster another gang: the clique that Henry currently represents, its allied elites, and whatever loyal faction they favor within the Haitian National Police. In other words, outside force may give a different group access to the fuel port and keep the current clique in relative power a little longer. But it will do nothing to prevent the violence and inequality that rive Haitian society. Only forcing the unpopular and manifestly undemocratic Henry government to share or cede power, preparing the ground for eventual elections and a return to Haitian democracy, and ending a century of destructive U.S. interference in their affairs, will give ordinary Haitians a shot at survival.

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michellelynncangelosi · 2 years

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Is the US military intervention in Haiti a good illustration of such action?

Many countries have participated in the humanitarian world throughout history. The US, France, and Greece are a few of these countries.

It's debatable whether or not the US invasion of Haiti qualifies as a positive example of humanitarian action. Over the years, the United States has conducted a number of invasions of the Caribbean island, each of which has harmed the people of Haiti. Another question is whether or not they are able to address Haiti's security issues.

Haiti was struck by an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.0 in 2010. The nation needs emergency relief as a result of the infrastructural devastation that resulted. Since the earthquake, the US has been the major donor to Haiti, giving more than $5 billion to the nation.

Although some members of Congress have pushed the government to stop backing Prime Minister Ariel Henry, the US still backs the UN's MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. He is charged with murdering President Jean-Bertrand Moise.

Armed gangs have shut off the city's gas reserves in addition to the ongoing pandemic. There is widespread hunger as a result of the considerable increase in fuel prices.

British and French forces participated in humanitarian intervention during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1833). Greece has been governed by the Ottoman Empire for several centuries. In the Peloponnese, a rebellion against the Turkish authorities began in 1821. Greece now has its own independent state as a result of the conflict.

In order to aid the Greek nationalist revolutionaries in their battle for independence, the troops of Britain, France, and Russia intervened. The Ottoman Turkish emperors, who had ruled Greece for a long time, were being overthrown. The Great Powers desired a formal conclusion to the Greek War. They did it as a result of geopolitical considerations. They wanted to stop the Russians from gaining further power in the area.

The Great Powers used humanitarian intervention as a cover for their military objectives. They thought that a Greek-run administration would be more agreeable to the "Allied Sovereigns of Continental Europe" than an Ottoman-run one.

On October 20, 1827, the Ottoman navy was attacked at Navarino (Pulos) by British, Russian, and French warships. They were unable to overpower the Turkish fleet.

A number of nations, including France, have used force militarily to assist in bringing about order in the Central African Republic (CAR). This is a nice illustration of humanitarian involvementmilitarily to assist in bringing about order in the Central African Republic (CAR). This is a nice illustration of humanitarian involvement. When analyzing France's approach to the CAR crisis, there are a number of things to take into account.

A landlocked nation with a population of 4.4 million, CAR is in Africa. Since its independence in 1960, the Central African Republic has seen a lengthy history of violence, including multiple military coups. 85% of the population is Christian, with Muslims making up roughly 15% of the total population. The Muslim community feels quite powerless because successive governments have continued to be dominated by Christians. This provides the revolt with fertile ground.

The violence in CAR has been influenced by a number of causes. The collapse of the state is one of the causes. Most Central Africans now live on the periphery of the state due to years of institutional breakdown, making them prey to rebel organizations. The distribution of humanitarian aid has also been impeded by insecurity.

Regional security is another factor.

There is a history of neighboring nations interfering with CAR politics. For instance, the Seleka rebel organization has long been supported by neighboring Chad. This group is an alliance of Chadian and Sudanese mercenary fighters and rebel organizations.

Due to conflict, about 80 million people have abandoned their homes, resulting in starvation and fatalities. Nearly 1.6 billion people worldwide lack access to even the most basic medical treatment.

Governmental advice is the responsibility of the World Health Organization. Additionally, it collaborates with assistance organizations to make policy suggestions. The U.N. supply chain task group, which offers logistical support to the global response to COVID-19, is also co-chaired by the World Health Organization.

To help the WHO respond to COVID-19, the United Nations Foundation established the Solidarity Response Fund. It takes public donations from all across the world and distributes them to the impacted nations. Kate Dodson, the UNF vice president for global health, is in charge of overseeing its stewardship.

For the populations impacted by forced eviction, overcrowding, and inadequate water and sanitation, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised serious concerns. Significant disparities across nations have also been brought to light.

The delivery of humanitarian aid has changed as a result of the global response to COVID-19. Both national and international organizations now have new prospects thanks to it. Many businesses have repurposed their current products to satisfy COVID-19's requirements. The rate of adaptability, though, has been astounding.

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